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ABSTRACT: 
 
This study aims to explore children’s conceptual development in science. Curricular design is an 
activity that rests on some fundamental assumptions about the organisation of knowledge and 
development of understanding. Presently the National Curriculum for England is organised in a 
manner that assumes sequential learning of scientific concepts: generalised understanding can be 
developed on the basis of established concepts. However there is a distinct lack of any systematic 
literature on the processes behind conceptual development. What little research there has been has 
often shown children’s learning to be piecemeal (e.g. diSessa, 1993). Therefore questions into how 
the mind and cognitive schemata are organised cannot be fully answered without first exploring the 
potential processes behind conceptual change and above all the ways in which related concepts are 
coordinated and interlinked, something that has rarely been the focus of psychological investigation. 
The present study explores young children’s (aged 4-11) ideas about biological phenomena in an 
effort to understand conceptual development using a triple-cohort longitudinal design. Children 
were recruited into 3 cohorts spanning the primary age-range and followed-up a year later so that a 
putative developmental trajectory relating to the understanding of biological concepts could be 
ascertained. Children were assessed using general cognitive and demographic measures. A novel 
interview method was developed to assess children’s biological knowledge. Findings revealed 
children’s understanding to be heavily influenced by biologically-specific language, which may act as 
a mechanism for conceptual change. It was also found that general cognitive abilities and 
demographic factors had very little influence on conceptual change in the domain of naïve biology, 
in contrast to previous research. Finally, children’s knowledge appeared to be more theoretical than 
hypothesised, as related biological concepts were predictive of each other. Given these findings, a 
new model of conceptual organisation and change is proposed.  
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“Try to learn something about everything, and everything about something.” 
-Charles Darwin 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1  
 
1.1 The current picture of science 
 
Trying to understand how children view the world has intrigued curious minds for decades. 
While there has been much progress in our collective understanding of how children acquire 
concepts, there is plenty yet to uncover. These endeavours are important. Towards the 
1980s there was a sudden interest in children’s naïve understanding about the world and 
specific questions were asked about what the content of children’s concepts might be at 
different ages, how these concepts might develop with age, and how they might be 
organised. Indeed the answers to these questions are highly relevant, not just in terms of 
theoretical research but also in terms of the educational implications involved. By knowing 
when a child is cognitively equipped to learn a concept, the mechanism(s) the child employs 
in order to learn it, and how these concepts may go on to influence the development of 
each other into more sophisticated ideas, it is possible to shape teaching methods and 
curricula around this knowledge, and enhance education as a practice.  
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Learning science requires children to think scientifically. This term is usually taken to mean 
two things: firstly, the actual process of scientific thinking e.g. examining evidence and 
problem solving. Secondly, the understanding of phenomena and the mechanisms involved. 
The second definition of scientific thinking encompasses the first and focuses mainly on the 
conceptual understanding and integration of scientific concepts. This is the area that the 
thesis will specifically focus on.  
 
Unfortunately, science is an area that many children struggle to learn and a failure to do so 
can lead to a decline in the number of individuals taking up science related degrees in 
higher education, to the detriment of the national economy (Royal Society, 2010, 2011). The 
failure of many children to adequately learn science has also had a negative impact on 
scientific literacy in the broader population, limiting the capability of people to participate 
meaningfully in debate and decision-making about policy on science and scientific 
developments. 
 
The impact of poor science learning is less well quantified in comparison to the impact of 
poor literacy or mathematics learning. Poor performance in science, literacy, and numeracy 
has been shown to affect economic growth and income (Wilson, 2009). For example, 
Beddington (2008) showed that a failure to address learning difficulties in literacy and 
numeracy leads to poor educational attainment and employment prospects. Bynner and 
Parsons (2005) have shown that in particular, poor numeracy skills are associated with 
higher risk of unemployment, depression, crime, and ill health. Thus, it is evident that 
literacy, numeracy, and science are core areas with which to focus study on, not least in the 
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school curriculum, where these three areas have remained the key focus of comparative 
international assessments (Tolmie, 2012).  
 
Given the huge impact these topics have economically, developing effective pedagogies in 
each of these areas (but science in particular given the lack of research) should be a priority 
and not based on arbitrary principles or political agendas, but rather on sound scientific 
research (Tolmie, 2012; Ghazali, 2015).  
 
Consequently, it becomes necessary to investigate the range of understanding children have 
about certain scientific concepts and how this knowledge might progress i.e. conceptual 
development of scientific concepts. By doing so, researchers will gain a better 
understanding as to why some children have difficulties with science from an early age, and 
investigate whether curricular structure, content, and pedagogy itself could be enhanced to 
promote better grasp of scientific concepts. 
 
The difficulty with this is that conceptual development is an ill-defined concept, which has 
left a lack of consensual agreement amongst researchers about its nature. Many 
researchers have not been overtly clear about what they mean regarding concept 
development or change. Is it the case that all types of concepts change in the same way so 
that as more knowledge is obtained, concepts change using the same system and continue 
to do so? The answer to this question has reached very little consensus among researchers, 
specifically about how initial ideas might develop into more sophisticated concepts. If the 
answer is yes, this would imply that conceptual development and conceptual change are the 
same, when it is not yet clear whether change involves restructuring existing knowledge, 
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and development involves encompassing new concepts into existing knowledge. It may 
even be that the way in which initial concepts are organised goes onto constrain future 
acquisition and organisation of new concepts. Consequently, a failure to address the nature 
of change means that there is not yet adequate evidence to inform theories about the 
mechanisms involved.   
 
Due to these limitations, a definition of conceptual progression is needed. In the past it has 
simply been discussed as the journey between a naïve and rudimentary (perhaps 
incomplete or even inaccurate) understanding of a concept, to a more sophisticated and 
expert-like understanding of the same concept (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988). For example, 
knowing that “plants need sunlight to grow” to the more sophisticated causal/mechanistic 
understanding of “plants need sunlight to allow photosynthesis to occur, enabling the plant 
to function and consequently grow.” As of yet, there have been few attempts to develop a 
principled scheme to measure conceptual change and without this it becomes difficult to 
judge conceptual progression, developmental trends of this progression, and its influencers.  
 
The problem is further accentuated by the fact that what little cross-conceptual (conceptual 
development and progression across multiple concepts) research there has been, is 
suggestive of piecemeal development (e.g. Tolmie, Tenenbaum, & Pino-Pasternak, 2009; 
Gelman & Markman, 1986) and therefore conceptual understanding is unlikely to progress 
in such a straight-forward and linear fashion, contrary to earlier theorising (e.g. Piaget, 
1972). Other work also highlights the fact that young children start school with existing prior 
knowledge and often hold misconceptions that are highly resistant to change (Driver, 
Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985). The fact that children demonstrate existing conceptual 
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knowledge prior to any formal instruction, is something not accounted for by the current 
model of teaching in the United Kingdom (UK). 
 
1.2 The National Curriculum 
 
Curricular design is an activity that rests on some fundamental assumptions about the 
organisation of knowledge and development of understanding. Presently the National 
Curriculum (NC) for England and Wales is organised in a manner that assumes sequential 
learning of scientific concepts so that generalised understanding can be developed on the 
basis of earlier concepts. For instance in Key stage 1 (KS1) children are taught the 
differences between living and non-living things and in Key stage 2 (KS2) they are taught to 
establish causal effects and explain how living things and non-living things work 
(Department for Education; DfE; 2001). However, even if it may seem intuitively reasonable, 
the assumption that seemingly complex concepts can only be understood after acquiring 
simpler ones might be premature due to an overwhelming lack of research. Thus far, the 
majority of research in conceptual change in science has tended to focus on the growth of 
concepts in an isolated fashion, without considering the relationships between them (e.g. 
Carey, 1985; Keil, 1996). Hence, very little is known about the organisational principles that 
might be at work, despite the fact that there is scant evidence for children being tabula rasa 
prior to any formal instruction.  
 
Another issue with regards to current curricular organisation is that assessments of 
academic achievement are also based on these seemingly problematic structures, which 
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have implications for the reliability of current measurements of children’s knowledge. 
Indeed, it may be this very assumption past approaches have taken that has most likely 
driven curricular design and organisation to be based on little more than taxonomic 
structure and evident conceptual precedence typically seen from the viewpoint of the 
expert rather than of the learner, for whom emergent structures of knowledge may be 
organised in different ways. If so, it is possible that curricular content as it stands may not 
be in concordance with the nature of conceptual change both within and between concepts 
in children, and it serves to purpose that the curriculum itself be under scrutiny and possible 
amendment, therefore.  
 
Naturally, political agendas have also contributed to the changes in the current education 
system in England and Wales. The NC has had the merit of ensuring that some attention to 
curriculum planning was taking place, at least at primary level, rather than it being driven 
solely by individual teacher intuition and school resources. However, this has also led to 
some seemingly unwarranted and disruptive changes. More recently, a draft of the 2014 NC 
was released in 2011 and there was much uproar and speculation about the bases for 
drastic changes in curricular topics, after what seemed like a lack of evidence in support of 
these changes. This thesis will only focus on the new primary science curriculum for KS1 and 
KS2, introduced from September 2014, and for reasons that will be enlarged below, 
children’s understanding of biological phenomena in particular.  
 
The weaknesses of design approaches towards examining conceptual understanding of 
scientific phenomena has consequently led to a weak evidence base with which to ground 
the recent changes in curricular content and organisation. In the context of biology, these 
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changes include the introduction of more practical science and investigation to encourage 
scientific thinking in terms of the processes involved in experimental research, the 
introduction of using more scientific terminology from a young age, learning about 
biographies of notable scientists, and perhaps most unexpectedly, the introduction of 
evolutionary concepts in primary school that had only ever been previously taught in 
secondary school. 
 
While basic evolutionary concepts such as variation and inheritance were already on the 
primary curriculum (DfE, 2001), it was not typically until secondary school where evolution 
was formally taught as a module. Although children might already be exposed to 
evolutionary concepts, there is little systematic research in this area to support any views on 
whether teaching evolution at primary school level is wise. In fact, despite a fair amount of 
research around the nature of children’s scientific learning, the outcomes of this research 
have been very fragmented so there is no real basis for informing any wider organisation, or 
indeed the curricular changes for 2014.  
 
In sum, the current structure of the NC might not be matched up to the ways in which 
children understand concepts over time. Exactly how concepts are changing, developing, 
and progressing is currently unknown in any definitive sense. Questions into how the mind 
and cognitive schemata are organised cannot be fully understood without first exploring the 
processes behind conceptual change and above all the ways in which related concepts are 
coordinated and interlinked, something that has rarely been the focus of psychological 
investigation.  
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1.3 Conceptual domains  
 
Researchers have put most effort into understanding initial acquisition and development of 
key areas of learning on the grounds that these are the immediate priority, both 
theoretically and educationally. For instance, the cognitive changes involved in literacy 
development are best understood (e.g. Hulme & Snowling, 2009) followed by numeracy and 
the early stages of arithmetic (e.g. Dowker & Sigley, 2010). Understanding in these areas has 
been used to aid teaching practice, and yet comparable work has not been undertaken in 
the realm of science, with researchers frequently disagreeing about the nature of concept 
formation and concept change. This has led to a seemingly unsystematic approach to 
investigating conceptual development in science in comparison to the work in literacy and 
numeracy (Tolmie, 2012).  Moreover, the work into literacy and numeracy is unable to shed 
light onto the nature of conceptual development in science. The initial development in 
literacy and numeracy is focused to a much greater extent on performance outcomes (e.g. 
Gathercole, Brown, & Pickering, 2003; Alloway, Gathercole, Kirkwood & Elliot, 2008), and 
the conceptual dimensions involved are substantially narrower than is the case in science, 
where any phenomenon requires a distinct conceptual structure.  For example in literacy, it 
involves learning of orthographic/sound relationships, and development of the ability to 
extract meaning from groupings of text (Hulme & Snowling, 2009). For numeracy, 
development involves a grasp of counting procedures and principles, recognition and use of 
symbols, translation between verbal and symbolic formats, and knowledge of number facts 
and calculation strategies (Soltesz, Szucs, & Szucs, 2010). More fundamentally, the 
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underpinning skills and effective pedagogical strategies involved in literacy and numeracy 
are both specific and distinct; hence given the further differences between science and 
these two areas, there is clear implication that science requires separate systematic 
investigation. The organisation and the development of skills and concepts in various areas 
is simply too different, and research into the specificity of conceptual development 
corroborates this (see Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). 
 
 1.4 Conceptual sub-domains 
 
One potential factor that increases the difficulty of understanding conceptual progression in 
science is the broad areas within science itself: chemistry, biology, and physics. Each area 
deals with quite differentiated, complex concepts that are often highly theoretical in nature. 
Therefore it may be unhelpful to assume that conceptual progression in all scientific areas is 
likely to be the same because the nature of conceptual growth might differ according to the 
types of phenomena involved. For instance, understanding in physics can be quite atomistic 
or piecemeal as there is less logical reason for concepts to be connected. The very nature of 
physics is to deconstruct broad concepts into their fundamental principles that are often 
unconnected in character. For example, in state change, there is a basic generalisation for 
ideas about energy, processes, and exhibited physical state across different types of state 
change. However, unless one studies advanced physics, there is little extra information a 
child requires to merge these particular concepts beyond those basic and somewhat 
isolated ideas, hence a need for deep conceptual integration is less likely.  
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In contrast, there has always been recognition of the complex systems involved in biology as 
the very nature of this discipline seeks to take smaller concepts and merge them together to 
understand various phenomena. For example, in a simple concept of plant biology, a child 
may know a plant requires water, sunlight etc. to grow. Thus, biology is an area that focuses 
on combinations of interacting processes, whereas physics is primarily concerned with 
separate, if not additive processes.  
 
For these reasons a focus on biology might be productive, at least initially, in trying to 
understand the nature of conceptual progression in science. The inherent similarities 
between different contexts makes it a better area to look for connections between concepts 
and observe how these influence the growth and development of each other. For example, 
biological concepts such as inheritance are naturally connected to aspects of biodiversity, 
ecology, and even evolution; therefore in terms of trying to examine conceptual integration 
and progression in science, biology is a suitable area to begin investigation because arguably 
more simple concepts of inheritance may be gradually enlarged and built upon to form a 
more complex understanding of something that requires prerequisite knowledge of 
inheritance, such as evolution. Put simply, there is more reason to expect connectedness 
among biological concepts, and so this makes it a better place to begin observation of 
conceptual development and change in comparison to other scientific areas. Principles 
concerning the nature of connections found in biology may not extend to other areas such 
as physics, but these provide at least an initial steer on what to investigate; a finding of 
apparent ‘unconnectedness’ in physics would not serve the same purpose.  
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1.5 Overview of the thesis 
 
The section above outlined the potential benefits of investigating the area of biology, which 
will allow examination of how primary school children, working to the NC for England and 
Wales, are developing related concepts, and how these concepts might change and 
integrate over time. It will also allow examination of past approaches to conceptual change 
research that may have ultimately led to the current taxonomic structure of the NC, which 
in turn will allow closer inspection of the curriculum and areas of potential amendment.  
 
For these reasons, this thesis aimed to examine three main questions with regards to 
children’s biological knowledge, given the current literature:  
1) What can be said about the ways in which children are acquiring initial rudimentary and 
perhaps inaccurate biological concepts (henceforth referred to as naïve biological 
concepts), and how these develop into more sophisticated ones?  
2) How do concepts seem to be structured and organised, and more specifically, what 
constitutes conceptual development in areas of biology in young children? Can a 
principled scheme to measure this be empirically developed? 
3) Are there any other factors, such as environmental or social factors, besides conceptual 
progression alone that influence the conceptual development of children’s biological 
ideas, such as general cognitive abilities? 
 
To address these general objectives, Chapters 2-5 explore the theoretical background to the 
areas outlined above, and lead towards an overview of the more specific research aims.  
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Chapter 2 outlines research into naïve biology in particular where the general focus in the 
past has been on natural kinds and inheritance research with a particular emphasis on 
children’s tendency towards essentialism, which the majority of research into naïve biology 
has been influenced by. Research in other related biological areas to inheritance 
(biodiversity, ecology, and evolution) is discussed before speculating on a route of 
conceptual progression. The potential flaws of previous research paradigms are discussed, 
and alternative plausible explanations are offered to account for past research findings in 
naïve biology including children’s natural predisposition to categorise and observe 
regularity. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the notion of conceptual change and ideas of domain-generality and 
domain-specificity of knowledge. This chapter also introduces the key debates surrounding 
the basis of conceptual development and organisation of conceptual structures of 
knowledge; highlighting the view that knowledge is fragmented, versus the view that 
knowledge is theoretical. Finally, this chapter introduces a possible route towards 
knowledge acquisition where language and collaborative learning appear to be key drivers 
of change.  
 
Chapter 4 specifically deals with alternative theories that move away from the potentially 
flawed essentialist paradigm, starting with statistical learning and categorisation, introduced 
at the end of Chapter 3. The differences between implicit and explicit thought are 
highlighted alongside recent insights from neuroscientific studies to promote views of dual-
route learning models of conceptual change. The possible importance of general cognitive 
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abilities is also discussed by examining research about their importance for literacy and 
numeracy, and their potential influences on science learning, particularly the related role of 
working memory and inhibitory control. Given these insights, the relationship between 
science and numeracy is also considered before examining the role of these influences 
within biology specifically, due to their relevance for systems thinking and the potential 
impact of this on conceptual growth.  
 
Chapter 5 offers a summary and overview of the theoretical background and goes on to 
provide a general overview of the rationale for the proposed research. The key research 
questions will also be discussed followed by a timeline of data collection.  
 
Subsequently, reports on two pilot studies (Chapter 6) are outlined to address the issue of 
defining conceptual advance in an empirical fashion, before the methodology chapter 
(Chapter 7), which describes the triple-cohort longitudinal design. The longitudinal study 
spans two years and tracks children’s understanding and progression of biological concepts 
between cohorts across the primary age-range. Therefore the findings will be explored over 
three results chapters; the first (Chapter 8) outlining findings from the data collected at 
Time 1, and the second (Chapter 9) outlining findings from the data collected at Time 2. The 
final results chapter (Chapter 10) attempts to bring the results from the longitudinal study 
together and discusses statistical models that were constructed in order to map conceptual 
development of biological knowledge across primary school.  
 
28 
Lastly, the discussion Chapters 11 and 12, begin by exploring key points from Chapter 10 in a 
theoretical discussion. This is followed by Chapter 12, which summarises findings with 
regards to educational practise, and explores limitations and future directions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1 Naïve Biology 
 
Chapter 1 highlighted the issues and lack of agreement regarding conceptual organisation 
and the process of conceptual change. The process of concept progression has only been 
explored in limited fashion. Many theorists agree that there is indeed a process of change, 
yet work has typically focused on tracking change in single constructs over a relatively short 
time frame (because of difficulties with designing measures that have wider applicability) 
using cross-sectional methods and no assessment of input. Thus what is currently known 
about conceptual change is somewhat piecemeal and there is no clear consensus about 
what conceptual change actually involves, although there is agreement that it is the 
development of a rudimentary concept into a more sophisticated or complex form. There is 
also agreement on the fact that this development does not always lead to an accurate 
conception. This is discussed further in Chapter 3.   
 
The lack of consensus within research has consequently led to a variety of ideas about how 
children might be acquiring biological concepts. Although children might have fairly 
sophisticated ideas about biological phenomena before any formal instruction, it is not yet 
clear how their prior concepts are influencing any new information they acquire or what the 
nature of conceptual organisation and progression in biology might be. In order to discuss 
what conceptual progression of biological concepts might look like, one must first consider 
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the degree of understanding children aged 4-11 have around aspects of naïve biology. This 
will now be explored. 
 
One of the ways that conceptual change research has been approached is to define the 
different domains of knowledge children have, because appropriate models of the 
organisation of knowledge are required for adequate theorising about conceptual change. It 
has largely been thought that the ways in which children group together a set of 
representations sustaining a specific area of knowledge such as language, number, biology 
etc, is known as a domain (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) describe a 
domain as: 
 
“…A body of knowledge that identifies and interprets a class of phenomena assumed 
to share certain properties and to be of a distinct and general type…functions as a 
stable response to a set of recurring and complex problems…involving difficult-to-
access perceptual, encoding, retrieval and inferential processes dedicated to that 
solution” (p.21).  
 
These domain models of conceptual change widely accept the view that human beings are 
endowed with a set of reasoning abilities or a common set of processes that apply to all 
thought (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). These are typically known as domain-general models 
of cognition. However, there is now the increasing view that many of these cognitive 
abilities are specialised to handle specific types of information such as categorising natural 
kinds etc, and these are known as domain-specific cognition models (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 
1994). Depending on the way children organise and manipulate the information they 
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acquire, knowledge might be theoretical or fragmented. This is still currently an ongoing 
debate in the literature that is still relatively unresolved.   
 
Part of the problem lies in the fact that learning science depends on more than just 
acquiring new information, rather it requires conceptual change (Zaitchick et al., 2013; 
Nersessian, 2003). Simply acquiring facts with age does not necessarily suggest that one is 
able to hold a theoretical understanding. Much of the previous work within the area of 
naïve biology has focused on children’s early or naive ideas about natural kinds and 
inheritance, and has been taken to indicate that children could have fairly coherent 
concepts by age 5 (Springer, 1999). Inheritance describes the passing of traits from parents 
to offspring and is one of the most studied areas in biology. There have been various 
theories offered to account for children’s understanding of inheritance from around age 4 
but by far ideas of essentialism have been most frequent. 
 
2.2 Inheritance and Essentialism  
 
Essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one 
cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity (Gelman, 2003). Essentialism has 
been argued to be a potential early precursor of genetic concepts, and refers to the idea 
that natural kinds contain ‘essences’ of their being which makes them what they are 
(Gelman & Kremer, 1991). The essence therefore gives rise to the observable similarities 
shared by members of a category i.e. children’s understanding about inheritance (Gelman, 
2003).  
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Psychological essentialism, according to Gelman (2009, 2015), is the tendency to believe 
that categories are real, natural, and have a deeper basis and hidden causal essence that 
may or may not be implicit. Gelman, Coley and Gottfried (1994) conclude that essentialism 
stems from a domain-general assumption; children assume that events and features are 
caused and appear biased to search for internal inherent causes.  
 
In fact, many of those who investigate children’s understanding of naïve biology argue that 
children often hold coherent thoughts about biological phenomena and display evidence of 
theoretical thinking. For instance, Keil (1996) demonstrated that children are able to 
understand that characteristic features on their own should not be used to diagnose 
membership in a kind. In one particular study, children were told stories about goats that 
were given vitamin shots when they were born so that they did not appear to look like 
goats, but had white curly coats and said “baa baa.” Children were then asked whether 
these animals were still goats or sheep (see Keil, 1996). It was found that depending on the 
mechanisms responsible for the changes, exactly the same types of characteristics were 
judged either as having no effect on the animal involved or changing it to an entirely new 
kind. For these reasons, Keil argues that children embed their concepts and interpret their 
properties in a variety of connected and theoretical beliefs, ultimately leading to a coherent 
understanding.  
 
It is often the case that essentialist responses from children have been used as evidence of 
coherent biological reasoning, which in turn have been used to provide evidence for a 
domain of naïve biology (Carey, 1985; Altran & Medin, 2001; Soloman, 2002). For example, 
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a study by Gelman (2003) examined children’s inheritance beliefs about gender using a 
nature/nurture task. Children were given a story about an infant girl raised only by men (or 
an infant boy raised only by women) and asked to infer various properties about the boy or 
girl when s/he was 10 years old. When asked whether the boy would play with a truck or a 
tea set, a boy aged five replied: “because boys play with boy things and girls play with girl 
things.” in comparison to a boy aged ten “because usually, since she has a girl brain, she’d 
like to play with a tea set.” (See Gelman, 2003, p.97 for more examples).  These examples 
demonstrate that although the 10-year-old does seem to be alluding to some kind of 
underlying mechanism for why girls like to play with tea sets, for example it may be argued 
that all the 5-year-old is doing is asserting an observable probability and no sense of 
mechanistic understanding is evident here at all and yet the findings from this study were 
taken as evidence of coherent understanding about inheritance, which seems to be a 
grossly overreached conclusion. Therefore, despite some early findings indicating that 
children’s inheritance concepts could be theoretical, it was often the case that early 
methods used to examine this had several issues.  
 
The findings from studies such as Keil’s (1996) have generally stemmed from the consistent 
use of experimental tasks of which, according to Gelman (2015) there are three types: 
inductive projections, transformation, and switch-at-birth tasks. The first is where children 
make sensible projections of newly taught biological properties. For example, Carey (1985) 
demonstrates that when 4-year-old children are taught novel and vague biological 
information such as “a spleen is a round, green thing inside people,” children projected the 
new organ information to other animals with decreasing likelihood from mammals through 
to birds, insects, and worms. These patterns of induction are constrained by children’s 
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existing concepts of animal and living thing, hence learning of novel biological information is 
taking place by linking the new concept to one(s) that children already have basic ideas 
about. The second task, transformation, is the type of task most common in this paradigm. 
For example, Keil (1996) has shown when asking pre-schoolers whether a scientist could 
ever perform a new operation to a toy bird to make it into a real bird, even young children 
thought it was impossible. This, Keil argues, is evidence of a rudimentary understanding of 
inheritance.  
 
Finally, the last task is the “switch-at birth” vignette. Children hear a story where a child or 
animal is adopted from its biological family to a host family that looks dissimilar to the child 
or animal, and children are asked to predict what traits may or may not be inherited by the 
child e.g. temperament, hair colour, weight (Keil, 1996). Gelman (2015) describes another 
variation of this task, which suggests that children think internal organs have causal 
consequences. In this study, children aged 4-7 years were shown heart transplant vignettes 
and asked “if you had X’s heart inside you, would you be meaner?” (Note X is previously 
described as being mean). They found the majority of children said yes in answer to the 
question and took this as evidence to suggest that children have internal essential beliefs.  
 
All of these paradigms that have been outlined so far rely on gathering insights into 
children’s understanding about biological concepts via inference based on bridging together 
their responses to hypothetical scenarios, a potentially problematic strategy. However, 
there is increasing research to suggest that children’s apparent reasoning may be little more 
than a reflection of children’s cultural or behavioural knowledge in the absence of any 
biological causal or mechanistic understanding (Altran, 1987; Soloman, 2002). For example, 
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the language children use during investigations has been taken as evidence of coherent 
knowledge of inheritance, yet often the criteria used to interpret language as coherent are 
abstract, and interpretations may therefore be erroneous (e.g. Gelman, 2003).  
 
It may be that a child holds initial rudimentary thoughts that are un-sophisticated and 
possibly tacit in terms of when inheritance concepts are acquired, for example if children 
are acquiring perceptions of co-varying regularities in the environment and thus are gaining 
some implicit knowledge about particular biological phenomena. Hence a young child may 
have no real sense of inheritance other than the patterns of observed regularity in the 
environment making it highly probable that organisms give birth to the same kind (perhaps 
with some degree of individual variation). However past research has all too often focused 
on children’s understanding of interspecies variation when inheritance covers more than 
just knowing species run true. It covers a whole host of sub-concepts that relate to growth, 
genetics, and intra-species level variation, which naturally relate to ideas around 
biodiversity, ecology, and evolution.  
 
This is further accentuated by the large body of work around inheritance where the essence 
of an organism gives rise to observable similarities shared by members of the same category 
(Carey, 1985; Gelman, 2003 p.7; Shtulman, 2010; Gelman, 2015), or in other words, allows 
the child to understand interspecies variation.  
 
However, the very nature of essentialism means children will assume members of a species 
are alike so by default should fail to understand variation of members within a species 
(Shtulman & Shultz, 2008). Indeed it is exactly the idea of intra-species diversity that the 
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body of research following the essentialist paradigm has somewhat ignored. In fact, if one is 
ever to understand how children’s concepts are progressing, knowing that species run true 
is not the helpful part of the concept because it only captures biodiversity at the 
interspecies level whereas the crucial element is the significance of individual variation 
within a species.  
 
This also has obvious consequences if we consider basic evolutionary ideas about successive 
adaptation. A child must be able to grasp that individuals within a species adapt to their 
environment and this perpetuates over time, otherwise a thorough understanding of 
evolution will fail to be achieved (Shtulman, 2012). The consequences of this, therefore, are 
that inheritance concepts may actually be less accurate in a scientific sense than previously 
thought. The key point to note is the difference in children’s conceptual development 
between inter- and intra-species variations, which has scarcely been investigated if at all. 
Thus what is needed is a methodology that is sufficiently sensitive to grasp both types of 
diversity, as this will allow one to investigate routes of developmental progression against 
other biological phenomena. Shtulman and Schultz (2008) suggests that knowing a species’ 
identity and categorising it allows us to determine where the organisms should live, for 
instance categorising an organism as a fish, means also knowing that it must live in water, so 
in this sense categorisation is driving knowledge about habitat and ecology, which may then 
in-turn constrain the idea further to allow children to subsequently understand certain 
habitats, such as fresh water, are home to certain types of animals, such as salmon, building 
up a larger web of connected knowledge related to key initial inheritance concepts (Assaraf 
& Orion, 2007., Hipkins et al., 2008).  
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2.2.1 Current work in inheritance 
 
As stated earlier, more recent work is starting to support the idea that children’s concepts 
around inheritance and other biological phenomena might be less theoretical than 
previously thought, even among older children. In one study (Williams, 2012) children’s 
knowledge about two connected naïve inheritance concepts were explored using a modified 
version of the phenotypic similarity task (where participants predicted and explained 
feature outcomes in both an offspring and a sibling). In the second task, participants offered 
explanations for instances of parent-offspring dissimilarity and grandparent-offspring 
resemblance (phenotypic difference task). Findings revealed significant age trends between 
4-10 years in naïve inheritance concepts. However, there was little consistency in children's 
inheritance explanations within or across tasks, indicating fragmented ideas on ostensibly 
related phenomena.  This suggests that it is possible for children to hold accurate 
knowledge, however without understanding how or why things are as they are, they cannot 
be thinking about biological phenomena in a theoretical manner.  
 
Similarly work by Williams and Smith (2010) found that although children’s (aged 4-14) 
inheritance knowledge became more consistant and accurate over time, children still failed 
to explain this knowledge, even at 14 years. This study specifically sought to examine the 
effects various tasks have on children’s inheritance knowledge as if children’s knowledge 
was truly coherent, different tasks should not invoke different responses. Three different 
types of task were used to examine the effect that task had on children’s inheritance 
knowledge. These were: a modified adoption task (children were required to distinguish 
traits inherited by between biological and social parentage), a causal mechanisms task 
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(investigating children’s preference for various mechanisms of inheritance), and a family 
relatedness task (children were required to provide judgements on the relatedness of family 
members and explain these judgements). The study found that children were able to 
demonstrate increasingly good knowledge in kinship judgement and phenotypic similarity 
tasks, but when given a task requiring children to explain causal mechanisms, there was 
significant variability in children’s understanding with children having either partial, 
inaccurate, or no knowledge in this area, even at age 14.  
 
 The results from this study illustrate how the onset of inheritance concepts can be very 
complex, as others (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Siegal & Peterson, 1999) have also found. It 
may be that children have early concepts that are implicit (see Medin & Altran, 1999; 
Wellman & Gelman, 1992) that later undergo conceptual re-organisation and change to 
become explicit concepts. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.  
 
The findngs from Williams and Smith (2010) highlighted that younger children’s concepts 
are tied to a particular task where some inheritance concepts were explained via social 
terms e.g. in the famly relatedness task, and others were explained via biological terms e.g. 
the adoption and causal mechanisms task. This indicates that younger children appear to 
treat a variety of tasks differently and employ different aspects of their inheritance 
knowledge, ultimately suggesting that it has a fragmented structure. This changes 
somewhat by age 14 where adolescents demonstrated consistent reasoning across all tasks. 
Williams and Smith (2010) explain these findings by suggesting that adolescents’ implicit 
knowledge has become refined and allows them to recognise similarities across tasks 
investigating the same underlying biological phenomenon (inheritance through genetics). 
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This implies that inheritance concepts become more theory-like with age but initially, are 
very fragmented.  
 
This finding of incoherence and fragmentation is consitent with children’s other biological 
concepts  such as life and death (Slaughter, Jaakkola & Carey, 1999) and illness (Myant & 
Williams, 2005; Williams & Binnie, 2002). Interestingly however, there was not always 
consistency in adolescents’ inheritance explanations, hence although they can demonstrate 
inheritance knowledge in all tasks, they did not always verbalise this in open-ended 
questions, perhaps because few children had a detailed grasp of genetics to offer sufficient 
explanations of inheritance. Thus these findings are again at odds with those who suggest 
conceptual development is a process of theory change (e.g. Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).  
 
As well as examining whether or not children have the same inheritance concepts across 
different tasks, research from the field of science education has also demonstrated that 
children have multiple concepts for one scientific phenomenon and that these different 
concepts might be employed depending on the type of context (Engel, Clough & Driver, 
1986). Hence it becomes reasonable to assume that the same may also be true for biological 
concepts such as inheritance, where chidren’s ideas may appear more coherent in particular 
contexts than in others, resulting in researchers to hold differing opinions about the true 
nature of children’s understanding.  
 
diSessa (1988) argues that children’s inheritance concepts may be tied to particular task 
contexts because they may be contextually rooted in personal experience. Hallden (1999) 
also supports this idea and suggests that this may lead younger children who have less 
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knowledge of inheritance to use both biological and social concepts of inheritance 
interchangeably (which is something that Carey (1985) also found in her research) 
depending on the task used to examine children’s knowledge. It follows then that older 
children who have acquired more explicit inheritance knowledge start to use this knowledge 
consistently in their reasoning and are less susceptible to changes in context i.e. knowledge 
begins as fragmented but may become more theoretical with age and increasing 
experience. This may also lead to more consistent reasoning about inheritance-related 
phenomena with increasing age too (Williams & Smith, 2010).  
 
The more recent work described above not only aids our understanding about whether 
children employ different concepts in different task settings, but it helps to answer the 
wider questions of what the true nature structure of children’s knowelge is: theoretical or 
fragmented. Although past work indicated that children’s concepts are theory-like and 
cohesive in structure (Gopnick & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Slaughter & 
Gopnik, 1996) recent work has highlighted the constraining aspects of judgements tasks 
that do not allow for a full examination of children’s reasoning and understanding. Instead, 
recent work that has tried to consider this illustrates that children’s concepts are 
fragmented and relatively uncoordinated in structure initially (Williams, 2012; Williams & 
Smith, 2010; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; diSessa, 1988). At what point children’s knowledge 
starts to become theoretical is therefore still unanswered.  
 
However, something that is still relatively unexplored in the literature is the effect 
theoretical or fragmented inheritance knowledge might have on other related biological 
concepts. This is important to investigate because if knowledge is theoretical as has been 
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argued in the past then children should be able to use this knowledge to also explain other 
biological concepts. However if knowledge is more fragmented as recent work is beginning 
to show, it is likely that children’s knowledge is piecemeal across all platforms and therefore 
investigating how and when integrated knowledge comes about is of great importance for 
educators.  
 
2.2.2 Related biological constructs:  
 
Assessing naïve biology requires careful consideration given the fact that past research has 
often selected biological concepts arbitrarily. Inheritance is a key area that has always been 
a focus and it is also a concept that is formally taught in primary school. Given some of the 
more recent research around inheritance, it seems sensible to assess children’s knowledge 
of this concept using an unbiased and robust methodology that makes use of more in-depth 
techniques than phenotypic similarity/dissimilarity tasks to form a useful comparison of 
previous work with which to contribute towards the debate about conceptual development. 
Likewise, in order to assess progression of inheritance concepts and examine the range of 
children’s understanding on a variety of related concepts, it seems wise to review concepts 
that are logically related to inheritance and are also part of the NC (DfE, 2014) for primary 
science. Only then will we be closer in understanding the true nature of conceptual 
progression in the domain of biology.  
 
Inheritance, biodiversity, and ecology are topics that are currently taught in the NC in KS1 
and KS2, which are logically related to inheritance concepts also and yet, have never been 
investigated thoroughly in the same context. Although evolution is a concept that was not 
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covered by the previous NC (DfE, 2001), the current curriculum (DfE, 2014), includes 
evolutionary concepts as part of the KS2 primary science syllabus and so its investigation 
would be timely. These four constructs (inheritance, biodiversity, ecology, and evolution) 
provide a logical set of ideas to explore the developmental path of concept formation based 
around inheritance, which has already been fairly well established in the literature. These 
constructs1 are explored in more detail in the section below.   
 
Biodiversity:  
Biodiversity is a term used to describe the variety of life in the world or within a particular 
habitat or ecosystem. It is a less well-articulated idea in the research in comparison to 
inheritance, and little is known about the possible routes of progression in biodiversity 
concept development. The existence of diversity is typically directly evident to children 
simply from observing the world around them and thus implies perceptual registration as 
the start point in conceptual development. This is because early rudimentary concepts 
about diversity within a particular environment are likely to be based around taxonomy and 
categorisation. Taxonomy deals with the description, identification and classification of 
organisms and this is naturally linked to categorisation, which only refers to the latter. An 
established body of research already implies children have a natural tendency to categorise 
and so taxonomy is likely to be grasped fairly early on in development (Krombaβ & Harms, 
2008; Snaddon, Turner & Foster, 2008).  
 
                                                     
1
 Note that henceforth ‘constructs’ refers to only inheritance, biodiversity, ecology, and evolution either 
collectively or individually.  
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Of course biodiversity covers a broad range of sub-concepts, which go beyond simple 
taxonomy and categorisation. However what taxonomy and categorisation allow is the 
recognition of differences in diversity in the environment and perpetuation of these 
differences: for example, knowing biological creatures are different from other things and 
that biological entities give birth to the same kind. By naturally recognising this, it follows 
that children’s early ideas around biodiversity are also likely to be linked to those of 
biological inheritance, and yet this is something that research thus far has failed to 
acknowledge on any solid terms.  
 
The basis of acquiring coherent inheritance concepts may result from the fact that 
inheritance and growth are part of everyday discourse and are observable phenomena. For 
example, parents frequently comment on the resemblance of their children to themselves 
(Hyde & Linn, 2006). This, perhaps implicitly, endorses essentialist views about inheritance 
in the absence of any sophisticated biological knowledge, as Carey (1985) claims. If taken to 
be true, the same must also stand for biodiversity concepts: grouping animals based on their 
observable similarities (i.e. taxomy, a key aspect of biodiversity) is something children do 
very well from a young age as described earlier (Springer, 1999; Keil, 1986; Keil, 1987; Altran 
& Medin, 2001; Bang, Medin, Altran. 2007) and therefore there is reason to suspect 
children’s knowledge of biodiversity might be better than their knowledge of inheritance, at 
least initially.  
 
Additionally, Schtulman and Schultz (2008) suggest that knowing a species’ identity and 
categorising it allows one to determine where organisms should live because children’s 
categorisations would have been formed based on observations and clustering related 
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concepts about related organisms. In this sense categorisation is driving knowledge about 
context, which may then in turn constrain the idea further by essentially forcing children to 
attend to relevant and associated pieces of acquired knowledge. This is in line with work by 
Almeida and colleagues (2013). 
 
Conversely, Inagaki and Hatano (2008) claim that children acquire new information about 
other biological properties of organisms by anthropomorphising; first comparing the 
organism to humans, and then projecting this onto the organism. Carey (1985) stresses the 
importance of animism being semantically and conceptually different for young children, so 
much so that they tend to rely on concepts related to psychological properties than 
biological ones. For example, when asking children “what is a heart for” they would often 
provide a psychological response (e.g. for loving) rather than a biological one (e.g. pumping 
blood around the body for survival). Interestingly, animistic tendencies such as these do not 
pose a problem for biodiversity concepts, because it is children’s ability to categorise related 
things together. However, note that with the latter a concept of inheritance is required.  
 
In this regard, not only is biodiversity a potential start point for routes of conceptual 
progression in biology (because of the early categorisation tendencies of children) but it is 
also interwoven into other concepts such as inheritance and ecology (Assaraf & Orion, 2007; 
Hipkins et al, 2008). It is precisely this interconnectedness that past research has failed to 
engage with and so nothing is yet known about the expected trajectories of developmental 
progression in these areas. 
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Ecology: 
Ecology is the scientific study of interactions among and between organisms and their 
physical environments. The idea of interdependence is a key feature of the definition. This 
includes knowledge on the relationships between organisms but also the environment; 
abiotic (non-living factors: water, temperature, food etc) and biotic (living) factors. Ecology 
is organised under many levels of interaction with individual sub-concepts that need to be 
linked in order to have a complete understanding. For example, in order to understand the 
concept of ‘ecosystem’ (all the organisms that live in a place along with the physical 
environment), one must first have prior knowledge of 1) species (organisms that can grow 
and produce fertile offspring) that live in the same area to form 2) a population, and that 
different populations can live in the same area to form 3) a community which, when 
interacting with the physical environment, forms an ecosystem (Jordan & Duncan, 2009). 
Thus logically, one would predict that different levels of ecological concepts are acquired at 
various ages because of the implied differences in complexity.  
 
A study by Hipkins, Bull, and Joyce (2008) examined children’s ideas about ecological 
phenomena through an interactive drawing task. They found that children would often 
provide answers to the researcher’s questions using psychological reasoning e.g. “the 
animals will try to all get along (if they live in the same place)” child aged 8, p.74. Thus Carey 
(1985) argues that although the domains of naïve psychology and naïve biology are 
separable, a domain of biology arises out of a domain of psychology because prior to 
holding accurate biological ideas, children have acquired more by way of psychological 
information. It is only when enough biological information has been acquired and children 
start to favour biological explanations over psychological ones, that domain of biology is 
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established. In fact findings by Williams and Smith (2010) also support the idea of children’s 
knowledge becoming increasingly biological with age. 
 
Lewis, Driver, Scott and Wood-Robinson (1997) investigated children’s (aged 5-16 years) 
ideas about ecology and found that the majority of children held inconsistent concepts. 
When asked about various ecological phenomena, children not only held different ideas, but 
also provided different explanations of the same idea depending on the context they were 
referring to. Williams and Smith (2010) found similar results relating to inheritance 
knowledge although arguably Lewis et al (1997) found more fragmentation in children’s 
ecological knowledge. It may be that children often only have 'social' ideas with which to 
ground their knowledge when a lack of any scientific concepts are available, and as Hipkins 
and colleagues (2008) say, even though the explanation the child provided is psychological, 
they have still grasped the basic idea of an ecosystem.  
 
Hence, it may be that with a lack of scientific understanding children rely on the domain of 
psychology to fill in the gaps and in doing so, promote their understanding of a concept. 
Thus while Carey (1985) might be right in that children develop a biological domain out of a 
psychological domain, one would suggest that the domain of biology is simply less scientific, 
overlapping with a domain of psychology, and later goes on to develop more strongly into a 
domain of scientific biology (Zaitchik et al., 2013). If accurate, the fact that children 
frequently anthropomorphise would imply that children do not display theoretical 
understanding, but have naïve ideas which seem fragmented by default (because they are 
not theoretical but based on overextension), and have concepts that are generally a result 
of biases.  
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Similarly, research by Grotza and Basca (2003) indicates that context is highly important 
when it comes to assessing the theoretical nature of children’s ideas. They found that 
children who demonstrated theoretical understanding of ecological concepts in secondary 
school tended to have more prior experience with the particular context being assessed 
than those who did not. Hence the researchers highlighted the importance of familiarity and 
context in promoting more globalised concepts about causality and concluded that in 
general, children’s ideas are likely to be fairly piecemeal without relevant contextual 
knowledge. This is further supported by work from Almeida, Vasconcelos and Strecht-
Ribeiro (2013) who found that children’s past experience of ecosystems were generally in 
more managed and controlled environments e.g. parks/zoos rather than natural or semi-
natural environments e.g. forests. However they note that children’s lack of experience of 
natural environments does not seem to exert any negative influence on their non-
anthropocentric reasoning, suggesting any type of experience or exposure is generally 
helpful for children to develop ecological concepts.  
 
Ideas about ecology need to be fractionated into different elements because a young child is 
unlikely to have the cognitive capacity to deal with or to understand all of the components 
of this broad construct as Grotzer & Basca (2003) argue. By separating the large number of 
ecological sub-elements one is able to assess what kinds of concepts are understood when 
and what other types of knowledge will influence this.  Sander, Jelemenská, and Kattmann 
(2006) found that secondary school children refered to generally consistent properties 
which are visible in the everyday environment and that their knowledge of ecological 
processes was far worse. They argue therefore, that the scientific conceptions of ecosystem, 
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imbalance and the dynamics of biodiversity would be difficult for children to understand. 
For a better understanding, the dimensions of both space and time should be included in 
curricular design. For instance, ecology encompasses the idea that species eventually adapt 
to their habitats over time, thus an understanding of inheritance is presumably required to 
recognise the possibility of successive adaptation over generations to further conceptualise 
the idea that the environment and organisms are all interconnected in some way to form 
part of our ecosystem. Of course, this would also feed into basic ideas about evolution. 
 
Evolution: 
Evolution is the process by which different kinds of organisms are thought to have 
developed and diversified. Evolution covers a wide range of complex concepts but Shtulman 
and Shultz (2008) define two branches: micro-evolutionary concepts including inheritance, 
variation, and adaptation, and macro-evolutionary concepts including speciation, 
domestication, and extinction. It is certainly the case that knowledge about evolution would 
apparently require prerequisite knowledge of inheritance, biodiversity, and ecology to be 
fully understood. In addition there seems to be a fine line between biodiversity and 
evolution when notions of adaptation to the environment are considered. A key difference, 
as has been suggested by many (e.g. Sander et al., 2006) appears to be the temporal 
dimension to evolution that may make macro-evolutionary concepts, which are usually 
taught in KS3 and KS4 (DfE, 2011), harder to grasp. 
 
Interestingly, Maurice-Nelville and Montangero (1992) shy away from any ‘evolutionist’ 
terms and choose instead to refer to the kind of integrative thinking involved: diachronic 
thinking. They use this term with reference to the ability to construct a series of connected 
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concepts over a temporal axis, which they argue can only occur between the ages of 8-12 
due the level of cognitive processing required. Their study examined children’s ability to 
understand forest disease as the disease progressed over time, to eventually be able to 
reconstruct it, and specifically observe the point at which relatively piecemeal concepts 
about the disease become integrated into a series of connected ideas about forest disease 
evolution. This line of investigation is directly linked to the current understanding of 
evolution in the present research, because the interest is in children’s understanding of 
inheritance turning into a more sophisticated and integrated concept when understood over 
time.  
 
There is virtually no research on the development of evolutionary concepts among primary 
school children presumably because any work conducted using the essentialist paradigm by 
default fails to consider aspects of intra-species variation which is a key element to 
understanding natural selection, the mechanism behind evolution.  In this sense, a 
methodology that captures all the sub-elements in relation to inheritance concepts is likely 
to help gauge the nature and structure of children’s knowledge, which past studies have so 
far failed to capture.  
 
The majority of the research about children’s understanding of evolution has been among 
secondary school children, and this has largely focused on teleogical reasoning. There has 
been a wealth of research suggesting children have a teleological bias in the way they think 
about biological phenomena. To have a teleological bias is to believe that category features 
exist for some purpose and is most commonly found amoung research into children’s ideas 
about evolution. For instance, the idea that giraffes evolved long necks in order to reach 
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food on high trees, in other words the effortful action on behalf of the giraffe is a 
teleological belief (Keleman, Emmons, Schillac, & Ganea, 2014). Reasoning about categories 
is informed by how people make sense of the world; this explains why children have 
nuanced categorisations (Keil, 1999; Hirshfield & Gelman, 1994). For example, Keleman 
(2004) and Evans (2001) have argued that students learning about Darwinian evolutionary 
theory frequently display a teleological bias, believing that entities must evolve for a 
purpose. These findings are even true among expert scientists, though only under speeded 
conditions (Keleman, Rottmann & Seston, 2013) corroborating the findings of Shtulman and 
Valcarcel (2012) who demonstrated the retention of naïve theories among adults.  
 
Interestingly, Ojalehto, Waxman, and Medin (2013) suggest that teleological reasoning may 
instead reveal an understanding or belief of perspective relationships in which nature is an 
ecological connected web. For example, the relationship between trees and birds could be 
considered as “well if you’re a bird, trees are for providing homes, food, or shade” (p.7), 
hence if there is a purpose for the existence of trees, that must be it. This kind of reasoning 
may then also account for children’s understanding about organism and habitat 
relationships and other related evolutionary and ecological ideas, thus such a form of 
reasoning might not be naïve but instead take account of how causal systems function in a 
more global fashion, thus implying coherent and theoretical beliefs.  
 
Despite young children demonstrating coherent and theoretical ideas about biological 
phenomena as some would suggest (e.g. Gelman, 2003, 2009; Carey, 1985), it is still the 
case that children’s level of understanding is highly unlikely to reach the same level of 
understanding to that of an adult’s (Piaget, 1970), especially given adults’ vastly greater 
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experience. Also, these findings have been obtained from research into secondary school 
children. As was described earlier, there is reason to believe primary school children may 
struggle to understand more macro-evolutionary concepts given the temporal axis 
(Maurice-Nelville & Montangero, 1992; Grotzer & Basca, 2003; Sander et al., 2006; 
Keleman, Emmons, Schillac, & Ganea, 2014) but may find some of the micro-evolutionary 
concepts easier. Regardless, the research indicated that children are likely to have limited 
knowledge and understanding int his area, consequently resulting in teleological biases.   
 
Moving on, a way forward in examining the nature of conceptual progression in the domain 
of biology would be to investigate a range of related concepts in an in-depth fashion. 
Findings obtained from earlier work describing theoretical or coherent concepts in young 
children often made use of constrained paradigms and in some cases, flawed methods. 
More recent work in this field has begun to use more robust methods and consequently 
showing children’s ideas to be more fragmented than initially thought. The key messages 
from this recent work suggest that children can hold fairly detailed factual knowledge about 
biological phenomena, without having much understanding about the causal or mechanistic 
processes behind them. Hence, children’s factual knowledge might be a result of the fact 
that they are naturally able to make probabilistic judgements from their environment, and 
successfully categorise information. These ideas are explored below. 
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2.3 Probabilistic judgements 
 
Probabilistic judgements would also explain results from essential paradigms. A lack of 
biological knowledge about a particular phenomenon, may force children to rely on 
teleological, animistic, and essentialist assumptions. The progressive change from social to 
biological reasoning lends some support to Carey’s (1985) thinking that a domain of biology 
may arise out of a domain of psychology. On the other hand a young child is obviously not 
taught complex, mechanistic, causal biological explanations about different phenomena and 
researchers cannot expect to judge children’s reasoning as such. A child’s knowledge about 
inheritance at age 5 for example, cannot be thought to be framed in terms of causal 
biological reasoning because children at that age are not formally taught about genetics, 
sexual reproduction, or cell biology. For this reason when young children are asked about 
phenomena of which the causal mechanisms are unknown, they can only offer explanations 
using knowledge that they have available to them (e.g. Grotzer & Basca, 2003; Sander et al., 
2006), and in a case where there is a lack of knowledge, children are susceptible to biases 
(e.g. Evans, 2001; Keleman, Emmons, Schillac, & Ganea, 2014). 
 
This could be in effect what Carey (1985) describes: children know that species run true 
from direct observation, though they may not describe it in this way, and as they have a lack 
of the scientific knowledge and indeed language (scientific or otherwise) available to them, 
they may describe the process somewhat inaccurately in an effort to capture the weight of 
probability. However, the exact nature of knowledge and therefore conceptual 
development is still not captured by this. This is in part due to a lack of research 
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investigating related and in-depth understanding of biological phenomena, but also in part 
due to a failure to move beyond theuse of highly constrained paradigms that may push 
children into seeming to say more than they really understand such as the phenotypic 
similarity task. For example, if children are using a certain means of causal reasoning then 
they should be using it to explain biological phenomena regardless of the types of 
questioning.  
 
For example, Strevens (2000) notes that children are not necessarily committed to the view 
that essences underlie the laws of inheritance. He hypothesises that although children 
might believe that ‘something’ about a squirrel causes it to eat bugs, there is not sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the strength of this inference might be greater if the ‘something’ 
was an essence. Hence it could merely be depicting a pattern of statistical inference 
(Strevens, 2000). In support of this, recent studies have examined the extent to which young 
children’s judgements conform to probabilistic models and found that children are quite 
capable of detecting patterns, which lead them to infer causal relationships from the age of 
two.  
 
Schulz and colleagues (2007) looked at children’s ability to learn causal structures from the 
outcome of a series of interventions using a novel toy; an electronic detector with two pegs 
which would activate when a particular set of coloured gears were placed on the pegs. In 
one study, children were also shown pictures of a set of gears and that were explained to 
them e.g. “The picture shows that yellow is pushing green. Yellow makes green go.” Children 
were then able to manipulate the gears and at the end of the trials they were asked to 
select the picture that showed how the toy was working. In the second study children were 
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told how the toy was working and were asked to predict causal outcomes following 
manipulations. The final study allowed the child to figure out how the toy worked for 
themselves. The series of studies provided evidence that pre-schoolers aged 24 months 
were able to accurately identify patterns of evidence from the interventions allowing them 
to learn the causal structure of events, and in turn allow them to predict the outcome of 
novel interventions. However the ability to detect patterns of regularity does not 
necessarily equate to a mechanistic understanding, even of a rudimentary kind, and if 
children are led into saying something, they may simply be trying to express their sense of 
observed regularity. 
 
2.4 Categorisation 
 
The tendency for children to make probabilistic judgements also connects with their 
tendency to categorise this information. The ‘Quinnian’ (Quine, 1960) theory of 
categorisation is that learning about natural kinds comes through only a few examples in 
one’s environment in a trial-and-error manner. Quine describes this as the ‘problem of 
induction’. Children expect objects to belong to a kind and generate generic categorisations 
based on that. Labels are strong identifiers of kind (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015) and so it 
is likely that the increasing use of language would also aid this tendency.  
 
It is apparent that the paradigms used to test children’s notions of inheritance often involve 
unrealistic and over-simplistic scenarios. For example Keil (1996) showed young children 
pictures of animals and told them about transformations doctors made altering the 
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characteristics of these animals, such as a tiger having its fur bleached and a mane sewn on 
so that it resembled a lion. Children were then asked if the animal became a lion or was still 
a tiger and the findings showed that young children maintained that the animal’s identity 
would not change.  The reason this seems to succeed as a paradigm might simply be 
because it abides by the rules of causal laws connecting category membership. Indeed a 
large body of research has demonstrated that children are naturally good at categorisation 
from a very early age with some suggesting that even new-borns display primitive 
categorisation abilities (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001) therefore indicating that children’s 
knowledge of biodiversity may develop the earliest (Krombaβ & Harms, 2008; Snaddon et 
al., 2008).  
 
Categorisation ability is important because the way children group items together influences 
the way they learn about the relationships between items and how this knowledge might be 
generalised. Studies suggest children as young as 3 months are able to make distinctions 
between domestic cats, tigers, dogs, and birds (Younger & Fearing, 1999). This exhibits how 
children are naturally making broad distinctions between animal categories and could 
explain why in the case of biodiversity and inheritance concepts children are able to 
understand the maintenance of identity (Krombaβ & Harms, 2008).  
 
Gelman (2015) argues that children’s knowledge about transformation does not stem from 
perceptual experiences such as observing regular patterns in the environment; however the 
experimental examples are sound evidence that children’s early knowledge of this kind 
would be purely perceptual (e.g. Keil, 1994). Likewise, and perhaps more convincingly, 
switched-at-birth tasks work cross-culturally with animals but not across social categories 
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like gender (Gelman, 2015). These tasks take the idea that off-spring of one or more animals 
(including humans) are switched at birth and raised by a different type of animal; the child is 
then asked to decide whether off-spring will grow up to be the same as its biological parents 
or adoptive parents. Differences in categorisation between adults and children have also 
been shown in these tasks. For instance, Rhodes and Gelman (2009) investigated whether 
children shared adults’ intuitions that categories vary across cultural contexts and found 
they did not. Indeed, animals are observable phenomena whilst social categories are 
arguably not, which would imply children are able to make probabilistic judgements about 
the former but not the latter. Hence, essentialist tendencies may be indicative of 
probabilistic judgements.  
 
It may be that the status of research paradigms currently are so constrained, either by using 
limited methods or exploring limited topic, that they have simply led children to provide 
coherent-like answers and talk about something of which they have no real grasp, other 
than a natural tendency to categorise. Perhaps children are simply demonstrating their 
efforts to capture the force of strong patterns of association that they have observed in the 
environment, and a tendency to tacitly assume, without any particular mechanism being 
inferred, that these reflect causal laws connecting natural kinds and their observable 
properties. In reality, it may be that children know very little to begin with and that their 
concepts are more fragmented as been shown more by recent research (e.g. Williams & 
Smith, 2010; Williams, 2012). The consequences of this will be explored further in Chapter 
4. 
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2.5 Summary  
 
In sum, much of the research into children’s naïve ideas about biology has largely focused 
on concepts of inheritance. Studies that investigated this in the past argued that children 
have coherent and in some cases theoretical understanding of inheritance concepts by age 
4. However, more recent work is showing another picture, that of fragmented 
understanding of inheritance.  It has been suggested that the reason children seemed to be 
demonstrating coherent understanding in the past was because of their tendency to 
observe their natural environment and make probabilistic judgements and categorisations 
in rather constrained paradigms. In a sense these tendencies are simple heuristics (which 
may or may not be intentional) that occur as a result of perceptual information. Given that 
past work only ever looked at children’s surface knowledge, the impression was that of 
coherence, when in reality children have very little understanding because this, as has been 
found with recent work in the fields of inheritance (e.g. Williams, 2012) and other related 
areas like ecology (e.g. Sander et al., 2006), biodiversity (Snaddan et al., 2008), and 
evolution (Shtulman, 2006). 
 
Indeed the early research paradigms used to investigate children’s naïve ideas of inheritance 
are amenable to more simple interpretation: they reflect probabilistic judgements and 
categorisation. Therefore, in order to fully comprehend how children are learning naïve 
ideas about inheritance, we ought to use a more robust and unbiased paradigm that uses 
these two variables, and not essentialism, as the point of departure.  
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Similarly, in order to understand conceptual change in naïve biology, other related concepts 
to inheritance such as biodiversity, ecology, and evolution should also be tested in order to 
see how knowledge in one area might influence knowledge in another, in order to observe 
the points at which isolated biological knowledge might be incorporated and integrated. 
This becomes particularly important if it is the case that children’s understanding is 
fragmented because establishing a sequence of conceptual development would enhance 
teaching practices and curricula considerably.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
3.1 Conceptual Change  
 
Research in the fields of education and psychology has shown that children enter school 
with existing ideas about how the world works and that these prior conceptions are 
resistant to change in certain contexts (particularly those relating to more socially 
prominent phenomena to a greater extent) despite not being fully developed or accurate 
(Driver et al., 1985; Howe, 1998). Studies have also demonstrated that the misconceptions 
children have are often very resistant to change, even when children are provided with 
explicitly contradictory, although accurate, information (Howe, Tolmie & Sofroniou, 1999; 
Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003). This phenomenon poses a problem for effective instruction; 
it becomes important to understand how children are acquiring and organising knowledge 
and how this ultimately leads to conceptual change and progression.  
 
Kuhn (1962) introduced the notion of conceptual change to indicate how concepts are 
embedded within a theory and can change alongside any alteration of the theory itself. 
Specifically, Kuhn (1962) argues that the process of concept change occurs as a result of an 
accumulation of anomalies and a resulting crisis, which essentially drives forward a change 
in the conceptual structure. Although this is a philosophical perspective, it could still relate 
to science learning in children by comparison. Indeed, conceptual change has been 
recognised as a fundamental aspect of science learning (Mayer, 2002; diSessa, 2006) 
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because learning science depends on more than just a simple accumulation of facts, but 
rather on a child’s ability to restructure existing ideas on the basis of any new content and 
experience of the everyday world (Zaitchik, Iqbal & Carey, 2013; Vosniadou, 2002). This 
poses a problem in the context of teaching because learning science is likely to involve 
conceptual change much of the time, and pedagogical strategies need to take this as a 
general point of departure.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the process of conceptual progression has only been explored in 
limited fashion, with the focus tending to be around the way children organise the 
information they acquire. There are many different models of organisation, which makes 
theorising about conceptual change difficult. In cases where children are able to successfully 
acquire accurate biological concepts, it is assumed conceptual change has occurred. 
However, there is still debate about exactly what the process of change entails both in the 
short-term and long-term. The difficultly is compounded by the fact that the nature of 
conceptual progression is unknown and under-researched.  
 
Theorists in this area generally discuss conceptual change within two broad perspectives: 
those that view knowledge acquisition of novel material only in the context of formal 
instruction, and those that consider the reshaping or restructuring of existing knowledge via 
experimental mechanisms. 
 
Even within these two camps of conceptual change, there have been largely two schools of 
thought that dominate the discussion about how conceptual change comes about. Some 
have argued that knowledge is represented in a theory-like structure and highly organised, 
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with concept change occurring through theory-replacement processes (e.g. Vosniadou, 
2002, 2014; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, Gelman, 2009; Carey 1985). Others argue concepts 
are not theoretical, but a collection of fragmented ideas that are context-specific, with 
development more iterative and concepts more malleable (e.g. diSessa, 1993; Harris, 2002).  
 
The differences of opinion imply different pathways towards how biological knowledge is 
structured, and therefore the consequent educational implications are likely to vary. For 
example, there is a lot of literature regarding conflict and change, reconstruction of 
knowledge structures through peer collaboration and inhibition rather than reconciliation 
(discussed in more detail below). However, the difficulty with all of these explanations is 
that they all seem to have evidence in support of them, suggesting different processes 
might occur in varying contexts and conditions. These theories of conceptual organisation 
and resulting change are now discussed.  
 
3.2 Accounts of conceptual change  
 
3.2.1 Equilibration 
 
Piaget (1971, 1972, 1985) paid much attention to the development of children’s concepts of 
physical and biological phenomena. His theory of cognitive development claimed that 
children were born with an innate set of mechanisms that allowed them to represent, store, 
and use information they gained from their environmental experiences. By this account, 
Piaget views conceptual change as reshaping existing knowledge structures, which children 
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obtain by acquiring perceptual information from their environment. Children are first able 
to assimilate this information, and try to incorporate this knowledge into existing schemata 
or modify the schema entirely by a process of accommodation; by doing so, children reach a 
state of equilibration between internal representation and external reality and between 
related internal representations. However the process of knowledge acquisition and 
conceptual change is reliant on the child encountering conflict, that is to say if a child 
encounters a novel scenario which their current model of conceptual knowledge cannot 
explain, a state of disequilibration is reached resulting in a series of transformations 
occurring to the schema, so that it becomes progressively adequate. 
 
In Piaget’s explanation of conceptual change, knowledge results from continuous 
construction of new structures that did not exist before, either in the external world or in 
the child’s mind. The development of scientific thought, according to Piaget’s framework, is 
a process of continual organisation and reorganisation. Sophisticated concepts emerge via 
processes of coordination (e.g. the same action performed on different objects leads to 
coordination of the constant aspects into a more general action concept) and differentiation 
(e.g. different types of outcome to the same action will result in more refined action-
outcome concepts). This type of approach also implies that the underlying mechanisms by 
which children learn different portions of information are essentially the same i.e. the 
processes and mechanisms to acquire inheritance concepts would be the same as those 
required to acquire ecology concepts.   
 
Piaget (1970) stresses that there are many different schemas about perceptual material 
encountered in ones’ environment that can be coordinated with one another, thus implying 
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a general system of coordination of perceptual information. It is the resulting schemas that 
are the point of departure for logical structures. Theories that push this framework of 
learning are known as domain-general theories, where there is an assumption that 
development leads to a structural change (Gelman, 2009). The process of sophisticated and 
on-going refinement of knowledge structures, as described by Piaget (1970), is necessary 
because no single logical schema is sufficiently strong to support all knowledge that is 
encountered. This may explain why even within area of naïve biology such as inheritance, 
children can have well-developed knowledge about phenotypic similarity with quite poor 
knowledge about phenotypic dissimilarity despite the fact that they are heavily related 
concepts (Williams & Smith, 2010).  
 
The consequence of this is that when all the different logical schemas a child has are taken 
together, they are not sufficiently coherent with one another to serve as the “foundation 
for human knowledge” (Piaget, 1970, p.10). This would suggest that children’s ideas about 
biological phenomena are not theoretical, particularly at the beginning of knowledge 
acquisition in contrast to early inheritance research (e.g. Springer, 1999) and therefore the 
degree of integration among different but related biological concepts would not be 
sufficiently high to yield a theoretical and coherent understanding. This issue is also 
highlighted in Piaget’s work where children’s understanding about conservation of area was 
acquired sooner than conservation of volume because, according to Piaget, it involves fewer 
dimensions, and conservation of number sooner still for the same reason (1970). Research 
exploring Piaget’s notion of conservation (Prince-Williams, Douglas, Gordon, William, 
Ramirez & Manuel, 1969) found that some children did acquire conservation of volume 
earlier because of direct experience suggesting that experience rather than complexity is 
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key. Prince-Williams et al (1969) recruited 28 6-9 year-old boys from pottery-making 
families in Mexico with 28 matched controls and hypothesized that boys who were 
experienced in pottery-making would demonstrate earlier conservation skills (particularly 
around the concepts of weight, liquid, and volume) than those boys who had no pottery-
making experience. Results confirmed Piaget’s hypothesis, ultimately suggesting that direct 
experience of phenomena is more important than the simplicity or complexity of that 
phenomena. If this were the case, then examining the nature of input would be key in trying 
to understand the nature of rudimentary knowledge and how it is stored.  
 
Similarly, as Hipkins et al (2008) and Almeida et al (2013) note, it may also mean examining 
the contexts in which children have acquired knowledge as it would indicate children’s 
initial conceptions are likely to be heavily context-specific.  
 
Vygotsky (1962, 1978) was one such researcher who examined the nature of input a child 
received. He believed language plays a critical role in children’s conceptual development. 
Social interactions drive cognitive processes including language, thought, and reasoning 
because the linguistic social interactions (external speech) the child has with adults later 
become internalised as thought (inner speech). This approach suggests that language is a 
key driver for conceptual change, given the co-construction of knowledge that takes place.  
 
However, this approach does not clarify with any specificity how children develop 
inaccurate intuitive biological theories, and seems to consider conceptual change only in the 
context of formal instruction, unlike Piaget. By default, if a child is internalising what an 
adult has explicitly demonstrated through speech, they should develop fairly explicit and 
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accurate ideas from a relatively young age. In this regard, Piaget was certainly pioneering in 
suggesting that conceptual development is not solely the product of formal education, but 
involves something of the internal construction of knowledge, and although he strictly dealt 
with the explicit content of children’s knowledge, he was still able to provide some valuable 
insights about what the origins of implicit naïve biological concepts might be that eventually 
lead to explicit theoretical concepts.  
 
Nevertheless, this model does not directly highlight the ways in which children coordinate 
and integrate their knowledge of different biological constructs. One model that potentially 
accounts for this is proposed by Karmiloff-Smith (1992), described below.  
 
3.2.2 Representational Redescriptions 
 
Following on from Piaget’s work, other perspectives on conceptual growth suggest that 
ontological experience (basic categories of being and their relations) is one area of input 
that is key in terms of coordinating fragments of knowledge that may be implicit, into more 
explicit and broad structures (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 
2004, 2008).  Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) model of representational redescription (RR) asserts 
that conceptual development begins with the acquisition of fragmentary and implicit 
representations of action-event relationships that are triggered when appropriate 
circumstances are encountered, but are otherwise not mentally malleable. She argues that 
the human mind has both detailed innate specifications and predispositions, as well as 
skeletal domain-specific predispositions that are context-dependant. In other words, she 
implies that environmental input is necessary for development and in the case of detailed 
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innate specifications; the environment simply acts as a trigger for the organisation of 
knowledge, whereas in the case of the skeletal outlines, the predispositions are not detailed 
and in these instances the environment is likely to act as more than just a trigger, but as a 
key influence for subsequent conceptual organisation and potential change.  
 
This is an interesting idea and has similarities to a model of conceptual change offered by 
West & Pines (1984; 1986) who attempt to explain the full gamut of knowledge conditions 
by considering the reshaping and restructuring of existing knowledge prior to or after 
instruction. They argue that in any instance where children have no prior intuitive concept, 
and are formally taught new material, children must attempt to acquire symbolic knowledge 
from their environment in order to make sense of their reality. In this situation, which the 
authors note is typical of school biology lessons, learners are often forced to ignore their 
own reality whilst trying to integrate symbolic knowledge. This, they argue, is the process of 
conceptual change.  
 
West and Pines (1984) highlight that the differences in understanding between student and 
teacher knowledge might hinder or enhance learning; children who are taught material that 
is consistent with their existing ideas are able to learn effectively, whilst those who are 
taught material that is inconsistent with their existing ideas struggle to understand new 
concepts and are often resistant to the suggestion that their own ideas might be inaccurate. 
A fault line with this model however, is that conceptual change is only viewed in the context 
of formal instruction, and the exact mechanisms which might take place allowing 
conceptual change have not been specified. As a remedy to this, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
claims that knowledge acquisition is brought about when the mind exploits the information 
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it has already stored internally (both innate and acquired), by iteratively redescribing its 
representations of this information or “re-representing in different representational formats 
what its internal representations represent” (p.15). This entire process aids the child to be 
able to turn implicit ideas into explicit concepts, allowing conscious construction of 
knowledge and theoretical manipulations of it. Therefore this model indicates that not only 
is knowledge likely to be context-specific as others (Hipkins et al., 2008; Almeida et al., 
2013) have also stated, but that children have very fragmented initial concepts which they 
acquire from direct observation and gradually build up and refine over time to develop 
more coherent and integrated biological ideas.  
 
The RR model postulates different representational formats at different levels: I (implicit), 
E1 (explicit 1), E2 (explicit 2), and E3 (explicit 3). These are parts of a reiterating cycle that 
occur within different domains throughout the developmental span. At the Implicit level, 
information is embedded in procedural form, new representations are independently 
stored, and the potential links between domains remain implicit. The processes of 
representational redescription for phases E1-E3 compress the procedurally acquired 
formats in the implicit level. At the E1 level, explicitly defined representations can be related 
to other redescribed representations, unlike at the implicit level. Representations at E2 have 
conscious access but are not yet available to verbally report, hence they are partially explicit 
and E2 is mainly a stage for extra representational redescriptions of those at E1 with 
increasing levels of explicitness. Only representations at level E3 are verbally explicated and 
these representations are accessible across domains and communicable. This view is in line 
with Piaget (1971) who argued that acquisition of schemas gave rise to linguistic structures 
(one possible form of symbolic representation). The RR process also provides a useful 
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explanation as to why children have different levels of understanding in related biological 
areas (e.g. Williams, 2012) as Piaget (1971) does, but goes further in explaining why even 
older children and adults still hold naïve biological theories (Williams & Smith, 2010; 
Shtulman & Valcacel, 2012).  
 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) claims that attentional biases and some innate predispositions make 
one susceptible to focus on linguistically relevant input and with time, build up domain-
specific linguistic representations that eventually become modularised. She argues Piaget’s 
theory of sensorimotor development (Piaget, 1971) does not explain how language 
acquisition is initiated and argues that in the case of language, the mind becomes 
modularised as development proceeds (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Her account also considers 
brain plasticity in early development and she suggests environmental input is constrained by 
initial biases or predispositions that channel attention to relevant environmental inputs, 
which in turn affect subsequent brain development. This suggests a potential route for how 
newly acquired language might influence subsequent conceptual change constraints. Hence 
Karmiloff-Smith in her account provides further detail as to how general cognitive abilities 
may also contribute towards children’s domain-specific knowledge acquisition. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
The premise that human cognition involves domain-specific mechanisms is a common idea. 
Other cognitive developmental psychologists also view domain-specific learning as a result 
of the constraints on learning (e.g. Keil, 1987). Domain-general and domain-specific 
theorists treat the idea of constraints on development differently. Constraints for the 
former would act as a factor to curtail a child’s competence, for example with Piaget’s 
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theoretical stance, constraints would limit the overall system with which to acquire, 
assimilate, and accommodate environmental information, which would subsequently curtail 
successful conceptual change. This would ultimately mean that conceptual progression of 
children’s biological knowledge would be exceptionally inefficient and piecemeal, as 
mentioned earlier. In contrast, constraints enhance learning in domain-specific models such 
as Karmiloff-Smith’s, by limiting the number of extraneous variables and focusing only on 
relevant pieces of information with which to strengthen children’s representations from 
implicit to explicit levels. For example in the RR model, verbally explicable concepts at the 
E3 level are only formed as a result of the redescribed perceptual representations acquired 
at the implicit level. Hence the input representations constrain the output representations. 
This highlights the ways in which children are likely to have domain- and context-specific 
knowledge when it comes to biology (Assaraf & Orian, 2003; Grotzer & Basca, 2003) and 
hence, also why children have varying degrees of understanding among related biological 
phenomena (Krombaβ & Harms, 2008).  
 
Keil (1996) describes constraints as restrictions on the kinds of knowledge structures that 
the learner typically uses in order to restrict and guide understanding, and these constraints 
could either be acquired developmentally, or be innate (Keil & Lockhart, 1999). In the case 
of the RR model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), constraints are innate and subsequent 
environmental input constrains output. This is an interesting idea because it may be that a 
child is learning something within a particular context and thus the context itself may be the 
constraining factor (e.g. Hipkins et al., 2008). Assuming domain-generality, children should 
be able to learn certain scientific concepts at the same rate as other related concepts and 
be equally proficient in both. However, this does not seem to be the case. For instance 
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Tolmie et al (2009) have shown that even within a single curricular topic such as physical 
state change, understanding of melting among 8-year-olds is not predictive of 
understanding of evaporation. Likewise in the field of biology, work into children’s 
understanding of animate versus inanimate knowledge would logically rely on the same 
grasp of the distinguishing properties of animate entities and inanimate objects, yet work 
into natural kinds suggests otherwise (Gelman & Markman, 1986). This would imply the 
type of contexts children are exposed to can restrict or constrain the theoretical 
formulations leading to domain-specific conceptual change.  
 
The process of RR that Karmiloff-Smith (1992) describes is the same across domains, 
however this does not imply that there is simultaneous change across domains, just as 
Piaget (1970) also claimed. The difference with the RR model is that it is a process by which 
implicit information in the mind becomes explicit information of the mind, first within a 
domain, and then subsequently across domains. In the first level of the RR model, children 
focus mainly on environmental input hence this stage is data-driven, much like Piaget (1970) 
would argue.  
 
The RR model attempts to account for the ways in which children’s representations become 
more flexible and malleable, to eventually allow the emergence of conscious and explicit 
knowledge for theory building. This allows the child to form representational adjunctions 
that neither alter existing stable representations, nor are brought into relation with them. 
Thus indicating that concepts develop laterally where children may use knowledge of one 
biological area to help them understand another. Successful performance can be generated 
by a sequence of independently stored representations that will ultimately have to be 
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linked into a more coherent system. Hence level one is the only stage to have 
environmental input where the subsequent changes and redescribed representations are 
internally driven. At level two, the temporary discard for environmental evidence may lead 
to errors and inflexibilities. In phase three the internal and external data are reconciled, for 
instance in the case of language, new mapping is made between the input and output 
representations in order to restore correct usage (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Once new 
representations are stable, they are added, domain-specifically, to the existing concepts 
with minimal effect on what is already stored. Therefore independently stored 
representations do not cultivate representational change. This suggests that knowledge in 
this phase is very piecemeal and is merely an accumulation of various domain-specific 
environmental inputs, at least initially, but over time, with explication and coordination of 
biological concepts, knowledge may indeed be theoretical.  
 
This view is in line with Gelman’s (2009) account that conceptual development is the 
product of both innately specified mechanisms and also through environmental experience. 
This argument is persuasive because domain-general theories, such as Piaget’s (1970) 
assume there is no element of mechanistic cognition during learning; the focus is on 
learning and learning output, rather than the cognition that takes place in between to allow 
learning to occur.  The RR (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) model postulates that domain-general 
processes sustaining inference and representational redescription operate throughout 
development (and are likely to be innately specified) and in order for representations to go 
across different domains, a process of explication that is aided by increasing linguistic ability 
must undergo representational redescription. In contrast to the Piagetian framework, 
Karmiloff-Smith’s RR model will spontaneously improve itself even in a state of stability 
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upon environmental exposure and provides a better explanation of conceptual change over 
time than Piaget’s account where conflict and disequlibration must be encountered in order 
for change to occur.  
 
The exposure to different ontological experiences (relationships between different 
categories) serving as a guide to constrain children’s conceptual change is something also 
claimed by Carey (1985). Carey argues constraints in the environment allow children to 
acquire relevant information so that learning may in turn be sequential. When children’s 
innate predispositions are not sufficiently specified whereas Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues 
the environment acts as a key influencer of change, Carey (1985) maintains children are 
able to pursue intuitive knowledge across domains, in a theoretical manner, until more 
knowledge is acquired.   
 
3.2.3 Carey’s account of conceptual change 
 
Carey (1985) is one of the few researchers that have developed an account of conceptual 
change that specifically relates to children’s biological knowledge. Carey (1985) argues that 
domain-specific knowledge emerges from different ontological experiences a child is 
exposed to, which go on to restructure children’s concepts rather than endorsing the view 
that domains require distinct ways of acquiring knowledge through innate mechanisms.  
Unlike Piaget, Carey (1985) proposes that conceptual change cannot be considered as global 
restructuring, but domain-specific restructurings of naïve theory structures on the basis of 
increasing new knowledge about a particular biological concept. Hence, as children are 
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exposed to new experiences and instruction, they gradually replace their naïve theory-like 
structures with scientifically correct conceptual structures.  
 
Similarly, Chi, Slotta and DeLeeuw (1994) offer an explanation about how conceptual change 
might occur in the context of acquiring new biological knowledge through instruction. They 
claim that some concepts would be harder to learn than others and posit a model of 
conceptual development named the Incompatibility Hypothesis. They propose that in a 
classroom setting causal relationships cannot be understood until the categories with which 
to organise new knowledge are well defined, suggesting that it is the organisation of new 
information with prior related information that is the basis for understanding. Chi et al 
(1994) view conceptual change as a concept redefined from one category to another. In 
other words, conceptual change is a category shift, which they argue causes a change in the 
ontology of a particular concept. By default, this model is able to account for why 
conceptual change for some biological concepts might be easier to organise and understand 
than others, because if a child is introduced to a concept that cannot be readily organised 
into a pre-existing group of related ideas, difficulty arises. However, unlike Carey this model 
does not fully consider the actual processes involved in conceptual change or conceptual 
progression, nor address the fact that children arrive in school with pre-existing ideas that 
may influence restructuring or transformation of ideas rather than simply be used as a path 
map to conceptual organisation.  
 
According to Carey (1985) restructuring occurs through processes of replacement (one 
fundamentally different concept replaces another), differentiation (the initial concept splits 
into two or more new concepts e.g. the concept of cat can be split into Persian, or tabby), 
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and coalescence (where two or more concepts coalescing into a single concept e.g. Persian 
and tabby into one concept of cat).  
 
Carey (1985) claims that children’s early beliefs about biological phenomena are couched in 
psychological domains, which can often lead to misconceptions about biological kinds. For 
example, Carey (1989) quotes one child as saying “worms don’t have babies, they just have 
little worms” as demonstrating that this child views “having babies” in terms of the social 
roles of parenting (psychological domain), and not in the reproductive sense (biological 
domain). In this way knowledge acquisition might even be seen as sequential in nature 
whereby explanations for biological phenomena become more ‘biological’ as more 
biological knowledge is acquired. A similar view is also taken by Hatano (1990) where prior 
to any formal instruction, children are in possession of well-developed biological ideas that 
allow them to make consistent predictions and form explanations regarding biological 
phenomena. At first a child’s ideas are uncoordinated but then eventually develop within 
the domain they belong to, increasing in complexity. This, Carey (1985) says “typifies all 
novice-expert shifts regardless of age” (p.71). Hence, one way children address a problem is 
to assess the degree of similarity a phenomenon has to an exemplar they already have 
knowledge about, thereby allowing domain-specific theoretical changes.  
 
Recent studies offering support for the domain-specificity of children’s theories (e.g. theory 
of mind; theory of physics) make apparent that content knowledge is integral to structure 
and development (Gelman, 2009; Wellman & Gelman, 1998; Carey, 1985). Carey (1985) 
claims that children organise their learned concepts into coordinated systems and beliefs 
such as physics, psychology, and biology, as shown by the degree of variation in 
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sophistication of ideas sufficient to drive explanation. These ideas probably derived from 
the differences in ontological experience children have had, and the exposure to different 
ideas.  
 
Tolmie (2012) notes that both explicit explanation and implicit beliefs have been regarded 
as an index of children’s understanding, and yet the actual origins of these explanations or 
beliefs and their relationship with conceptual structure have been unexplored, as has 
evidence suggesting that children’s learning is heavily context-dependent and subject to 
familiarity effects. For example, Inagaki (1997) claims that familiarity with a domain of 
knowledge increases not only the amount of factual knowledge children have but also their 
conceptual organisation of that domain. Hence, Carey (1985) argues that a lack of familiarity 
with concepts in the domain of biology results in children using existing concepts in the 
domain of psychology to make sense of their world.  
 
The organisation of knowledge has so far been the main focus with regards to how children 
are learning from the environment, for example, Rhodes and Gelman (2009) propose that 
children may believe that both animal and artefact categories reflect true structure because 
they associate with groups that share similar properties. In this sense categories are 
“natural bundles” in the environment (p.247) i.e. they are ontologically different as Carey 
(1985) would suggest. This provides further support that children might be context-bound 
with regards to scientific phenomena, as category boundaries are often applied in domain-
specific ways.  
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Chi and colleagues (1989) are also of the view that domains can be seen as guides with 
which to categorise things for example, although there are a number of ways to classify 
living things, some beliefs about living kinds are typically early emerging and consistent. 
Thus domain competency facilitates this by focusing attention on a specific domain rather 
than general knowledge (Chi et al., 1989), which both Carey (1985) and Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) argue children are predisposed to do.  
 
Indeed, feature extraction and association is what children do extremely well (Gopnik, 
Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001), and categories/schemas emerge naturally from that 
process, as discussed in Chapter 2. It has been argued that causal information can serve to 
organise other information in a way that makes it easier to recall (Grotza & Basca, 2003). 
For instance when memorising facts about birds, an expert will be able to grasp the causal 
(i.e. cause-and-effect) relations between facts (e.g. birds can fly because they have wings). 
Causal reasoning might be largely domain-general, its properties are largely independent of 
topic area but conceptual understanding is seen as domain-specific with marked topic 
variation of levels of sophistication and the degree to which it is sufficiently explicit to drive 
an explanation. Studies have shown that fostering the use of causal relations helps novices 
to understand biological facts and to recall the information over a longer period of time 
(Opfer, Nemh & Ha, 2012). This view is similar to that of Carey (1985) who argues that a 
biological domain can only ever be attained if deductive reasoning (i.e. using multiple 
premises to logically guide reasoning) is attained, presumably by understanding the causal 
relations between phenomena, however she also mentions the fact that adults do not 
consistently use deductive reasoning, which would imply that causal reasoning might not 
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necessarily be explicit. This suggests that harnessing causal and deductive reasoning might 
be a domain-general strategy that could be generalised across a variety of different topics.  
 
What seems to be evident is that there is a natural tendency for children to extract causal 
information from experience because of its organisational benefits, and this may explain 
why children are sensitive to co-variation and causation from a young age (discussed further 
in Chapter 4), possibly because of an innate predisposition to do so. Piaget (1970) also 
emphasised children’s structural knowledge is experientially driven, as does Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992). If the external environment is chief in the initial organisation of domain structures, 
these domain structures themselves must be a constraining factor in the development and 
change in children’s concepts. Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) note that if knowledge was left 
unconstrained, instruction would rarely yield meaningful knowledge, unless by chance. For 
instance, within a topic such as evolution there are constraint-based interactions crucial to a 
complete understanding (Chi et al., 1994), suggesting that it may be easier to acquire 
simpler related concepts, which would subsequently constrain the child. This would also 
imply that a complex biological concept such as evolution might dip into other ontological 
categories in order to be fully understood, potentially organised in some kind of network of 
related ideas within a domain (Vosniadou, 2014).  
 
In fact Carey (1985) argues a domain of biology arises out of a domain of psychology for this 
specific reason: children have limited biological knowledge early on and in an effort to 
understand certain biological phenomena, they will often resort to psychological 
explanations. For example Myant & Williams (2005) investigated children’s understanding 
of health and demonstrated that in the absence of knowledge about the mechanisms 
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involved in illness, children would refer to behavioural or psychological explanations, but 
that explanations would become more biological with increasing age. This ultimately implies 
that conceptual change in children is theoretical in nature. Others (Gelman, 2003; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1994) also have similar views such as Carey (1985) who believes a domain of 
biology arises from a domain of psychology through restructuring theories about biological 
phenomena. Indeed Gopnik and Wellman (1994) claim children’s early conceptions in the 
domain of psychology are implicit theories and any changes in those conceptions are theory 
changes; children are like “little scientists” (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994, p. 259).  
 
However, while it is certainly true that limited biological knowledge will lead to limited 
conceptual understanding in this domain, the fact that children go across domains to 
explain unknown biological phenomena would suggest that theoretical domain-specific 
conceptual integration would take longer to achieve and perhaps be more susceptible to 
error, given the lack of a foundation of rudimentary biological concepts.  
 
Vosniadou (2002, 2014) puts forward an account to explain how children might coordinate 
pieces of related information in a theoretical manner based on different ontological 
experiences that is similar to Carey’s (1985). 
 
3.2.4 Vosniadou’s framework account 
 
Vosniadou (2002) argues that children’s concepts are embedded in a theory-like structure 
and subsequent formation and change is theoretical. Vosniadou and Ioannides (1998) argue 
that children’s beliefs are linked to and consequently constrained by ontological 
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presuppositions, which allow concepts to form within a coherent structure. These are 
presuppositions about the kinds of entities children assume to exist and the way that they 
are organised. For instance, one assumes that in their ontologies there are entities such as 
physical objects, which can either be categorised as animate or inanimate. Of those that are 
animate, children can further assume that animate entities have certain properties 
themselves (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998). In this regard, the only difference between 
children’s naïve beliefs and adult’s expert beliefs, are the ontological presuppositions 
children may make about explanatory mechanisms, which become refined over time.  
 
Thus this framework theory approach is able to account for children’s difficulties in learning 
counter-intuitive science concepts, such as the Earth is spherical and not flat as it appears, 
for example (Vosniadou, 2014). However, exactly how concepts relate to each other has not 
reached any consensus. It is precisely for this reason that the role of a domain in conceptual 
change and development might be especially salient with regards to constraining, 
integrating, and coordinating existing and subsequent knowledge within a child’s 
framework.  
 
Vosniadou (2014) maintains that domain-specific learning occurs through formulating 
hypotheses about the ways in which specific content is structured and restructured, without 
the need for innate constraints or modules, but instead via the use of domain-general 
mechanisms. There have generally been two major foci in this regard; the first is cognitive 
conflict, and the second is meta-representation (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998). The former 
is the idea that children have pre-existing concepts, which either corroborates with any new 
knowledge they learn or does not, i.e. the two concepts (old and new) are in conflict with 
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each other (e.g. Piaget, 1970; Chi et al., 1994; West & Pines, 1986). The child must then 
resolve this conflict either by choosing the existing or novel concept, or form a new concept 
altogether, hence cognitive conflict causes cognitive adjustment.  
 
However little has been said by Vosniadou to explain the processes involved in conflict 
resolution in the context of this specific framework, unlike Piaget (1970) who offered the 
account of equilibration described earlier. Consequently, without being able to understand 
the mechanisms behind concept change in biology one will never be able to understand the 
process or developmental trajectory of conceptual progression, or indeed what, how, and 
why category shifts occur. Hence this framework theory in the context of cognitive conflict 
appears to be under-specified. 
 
The other process or cause of conceptual change is the development of meta-
representations. This is the notion that children will hold multiple ideas or concepts in their 
mind in one large network of related concepts, yet within this network would exist the 
initial naïve concept as well as its more sophisticated form (Vosniadou, 2014). For instance 
children may hold the naïve idea that inherited phenotypic traits are a result from sharing a 
home with their parents, to the more sophisticated biological idea that sharing parental 
genetic material leads to similar phenotypes. Similarly, Gelman (2009) argues that biological 
concepts are not isolated fragments rather they are part of an integrated network of larger, 
related concepts, culture, and other idiosyncrasies much like the ideas of Vosniadou (2014) 
and Carey (1985).   
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However, this does not address the cause of resistance to new ideas in children; one would 
assume that if children were capable of holding multiple representations of concepts in 
their mind then they would also find including new information into their web of knowledge 
relatively easy. Conversely, it could be that meta-representations can only be formed when 
related ideas cohere together to form a theoretical framework (e.g. of biology), and if a 
concept does not relate to existing concepts in child’s network, it is rejected i.e. ontological 
presuppositions determine the new information that a child acquires in order to develop a 
meta-representation of existing material. In the RR model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), innate 
predispositions constrain children’s representations through a process of representational 
descriptions. Though again, Vosniadou fails to adequately explain how concepts might be 
coordinated within theoretical frameworks.  
 
Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) found evidence supporting framework theories as described 
by Vosniadou (2014), and go as far as to say that these framework theories may remain until 
adulthood. They found evidence of the maintenance of naïve theories of natural selection, 
even among biology experts, when under speeded conditions. This suggests that there may 
be inferential competition between theories rather than the replacement of one theory 
with another (e.g. Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), as the knowledge-as-
theoretical supporters (e.g. Vosniadou, 2014, Carey, 1985) would argue. This view would 
also explain how cognitive conflict resulting from a mismatch in prior beliefs of children to 
new material might be resolved.   
 
In their study, Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) gave college participants a speeded task on a 
number of topic areas, including natural selection knowledge, where participants responded 
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true/false to statements. They found that participants were more accurate at responding to 
‘consistent’ statements (where naïve and non-naïve statements were both true/false) 
rather than ‘inconsistent statements’ (where statements were true for either naïve or non-
naïve theories and false on the other).  They also found a difference in response times 
between inconsistent and consistent statements was significantly correlated with accuracy 
scores, and interpreted these results by suggesting that students with greater domain-
general expertise might have exhibited more cognitive conflict on the inconsistent items 
than did participants with less expertise. Results also suggested that naïve theories are 
suppressed by non-naïve scientific concepts but are not supplanted by them, possibly 
because naïve theories emerge earlier and are therefore more deeply entrenched 
(Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). Their results coincide with the meta-representation view that 
Vosniadou (2014) describes whereby conflict does not cause conceptual development, 
rather the ability to hold multiple concepts in an organised framework does.  
 
Alternatively it could be that under limited processing speed and limited resources, students 
resort to using a heuristic of sorts. Perhaps naive theories and scientific theories occupy 
different levels or have different forms of representation (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). The 
former may take a more situational and context-specific representation, whereas the latter 
may be more abstract and general. This is similar to the RR model where Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) argues concepts develop over different levels to eventually become explicated and 
more sophisticated. If so, then the perspectives offered by Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012), 
and Vosniadou (2002, 2014) regarding theoretical conceptual development would actually 
point to theoretical integration of initially acquired fragmented concepts. This view echoes 
sentiments of Harris (1994) who believes children undergo processes of hypothesis testing 
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and have working models that serve as a basis for prediction and explanation. However, 
Harris (1994) stipulates that learning in this sense is not theoretical, but dependent upon 
concrete paradigms, where the child is thinking like a working scientist piecing together 
fragments of information.  
 
3.2.5 diSessa’s account of conceptual change 
 
Some have argued that a common-sense or folk theory, based on intuition rather than fact, 
is not the same as a scientific theory (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974; Carey, 1985; Keil, 
1994; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994) because everyday thought may not be theory-like in its 
resistance to counter-evidence, ontological commitments, attention to domain-specific 
causal principles, and coherence of beliefs (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Indeed it seems as 
though the lack of consensus has led to mixed opinion about the definition of theoretical 
thinking, and if it were the case that a folk theory is not the same as a scientific theory, this 
would imply conceptual change is not as theoretical as previously thought, and may be far 
more fragmented. By default, this would also suggest that children’s beliefs at an initial 
stage are unlikely to be coherent either, not least until they are able to be sufficiently 
coordinated or verbally communicable as Karmiloff-Smith (1992) describes.   
 
The main champion for the ‘knowledge-as-pieces’ view is diSessa (1983, 1988, 1993, 2006). 
diSessa’s viewpoint is that knowledge structures consist of various conceptual elements at 
different stages of development and sophistication, which have been constructed bottom-
up out of sensory and perceptual primitives, or p-prims. From this perspective concept 
change is a piecemeal evolutionary process, rather than a theory replacement process, 
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where p-prims lead to the development of mental models that will iteratively change given 
new context-specific knowledge. These p-prims are loosely organised in a conceptual 
network, and specific p-prims are activated by recognition mechanisms under exposure to 
relevant contexts. Hence, knowledge is highly context-specific. However, p-prims are 
universal in their function as diSessa describes them, which seems somewhat contradictory 
to the idea that they should result in fragmented knowledge.  
 
diSessa (2006) suggests that conceptual change results from a cognitive reorganisation of 
the naïve knowledge elements into more complex systems, thus with the acquisition of 
more elements an eventual theoretical framework is possible. For instance, fragments of 
ideas on plant biology could be loosely grouped together with fragments around ecology, 
which after appropriate activation in relevant contexts, could lead to a more holistic 
understanding about ecosystems (e.g. Krombaβ & Harms, 2008). With this view, diSessa’s 
(1988) theory would also help to explain exactly how children go from implicit to explicit 
knowledge via appropriate triggers in the environment. This view is very similar to that of 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) with regards to pieces of knowledge becoming more coordinated as 
they become more explicit. Relevant contexts, and the increasing coordination of linguistic 
units allows explication of rudimentary and implicit concepts to occur, which eventually 
might lead to a more theory-like conceptual view once a certain level of coordination has 
been reached. This would create a level of conviction that Piaget (1971) refers to as 
necessary knowledge, whereby logical reasoning is necessary in children’s thinking in order 
to identify a species of knowledge. In this sense, necessary knowledge is a pervasive feature 
of every domain where necessary conclusions allow children to go beyond the information 
85 
they obtain from the environment (Smith, Laughran, Berry, & Dimitrakopoulos, 2012). 
Hence it seems as though there are certain similarities between the two major perspectives. 
 
3.3 Knowledge as fragmented and emergently theoretical 
 
Ozdemir and Clark (2007) conducted a study aiming to find support for one of the two 
perspectives (knowledge-as-theoretical or fragmented), and found support for the 
knowledge-as-pieces perspective overall after replicating an earlier study of Ioannides and 
Vosniadou (2002). In the study, the meaning of force and its development among 105 
children was investigated. It was found that 88.6% of children’s responses fell into seven 
categories of internally consistent interpretations of force: internal force, internal force 
affected by movement, internal and acquired force, acquired force, acquired force and force 
of push/pull, force of push/pull, and gravitational and other forces. The students in the 
study gave consistent predictions and explanations regardless of context, which the authors 
concluded as confirmation that children have uniform and internally consistent 
interpretations of force.  
 
However, diSessa et al (2004) conducted a direct replication study of Ioannides and 
Vosniadou’s (2002) and found children’s meaning of force were inconsistent across 
contexts. Most importantly, diSessa et al (2004) found evidence that children’s knowledge 
about force was heavily context-dependent, where pieces of knowledge were activated 
under certain contexts (diSessa, 1993). Ozdemir and Clarke (2009) conducted a replication 
of diSessa et al’s (2004) study with Turkish children, and found overall support for the 
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knowledge-as-pieces view. They highlighted that methodological flaws such as soft coding 
schemes and limited contexts could lead to overestimations about student’s knowledge and 
the coherence of student’s knowledge.  
 
Likewise, Southerland, Abrams, Cummings and Anzelmo (2001) conducted a quasi-
replication of diSessa et al’s (2004) study and examined the structure of children’s biological 
knowledge. They found that a knowledge-as-pieces view had more explanatory power than 
a knowledge-as-theory view, because p-prims could better explain the shifting nature of 
students’ conceptions of biological phenomena over the frameworks theory (Ozdemir & 
Clarke, 2007).  
This work is in line with more recent research suggesting children may have fairly 
fragmented ideas (e.g. Williams, 2012; Williams & Smith, 2012) and many are now of the 
opinion that the mechanisms allowing a child to learn are domain-general, yet the topic-
specific variation in their knowledge would imply domain-specificity in content. The idea 
that knowledge is domain-specific suggests that many cognitive abilities are specialised to 
handle specific types of information (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). As such, it is highly likely 
that children acquire fragmented topic-specific concepts, and it is not yet clear how these 
concepts develop, or are coordinated to lead to more holistic understanding about 
particular phenomena. The RR model proposed by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) makes an attempt 
at describing how fragmented concepts become coordinated over time via a process of 
redescribing implicit representations to explicit ones that are verbally communicable. If 
taken to be accurate, in the mental models diSessa describes there is still the possibility to 
hold a theory-like model which will iteratively change, where the role of language is central 
to the explication and coordination of ideas over time.  
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In fact, this process of explication and coordination of fragmented concepts goes as far as 
explaining the retention and inhibition of naïve concepts. Concepts that are not matched 
with a linguistic unit will not reach the final E3 stage of explication (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), 
likewise any concept that has not been through the necessary iterations of redescribing 
representations means that concepts might remain implicit, or only partially explicit 
resulting in the maintenance of naïve theories. In any instance where representations are 
redescribed on the basis of new external information, previously held ideas are inhibited in 
favour of more coherent and robust concepts.  
 
Indeed the evidence for the retention and inhibition of naïve concepts is vast and any model 
attempting to credibly explain conceptual change should be able to successfully account for 
this. Given this point, the knowledge-as-pieces view seems to be the most sustainable 
argument. Vosniadou (2014) maintains that initially children acquire fragments of 
knowledge but these form a relatively coherent explanatory system, or framework theory, 
which allows for prediction and explanation of new phenomena. The idea of a framework 
theory almost places Vosniadou in middle-ground territory as on the one hand she accepts 
thoughts can be relatively coherent, and yet the framework is not necessarily explicit or has 
any internal consistency as a scientific theory would. It is also not a socially shared theory, 
which implies that domain-specific knowledge may be highly individualistic and dependent 
upon on the early experiences and observations of the child. What a framework theory is 
able to do according to Vosniadou (2014), is be used to predict and formulate hypotheses 
and generate explanations. Hence domains like naïve biology and physics may be less 
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closely linked with our scientific understanding in the formal sense of the word than is 
sometimes appreciated (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998).  
 
However, Vosniadou (2014) claims that framework theories are not explicit, and that 
conceptual change is a gradual process. If taken to be true then, framework theories cannot 
be theoretical in the scientific sense as this would require them to be explicit, as Karmiloff-
Smith (1992) argues, echoing the sentiments of diSessa (1993). Hence, on the surface, the 
two views are not completely incompatible, however the key difference is that Vosniadou 
assumes coherence (at least locally) and this cannot account for why children perpetuate 
and maintain naïve theories as shown by Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) and also other 
studies such as that by Howe, Tavares, and Devine (2012) who demonstrated that children’s 
responses to tacit and explicit trajectory tasks are completely at variance. The accounts 
offered by diSessa (1993) and Karmiloff-Smith (1992) are better able to explain results such 
as these because explication and coordination seem to be relatively piecemeal. The 
implication of this then is that fragmentation can be quite extreme, especially at the 
perceptual or explanatory boundaries, and coordination only happens through relatively 
deliberate and conscious effort.  
 
3.4 Interim summary 
 
Overall it would seem that even though there is some consensus that children’s knowledge 
and conceptual change is theoretical (Carey, 1985; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; Vosniadou, 
2014; Gopnik, 1996; Gelman, 2009), much of the accounts and perspectives offered by the 
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relevant theorists seem not to be sustainable as a position. The domain-general account by 
Piaget (1970), which has influenced many conceptual change models, is unable to explain 
exactly how children coordinate concepts theoretically. Moreover, the very fact that 
children have separate logical schemas for different phenomena means that children must 
have different rates of understanding for seemingly tightly related concepts (e.g. children’s 
understanding about conservation of area was acquired sooner than conservation of 
volume). Similarly Karmiloff-Smith (1992) offers an account of how conceptual change might 
lead to eventual theoretical understanding, but not before acquiring separate fragments of 
knowledge. Even in a specific domain, or a specific area within a domain there could be 
markedly different apparent levels of progression, for example Tolmie and colleagues (2009) 
showed children’s understanding of melting is plainly ahead of their understanding of 
evaporation and condensation throughout the primary age groups and others have shown 
similar findings in the domain of biology (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Williams, 2012). This 
suggests that the level of development is likely to vary for different domains of knowledge, 
and one cannot assume that cognitive development will be the same across multiple or 
even related domains. Hence even if ostensibly tightly connected concepts have uncertain 
relationships to each other, then the nature of the connection between taxonomically 
related concepts certainly cannot be assumed, but needs to be empirically demonstrated. 
 
It seems as though the fragmented knowledge accounts of conceptual change seem to offer 
a more viable position than the theoretical knowledge conceptual change accounts, both in 
the way of explaining how change from naïve to more sophisticated concepts might take 
place, but also in terms of explaining the evidence from studies about the retention and 
maintenance of naïve theories. Both views stipulate that the acquisition of concepts is 
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highly context dependent, and this is supported by other research (Assaraf & Orian, 2003; 
Hipkins et al., 2008; Almeida et al., 2013).  If so, then instruction should focus on how these 
fragments of knowledge are activated in appropriate contexts, perhaps by developing an 
incremental curriculum, which would allow for the organisation, modification, coordination, 
integration, and refinement of biological concepts over time.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, many researchers have not been overtly clear about what they 
mean regarding concept development or change. Domain-general theorists accept the 
notion that all types of concepts change in the same way, but very little consensus has been 
reached about the nature of conceptual progression and it is not yet clear whether 
conceptual change involves restructuring existing knowledge, and development involves 
encompassing new concepts into existing knowledge as Piaget (1985) and West and Pines 
(1984) would suggest. The many different models of organisation ultimately make theorising 
about conceptual change a difficult task.  
 
Both perspectives of the knowledge-as-theory and knowledge-as-pieces debate would agree 
that children observe phenomena in their environment, which in turn influences their 
conceptual knowledge, but there are differences as to how sophisticated this knowledge is. 
Some have suggested that the way initial concepts are organised goes on to constrain future 
acquisition and organisation of new concepts. Consequently, investigating the strategies 
and mechanisms behind knowledge acquisition should also be examined (Siegler, 2000). 
However, an issue with this is that a failure to address the nature of change means that 
there is not adequate evidence to inform theories about the mechanisms involved. The 
account offered by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) seems to be the most convincing in that is it the 
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development of language that allows the coordination of atomistic ideas into larger 
structures. It could be, however, that with the gradual coordination that language offers, 
concepts may become more theoretical over time. In any case, initial conceptual change 
certainly seems less likely to be theoretical.  
 
3.5 Language  
 
Gelman (2009) takes the view that language helps children to coordinate their ideas, and 
serves to organise their concepts in such a way that a combination of explicit testimony, 
implicit cues on language, and child expectations and capacities work together to guide 
conceptual learning. Gelman (2015) however, argues that the type of language children are 
exposed to matters a great deal with regards to how children are able to categorise 
information, and has shown that children are sensitive to the use of generic language or lack 
of. For example Brandone and Gelman (2013) found generic language use reveals domain 
differences in children’s expectations about animals and artefact categories. In their study, 
5-year-old children and adults’ use of category-referring generic noun phrases (e.g. “birds 
fly”) were examined for novel animals and artefacts. Results revealed children and adults 
produced more generic language when items were described as animals, as opposed to 
artefacts, even though the stimuli were perceptually identical. The authors attributed the 
findings to participants’ ontological expectations about animals and artefact categories. 
Indeed, particularly in the context of science within a classroom setting, specific language 
will refer to specific phenomena for example “a bird is an animal that can fly” yet this 
generic phrase does not consider flightless birds which, according to Brandone and Gelman 
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(2013) children would categorise as flying animals based on their sensitivity to generic 
language. Gelman (2015) argues children begin to use generic language about natural kinds 
at around two years of age despite limited observations, hence this level of abstraction 
would suggest theoretical learning, as Carey (1985) would also claim.  
 
One issue to consider here is the difference between language use in context, and language 
use in testimony that is removed from context. Both are important but testimony requires a 
degree of prior elaboration of existing concepts in order to be effective. Therefore, language 
use in context may be more important to begin with, helping to direct attention toward 
important features, making connections between these and providing sign functions that 
enable these to be explicitly manipulated. For example, Philips and Tolmie (2007) 
demonstrated that providing 8-year-olds with explicit explanations about balance scale 
problems promoted learning only when the children had a foundation of basic knowledge 
about the role of weight and distance i.e. externally input language must match the child’s 
existing level of functioning to some extent. Without this basic knowledge, learning more 
complex material created confusion. This is similar to the view that linguistic units have to 
be redescribed to the same level as conceptual units in order to be coupled together 
explicitly in the RR model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Hence it seems trying to promote higher-
order reasoning skills before initial precursors are established may hinder learning.  
 
One idea about the influence that language has on conceptual development is that the 
labelling used in everyday language helps associate the word to a perceptual feature and 
aids the categorisation process that children are so good at (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). 
These lexicalisation effects are automatic consequences of the fact that the label serves as 
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an automatic cue to influence a child's judgements. However there are situations where the 
child may hear a word yet fails to learn it, thus lexicalisation effects are not automatic as the 
child must also make an evaluation and judgement. This would also highlight exactly how 
within the right context, children’s fragmented concepts could be activated as diSessa 
(1993) posits in the knowledge-as-pieces view. Indeed, the influence of language brings up 
important questions to consider. Is it that language serves as a mechanism with which to 
bring together ideas and create new concepts (Gelman, 2009), or is it that language can 
draw attention to and highlight other available concepts and thus promotes conceptual 
progression?  
 
Fulkerson and Waxman (2007) suggest that the process of learning words is essentially 
matching (and understanding) a linguistic unit to a conceptual unit. Early studies 
investigating inheritance concepts of young children often failed to consider the importance 
of language in conceptual knowledge, as the methods used in those early studies often 
required children to make simple judgements (e.g. Keil, 1997; Springer, 1999; Gelman, 
2015). The reason for these early language-sparse methods may have been because much 
of the research was conducted on pre-schoolers who arguably are unable to articulate 
themselves. However, more recent research into this area suggest that children as young as 
4 are able to demonstrate quite sophisticated ideas about inheritance and other biological 
phenomena using speech (Myant & Williams, 2005; Williams & Smith, 2012), and even 
though children are still required to make judgements in some of these tasks, they were 
asked to explain the judgements they made in an interview-type task, which aided 
researchers in understanding the limitations of their knowledge.  
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However, one thing to consider is the extent to which different approaches might be 
reconciled to produce same or similar results. In the previous chapter it was argued that 
language-sparse approaches may have led to children appearing as though they had more 
advanced conceptual knowledge than if they had taken part in a language-heavy approach 
but this does not necessarity mean that children should only be given language-heavy tasks 
as language-sparse approaches may be informative of children’s implicit conceptual 
understanding.  However, the RR model postulated by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) would suggest 
that explicit concepts are formed out of implicit strands and not independently of them. 
Hence there ought to be a degree of overlapping or carry-over, even if explicit concepts 
have become more organised. This however, does not mean that language-sparse and 
language-heavy tasks are addressing the exact same parts of the concepts children hold, but 
it does suggest value in encouraging children to give explicit responses sooner rather than 
later because the building blocks already exist. Therefore, it appears sensible to use tasks 
that require both judgement and explanation and any future research in naïve biology 
should consider the importance of including a language-based element to their method, 
even when examining younger children. 
 
Evidence suggests that infants as young as three months old are able to form language 
categorisations to non-human primates’ vocalisations (Ferry, Hespos & Waxman, 2013). It is 
only when infants begin to understand word meaning that they are able to map that 
learned word to a specific category across varying contexts. It may then be suggested that 
learning the meaning of novel words in different contexts could take longer to understand 
than when the same context is used consistently. For these reasons, priming would have to 
be sufficiently powerful to deal with the unstructured nature of everyday events, and thus 
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cognitive conflict with peer collaboration may help increase the salience with which primes 
are held in memory. The authors suggest that learning from collective insights (a Vygotskian 
view) and learning from subsequent events may be two sides of the same coin; both are 
dependent on opposing ideas and with the balance resting on the degree of contradiction 
and the child’s skill to deal with this (Howe, McWilliam, & Cross, 2005). This hypothesis 
explains how peer collaboration induces cognitive conflict to promote concept change over 
time, specifically via explicit language used to provide causal explanations of particular 
phenomena.  
 
The work into peer collaboration also highlights the importance of language as a potential 
supporter towards conceptual development. In fact parents might also be socialising their 
child to think in more relational ways (Gelman, 2015), hence increased social relations might 
play a role in the construction of knowledge. This again, is a very Vygotskian idea but may 
also explain the benefits of collaborative group work observed in other studies (Howe, 
Tolmie & Rogers., 1992). Ganea and colleagues (2007) further suggests that one function of 
collaboration through language is to allow a child to update knowledge and beliefs in the 
absence of any direct experience with the object or phenomenon itself, which also explains 
why peer collaboration might promote concept change. 
 
3.5.1 Peer collaboration 
 
It is often assumed learning is a solitary act when in actuality it is usually embedded within a 
social context (Gelman, 2009). For example studies of theory of mind suggest certain types 
of learning require attending to others as a key source of information (Baldwin, 2000 as 
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cited in Gelman 2009). This of course is not a new idea, and based around earlier Vygotskian 
theory.  Vygotsky (1978, 1983) held the view that the mind is a network of specific and 
independent capabilities, which allow for the ability to think about a variety of things. 
However as Siegler (2000) notes, despite this early belief, the initial research into children’s 
development was more focused on learning rather than the thought processes behind that 
learning. Studies into collaborative learning have suggested that this may be a specific 
context in which language use appears to play a key role in engendering productive 
conceptual shifts, by allowing the coordination of fragmented ideas as Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) suggests.  
 
Williams and Tolmie (2000) studied 8- to 12-year-olds’ ideas of inheritance in a peer 
collaboration setting. Children were pre-assessed individually and placed into peer groups 
with either similar or dissimilar ideas to their own, and took part in a task designed to 
promote conceptual conflict and group discussion. Post-test interviews with individual 
children showed greatest conceptual advance among those children who were placed in 
groups of peers who had dissimilar ideas to their own, suggesting that encountering high 
levels of conceptual conflict promoted dialogue in these groups, leading to conceptual 
change. Similar findings of collaborative group-work studies have also been shown in the 
domain of physics, although often the conceptual benefits appear after some time. 
 
A study by Howe and colleagues (2005) examined why the beneficial effects of peer 
collaboration are not always apparent until time has elapsed by investigating children aged 
9-12 years on their understanding of floating and sinking objects using a peer collaboration 
task. They found that delayed effects were not down to any post-collaborative reflective 
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appraisal, nor the breakdown of any unhelpful representations over time, rather that peer 
collaboration primed children to make better use of subsequent related observations and 
evidence. In their study, Howe et al (2005) provided demonstrations highlighting the 
different factors towards objects either floating or sinking, which were viewed as probes, 
and demonstrated fortnightly. They gave these to one group of children and not the other, 
and then gave all participants a collaborative group task. The results suggested strong 
evidence that peer collaboration can prime children to make productive use of subsequent 
events and observations in a way that “chance seems to favour the prepared mind”. The 
study suggests the mechanisms include primed sensitivity to useful events and that priming 
might depend on cognitive conflict because if a child who had incorrect prior knowledge, 
collaborated with someone with differing views, and was therefore exposed to new 
vocabulary, experiences, or explanations, this would prime them to assess and think about 
any future encounters that they may have. In this way, it could be that cognitive conflict and 
the resulting priming from collaborative group tasks promotes conceptual change within 
individuals. Note that this might not actually be a necessary element, just one that might be 
helpful because it results in stronger traces.                         
 
3.6 Accounts of mechanisms involved in collaborative learning 
 
Studies researching the impact of collaborative learning, point toward the central role of 
transitive dialogue that appears to be consistent across a range of studies. Howe et al (2007) 
conducted a study investigating children’s understanding of condensation, evaporation, 
floating, and sinking in group-work projects where children had to propose ideas, explain 
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their reasoning and resolve any differences of opinion with other members of the group. 
Their study found that knowledge gains were predicted by the proposition/explanation 
variable in group-work contexts. The frequency for disagreements was also higher in group-
work contexts, although disagreements themselves were not consistently associated with 
knowledge gains. The authors suggest that it may be disagreements create a context where 
propositions and explanations are more likely, which serve as indirect support to learning.  
 
Based on Piaget’s account (1971) of conceptual change, it would seem as though the reason 
collaborative learning is successful is because children are exposed to new information that 
comes into conflict with their existing knowledge. This causes a state of disequilibration by 
which children are forced to assimilate and accommodate existing schemas. For example in 
the case of Howe and colleagues (2005) who conducted a study similar to Williams and 
Tolmie (2000), children were asked about their predictions for materials that would float or 
sink and the reasons for why. Children were asked to make predictions about what objects 
they believed would float or sink, prior to confirming whether or not all children within a 
group agreed. There were two conditions: those where children had similar ideas and so 
agreement was easy, and those where they had differing ideas and so agreement would 
have been more difficult. Children then participated in a practical experiment to identity 
which objects floated or sank, and were asked to discuss the results in their groups until 
everyone in the group could agree about what caused objects to float or sink. Those 
children whose predictions did not come true would not be in a state of cognitive conflict 
according to Piaget. In the study, children within the group had to agree on a potential 
theory of floating/sinking, which essentially forced the child to accommodate new 
information (the ideas of the other children that seemed accurate) to eventually form a new 
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schema, thus allowing conceptual change. Thus, for collaboration to drive conceptual 
change, children must have differing ideas to begin with, in order for cognitive conflict to 
occur. These findings are of course similar to those of Williams and Tolmie (2000).  
 
Studies of shared learning suggest that reconstitution of knowledge, i.e. re-shaping or 
organising knowledge on the basis on new information to become more scientific, might 
also be a difficulty in learning science, and to this end collaborative learning may be 
beneficial (Howe et al, 2007). This remains to be fully tested but resonates well with the 
knowledge-in-pieces account of representational development. Indeed the co-construction 
of knowledge is by no means a new idea, Vygotsky (1978) considered the reconstitution of 
knowledge to occur in a shared state, where children learn first at a social level, and then on 
an individual level given the results of collective insight. Under group work conditions, 
children have different sensitivities to different phenomena and have to marry that with 
language. It is this mapping with language that provides a basis for manipulation of 
information needed for scientific thinking and argumentation. Hence Vygotsky (1978) would 
claim the reason peer collaboration works is because children are communicating ideas with 
each other which forces them to use and coordinate linguistic structures that eventually 
allows them to form a coherent argument, and thus a coherent concept. 
 
This explanation by Vygotsky (1978) echoes the sentiments of Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
somewhat. The mapping of language onto implicit concepts allows these implicit (or 
partially explicit) concepts to be borne out allowing coordination and integration of 
concepts, promoting change. Taking the same study (Howe et al., 2005), The RR model 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) would indicate that children initially have partially explicit ideas 
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(perhaps at E1 or more likely at E2 level) about the reasons for floating and sinking, as they 
are able to make some sort of prediction, albeit a wrong one. When the results of the 
practical experiment go against their predictions, children engage with dialogue with their 
peers, which as Vygotsky (1978) also claims, allows mapping of ideas onto language. This 
allows partially explicit ideas at E2 level to eventually reach E3 level where ideas can be 
coordinated and verbally communicable, thus engendering conceptual change. A problem 
with this, however, is that the movement from E2 to E3 levels is unlikely to occur right away, 
but is more likely to occur over time.  
 
A study by Howe and colleagues (1992) investigated the delayed effect of peer collaboration 
and demonstrated that a delayed effect was not simply down to extra time for consultation 
with teachers or adults, but rather because of individual cognitive activity (Howe et al., 
2005). Children are essentially cognitively consolidating information alone and it may be the 
case that the activity of group work facilitates this. This study provides some support of the 
RR model, therefore.  
 
However, children cannot rely on peer collaboration alone, particularly in instances where it 
seems as though their peers have inaccurate concepts. Tolmie (2012) considers this issue 
and highlights the importance of language as a mechanism for conceptual change, but 
emphasises the conjunction of dialogue with manipulation and observation. Tolmie’s two-
systems hypothesis suggests children are predisposed to detect all perceptual information, 
forming something of a tacit knowledge system, similar to Karmiloff-Smith (1992). This 
system over time and with the aid of language acquisition to coordinate and explicate the 
tacit ideas into more explicit ones creates a conjunction with the perceptual system and 
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linguistic structures. Tolmie’s two-systems account, although convincing, has not been 
investigated whereas the previous accounts of Piaget (1970; Vygotsky (1978), and Karmiloff-
Smith (1992) have studies in support of each of their ideas as presented earlier in this 
chapter. This would indicate that each account is capturing at least some of what is 
occurring by way of conceptual change, and yet neither account is fully able to disprove 
another. The account by Tolmie (2012) attempts to integrate the former three accounts of 
Piaget, Vygotsky, and Karmiloff-Smith and although it has yet to be tested, the two-systems 
account seems to resonate well with the idea that knowledge seems likely to be initially 
fragmented, and that these fragments of knowledge are coordinated by the increasing 
mapping of linguistic structures to tacit perceptual units, leading to conceptual change into 
explicit (and perhaps eventually theoretical) knowledge structures.   
 
3.7 Summary 
 
While there is increasing agreement that learning is likely to be domain-specific with 
underlying domain-general mechanisms, the debate as to whether knowledge is theoretical 
or fragmented has no clear consensus. The beginning of the chapter compared these 
accounts and outlined what the implication for the nature of science learning might be. 
Studies have provided support for both perspectives, however arguments for the notion 
that conceptual change, at least initially, is fragmented seemed to be more sustainable as a 
position, given the increasing evidence for this view as described in Chapter 2, also. What 
was clear from these studies is language seems to be a potential route to aid the process of 
conceptual change, particularly with regards to differing contexts. One avenue that research 
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in science learning has suggested this might occur is though collaborative learning. Howe et 
al (2005) argue that little is known about the exact benefits of peer collaboration, which 
studies have shown can often be delayed but yet results from such studies can be 
interpreted by Piaget’s account of cognitive conflict (Piaget, 1970), Vygotsky’s account of 
the co-construction of knowledge (Vygotsky, 1978), and Karmiloff-Smith’s model of 
representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). The fact that each of these accounts 
is able to account for the relative importance of language use in collaborative learning 
suggests that each is only capturing a limited part of the full picture of conceptual change. 
Tolmie (2012) presents an account that attempts to integrate the three models by 
suggesting the two-systems hypothesis, which although untested, corroborates the 
evidence that knowledge is initially atomistic and conceptual change relies on the ability to 
coordinate fragmented concepts with linguistic structures to reach explicit knowledge 
status.  
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CHAPTER 4 
4.1 Non-essentialist theories  
 
Chapter 3 illustrated that the nature of conceptual change and progression in naïve biology 
is still unclear. The majority of research has been embedded in the essentialist paradigm, 
which as the previous chapter demonstrated, is flawed. The Chapter 2 highlighted that 
research findings from such studies may be better explained by other non-essentialist 
theories, as will be described here.  
 
There has been a wealth of research suggesting that children detect and learn from patterns 
of probabilistic information (Kushnir, Xu & Wellman, 2010; Kirkham, Slemmer & Johnson, 
2002). There have been studies (Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer, & Nett, 2005) that have shown 
preschool children can understand the relation between co-variation and causal belief, but 
only when one causal factor co-varied with an outcome. Yet when more than one variable 
co-varied with the outcome, children failed to interpret patterns of empirical evidence 
(Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughin, 1988). It is possible that this pattern of findings relates to the 
development of domain-general cognitive mechanisms, which might not be sufficiently well 
developed to coordinate multiple concepts. However, it does not necessarily mean that 
children may fail to detect patterns of regularity implicitly. Explicit theories are thoughts and 
representations that are verbally accessible whereas implicit theories are those that are not, 
and yet might still be covertly influential as they are often supported by representations 
(Zaitchick et al., 2013).  
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The idea that children detect perceptual patterns from the environment relates to the 
account diSessa (1993) offers about conceptual change. In this account diSessa claims the 
perceptual or sensory primitives, or p-prims, that children acquire means that knowledge is 
piecemeal until context-specific mental models are developed over time. Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) takes this account further and suggests that the way in which implicit pieces of 
perceptual information (or p-prims) are coordinated is by a process of representational 
redescription which allows implicit ideas to become explicit concepts when linguistic units 
have been mapped onto them.   
 
4.1.1 Implicit & explicit thought 
 
A study by Howe and colleagues (2012) investigating children’s understanding of object fall 
showed the differences in implicit recognition of object fall and explicit prediction on the 
same task. They argue that prediction of the object fall trajectory requires children to 
actively and explicitly engage with their conceptual knowledge, whereas simply viewing 
different falling trajectories and selecting the one that looked the most accurate (i.e. as in 
the recognition task) is merely implicit, with no necessity to engage with explicit knowledge. 
Children in three cohorts across primary age range (Years, 2, 4, and 6) took part in this 
study. Children were shown a series of computerised scenes involving a hot air balloon in 
two tasks: recognition, and prediction. In the former, children were told a ball would be 
dropped from the hot air balloon (that was either stationary or moving) and watched 
computer-presented scenarios before being told to judge which of the scenes depicted an 
accurate motion.  Three weeks later, the same children were told a ball would be dropped 
from the hot air balloon again (stationary or moving), and were asked to predict the 
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trajectory in the prediction task by selecting the appropriate route from a series of three 
potential routes (note that the order was counterbalanced). Results demonstrated that the 
prediction task was considerably more challenging than the recognition task for all cohorts. 
In particular, the stationary scenarios had a 61.3% success rate on the prediction task 
whereas recognition task performance was close to ceiling. With the moving scenarios, 
success rates were 2.6% on the prediction task and 55.2% on the recognition task. It may be 
that the gap between prediction and recognition results from omission at the explicit level 
of elements that are tacitly appreciated (Spelke, 1994), which Howe and colleagues (2012) 
argue could account for a plausible model of conceptual development.  
 
Interestingly, the moving task was harder for children, despite the fact that the scene may 
have been more in line with their everyday observations. It may be that there was simply 
too much visual stimulation that caused confusion. However, the pattern of responses was 
quite different for the tasks too, with backwards trajectories (always the incorrect answer) 
being predicted increasingly more often with age, but no such change was evident in the 
recognition task responses. 
 
Rather surprisingly, it was found that in the prediction task, children in Year 6 performed 
consistently worse than children in Year 2 where performance was generally more accurate, 
despite the fact that in the recognition task, the majority of children from all cohorts 
performed satisfactorily. This suggests that although prediction requires explicit 
engagement with conceptual knowledge, recognition is achievable through tacit processing.  
The findings from the prediction task would also suggest that children in Year 2 are relying 
on their tacit knowledge, whereas those in Year 6 seem to be dismissing their tacit beliefs in 
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favour of a learned behavioural response. More fundamentally, this research suggests that 
with age children also have a dichotomy between implicit and explicit systems of knowledge 
(Howe et al, 2012).  
 
Providing support from the field of neuroscience, Kallai and Reiner (2010) conducted an 
EEG/ERP study that examined adult males’ electrical activity immediately following a 
stimulus event. Participants were shown video simulations of the classic ball trajectory 
problem by McCloskey and Kohl (1983) on separate trials where the ball would either exit a 
spiral tube or a straight tube. Participants were then asked to say whether the trajectory of 
the ball exiting either tube (which would either be a straight or a curved route upon exit) 
looked accurate or not. In this sense the paradigm was very similar to the recognition task 
used by Howe et al (2012), who would argue participants would not have to actively engage 
with conceptual knowledge. Findings revealed that the majority of participants tended to 
select the curved trajectory as the correct route when the ball was exiting the spiral tube.  
 
However, there was an activation peak at N400 (associated in general with a perceived 
semantic violation) for the curved trajectory, regardless of tube type. These results 
indicated that the curved path, which is always the inaccurate trajectory and yet the 
preference for the majority of participants, always violated expectations at some level given 
the peak in electrical activity at N400. However this ostensibly implicit violation of 
expectations was always overridden by an opposing behavioural response in the case of the 
spiral tube. This strongly suggests that implicit and explicit systems operate separately to 
some extent, and that in this instance, the implicit system seems to be more accurate.  
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Interestingly the pattern of responding in this study, which is essentially tacit, is very similar 
to the pattern of responding found in the prediction task in Howe and colleagues’ (2012) 
study, which is essentially explicit. This would imply that the more explicitly reasoned 
responses seen in children eventually become relatively automated. Indeed there is some 
evidence of inhibition of inaccurate conceptions by adults (Shtulman & Valcacel, 2012). The 
findings from both Kallai and Reiner (2010) and Howe et al (2012) would also imply that 
there are three layers of representation: accurate implicit conceptions, inaccurate partially 
explicit conceptions, and accurate fully explicit conceptions. There is not any indication that 
these three types of conceptions become combined, but rather that they are maintained 
separately and that the level of representation might be specific to certain contexts. In 
which case, this is evidence strongly in favour of the knowledge-in-pieces view advocated by 
diSessa (1993).  
 
Studies using blicket detectors, a device that flashes or makes a noise (manipulated by the 
experimenter) when a particular configuration of objects, or blickets, are placed on top of it 
(e.g. Gopnik et al., 2001) also suggest young children are very good at conceptually inferring 
patterns from their environment, implying that children are relatively good at picking up 
low-level perceptual information. Studies using this paradigm generally involve 
manipulation of more than one ‘causal factor’ at a time and have shown that children’s 
responses show more or less exact statistical sensitivity to the witnessed covariation, unlike 
other instances where if more than one variable co-varied with the outcome, children failed 
to interpret patterns of empirical evidence (Kuhn et al., 1988). It might be that once children 
have established these patterns implicitly, they begin to manipulate the variables involved 
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in their environment, yet as this involves the perceptual system, there is still no formal 
conceptual understanding.  
 
Consequently if this low-level perceptual system is accurate then one must consider where 
explicit thought comes from. Perhaps it derives from social contexts (Harris & Koenig, 2006; 
Rhodes & Wellman, 2013), which would lend support to Vygotskian (1978) ideas of learning 
where dialogue is the key mechanism behind the distinct overlay of explicit concepts onto 
previously implicit ones. Indeed the two-systems hypothesis proposed by Tolmie (2012) also 
echoes these ideas. This hypothesis suggests that an anticipatory system exists in the brain 
that detects all perceptual information, almost like a tacit knowledge system, which over 
time and support through tasks that create a conjunction between the perceptual system 
and language, eventually overlays implicit idea with explicit concepts. What needs to be 
considered, however, is whether this pattern differs according to different contexts, and if it 
does, there is likely to be a dual-system model of learning, which might suggest the ways in 
which children’s concepts change developmentally.  
 
It may be that learning is largely implicit where some pieces of knowledge can be formed 
explicitly straight away. This implies that the prior building blocks of that knowledge, such as 
domain-general foundations, had to have existed previously for this to work. If this account 
is taken as accurate, it would seem as though adults and children alike would have accurate 
low-level systems which cumulatively extract perceptual regularities in the environment to 
serve anticipatory mechanisms. Considering the RR model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), it may be 
that only some aspects of (implicit) perceptual experience become more explicit through 
the support of language, at the E1 to E3 stage in the RR model, and become more 
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coordinated as a result of this, leading to actual concepts. Where this happens in a bottom-
up fashion, the result is slowly emerging with relatively accurate partially formulated ideas 
(e.g. the effect of slope angle on motion). Therefore implicit ideas can form a number of 
explicit (relatively related) concepts, and reach a further level of sophistication when explicit 
knowledge can reach a level of abstraction, much like Piaget (1985) might have thought.  
 
However, although this is essentially a bottom-up process, it is also highly likely to have top-
down feeds for instance, the influence of media, conversations, and teaching. It is likely that 
occasionally top-down feeds may lead to quite distorted conceptions about everyday 
phenomena and these distorted ideas may be further reinforced by a priming effect (see 
Howe, 2006) and eventually automated (e.g. as seen in the backward trajectories of falling 
objects experiments by Howe et al., 2012 and Kallai and Reiner, 2010). In this account, 
language seems to be the likely driver for explicit concepts, but it operates in an uncertain 
fashion and will not necessarily be helpful in the development of accurate conceptions. For 
this to occur, language would need to be systematically introduced alongside observation to 
be sure of being productive, which is something that could potentially be introduced under 
formal instruction at primary school.  
 
Consistent with the layering account is an fMRI study conducted by Fugelsang and Dunbar 
(2005) investigating physics concepts. They discovered that the anterior cingulate cortex, an 
area associated with cognitive conflict, was activated when participants viewed a 
scientifically accurate movie clip that conflicted with their beliefs, as does the dorsolateral 
pre-frontal cortex, an area associated with executive function. This implies that the task in 
the study forces observation into merging with prior concepts, where otherwise the 
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observation would have just been glossed and depending on the relative strength of this 
connection, concepts may be partially accurate, or fully accurate. The response conflict was 
taken to indicate that students still had access to naïve theories despite conceptual change 
already having taken place, a finding also observed for evolutionary concepts (Shtulman & 
Valcarcel, 2012). Perhaps then, it is possible that different mechanisms might be involved in 
learning, the neurological basis of which is unknown. It would also lend support to Tolmie’s 
(2012) two-systems hypothesis in that explicit concepts overlay implicit ones, implying that 
implicit beliefs may never truly be lost.  
 
A more recent fMRI study (Mason & Just, 2015) assessed the neural mechanisms behind 
incremental learning of college students in physics knowledge, specifically mechanical 
systems. The study was able to show the sequence of neurally-identifiable knowledge 
states, which the authors argue could be generalised toward other areas of science, 
including neuroscience and biology. The study suggested that early learning is very 
piecemeal, with students’ focus on specific components to the mechanical system, but with 
further incremental training, these components could be grouped together in order to focus 
on the system as a whole. This is in line with Tolmie’s (2012) argument that repeated 
support through tasks helps to create a link between the perceptual system and language, 
eventually overlaying implicit ideas with explicit ones. Mason and Just (2015) argue 
therefore, that learning is the transition from one state of piecemeal knowledge to another 
that encompasses all prior learned components, thus providing further evidence that is 
consistent with the idea that complete integration of concepts is unlikely to occur, rather 
partial selection and integration is more plausible. This suggests that incremental and 
repetitive learning seems to aid accurate knowledge acquisition, and if the same were 
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shown in younger children, this would have inevitable curricular implications. What this 
study by Mason and Just (2015) does not do however, is demonstrate exactly how children 
go from having implicit to explicit beliefs, or how the influence of social factors, such as 
language, are likely to influence children’s learning. 
 
As noted earlier, there may be three layers of representations: accurate implicit 
conceptions, inaccurate partially explicit conceptions, and accurate fully explicit 
conceptions. These three types of representation are maintained separately and that the 
level of representation might be specific to certain contexts in that the selection about what 
pieces of knowledge become explicit and coordinated is likely to be a process driven by 
specific contexts. Also, the kinds of activity and the timing of exposure support the active 
and predictive use of context, suggesting that by understanding how contexts provide 
constraints on ambiguity we might be able to understand its influence on conceptual 
development. Indeed Skipper (2015) argues that brain regions supporting language are not 
fixed, and as the guided use of language may aid explication of some implicit ideas, it 
follows that brain organisation might shift around as a result of contextual information and 
prior experience, in which case one is likely to expect a developmental change with regards 
to the kind of contextual information children are using in comparison to the kind that 
adults are using.  
 
So far the perspectives of Karmiloff-Smith (1992), diSessa (1993), and Tolmie (2012) have 
led to the account that language may have a role to play with regards to overlaying implicit 
scientific concepts with explicit ones. Given this account, implicit concepts form as a result 
of acquiring perceptual information and eventually coordinating this information, which 
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points to a relationship between science learning and domain-general capabilities. As 
discussed earlier, contextual differences within aspects of science learning would imply that 
children may have different levels of representations (accurate implicit, inaccurate partially 
explicit, accurate fully explicit) even among areas of related biological ideas. Perhaps more 
importantly however, is that if the process of explication is influenced by factors such as 
media, formal instruction, or everyday conversations about biological phenomena, it 
becomes important to investigate the domain-general capabilities that coordinate this 
information. One would assume that better domain-general capabilities would lead to 
better coordination of ideas, resulting in a higher likelihood of accurate biological 
conceptions.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, if the goal is to assess how children are linking together related 
biological concepts to form more sophisticated concepts over time, one cannot simply 
investigate conceptual progression and growth of these concepts alone, but also seek to 
investigate the domain-general mechanism/capabilities which contribute toward the 
coordination of piecemeal biological concepts in the first place. Hence one must assess how 
far any sources of shared variance between different (biological) conceptual areas are 
simply explicable in terms of general capabilities because any variance that is not explained 
by these domain-general capabilities, may imply conceptual integration/progression of 
some kind, which would be more informative for research given the current nature of 
curricular sequencing.  
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4.2 Importance and influence of general cognitive functions 
 
The development of children’s knowledge is likely to be dependent upon the increasing 
sophistication of domain-general capabilities. This intrinsically forms the foundation of 
learning or cognition, but also highlights the importance of investigating domain-general 
capabilities in children. Indeed the extent to which there are points of connection between 
different biological areas could be driven in part by these underlying capabilities, as 
discussed earlier. 
 
4.2.1 Numeracy and Literacy  
 
There is already a wealth of evidence to suggest that general cognitive functions influence 
other areas of learning such as literacy and numeracy, for example Cragg and Gilmore 
(2014) note that although it is clear that domain-specific numerical skills and knowledge are 
important factors for success in mathematics, other domain-general factors are also likely to 
play a significant role, as well as other cognitive factors including attitude, motivation, and 
language ability (see Cragg & Gilmore, 2014 for a review). These skills are domain-general 
and are therefore not maths or literacy specific; rather they are skills that are important for 
learning and performance across all academic subjects, and they are likely to also influence 
science learning.  
 
Many studies have considered the effect of executive function (EF) and language on 
academic achievement (Gathercole et al., 2003; Alloway et al., 2008) and there are some 
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indications that working memory and EFs might well be implicated in science learning in 
preschool (Nayfield, Fuccillo & Greenfield, 2013). EFs are a group of processes that allow 
one to flexibly respond to environmental demands in goal-oriented, deliberate, and 
thoughtful actions (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). Studies have 
shown EFs begin emerging in infancy and continue to do so until late adolescence (Best & 
Miller, 2010; Huizingga, Dolan, & Van Der Molen, 2006). The three most commonly studied 
EFs are inhibition of automatic responses (supressing distracting information and unwanted 
responses), shifting of mental states (flexibly switching between different tasks), and 
updating or working memory (monitoring and manipulating information in mental space).  
 
Studies have also shown that children have different profiles of performance across various 
components of maths knowledge and while they may have strengths in one area, they have 
weaknesses in others. For instance a study by Hecht et al (2002) found that while working 
memory related to fraction computation, it was not a predictor of conceptual understanding 
of fractions, hence the role of EF skills in the performance of mathematical calculations and 
how EF skills support the acquisition of new mathematics knowledge vary (Cragg & Gilmore, 
2014). This suggests that it is entirely possible for children to have different competencies in 
relation to different science areas and that these science areas might be related to different 
EFs or domain-general skills.  
 
Cragg and Gilmore (2014) stipulate that working memory has been shown to predict maths 
performance when using non-numerical stimuli as well as numerical stimuli (as shown by 
Gathercole et al., 2003). The significance of the non-numerical stimuli however, suggests 
that deeper domain-general factors are influencing maths proficiency as opposed to 
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domain-specific numerical stimuli. There is some evidence that in 5-year-olds, executive 
functioning explains more variance in mathematics than in reading (Willoughby, Blaire, 
Wirth & Greenberg, 2012), while only inhibition and working memory skills predict English, 
maths, and science at age 11 (St Claire-Thomson & Gathercole, 2006) and age 14 (Nunes, 
Bryant, Barros, & Sylva, 2012), and shifting predicts maths and reading only throughout 
development (Yeniad, Malda, Mesman, van Ijzendoorn & Pieper, 2013). A study by Geary 
(2011) revealed how selective executive functioning skills are with regards to maths and 
reading: while the influence of working memory decreased with age for reading, it increased 
for maths. This suggests that although EFs are important for academic achievement, the 
exact relationships with different domains may vary.  
 
Studies that have found working memory was not a predictor of conceptual understanding 
(Hecht, 2002; Hecht, Torgesen, Wagner & Rashotte, 2001) may explain why others have 
found relationships between science achievement and EFs but not with regards to 
conceptual development.  Therefore research should take a componential approach to 
understand how EFs relate to science (Cragg & Gilmore, 2014). As the authors suggest, this 
necessitates further study into EFs beyond simple correlations and scores of academic 
achievement in order to examine the exact pathways involved because simply measuring 
performance at one time point does not reflect the learning of new science material. 
Indeed, research has regularly failed to account for science learning and achievement 
throughout primary school and as a result, little is known about the exact effects of domain-
general capabilities on science learning.  
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Studies that have found positive influential effects of the executive functions on academic 
achievement for literacy and numeracy in primary school (Alloway, Gathercole, Willis & 
Adams, 2003; Alloway, Gathercole, Adams, Willis, Eaglen & Lamont, 2005; Alloway et al., 
2008) and secondary school (Gathercole, Pickering, Knight & Stegmann, 2004; St Claire-
Thompson & Gathercole, 2006) demonstrate that if literacy and numeracy are influenced by 
the same variables, it seems plausible that the same EFs would also be influential for science 
education.  
 
4.2.2 Science and biology 
 
Zaitchick and colleagues (2013) argues that EFs are likely to play a part in the development 
of biological theories. Opfer and colleagues (2012) also highlight the importance of domain-
general features in science learning, particularly with regards to encoding new knowledge 
and subsequent ability to recall it. They argue that the gradual progression from novice to 
expert involves significant changes in what and how information is stored and retrieved 
from long-term memory, such as when solving problems. Science learning would require 
one to access long-term memory, and in that sense, the differences between novice and 
experts would also have strong implications for assessment and curricular design (Opfer et 
al., 2012). Studies of collaborative group work among primary aged children suggest that 
language may help to improve children’s ability to manage information and aid 
categorisation thus reducing cognitive load by sharing information management (Tolmie, 
2012).  
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More recently a study conducted by Zaitchick and collegues (2013) investigated the link 
between EFs and vitalist biology. Vitalist biology is the universal theory of ideas behind life, 
death, and health (Inagaki & Hatano, 2008). The researchers argued that the differences in 
the way in which children construct biological theories depends in part on the differences in 
their executive functioning abilities. They investigated this in a correlational study by giving 
children aged 5-7 a battery of EF tasks, and a battery of vitalist biology tasks. The former 
included the colour word test (testing working memory), and the hearts and flowers flanker 
task (Diamond, Barnett, Thomas & Munro, 2007), which tested working memory, set 
shifting, and inhibition. The battery of vitalist biology tasks included interviews based on 
Piaget’s (1985) Animism interview, which probes what it means to be alive, the Death 
interview, probing what it means to be dead, and finally the Body Parts interview, probing 
the location and function of a series of body parts. Zaitchick et al (2013) created aggregate 
scores for EFs and for vitalist biology, and after conducting a regression analysis controlling 
for age and verbal IQ, came to the conclusion that EFs predict children’s knowledge of 
vitalist biology.  
 
However, while it is entirely likely that EFs do influence the development of scientific 
concepts, this particular study did not measure individual EFs with enough sensitivity to be 
able to explore exactly what executive functions (set-shifting, working memory, or 
inhibition) influence what aspects of biological knowledge. Moreover, the three vitalist 
constructs measured in this task were also measured separately but the scores for each 
summed to create a composite score, meaning that the task is inherently not allowing one 
to examine the links and influential pathways between concepts as well as within them. 
Results showed the three areas of vitalist biology were correlated with one another, which 
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was expected given the fact that they all tap into similar areas of biology. But in order to 
test coherence, more in depth questions about all aspects of the three areas are required in 
order to observe how they influence each other. It might be individual executive functions 
are influential in different ways; hence a body of work to test specific general cognitive 
abilities with specific biological concepts is needed. 
 
Cognitive flexibility is one EF that seems important in relation to science education given 
that children are often presented with multiple pieces of information/observations that 
conflict with their prior beliefs (e.g. Kallai & Reiner, 2010; Howe et al., 2012) and as such, 
children are likely to use this EF in order to modify or change a set of ideas given new and 
relevant information. Likewise, inhibitory control would be implicated in a similar way, so 
that children are able to discount any information that is accurate or indeed not relevant to 
their current representation about a particular scientific phenomenon. Lastly, the need to 
coordinate and integrate fragmented pieces of knowledge into a broader and possibly more 
coherent concept would implicate updating or working memory in children, also.  Hence, 
this would suggest that the development of children’s biological understanding would be 
heavily dependent upon the rate of development and sophistication of children’s EF 
abilities. Note that this would also imply that any cases of impaired executive functioning 
would result in poor acquisition and conceptual development of scientific concepts.  
 
The influence of EF of science knowledge would also suggest that children may struggle to 
coordinate and form explicit scientific ideas early on because these underlying domain-
general functions are not fully developed. This might explain why children have many 
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implicit ideas in relation to scientific phenomena but are unable to coordinate or explicate 
these rudimentary ideas until they are much older. In the context of biological concepts for 
instance, it may be that different aspects are initially fragmented, but start to cohere 
around age 7 or 8 as EF and attentional control become more sophisticated (Gathercole et 
al., 2004). From this stance, curricular sequencing might make sense, provided the timing of 
formal instruction is suitable.  
 
Indeed Vosniadou (2014) investigated conceptual change processes and EFs and found 
significant correlations between the two. While it is certainly very likely that in order for 
domain-specific learning to occur there must be certain domain-general structures in place, 
the relationship between EFs and conceptual development within science education and in 
particular biological knowledge, has never been systematically researched. There is a 
desperate need for thorough investigation, which would naturally inform the relationship 
and influence of domain-general structures on domain-specific concepts.  
 
4.2.3 Maths and science  
 
Although there has been work to suggest number ability and science ability are connected in 
terms in of relative rates of progress (Gathercole, Pickering, Knight, & Stegman, 2004; St-
Claire-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006), the exact nature of this relationship has not been 
examined in great detail either, and it is possible that the mediating role of language may 
also account for this (Tolmie, 2012). Studies have demonstrated the longitudinal predictive 
effect of short-term memory, working memory, and executive functioning in preschool 
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children, on their academic achievement for mathematics by age 7 (Bull & Scerif, 2001; Bull, 
Espy & Wiebe, 2008), and on mathematical word problems (Zheng, Swanson & Marcoulides, 
2011). 
 
Some research has suggested that the relationships between mathematics and science 
knowledge are strong and that academic achievement in these areas is influenced by the 
same underlying EFs, and working memory in particular. This may be because both science 
and mathematics involve the manipulation of information, however with the latter, this 
manipulation of information is temporary given that its use is often in the service of 
problem solutions. This is also likely to be true for science, yet here it would seem more 
plausible that working memory would be especially important for the more permanent 
coordination of ideas, and conceptual integration over time.  
 
It could also be that if working memory is to some extent used more on a temporary basis 
for mathematical problems, a child’s mathematics ability could potentially be influential, if 
not predictive of children’s scientific ability, given the importance of executive functioning 
and working memory for both. The perhaps more weak and temporary use of working 
memory in solving mathematical problems, and of course the success of the child’s ability to 
do this, could in a sense influence their success to use working memory in a more strenuous 
exercise of manipulating, integrating, and coordinating conceptual ideas. This is speculation, 
however it may account for why academic success for numeracy seems to predict academic 
success for science also (Gathercole et al., 2004).  
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4.2.4 Inhibitory control in science 
 
Inhibition is also a skill that is likely to be implicated in science learning. Zaitchick et al (2013) 
say the process of conceptual change are basically where the learner builds a new 
explanatory framework and inhibits previously useful (but inaccurate) frameworks for those 
same phenomena. Research (Shutlman & Valcacel, 2012) has already shown that naïve 
theories exist into adulthood. If one accepts the premise that children do indeed have naïve 
theories available to them after conceptual change or development, and that this persists 
onto adulthood (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012; Vosniadou, 2014) then this would require 
children to have good inhibition skills, which may increase with age.  
 
Studies by Kwon and Lawson (2000) and St Claire-Thompson and Gathercole (2006) seem to 
suggest that inhibition, problem-solving ability, and spatial ability might be needed for 
scientific reasoning, however these same skills may not be needed for conceptual 
development, which may require less ‘active’ or intentional coordination of skills. For 
example, some studies (Mayer, Sodian, Koeber, & Schwippert, 2014) have shown that 
inhibition and scientific reasoning are not related. It could be that scientific reasoning is not 
the same as conceptual development, and the latter would require separate investigation.  
 
Mayer et al (2014) argue that scientific reasoning is separable from intelligence and reading 
ability and designed a study to try and develop a paper-and-pencil scientific reasoning task 
for young children. In the study they developed materials to test domain-general scientific 
reasoning skills independently from earlier knowledge in specific scientific domains e.g. 
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physics, biology, and found there was no relationship between inhibition at age ten and 
scientific reasoning. It could be that the lack of relationship with inhibition reflects the lack 
of motivation for children to stop thinking about one thing, and instead think of something 
else, however it could also suggest that the test was not sensitive enough to measure 
inhibitory effects in scientific reasoning. With conceptual development, inhibition is likely to 
play more of an important role but the evidence from Mayer et al’s (2014) study that it does 
not could be due to the fact that early knowledge is simply probabilistic learning and not 
theoretical. If it were theoretical then inhibition would most likely need to form an 
important part as inevitably theory change would require shifting thoughts some way or 
another in which case cognitive flexibility would be a skill that is also required, as mentioned 
earlier. 
 
4.2.5 Working memory & systems thinking 
 
As well the influences of EFs in general, there is reason to believe that working memory 
might be particularly important for science learning. For example, Vosniadou (2014) argues 
in order for children to hold a dual-representation of the Earth being spherical, and yet 
looking flat, working memory is likely to be required to maintain these multiple concepts. 
On the other hand, the fact that you have to maintain the Earth is spherical while inhibiting 
that it is not flat despite appearing to be may also require inhibition (Opfer et al., 2012).  
 
Likewise, children often encounter many biological phenomena for which they may need to 
maintain multiple concepts or representations in their mind simultaneously. ‘Systems 
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thinking’ is the processes of thinking about how things influence one another within a 
system/environment. This may require a higher-order level of abstraction or cognitive 
capacity because it involves being able to think in more global terms about ecological 
systems and how various aspects influence each other and have long and short term 
consequences. Hipkins, Bull, and Joyce (2008) describe systems thinking with regards to 
ecology and note that the ability to hold multiple concepts in mind and notice the 
interactions does not occur until late childhood. They argue children’s knowledge is very 
contextually based and they are not able to generalise their ideas across contexts. Perhaps 
then children’s knowledge about their own cognitions is still developing, which could 
suggest that meta-cognition is a fundamental stage in conceptual development. However, 
we may also be considering the extent to which children are able to reach a level of 
abstraction when thinking more interactively, which is inevitably linked to the development 
of working memory in children at around age 8 (Alloway, Gathercole & Kirkwood, 2008; 
Kemp, Shafto, & Tenenbaum, 2012).  
 
Working memory might also be implicated in a child’s ability for diachronic thinking 
(Maurice-Neville & Montangero, 1992; Sander, Jelemenska, & Kattmann, 2006), which is the 
ability to think about biological processes over time, by understanding and representing key 
changes from the past, present, and future. A study by Maurice-Neville and Montangero 
(1992) investigated children’s (aged 8-11) ability to reconstruct the evolution of forest 
disease by specifically examining the extent to which children introduced a temporal 
dimension to their reasoning. Children were shown a video about forest disease and then 
given pictures of a healthy spruce forest and a diseased pine tree. They were then asked to 
draw pictures of the spruce forest and subsequently a diseased pine tree, in the past and in 
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the future and were interviewed about their knowledge and their drawings. Findings 
showed a distinct progression of the diachronic perspective with age, which the authors 
claim is slow and gradual until age 11 where the majority of children are able to think on a 
temporal axis. This ability may be particularly important for biological concepts such as 
evolution, where understanding natural selection over time is chief to understanding the 
entire concept of evolution. In fact thinking in a more global way might be the difference 
between novice and expert level knowledge. This is an interesting area to investigate given 
that has been a recent push in the new primary science curriculum in the UK towards 
practical skills and ‘scientific thinking’ and of course, the introduction of evolution as part of 
the new science curriculum.  
 
4.3 Summary 
 
The actual influences that EFs have on science learning, particularly biological learning have 
not been investigated in any great detail. A wealth of research from literacy and numeracy 
have suggested EFs play an important influential and in some cases predictive role of 
academic achievements in these subjects, and so there is a case for hypothesising an 
influential role of general cognitive abilities on science learning in primary school also. A 
systematic investigation is needed to assess how far any sources of shared variance 
between different conceptual areas are simply explicable in terms of general cognitive 
capabilities, because thus far studies have routinely failed to address this. Nonetheless, 
what is apparent is that there is no clear picture about conceptual development or 
progression in science, which can be used to steer curricular organisation. Thus a body of 
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systematic cross-concept research that includes measures of general cognitive change is 
needed to clarify things. Studies have also suggested that it seems important to investigate 
language in order to access how it could be used as a driver for explicit thought, or 
conceptual development. Consequently, it becomes necessary to assess these variables 
longitudinally also, in order to track conceptual progression over time, which past studies 
have also failed to do. This would allow one to detect the developments and changes of 
children at both a group and individual level, and as such would also allow one to establish a 
sequence of conceptual development. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.1 Summary, rationale, and overview of current work 
 
At the start of this programme of work it became very clear that there was reason to 
investigate how children are learning science in primary school given the recent curricular 
changes, but also the lack of progress in this endeavour in comparison to other core areas of 
the curriculum such as literacy and numeracy. More specifically important to investigate 
perhaps, is how children use the early concepts they acquire and how this might influence 
the acquisition of related or more complex concepts, and to understand the developmental 
trends in children’s conceptual progression for ideas in naïve biology.  
 
5.1.1 Conceptual change 
 
Part of the reasons for why progress has been slow in understanding how children are 
learning science is the fact that conceptual progression for any discipline is under-
researched. The debates around how knowledge is organised, whether in a theoretical 
framework or in fragmented pieces, have not reached consensus. These debates are 
important because understanding the ways children learn will inevitably have implications 
for curricular organisation and teaching practices. Understanding conceptual change is also 
important given research that has shown children have naïve biological concepts prior to 
any formal education, and that these concepts are often highly resistant to change (Driver 
et al., 1985). In order for instruction to be effective, one needs to establish what influences 
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how children acquire naïve knowledge and how that knowledge might change and influence 
the acquisition of new and related knowledge over time. Understanding this, will aid the 
development of techniques or learning strategies that will provide learners with 
environments to foster accurate knowledge acquisition.  
 
5.1.2 Essentialism 
 
The research into naïve biology has also contributed to the debate around conceptual 
change, with the majority of theorists in favour of a theoretical framework. However, the 
essentialist paradigm that was used in this research seems to be highly flawed. As such, it 
seems unreasonable to continue to investigate children’s understanding of biological 
phenomena like inheritance, using a paradigm that constrains their answers, but more 
generally, also constrains progression in research. Up until now, much of the literature has 
been about confirming or disproving children’s notions of essentialism and by doing so, 
research has failed to consider other dimensions behind the inheritance concept and its 
relationship with other ideas. Instead it seems appropriate to start an investigation into 
children’s biological knowledge based on established research about what children are 
known to be capable of. 
 
Firstly, it has been documented that children as young as six months have a strong tendency 
to detect the perceived relationships between events and to make probabilistic judgments 
about them, and even more evidence to suggest that this capability is generally established 
by around age 2 (Gopnik et al., 2001). Secondly, it has also been well documented that 
children have a natural tendency for categorisation with which meaningful language is also 
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acquired (Gelman & Coley, 1991). What this indicates then, is that if the theoretical debates 
about inheritance and essentialism are put to one side, there seem to be two naturally 
occurring tendencies in children: perceptions of co-varying regularities, and categorisation.  
 
Consequently, what is needed to move forward is to begin research with these already 
established ideas and project what conceptual development might look like if these were 
the point of departure, mapping observations against this projection to see how far it is 
borne out, using a more natural methodology that nevertheless still pushes at the 
boundaries of what children are capable of understanding or saying. Providing children with 
more familiar contexts is also likely to give them some assistance with which to ground their 
ideas, rather than using more obscure constructs as in the past (e.g. Gelman, 2003; Keil, 
1989; Springer, 1999). Those earlier studies often asked children about unrealistic 
hypothetical instances, which did not necessarily allow children to answer questions in the 
context of what they knew, where it has been shown that knowledge is specific to that 
context in any case (Hipkins et al., 2008; Almeida, Vasconcelos, Strecht-Ribeiro, & Torres, 
2013).  
 
What might be helpful would be to assess children’s knowledge of the same phenomena in 
multiple contexts which would allow one to infer firstly, whether their knowledge is 
context-specific and secondly, coherent (e.g. Almeida et al., 2013). If children are using 
probabilistic judgements and categorisation abilities to acquire information then it is likely 
that the first concepts to be acquired would be biodiversity concepts, which may lay the 
foundation for other logically related concepts. If so, we ought to understand, at least 
theoretically, how this might come about.  
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In this way more in-depth analysis about children’s conceptualisations should help uncover 
the developmental trajectory of conceptual progression in biology, provided children across 
a relatively large age range are tested. Rather than focusing exclusively on inheritance, the 
natural extension would be to extend the range of concepts to include ecology, biodiversity, 
and evolution, since all these constructs share a number of important points of connection 
and overlap heavily as discussed in Chapter 2. These concepts in themselves are not unitary 
but are constructed of more important sub-elements and what is needed is a method of 
capturing children’s understanding of all these elements in an even-handed fashion so that 
the relationships between them, and to more general cognitive capabilities, can be 
investigated.  
 
5.1.3 General cognitive abilities 
 
Research has suggested that EFs, aspects of memory, and inhibition in particular, might be 
key to understanding biological phenomena (section 4.2). Past research highlights that 
working memory and EFs may be predictive of children’s understanding at preschool 
(Nayfield et al., 2013) primary school (Zaitchick et al., 2013), and secondary school 
(Gathercole et al., 2004; St Claire-Thomas & Gathercole, 2006). For these reasons it is 
hypothesised that general cognitive abilities would also have a large influence on 
conceptual progression in this study.  
 
The links between general cognitive abilities and science learning have rarely been 
investigated for primary aged children, and where there is research of this kind, the focus 
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has been on testing much more specific relationships, when ultimately a systematic 
investigation is needed to assess how far any sources of shared variance between different 
conceptual areas are simply explicable in terms of general cognitive capabilities. Any 
variance that is not explicable in terms of general cognitive abilities must imply conceptual 
integration and progression of some kind, which previous studies have routinely failed to 
address. 
 
There has also been research to suggest that the numerical ability and language ability 
might also contribute towards children’s science knowledge. The exact relationships 
between language and number knowledge have not been assessed in any detail, and while 
there is work implicating numeracy and science knowledge are linked in particular 
(Gathercole et al., 2004), very little is known about how children’s early knowledge on 
general numeracy go on to influence scientific knowledge over time. Likewise the exact 
effects of language on conceptual change and progression have also never been addressed 
fully and given the importance of language to children’s categorisation, lexicalisation, and 
progress from implicit to explicit thought, it seems wise to assess its contribution towards 
learning biological phenomena in primary school, also.  
 
5.1.4 Study rationale 
 
Assessing naïve biology requires careful consideration given the fact that past research has 
often selected biological concepts arbitrarily. Inheritance is a key area that has always been 
a focus and it is also a concept that is formally taught in primary school. Given the past 
methodological flaws with early research, it seems sensible to assess children’s knowledge 
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of inheritance using an unbiased and robust methodology to form a useful comparison with 
which to contribute towards the debate about conceptual development. Likewise, in order 
to assess progression of inheritance concepts, and examine the range of children’s 
understanding on a variety of related concepts that are also part of the NC (DfE, 2014) for 
primary science: biodiversity, ecology, and evolution.  
 
Inheritance, biodiversity, and ecology are topics that are currently taught in the NC in KS1 
and KS2, which are logically related to inheritance concepts also and yet, have never been 
investigated thoroughly in the same context. Although evolution is a concept that was not 
covered by the previous NC (DfE, 2001), the current curriculum (DfE, 2014), includes 
evolutionary concepts as part of the KS2 primary science syllabus and so its investigation in 
this study is timely. These four constructs2 (inheritance, biodiversity, ecology, and evolution) 
provide a logical set of ideas to explore the developmental path of concept formation based 
around inheritance, which has already been fairly well established in the literature.  
Research into biodiversity, ecology and evolution reviewed in Chapter 2 also provide some 
key insights into what the developmental pathway of acquisition might be. The aims, 
research questions, and hypotheses are therefore discussed below.  
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 Note that henceforth ‘constructs’ refers to only inheritance, biodiversity, ecology, and evolution either 
collectively or individually.  
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5.2 Aims of the current research 
 
The main aim of this current research is to examine conceptual development in a number of 
related biological concepts across primary school in effort to examine the range of 
children’s understanding about naïve biological concepts and to comment on the 
developmental trajectory of these concepts in children aged 4-11. This research will also 
endeavour to develop a new methodology to assess biological knowledge in an unbiased 
and fully rounded manner, and to investigate the effects of general cognitive ability on 
biological understanding. By doing so, the outcome of this research should inform the 
current debates surrounding concept change and the structure of knowledge.  
 
5.2.1 Research questions 
 
Specific research questions pertaining to the aims of this research are: 
1) Do children have sophisticated ideas about inheritance (assuming past research is 
correct)? If so, how do their ideas influence the development of concepts in other 
related biological constructs such as biodiversity, ecology, and evolution? 
2) How are children progressing from having naïve and simple concepts to more 
sophisticated understanding of the same concepts? And how are related concepts 
influencing each other in their development and progression? 
3) What is the influence (if any) of general cognitive abilities on children’s biological 
understanding and conceptual development? 
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4) Does it seem as though children’s concepts are theoretical or fragmented? And are 
there any developmental changes to this? 
 
5.2.2 Hypotheses 
 
The present study is exploratory and as such no concrete predictions can be made about the 
outcomes. To clarify, the purpose of the present research is not to discover what the end-
point of knowledge might look like; rather it is to investigate the nature of concept 
formation and concept change, within biology in particular. Even though this work is 
exploratory, a review of the literature provides some indications as to the nature of 
conceptual progression. These are mapped out below along with predictions relating to the 
research questions outlined above. 
 
1) Regarding the first two research questions, past research suggesting children’s ideas 
about inheritance were coherent and theoretical is somewhat disputed by more recent 
research in the same area using more robust methodologies. Arguably children’s 
knowledge about inheritance is still very fragmented even up to 14 years of age 
(Williams & Smith, 2010; Williams, 2012). Instead, children appear to be able to acquire 
a good understanding of biodiversity concepts which makes use of children’s natural 
abilities to categorise observable information in their environment and make predictions 
based on this. Hence if this is the start-point of knowledge, it is likely that extensions of 
these initial ideas influence knowledge acquision in other related areas such as ecology 
(e.g. Assaraf & Orian, 2003; Sander et al., 2006; Almeida et al., 2013) where a context in 
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which to base ideas allows for more fine-tuned reasoning. It may then be that 
knowledge from these contexts feed into microevolutionary concepts, those that do not 
require a temporal axis to understand given that children find this harder (Shtulman, 
2006). This ultimately results in children struggling to understand inheritance and 
macroevolutionary concepts such as natural selection which requires knowledge about 
inheritance without formal guided instruction.  In this way it might be that early key 
concepts in one area may help to provide a basic foundation for other connected ideas 
to eventually form a coherent body of interconnected knowledge, which is compatible 
with curricular sequencing. 
 
2) As for the influence of general cognitive ability on children’s knowledge acquisition, it is 
likely that with increasing cognitive capacity to hold multiple concepts in mind 
simultaneously and coordinating these pieces of information would require working 
memory (Gathercole, Brown & Pickering, 2003; Alloway, Gathercole, Kirkwood & Elliot, 
2008), hence one can predict that children with good working memory abilities are likely 
to have more advanced conceptual knowlegde. Similarly, the research literature 
presented in Chapter 4 also illustrated that children who had well-developed executive 
functions were also likely to be more advanced in conceptual knowledge (Cragg & 
Gilmore, 2014. This is due to the fact that they may be able to supress naïve theories 
(e.g. Shtulman & Valcacel, 2012) and demonstrate cognitive flexibility (Yeniad et al., 
2013). 
 
However, while it is the case that general cognitive abilities are likely to aid children in 
acquiring knowledge form their environment, their exact effects on conceptual 
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progression are relatively unknown and in some cases, have not been shown to be 
predictive at all (e.g. Hecht et al., 2002; Hecht et al., 2001).  
 
Nonetheless, given the influence of general cognitive abilities on literacy and 
mathematics (e.g. St-Claire-Thomson & Gathercole, 2006) their effects for science 
knowledge are also likely to be positive (Nayfield et al., 2013; Zaitchick et al., 2013). 
 
3) Regarding research question 4, it may be that there is only a limited degree of co-
ordination within particular areas and ultimately these ideas do not necessarily inform 
each other too well. The exposure children have to various species of animals through 
different means (e.g. school, zoo trips, media) and children’s natural tendencies to 
perceive regularity and categorise may imply the construct of biodiversity emerges 
earliest. Indeed Hipkins et al (2008) demonstrated that children aged seven had clear 
understanding about biodiversity and basic ecological concepts such as interconnected 
food chains, presumably because this is a subject that can be taught relatively easily in 
contrast to ecological or evolutionary concepts. This would give rise to an experiential 
sequence which is likely to have cross-cultural variation yet mirrors the sequence of 
conceptual elaboration followed by Darwin’s (1839, 1859) work: biodiversity, ecology, 
inheritance, and evolution. In this route of progression, the ideas may be somewhat 
isolated from each other in development and only inform each other at a basic level, at 
least to begin with. It also implies that children may have slightly different routes of 
progression depending on their individual experience.  
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On the other hand, conceptual development may take an entirely different route of 
progression, which remains context-specific throughout with the child piecing streams 
of information together rather like a mini-scientist as their cognitive capabilities permit 
(Gopnik, 1996). It could be that early biodiversity concepts develop first, as 
categorisation studies suggest (e.g. Gelman, 2015; Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015), which 
feeds into rudimentary ideas around ecology and inheritance, which are specific to 
particular contexts. These may develop concurrently and eventually link individual 
variation to early evolutionary knowledge. In this account layers of knowledge are 
acquired gradually and thoughts are not integrated even at the level of topic. This route 
may also explain the fragmented picture research often depicts around children’s early 
biological knowledge (e.g. diSessa, 1993; Williams & Smith, 2010; Tolmie, 2012). This 
account also implies that understanding may vary according to context (e.g. Hipkins, et 
al., 2008; Almeida et al., 2013), hence when seeking to examine conceptual elements 
held by children, doing so in contrasting contexts will help ascertain whether this 
account is valid. The implications of such a route suggests that children may have 
multiple epistemologies and that their knowledge is not theoretical as claimed by others 
(e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1994), but that knowledge acquisition and integration is a slow 
and complex process.  
 
These potential routes will vary in the way that knowledge is acquired and used by children. 
As such each route would lead to contrasting developmental patterns in terms of both 
growth of understanding and the relationship between different elements.  
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5.3 Overview of Research 
 
5.3.1 Overview of project design 
 
A longitudinal project spanning two years will be presented. Primary school children from 
three cohorts were tested on their general cognitive abilities, and their biological 
knowledge. The same children were then followed-up one year later to participate in the 
same experiments as before in an effort to assess how their knowledge had changed over 
time. This enabled a developmental trajectory to be mapped out and informed on the 
differences in children’s general cognitive abilities and biological knowledge across cohorts. 
It also informed on the specific influences on the development of biological knowledge in 
children over time.  
 
5.3.2 Time line of data collection 
 
A timeline beginning from October 2012 to October 2015 is shown below in Figure 5.1. The 
timeline illustrates the stages of methodological development, piloting, and subsequent two 
phases of data collection. Data collection was always in the autumn term of the academic 
year. This was particularly important to capture what children in the youngest cohorts knew 
upon school entry in September, and then what children across all cohorts knew at the start 
of the following academic year. There were also for more practical reasons for using these 
dates, such as the necessity to complete the entire project within a period of doctoral study.  
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Figure 5.1. A timeline of data collection for this programme of study  
 
5.3.3. Participants 
 
The participants for the main study were recruited from three North London state schools. 
The sample for the pilot studies was recruited from an additional state school in North 
London, the final sample of which was 18. The first pilot study was carried out after the 
Christmas holidays in January 2013. Results from this study lead to further refinement of the 
methodology and a subsequent pilot study was conducted in March 2013. The second pilot 
study recruited a smaller sample of eight from the original sample of 18 from the same 
school. For both pilot studies, children were selected by classroom teachers from Year 1 
(around age 5), Year 3 (around age 7), and Year 5 (around age 9) after an opt-out procedure 
for parental consent was used in agreement with the school.  
 
As children could not be tracked from school-entry to the end of primary school, a triple-
cohort longitudinal design was used for the main study. This meant three cohorts of 
children recruited in 2014 would be followed up in 2015, and as such, the study would be 
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conducted in two phases. Testing Phase One was conducted in September 2013 for all three 
London schools consecutively. Children were recruited using an opt-in method of parental 
consent from Year Reception, Year 2, and Year 6. The final sample for Phase One was 138 
across three schools. These same children were followed up approximately one year later in 
September 2014 for testing Phase Two. The final sample for Phase Two was 129 across the 
three schools.  
 
The choice of age bands was made specifically to capture children’s knowledge of biological 
phenomena at school entry age, during the middle of their primary school education, and 
towards the end of their primary school education. In this way key developmental patterns 
could be observed. Also, by tracking the sample over two years, a developmental picture for 
Reception, Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, Year 5, and Year 6 could be obtained. Note no data were 
available for Year 4 given the design of this study.  
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CHAPTER 6 - Methodological development 
6.1 Overview 
 
This chapter outlines the process of methodological development for a task assessing 
biological knowledge (accurate) and understanding (current beliefs, which may be 
incomplete or inaccurate). The previous chapters established the flaws of past 
methodologies focusing on children’s essentialist beliefs. A key part of the research agenda 
for this study was to develop a methodology aimed at objectively examining children’s 
knowledge of four related biological constructs. As such, this new method had to be piloted 
and refined in order to be used as a principled standard with which to measure children’s 
biological knowledge. This is described below. Following the account of the development of 
this measure, the first pilot study is described. The results identified some changes that 
were necessary to improve the methodology. These are discussed before going on to 
describe and discuss the second and final pilot study.  
 
6.2 Rationale 
 
The aim of this programme of research was to track conceptual progression of biological 
constructs across primary school children aged 4 to 11 using a longitudinal design.  
Developing a methodology aimed at tracking conceptual development across a range of 
biological concepts has never been attempted in any real depth before.  
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The participant age groups were selected for specific reasons. Firstly there is a tendency in 
the literature to describe the key ages of conceptual development in the context of biology 
to be between the ages of 4-10 years (Carey, 1985; Piaget, 1970; Gelman, 2009; Vosniadou, 
2014) yet no one study had examined conceptual change across this entire range. By doing 
this, a better overall developmental picture of conceptual change in biology was 
anticipated, which would allow tracking of any developmental trajectories and trends that 
would help to illustrate the patterns in conceptual development for biological phenomena 
during primary school years. 
 
6.3 Development 
 
A task used in a study of children’s ecological understanding by Hipkins and colleagues 
(2008) was used as a basis for the development of this approach. In their study, children 
were provided with a two-dimensional drawing of an aquatic scene, which they were asked 
to complete with relevant drawings of other organisms, and then asked to explicitly write 
about the relationships organisms had with each other and their environment. Their study 
illustrated that the task was effective in getting children to think overtly about ecological 
systems and interdependence between the environment and organisms in that 
environment. Hence, they argue, children were actively trying to link related concepts 
together.  
 
This task had the potential to be used for a combination of other biological concepts. 
However an issue with using the task was that it was specific to children aged above 8 years 
143 
who were capable of writing about overt relationships. Hence the writing aspect was 
replaced using semi-structured interviews to allow children to articulate their thoughts 
through speech, based on a fixed set of criteria that would also allow the researcher to 
probe the limits of children’s understanding.  Also, a semi-structured interview format used 
in previous research (e.g. Williams & Smith, 2010; Williams, 2012) resulted in rich data 
about children’s knowledge which previous language-sparse methods failed to capture (e.g. 
Gelman, 2003).  
 
Investigating the effect of the mode of exposure for different contexts on children’s 
biological knowledge was necessary because each context encountered presents its own 
challenges for knowledge acquisition and integration (Almeida et al., 2013), and because 
context has been shown to have an influential role in shaping the boundaries of conceptual 
development (diSessa, 1988; Hipkins et al; 2008, Vosniadou, 2014). Also depending on 
children’s early experiences, different contexts may influence concept change and possibly 
help children explicate implicit thought (cf. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Using the study by 
Hipkins et al (2008) as a basis, children were presented with a selection of biological 
contexts within which they could draw relevant organisms. Drawing is something children 
naturally do from an early age and as the drawings were not coded themselves per se, they 
simply provided additional information to the answers children gave to various interview 
questions and acted as exemplar stimuli about which to ask those questions.  
 
The contexts chosen were environmental contexts that children were most familiar with 
based on physical experience in urban or rural environments, and media or school coverage. 
Seeing the extent to which children are able to distinguish between these would provide 
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useful information about how they are able to transfer knowledge across related contexts. 
A total of six environmental contexts for use in Pilot study 1 were developed (see Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1.  The six contextual scenes used in the pilot studies alongside the range of organisms 
Context Key criteria for selection Animals used 
Lake Replication of Hipkins et al (2008) & is an 
obviously constrained environment with regards 
to the types of organisms one would expect to 
find there 
Bird and Fish 
Pond More stereotypical looking than the lake and the body 
of water is less abstract than a lake, which might have 
been mistaken for the sea/ocean/river. The pond was 
a seemingly clearer example. Another familiar and 
constrained environment 
Bird and Fish 
Park Familiar for urban/rural environments and 
constrained, but not aquatic 
Bird and 
Worm 
Field As above (park), but less human-focused Squirrel and 
Fox 
Rainforest Less familiar and loosely constrained, plenty of 
media/school coverage 
Cheetah and 
Monkey 
Savannah As above, an alternative to rainforest Lion and 
Zebra 
 
The contexts were drawn by hand on A4 plain paper, and scanning these images on to a PC 
to colour and print. The actual content for each drawing was developed based on the 
example Hipkins et al (2008) used in their study. Copies of the contextual scenes that were 
developed can be seen in the appendix (A.1).  
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After developing the contexts, a set of interview questions was developed. The interview 
schedule for Pilot Study 1 can be seen in Table 6.2. As with Hipkins et al’s (2008) study, 
questions about the two organisms on the page and their relationships with the 
environment were developed. Following this, children were asked environmental questions 
pertaining to ideas around ecology. Finally inheritance questions were included to examine 
whether findings would support previous work given that this method departed from the 
essentialist paradigm. These questions were organised logically and made to fit into the task 
context by asking children about the animals they would have drawn on the page, 
specifically about the kinds of offspring they would have and the types of traits that would 
be inherited, and why. It was thought that questions around inheritance, biodiversity, and 
ecology would allow the experimenter to probe children’s answers about evolutionary 
phenomena sufficiently to grasp children’s knowledge in these areas. Guidelines were 
established about the types of evolutionary concepts children might refer to (Table 6.2), 
which the experimenter could follow up on. 
 
Table 6.2. Semi-structured interview schedule for Pilot study 1 
Type Question 
Comprehension What do you think this is? 
Why do you think it’s a_____? How do you know it’s a ______? 
Do you think these animals all live here? Probe.  
Have you been to/seen a ___before? 
Drawings  
Why did you draw a ___? (understand which animals are relevant to 
the context and why) 
Why did you draw a ____ next to/in/under/on the ___? (understand 
that animals are suited to particular habitats) 
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Inheritance How did _____get born? (understand the process of reproduction) 
Children’s answers to this question were probed. 
Ecology  
Why does the _____live here? (understand animals are suited to the 
environment in which they live) 
What would happen if the [lake dried up/there were no trees etc]? 
(understand animals are dependent upon the environment in which 
they live) 
Follow up 
Biodiversity Would there be as many types of animals around if [lake dried up/lions 
went away/no trees etc] (understand interactive food chains/webs) 
Follow up questions 
Evolution 
  
 
*Note there were no specific questions for Evolution but guidelines to 
assess children's knowledge 
animals all compete for the same resources 
animals adapt to their environment 
change in the environment = adaptation 
consider why some animals are eating other types of animals 
 
6.4 Pilot Study 1 
Piloting for the first study was carried out between January and March 2013 to establish if 
the methods for investgating biological knowledge were suitable. The pilot study was 
carried out in a separate school to those eventually recruited in the main experiment. 
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A cross-sectional experimental design was used for this pilot study. The sample (N=18) for 
this pilot study was recruited from one North London state primary school. Six children were 
selected from Years 1, 3, and 5 to provide a concise cross-sectional overview of children’s 
understanding at various ages.  
 
The task was modelled on the task used in the study by Hipkins et al (2008). Children were 
handed a pencil to draw on a pair of randomly pre-selected contextual scenes from the set 
systematic pairings. A SONY DX3 digital voice recorder was used to audio-record the 
interview. Children were split into two groups: one group that completed the drawings 
before any questioning, and another group that was asked questions about the two 
organisms already on the page before drawing, and then asked the subsequent remaining 
interview questions. This was done so that any effect of questioning on children’s drawings 
could be observed. There were a total of six contextual scenes used to show comparisons of 
performance across cohorts. Systematic pairings of each of the conceptual scenes were 
devised, and one of the pairs was randomly selected for each child. The pairs were: pond & 
park; pond & lake; pond & field; pond & rainforest; pond & savannah; park & lake; park & 
field; park & rainforest; park & savannah; lake & field; lake & savannah; lake & rainforest; 
field & savannah; field & rainforest; savannah & rainforest. The pairs of scenes were 
selected so that for every cohort, at least one of every type of context was used i.e. either a 
pond or lake; either a park/field; either a rainforest/savannah. The pairs of contexts were 
shuffled for each cohort and children were given the pair at the top of the pile at the start of 
the experiment. All ethical guidelines as stipulated by the British Psychological Society were 
followed.  
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The interviews with children took place individually in quiet meeting room in the school for 
effective recording. Children were presented with the first contextual scene and asked to 
identify it. They then partook in a general conversation about their experience of the 
context. From this point on, the procedure varied for those children in group one who 
completed the drawings before any questioning, and for group two who were asked 
questions about the two organisms already on the page before drawing, and then asked the 
subsequent remaining interview questions.  
 
6.5 Findings-Pilot Study 1 
 
Despite the weaknesses of curricular assumptions about conceptual progression, it is 
nevertheless the case that a serious attempt has been made to break different key areas 
down into definable components based on current science, and that this serves as a useful 
structure on which to focus, both in terms of obtaining an overall picture of primary 
children’s understanding and how far it equates with curricular objectives at different ages. 
There is no current independent standard for measurement with which to calibrate 
conceptual development against. This is of course challenging but something that this study 
has attempted to tackle. The results from Pilot Study 1 made it clear that the interview 
schedule used there was not sensitive enough to detect the subtleties in children’s 
knowledge about different biological areas. Thus the main issue with the previous interview 
schedule might have been that it was not grounded in any framework with which to 
systematically examine the four biological constructs, rather it was too abstract and vague. 
For these reasons it was felt necessary to ground the interview schedule in a comprehensive 
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framework that would encompass all the sub-topics within the four biological constructs. An 
obvious way of doing this was to look at the NC for England and Wales. The curriculum has 
many aspects of the four biological constructs that have been broken down into smaller 
elements so that they can be taught across the primary years sequentially. For example, the 
curriculum fractionates science learning under broad headings such as life processes and 
living things (DfE, 2014), and based on earlier predefined terms, each element of knowledge 
under this banner was allocated to one of the four key biological constructs. 
 
Therefore every element of the science curriculum (DfE, 2014) that related to any of the 
four biological constructs (inheritance, biodiversity, ecology, and evolution) was now taken 
as core knowledge (Spelke & Kinzler, 2000) for each biological construct, which when taken 
together allows, theoretically, for a full and coherent understanding of that broader 
construct. For example: “recognise similarities and differences between themselves and 
others” (DfE, 2014) was identified as an element of biodiversity knowledge as it emphasises 
the differences and similarities between and within species. To aid the children, many of the 
questions were constructed to ask about specific organisms and environmental artefacts in 
the previously selected contexts. Pilot Study 1 showed that the savannah and pond were 
the most successful contextual scenes; hence they were selected for a second pilot study.  
 
Based on all the core knowledge elements identified, interview questions were developed 
(Table 7.4 in Chapter 7). Note that a number of questions addressed more than one core 
knowledge structure and not necessarily within the same overarching construct, where this 
is the case, the question number is cross-referenced.  
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A final point to note is that not all the questions developed were context-specific, 
particularly those concepts that were centred around humans and on inheritance concepts, 
because the results from the previous pilot study had shown children had non context-
specific ideas about. Hence it was decided that any question children had generic 
knowledge on (often human-based questions that wold not need to be repeated) would be 
excluded for the second interview i.e. children would answer all questions for the context 
they received (e.g. savannah), and to save on testing time the generic questions from the 
same interview schedule would be removed for the second context (e.g. lake). The generic 
questions that were only asked once are highlighted in bold text in Table 7.4 in Chapter 7. 
 
Pilot Study 1 also revealed that there were no obvious differences between the group that 
was assigned drawings prior to the interview, and the group that was told to draw during 
the interview; hence the groups children were in did not seem to make a difference in the 
expression of children’s knowledge about biological constructs.  
 
With regards to the drawings, many of the children became preoccupied that their drawing 
skills were being assessed despite reassurance that they were not, and so were very 
reluctant to draw anything at all. Those that did draw often drew things that they overtly 
expressed as not being relevant but drew anyway. In this respect it was felt that in further 
developments of this methodology, the drawing aspect should not be included. 
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6.6 Pilot Study 2 
 
The format for this study was essentially the same as the first, though testing time was 
substantially reduced to approximately 20 minutes. They were shown both contexts in a 
counterbalanced order and asked comprehension questions, followed by questions relating 
to the four biological constructs. The interview schedule was fixed and was exactly the same 
for both contexts but depending on which context the child received first, the interview for 
the second context was administered with the removal of the generic questions as 
described above. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed for later analysis. 
 
Six children were randomly chosen from the original sample of 18 in Pilot Study 1 on the 
basis that they had not previously seen either the savannah or pond contexts. There were 2 
children from each cohort. This pilot study used similar materials as the last one, two A4 
sheets of paper with drawings of four animals commonly associated with the scene. A SONY 
DBX3 voice recorder was used to record the interviews as before.  
 
Children were presented with one contextual scene after the other (counterbalanced) and 
were briefly asked to identify the animals and the place in the picture. Following this the 
children were interviewed using the schedule developed on the basis of core knowledge 
(see Table 7.4 in Chapter 7).  
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6.7 Findings-Pilot Study 2 
 
The developments made to the biological task for Pilot Study 2 following the results from 
Pilot Study 1 significantly improved the task. The results from Pilot Study 1 had shown that 
there was a need for more specific and detailed questions that addressed all aspects, or 
elements, pertaining to each biological construct. This allowed one to capture the full range 
of knowledge and the level of understanding (accurate or otherwise) children might have 
across and within each biological construct. Regarding the contextual scenes, all children 
were able to provide good knowledge about each context and were familiar with the 
environments. The nature of the interview also made administration of the task much 
easier. 
 
A content analysis (Krippendorff, 1980) was used to ascertain general patterns and themes 
in children’s findings. Generally it seemed as though children’s early ideas about inheritance 
were fairly fragmented. Generally there did not seem to be evidence of coherent ideas 
about any biological concept, even among the older children as their knowledge was often 
fragmented showing no evidence of being theoretical. Previous work has depicted 
inheritance as the starting point for biological conceptual development, yet this pilot study 
suggested biodiversity might be instead, as this was the area children seemed to have the 
most knowledge about, even from a very early age.  
 
As expected, ecological and evolutionary constructs appeared to be much less understood. 
If true, this could possibly be due to a lack of diachronic thinking ability (Maurice-Neville & 
Montangero, 1992) as principally, these constructs need to be understood with regards to 
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change across a temporal axis. This can only be explored after the main study.  
 
By systematically and comprehensively breaking down elements of core knowledge that 
together would form a coherent understanding of a biological construct, the current task 
allowed examination about which sub-areas in the contexts children might have more 
knowledge on, but also allow one to be confident in the fact that all aspects of each 
biological construct had been assessed. This is something that previous tasks using the 
essentialist paradigm had failed to do. Moreover, past studies had failed to examine 
children’s understanding about a range of related biological phenomena, which the current 
biological task developed here allowed.  
 
Overall, the task developed and described above was considered fit for purpose but given 
the results from Pilot Study 2, it was decided that a few minor adjustments should be made.  
 
The two original contexts of the savannah and lake were kept the same, but were 
transferred onto A3 sized sheets of paper which were laminated. This was to ensure that 
the task could be used repeatedly without damage. However, during the second pilot study, 
children often used their hands or objects to obscure certain aspects of the picture in order 
to better explain themselves when asked a particular question, so it was felt that by having 
a more interactive picture that children could manipulate, they would be better equipped to 
articulate themselves. The materials were the only aspect of the task that had changed, the 
interview schedule itself was kept the same. For these reasons a third pilot study was felt 
superfluous.  
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CHAPTER 7 
7.1 Overview 
 
The following chapter describes the methods used to obtain data for this thesis. Data 
collection was carried out over two years throughout two phases (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 
5 for a timeline of data collection). This chapter begins by providing an outline of the design 
of the study, highlighting the main measures used for data collection. It then goes on to 
describe the participants and ethical considerations connected to the study, and finally the 
materials and procedures used in the study, both in Phase One and Phase Two.  
 
7.2 Design  
 
A triple-cohort longitudinal design was used for this research. Children across the entire 
primary age range (age 4-10 years) were recruited in three cohorts: at school entry, halfway 
through primary education, and towards the end of primary education. The children in 
these cohorts were then followed up approximately one year later (Phase Two) so that a 
brief picture of development could be observed across primary school.  
 
The first phase of data collection was conducted in the Autumn/Winter term of 2013, and 
the second phase conducted in the Autumn/Winter term of 2014. In order to reduce testing 
time, there were two separate testing sessions during each Phase: one session to administer 
the general cognitive measures that included tests on working memory, short-term verbal 
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recall, and visuo-spatial memory. There were also tests on semantic inhibitory control, 
cognitive flexibility, receptive vocabulary, and number knowledge. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the measures of general cognitive abilities were included due to past studies highlighting 
a link between memory and EFs to areas of children’s scientific knowledge at preschool 
(Nayfield et al., 2013), primary school (Zaitchick et al., 2013), and secondary school 
(Gathercole et al., 2004; St Claire-Thomas & Gathercole, 2006). For these reasons the 
influence of different aspects of memory including short-term verbal, visuo-spatial, and 
working memory, and the three core EFs as described in section 4.2.1, (cognitive flexibility, 
inhibitory control, and updating) were assessed.  
 
A second testing session approximately three weeks later was conducted to administer the 
biological task (described in Chapter 6) for measures of children’s level of knowledge on 
inheritance, biodiversity, ecology, and evolution.  
 
Phase Two of data collection was exactly the same as Phase One, with the exception of an 
additional measure of expressive language included in the second session of Phase Two 
only. In total, children had four testing sessions across two years, lasting approximately 30-
40 minutes per session.  
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7.3 Participants 
 
7.3.1 Ethical approval  
 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Faculty Research Ethics Committee for 
the Institute of Education via the Department of Psychology and Human Development, who 
decided that there were no known risks associated with this study. The Disclosure and 
Barring Service carried out enhanced checks prior to any testing. Written consent was 
obtained from all parents/guardians of children participating in this longitudinal study, and 
verbal consent was always acquired from each child prior to any testing. The main 
experimental procedures were outlined to the parents via the consent forms and were 
explained to the children before each testing session. Children (and their parents) were 
made aware that their participation was entirely voluntary, was not linked to any academic 
assessment, and that they were free to withdraw at any point. Children and their parents 
were also made aware that all data collected would remain anonymous and strictly 
confidential. At the end of data collection, children were fully debriefed about the aims of 
the study and given the opportunity to ask questions. Participants in the study were not 
deceived in any way and there was no obvious risk of physical harm or psychological 
distress.  
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7.3.2 Selection of schools 
 
Participants were recruited from three schools in London, United Kingdom. Each was a state 
school based in a deprived area of London and had a similar profile of intake, in that nearly 
half of all pupils were from ethnic minorities, and of these, approximately half spoke English 
as a second language. 
 
Recruitment of the schools was done opportunistically, schools were contacted about the 
project and all agreed to take part in the study because they shared a key interest with the 
project in ultimately trying to improve the standard of science education. As the new 
science curriculum was due to come into place the following year (2014), many teachers in 
the schools expressed their interest in finding out the results of the study, particularly with 
regards to children’s knowledge about evolutionary concepts. Also, given the length of 
commitment to the project, one of the schools agreed to participate in exchange for a brief 
teacher training session on new developments in science education research, while the 
others agreed to take part in exchange for a certificate of research participation. 
 
7.3.3 Selection of participants 
 
This study recruited children for the longitudinal study in three cohorts prior to testing in 
2013. Children from Reception (age 4/5 years), Year 2 (age 6/7), and Year 5 (age 9/10) were 
recruited. These same children also took part in Phase Two of the study where they were 
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subsequently in Year 1 (age 5/6), Year 3 (age 7/8), and Year 6 (age 10/11) respectively, as 
shown in Table 7.1.    
  
Table 7.1. Age bands of participants in the three cohorts with corresponding Year at school across 
the two phases of testing 
 
 
In agreement with the schools, invitation letters and consent forms were sent out to 
parents of pupils in the desired age range, hence sampling was purposive given the 
selectivity. Class teachers were asked to exclude children with developmental disorders or 
where speaking English language may have been an issue, because of the nature of the 
study protocol. The resulting sample composed of 138 children (73 females) divided into 
three cohorts. These children participated in both phases of the main study. 
 
7.3.3.1 Participants in Phase One (2013) 
 
In Phase One, there were 46 participants from school OG, 47 participants from school GT 
and 45 participants from school BP (see Table 7.2). Of the total sample, 48 children were in 
Reception (mean age = 56.96 months, SD = 3.50), 45 from Year 2 (mean age = 81.13 months, 
Phase Age Year at School 
Phase One 
(Autumn/Winter term 2013) 
 4/5 Reception 
 6/7 Year 2 
 9/10 Year 5 
Phase Two 
(Autumn/Winter term 2014) 
 5/6 Year 1 
 7/8 Year 3 
10/11  Year 6 
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SD = 7.12) and 45 from Year 5 (mean age = 115.29 months, SD = 3.68). The difference in 
standard deviation for Year 2 children suggests a larger distribution of age in months from 
the mean in comparison to the other two cohorts where the standard deviation is lower. 
There was also a significant association between year group and school as is reported in the 
next chapter.  
 
Opt-in letters were sent home to parents/guardians and informed consent was obtained 
from all parents/guardians of children in the study prior to testing. The letters that were 
sent home included information about the procedure and rationale behind the study. 
Parents were told that given the new changes to the primary science curriculum due to be 
implemented in September 2014, a study was being conducted to investigate children’s 
understanding of an area of science in an effort to examine the efficacy of the curriculum. 
The letter also highlighted that science is a difficult area for many children and that the 
study aimed to understand exactly how children were learning certain scientific concepts in 
an attempt to try and improve teaching practices (appendix A.3).  
 
Attached to the parental consent letters was also a brief questionnaire about demographic 
information, described in section 7.4.1. Out of the sample of 138 in Phase One, 116 parent 
demographic questionnaires were returned (84.06% response rate across the whole 
sample). One child withdrew at the start of the study and although parental consent was 
obtained, the child was very reluctant and so was not pursued. 
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Table 7.2. Distribution of participants in each cohort relative to the school they were recruited from 
  School attended    
 OG GT BP Total 
Reception 13 16 19 48 
Year 2 14 9 22 45 
Year 5 19 22 4 45 
Total 46 47 45 138 
 
 
7.4 Materials, administration & scoring 
 
A combination of standardised tests taken from a selection of test batteries was used for 
measures of cognitive indices. Measures of working memory (digit recall, block recall, and 
backwards digit recall subtests) were taken from the Working Memory Test Battery for 
children (WMTB-C; Pickering & Gathercole, 2001). The British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS-3; Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was used as a measure of receptive language, alongside the 
Number Knowledge test (NKT; Okamato & Case, 1996) as a measure of number knowledge 
awareness. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Grant & Burt, 1948) was used as a 
measure of attention shifting/cognitive flexibility, and finally as a measure of semantic 
inhibitory control, an adapted version of the Chimeric Animals Stroop task (Wright, 
Waterman, Prescott, & Murdoch-Eaton, 2003) was used.  
 
7.4.1 Parent Questionnaires 
 
The parental questionnaire included items such as: number of adults in the home, number 
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of younger siblings, number of older siblings, socio-economic status (SES), preschool 
attendance, languages spoken at home (English only, other language only, mixed bilingual), 
mother’s education level, father’s education level, mother’s occupation level, and father’s 
occupation level. Parents/guardians were informed that their data would remain 
anonymous, confidential, and that they were free to withdraw their child and their data 
from the study at any time without question. 
 
It was felt necessary to measure the language status of the child on the grounds of language 
being a potential mechanism for conceptual change (section 2.5). There is also reason to 
believe that verbal competency may be influenced by the number of adults and children in 
the home (Hart & Risley, 1995). Additionally, past studies have established strong links 
between levels of parent education and academic achievement of children (Alexander et al., 
1993; Duncan et al., 1994), and there is equally strong research that links this to SES (see 
Bradley & Corwyn, 2002 for a review). Finally pre-school attendance was measured as this 
has often been associated with later academic achievement (Rashid et al., 2013).  
 
SES was measured by whether or not the child received free school meals, and the score 
was therefore binary. Data for the language(s) spoken by the child were classified into three 
groups (monolingual English, monolingual other language, bilingual including English) and 
each of these groups was coded as 0, 1, 2 respectively. Mother and father’s education level 
was coded on the same scale: 0 for no education past high school, 1 for A Level or 
equivalent, 2 for undergraduate degree or equivalent, 3 for Master’s degree or equivalent 
postgraduate training, and 4 for PhD, equivalent training, or multiple degrees. Mother and 
Father’s occupation level was also coded on the same scale: 0 for unemployed or retired, 1 
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for unskilled manual labour, 2 for skilled manual labour, 3 for skilled labour not manual and 
professional office workers, 4 for training required, 5 postgraduate training required, 
professional level occupation. 
 
7.4.2 Digit Recall  
 
This subtest was taken from the WMTB-C (Pickering & Gathercole, 2001) as a measure of 
verbal short-term memory. In this task, the experimenter reads out a sequence of three 
numbers one after the other, which the child has to repeat in exactly the same order. “I’m 
going to say some numbers. I want you to listen carefully, and say the numbers back to me 
in exactly the same order that I did, OK? Let’s practice.” The child is then given three 
practice trials of three digits. If the child could not do this accurately, trials began using a 
sequence of two digits. If the child was successful in the practice trials, they began the task 
using three digits. “OK great. Let’s start. Remember, say the same numbers after I’ve said 
them in exactly the same order that I did.” If the child was able to do this correctly at least 
four/seven trials in a block, they moved onto the next block where an extra digit was added 
on to the random sequence of numbers until the child failed to recall the correct sequence 
at least four times in a given block. The maximum number of digits a child was able to 
successfully recall was taken as their digit span. Each trial a child got correct was scored as 
one. The number of correct trials before digit span was reached was taken as a measure of 
verbal short-term memory.  
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7.4.3 Backwards digit recall 
 
This subtest, also taken from the WMTB-C (Pickering & Gathercole, 2001), is a commonly 
used measure of working memory. The task works in a similar way to digit span in that the 
experimenter read out a list of two digits to begin with, which the child had to repeat in the 
correct backwards sequence. “I’m going to say some numbers. I’d like you to listen carefully 
and say the same numbers that I said, but backwards. For example if I say ‘1…2’ I want you 
to say ‘2…1’ OK? Let’s practice.” The child was then given three practice trials with two 
numbers. If they were able to do this correctly they moved on to the task.  
 
For younger children aged 4-5 years, and for those who failed the practice trial of two digits, 
a number line labelled from 1-10 was shown and two cards with random numbers from 1-10 
were selected by the experimenter and placed in front of the child. These children were 
given the same instructions as above, but the experimenter pointed to the cards in the 
forward and backwards direction to illustrate how the child must respond correctly. This 
was done for all of the practice trials as specified in the WMTB-C manual. Following 
successful practice trials, the number line and cards were removed and the task began with 
a sequence of two digits. “OK great. Let’s start. Remember, say the same numbers after I’ve 
said them in the backwards order like we practiced.” Each trial a child got correct was scored 
as one. If the child was able to do this correctly at least four/seven times, an extra digit was 
added onto the random sequence of numbers until the child failed to recall the correct 
sequence of numbers at least four times in a given block. The maximum number of digits a 
child was able to correctly recall in a backwards sequence was taken as their backwards 
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digit span and the correct number of trials before backwards digit span was reached was 
taken as a measure of working memory.  
 
7.4.4 Block recall 
 
This subtest taken from the WMTB-C (Pickering & Gathercole, 2001) is a measure of visuo-
spatial memory. It is essentially a non-verbal version of the digit span task whereby the 
experimenter laid out a tray with a number of raised blocks on that were arranged 
randomly. These blocks had no distinguishing features and were only numbered on the side 
of the blocks visible to the experimenter. The experimenter tapped a sequence of three 
blocks with their index finger. The child then had to recall the sequence of the blocks that 
were tapped, and do the same. “Have a look at these blocks. I’m going to tap some blocks 
with my finger like this, when I’m done, I want you to tap exactly the same blocks that I did 
in exactly the same order, OK? Let’s practice.” The child got three practice trials with a 
sequence of three blocks. If a child failed to do these correctly they began the task with a 
sequence of two blocks. If they passed the practice trials they began with a sequence of 
three blocks. “OK great. Let’s start. Remember, tap the same blocks after I’ve tapped them 
in exactly the same order that I did.” Each successful trial received a score of one.  If the 
child got at least four/seven trials correct, they moved onto the next set of trials where an 
extra block was added onto the random sequence until the child failed to recall the correct 
sequence of blocks at least four times out of seven trials. The maximum number of blocks a 
child was able to successfully recall was taken as their block span and the correct number of 
trials before block span was reached was taken as a measure of visuo-spatial memory.  
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7.4.5 Receptive language 
 
The BPVS-3 (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was used a measure of receptive language. This task 
involved showing children a page of four pictures that were numbered. The experimenter 
then said a word and the child was asked to point to the picture, or say the number of the 
picture that they thought was the word the experimenter had said. “Have a look at these 
four pictures. They each have a number at the bottom, 1,2,3,4 [points to the numbers] I’m 
going to say a word. I want you to listen carefully and tell me the number of the picture, or 
point to the picture, that you think is the word that I just said, OK? Let’s practice.” Children 
were given two practice trials, the selection of which was based on their age group as Dunn 
and Dunn (2009) specify. In the unlikely event that children failed the practice trials, the task 
was explained again and the experimenter pointed to the correct picture by saying “I said 
[ball], can you see this is a picture of a [ball]? I want you to point to the picture that is the 
word that I said” Depending on the age of the child, the task was started at different blocks 
as specified in the BPVS manual. “OK great, let’s start. Listen carefully to the words I’m 
about to say.” The experimenter showed children a new set of four pictures per page prior 
to saying a new word. Children were scored either zero or one for an incorrect or correct 
trial. There were twelve trials in a block and the trials became progressively harder in each 
block. If a child answered eight or more trials incorrectly in a block moving forward, the task 
was stopped at the end of that block. If in the very first block of trials children scored more 
than two trials incorrectly, they went back towards the previous block until a baseline was 
reached. The baseline was established if children got either one or two items incorrect out 
of a block of twelve. The number of correct trials was taken as a raw score for receptive 
language.   
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7.4.6 Number Knowledge  
 
The NKT (Okamato & Case, 1996) was used as a measure of number knowledge awareness. 
This task asked age-specific questions to children and depending on the age of the child the 
task began and ended at certain points. “I’m going to ask you some questions about 
numbers now. Remember this isn’t a test, if you’re not sure about the answer that’s OK, just 
try your best.” Children were asked questions relating to number order and simple 
arithmetic following the list of questions provided in the NKT such as “what number comes 
two numbers before 5?” This got progressively harder “what number is 9 numbers after 
999?” Children were scored one for every question they get correct in an age-appropriate 
block. If children got five consecutive correct answers, they moved onto the next block. If 
children failed to score at least five in their age-appropriate block, they were asked 
questions from the previous block for younger children until a baseline was reached. The 
correct scores relative to the number of questions administered created a percentage 
overall score which was used as a measure of number knowledge.  
 
7.4.7 Semantic Inhibitory control  
 
The chimeric animals task was converted from paper task to a digital version presented on a 
MacBook Air 11.6 laptop. This task is described in more detail below given that it was 
adapted from the original study. The original version of this task can be presented on either 
Eprime software or using paper cards. Children were shown four cartoon-illustrated 
animals: cow, sheep, duck, and pig in the congruent trials of the task (see Figure 7.1). In the 
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incongruent trials, children were presented with the same animals, but the animals’ heads 
and bodies were mixed up e.g. a pig’s body with a duck’s head. In the incongruent trials, 
children had to inhibit their natural tendency to name the animal (under speeded 
conditions) by looking at its head, and instead focus their attention on the body of the 
animal to get a correct answer. Children were shown a total of eight trials in a random order 
per block and were given a short break at the end of each block. They were shown two 
incongruent blocks, and six congruent blocks. Children were scored on the number of errors 
in each block of trials, and the time taken to complete each block. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Examples of the four types of trial used in the Chimeric Animals Stroop task taken from 
Wright et al (2003) with permission 
 
As suggested by the original paper (Wright et al., 2003), other blocks looking at children’s 
attention to the faces were also included. The first of these blocks of trials was known as 
‘control-faces’ where the body of the animal had a human (cartoon) head on it instead of an 
animal and so children once again had to focus on the body of the animal, this time without 
the distraction of another animals’ head. The second of these blocks of trials was known as 
‘control-shape’ where no face of any kind was used on top of the animals head and instead 
a selection of shapes (e.g. triangle, circle, square) were used to replace the animals head, 
once again focusing the child’s attention on the animal’s body without the distraction of any 
169 
type of face shape at all, animal or otherwise. Therefore, there were four types of blocks of 
trials: congruent, incongruent, control-face, and control-shape. Each block had eight trials, 
and the incongruent, control-face, and control-shape blocks were always separated by a 
congruent block of trials. The final sequence was: congruent, incongruent, congruent, 
control-face, congruent, control-shape. This sequence was repeated twice, using a different 
order of images within each trial. The images were standardised so that each animal was 
paired with each shape, face, or head and body of another animal. As there were three 
blocks of congruent trials in the final sequence, two blocks were the same and so had to be 
counterbalanced for example: block A congruent, block A incongruent, block B congruent, 
block A control face, block A congruent, block A control shape. These created two sets of 
trials, set A (where there were two congruent A blocks, one congruent B blocks, and the 
remainder of the other blocks were all block A) and set B (where there were two congruent 
B blocks, one congruent A block, and the remainder of the trials were all block B). These 
were counterbalanced during administration with half the sample of children starting with 
set A then set B, and the other half starting with set B then set A. 
 
To begin with, children were shown pictures of a cow, duck, sheep, and a pig to ensure they 
were able to participate in this task and following successful labelling of these animals, they 
were then instructed to name the image on the screen as fast as they could. If children were 
unable to label the animals correctly, the researcher went through the label for each animal 
and repeated the trial. If the child was still unable to label the animals correctly, they were 
excluded from this particular test. After this, they were given a practice trial using images of 
vehicles taken from Wright and colleagues (2003) with permission. When a child uttered the 
first syllable of a word, the experimenter immediately switched to the next image to keep 
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the trials as fast as possible. Children were instructed not to use words such as “the” or “a” 
before naming the image, and if they did they were reminded of this before the main trial. 
After the practice trial children were once again reminded of the instructions and were 
asked to “name the animal on the screen as fast as you can. If you make a mistake, don’t 
worry, we’ll just move onto the next picture, OK?” The instructions were also written on the 
screen in front of them. When the child was ready, the congruent trials were administered, 
and the experimenter timed the entire block of trials from the first utterance the child gave 
for the first picture to the first utterance the child gave to the last picture. No feedback was 
given throughout the trials, and if a child made a mistake the experimenter continued on to 
the next picture. If children took longer than 5 seconds to name the animal, the 
experimenter moved on to the next picture as in the original study (Wright et al., 2003).  
 
After the congruent trials, children were then told that they were about to see some funny 
pictures where the head of the animal was different to its body and were shown a practice 
picture (again taken from Wright et al 2003, with permission) for which they were asked to 
name the body. When the children were able to understand the task, they were told the 
instructions of the task again, which were also displayed on screen “This time I want you to 
name the body of the mixed-up animal as fast as you can. If you make a mistake, don’t 
worry, we’ll just move onto the next picture, OK?” The incongruent trials were presented 
when the child was ready. These trials were followed by the congruent block again, where 
the child was given the same instructions as before, followed by the control-face block (“this 
time you’re going to see some funny animals again with silly cartoon faces, I want you to 
just name the body as fast as you can ok? Don’t worry if you make a mistake, we’ll move 
onto the next picture.”), the congruent block, and finally the control-shape block (“this time 
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you’re going to see some funny animals again with shapes covering their faces, I want you to 
just name the body as fast as you can ok? Don’t worry if you make a mistake, we’ll just move 
onto the next picture, OK?). This concluded the administration of set A of the trials. Set B 
was conducted a while later so as to maintain the child’s attention of the task in the same 
way as set A described above, with the omission of the practice trials. After the end of each 
block of eight trials (16 in total from set A and B) the number of errors for each block was 
also recorded. Hence, the measures obtained from this task were: number of congruent 
errors for set A, set B, and total; number of incongruent errors for set A, set B, and total; 
number of control-face errors for set A, set B, and total; and number of control-shape errors 
for set A, set B, and total.  
 
7.4.8 Cognitive flexibility  
 
The bulk of the WCST remained the same as the original administration, but was slightly 
adapted. Children were presented with 4 target cards as in the original, a red triangle, two 
green stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles. Children were then given a variety of 
cards that differed from the original set either by the number of shapes on the card (e.g. 
two blue circles), the colour of the shapes (e.g. one green triangle), or the shape on the card 
itself (e.g. four blue crosses). All the cards were created to differ from the target cards 
either by shape, colour, or number and were repeated twice; hence four colours, four 
shapes, and four number variations leads to (43 = 64)2 = 120 cards in total were created. 
Children were told they were going to play either the shape game, the colour game, or the 
number game, where the aim of the game was to sort out the cards into matching piles 
underneath the target cards by shape, colour or number respectively. After three practice 
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trials to make sure children understood each game, they were then told “now we are going 
to play a guessing game because I’m not going to tell you how I want you to sort the cards, I 
want you to guess. Is it the colour game, the shape game or the number game? OK? But I 
might also change the game as we play, so we might start off playing the colour game but I 
might change my mind and want to play the number game instead. Your job is to try and 
guess what game I’m playing with you.” Children were then told a correct answer would get 
a “yes” response, and an incorrect answer would get a “no” response. The cards were 
presented to children in a random sequence after shuffling. The experimenter always made 
switches to the rule after 10 cards had passed. The sequence of the rules per 60 trials 
remained the same at: Shape, Colour, Number, Colour, Number, and Shape. Children were 
scored on the number of rule changes they were able to detect. This was measured by 
placing the card in the correct target box 3 times in a row. If a child was able to do this, they 
were scored as having understood the rule. Children were able to get a maximum score of 
six per 60 trials, and 12 in total after 120 trials. Children were also measured on the number 
of perseverative errors they made. This was measured by counting the number of times 
children kept on sorting with the previous card rule consecutively, after a switch in the rule 
had taken place. If children sorted using a different rule from the previous one or the 
current one and still made an error, this was not counted as a perseverative error. Children 
were able to score a maximum of 50 perseverative errors per 60 trials.  
 
It was thought that presenting children with all 120 trials of this task in one go would cause 
boredom or fatigue, and possibly reduce attention. For this reason the task was divided into 
two halves of 60 trials, presented at the beginning and at the end of the testing session.   
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Hence the final sequence of testing for session one was: WCST set one, Stroop task set A, 
digit recall, block recall, backwards digit recall, BPVS, number knowledge, Stroop task set B, 
and WCST set two. Note set A and B for the Stroop task were counterbalanced. 
 
7.4.9 Biological task  
 
Two A3 laminated colour scenes of a savannah and a lake were used following development 
from Pilot Study 2. Cut-outs of laminated animals and plants were also included for children 
to place on the scene and manipulate. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the two contextual 
scenes (savannah and lake).  
 
Children were tested on their biological knowledge on a separate occasion approximately 
three weeks after the cognitive indices testing. Children were randomly assigned a 
counterbalanced order of contextual scenes prior to testing. Testing was conducted with 
each child individually in a quiet room. The materials were set out on a table and the child 
and the experimenter were sat at the table next to each other, with the child always seated 
to the experimenter’s left. Average testing time per child was approximately 30 minutes.  
 
Upon entering the child was reminded about the background of the study, that the 
experimenter was interested in how children were learning science, and that today they 
would be asked about some things related to science learning. They were told that there 
was no right or wrong answer and that the experimenter was not testing them, they were 
just interested in what the child thought about some of these things. The child was 
informed about what the biological task would involve: “I’m going to show you two pictures 
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one after the other. Let’s do this one first, I’m going to ask you some questions about the 
things that you can see on this picture ok?” They were also made aware that the 
conversation would be recorded and that the experiment was not an academic test, their 
interview would remain confidential and anonymous and that they were free to withdraw 
from the study at any time. A SONY DBX3 digital recording device was used to record the 
interviews. Upon gaining the child’s verbal consent to record the interviews and participate 
in the task, the digital recorder was switched on and the child was asked about their 
familiarity with the place in the context, and their experience or knowledge about it, if any. 
Children were asked to look at the picture in front of them: “Have a look at this picture, 
what do you think this is a picture of? Have you been to a place like this before?” Children 
were given the opportunity to name the place in front of them. If they named the place 
incorrectly, they were told the correct name of the place, and asked if they had been here 
before, and asked to tell the experimenter about their experience. They were then asked to 
place the animals and scenery on to the picture with the help of the experimenter. “That 
looks great! Now I’m going to ask you some questions about what you can see in front of 
you. If you’re not sure about the answer that’s ok, I’m just interested in what you think 
about some of these things.” If the child had any questions, the experimenter answered 
these.  
 
The interview was then conducted using the predetermined set of questions (Table 7.4) that 
were developed and tested during two pilot studies described in the previous chapter. 
These questions were developed based on the core knowledge structures extracted from 
the NC. The interview questions were always in front of the experimenter, and depending 
on the answers of the children, these were then probed, repeated if the child 
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misunderstood, or omitted if the child had already answered them as part of another 
question.  
 
As children were interviewed for both contexts consecutively, there were some questions 
that previous piloting had shown were too repetitive to be asked twice. These were 
questions mainly around humans and questions about factual knowledge, where children’s 
answers were unlikely to change given the different context e.g. “what does a plant need to 
grow?” There were 13 questions in total that were only excluded from the interview 
schedule for the second context (presentation order of the contexts were counterbalanced). 
Table 7.3 below highlights these single-use questions (shaded in grey) and Table 7.4 
provides more details with regards to how these single-use questions related to each 
biological construct. Note that in the case for Ecology, all elements were context-specific. 
This is also true for Evolution aside from one generic element. In contrast virtually none of 
the inheritance elements were context-specific. 
 
Table 7.3. A list of the generic core knowledge elements under each biological construct 
Biodiversity Inheritance Evolution 
Q4_G_B26 Q10_G_I9 Q22_G_Ev44 
Q4_G_des Q10_G_I12  
Q7_G_B27 Q14_G_I1  
Q7_G_des Q15_G_I2  
Q21_G_B14 Q17_G_I4  
Q22_G_B25 Q18_G_I7  
 Q18_G_I11  
 Q23_G_I5  
 Q24_G_I8  
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 Q24_G_I10  
 Q25_G_I13  
 
After the interview was conducted, the digital recorder was stopped and the child was asked 
if they had any questions. The child was then debriefed, by reminding them about the aims 
of the study they were told about at the start of the session, thanked for their participation, 
and rewarded with their choice of stickers.  
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Table 7.4 Interview schedule in full with example answers from each cohort and related codes. Please note the coding is described in detail further below. 
# Interview Question CKE # CKE description & score for children’s response 
1 Do you think these animals live here? Why/Why not? 
 
COHORT 1: Yeah because of the sun 
COHORT 2: erm yeah because they need hot places to 
live  
COHORT 3: yeah because like the lions they hunt the 
gazelles I think and like I'm not sure what these hunt 
(cheetahs) but I think they hunt the same thing and 
there's like zebras there  
Ec33 Identify that animals live in habitats to which they are 
particularly suited 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
2 Can all animals live here? Why/why not?  
 
 
 
 
COHORT 1: …(shrugs)  
COHORT 2: No because like polar bears they will be in 
the cold country because its really hot 
B18 
 
Ec30 
 
Recognise different animals are found in different environments 
- focusing on the range of organisms supported by a habitat 
Recognise different animals are found in different 
environments - focusing on the interdependence 
between habitat and organisms 
(B18) 0 ; (Ec30) 0  
(B18) 2 ; (Ec30) 1 
(B18) 2 ; (Ec30) 1 
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COHORT 3: No because say there was like a polar bear 
it would just get too hot and die 
3 Could this animal live somewhere else? What kind of 
place could it live in? Probe (go through all animals) 
Can they live somewhere icy like... Why/why not? 
 
COHORT 1: yeah, like in deserts. 
COHORT 2: They can live in other hot places but in 
cold places they’ll get really cold.. 
COHORT 3: They could live in a zoo but only in special 
conditions...they can only really live here 
B16 
 
Identify similarities and differences between different 
environments and the effect this has on the animals that live 
there, focusing on the range of organisms supported by a habitat 
 
1 
2 
 
3 
4 What does an animal need to live? Does it get it 
here?  Can it go somewhere else to get it? Probe 
 
COHORT 1: water, plants, food, the sun [do these 
animals get that here?] yes [Can it go somewhere else 
to get it?] yeah. 
COHORT 2: Food, water, shelter and protection. [do 
these animals get that here?] yes [Can it go 
B26 
4G_des 
Describe how different habitats provide for the basic needs of 
different kinds of animals and how they depend on each other 
focusing on the range of organisms supported by a habitat  
(B26) 2 ; (4G-des) 3 
 
 
(B26) 3 ; (4G-des) 4 
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somewhere else to get it?] no. 
COHORT 3: water, food, shelter, and like...yeah that’s 
it [ok do the animals get that here?] yeah but 
sometimes there might be very little water [could 
they go somewhere else to get those things?] they 
could but like if they ate meat...they might not have 
the certain animals to hunt... 
 
(B26) 3 ; (4G-des) 3 
5 Why can't this [lion] live in cold weather? But a polar 
bear can? Why? How?  
COHORT 1: because they have loads of fur to keep 
them warm. 
COHORT 2: maybe because they’re blubber’s not that 
thick but polar bears and penguins are   [could a polar 
live here?] no it’s too hot, they’d be like sweating and 
stuff.... 
COHORT 3: because its adapted to the hot weather so 
like it evolved into what it is today to survive the 
condition. [So what does evolved mean? or adapted?] 
like evolved mean like some birds they were like,...like 
Ev46 Consider how some animals are adapted to the extreme 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
5 
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some things died out cause they didn’t evolve like 
dodo birds 
6 Can all plants live here? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COHORT 1: no....because some plants will find it too 
dry. 
COHORT 2: no because some plants need water to live 
COHORT 3: no....because you need different weather 
for growing different things like bananas you need 
hot weather and like apples you need quite wet and 
sometimes dry weather. 
Ec29 
 
Ec32 
 
B17 
Recognise different plants are found in different environments - 
focusing on the interdependence between habitat and organisms 
Identify that plants live in habitats to which they are particularly 
suited 
Identify similarities and differences between different 
environments and the effect this has on the plants that live 
there, focusing on the range of organisms supported by a habitat 
(Ec29) 0; (Ec32) 2; (B17) 0 
 
(Ec29) 0, (Ec32) 3; (B17) 0  
(Ec29) 2, (Ec32) 3; (B17) 1  
  
7 What does a plant need to grow? Does it get it here?  
 
COHORT 1: water, food, soil [can these plants get that 
B27 
7G_des 
Describe how different habitats provide for the basic needs of 
different kinds of plants [and how they depend on each other] 
(B27) 2, (7G-des) 3 
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here?] no because they can’t get soil here, but they 
have sand... 
COHORT 2: water, sun, and soil. [do these plants get 
that here?] yeah but they don’t get that much water. 
COHORT 3: it needs water, sunlight...and manure I 
think. there’s quite a few animals so like...they’ll be 
enough manure and also there's a lot of sunlight but 
in areas where there isn’t water there’ll be less plants 
 
 
(B27) 1; (7G-des) 3 
 
(B27) 4; (7G-des) 3 
8 Can they grow somewhere else like…? (Somewhere 
icy/cold/dry)? Why/why not? 
 
COHORT 1: Yes like they can grow here (UK) [could 
they grow somewhere like the North pole?) no 
because it’s too cold 
COHORT 2: .No cause they grow in really hot places. 
COHORT 3: No because there wouldn’t have any 
sunlight or there wouldn’t be any other animals 
around. 
B19 Recognise different plants are found in different environments - 
focusing on the range of organisms supported by a habitat 
 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
9 Why can’t this tree grow in the cold weather, but a Ev45 Consider how some plants and animals are adapted to the 
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Christmas tree can? Why/how? 
 
 
COHORT 1: Because some plants like a cactus they 
don’t need rain and like the Christmas trees, they 
don’t need rain and they don’t need sun.   
COHORT 2: because it will be too cold and it might 
freeze but they (xmas trees) have special roots 
COHORT 3: Because that one [points to tree] its a 
different type of tree than the xmas tree and it 
doesn’t have many leaves to produce food so it makes 
less food 
 
Ev40 
extreme 
Recognising how plants are suited to the environment in which 
they live 
(Ev45) 1; (Ev40) 1 
 
 
(Ev45) 3; (Ev40) 3 
 
(Ev45) 4; (Ev40) 3 
 
 
10 How does a plant change as it grows? 
 
 
COHORT 1: it gets bigger and they get small twigs 
COHORT 2: It starts to go bigger and more leaves and 
like the trunk of the trees gets really heavy. 
COHORT 3: first it starts off as a seed sucking up the 
I12 
 
I9 
 
Describe the main stages of the plant life cycle- noting inherited 
traits do not change over time. 
Recognise the process of growth in plants 
(I12) 1; (I9) 1 
(I12) 1; (I9) 1 
 
(I12) 2; (I9) 3 
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water and things like that, then like a seed will have a 
little thing come out of it to start forming its roots, 
then like it will have grown and it will start sucking up 
water to form a little sprout then it will have a leaf or 
something and it will start sucking up the daylight as 
well and then it will go eventually into its fully grown 
 
 
11 Do all plants look the same? Why/why not? 
 
 
 
 
 
COHORT 1: No because some plants will be like in 
different conditions so you wouldn’t know which pant 
will need to go in a shady area or in a sunny area. 
COHORT 2: no because they are...because some plants 
need specific places to live than others because 
different cacti need really hot places, like if you put it 
in the garden in winter it will like get frozen up but in 
I6 
 
Ev42 
 
B22 
B21 
Describe how offspring of plants resemble parent plants in 
features 
Recognise why plants produce offspring of the same kind and link 
this back to inheritance 
Recognise all plants show variation within the same species 
Recognise all plants show variation among different species 
(I6) 0; (Ev42) 0; (B22) 2; (B21) 2 
 
 
(I6) 0; (Ev42) 0; (B22) 2; (B21) 3 
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the desert there’s no rain 
COHORT 3: No because like every tree is kinds unique 
like if you look for trees around you, you will never 
find the same kind of tree really cause they’re all 
grown in different ways  [ok so why do they look 
different?] like some plants grow on the things 
around them, so say like this bookcase if you grew 
another one outside like it won’t have the shape of it 
 
(I6) 0; (Ev42) 1; (B22) 3; (B21) 3 
12 Are all animals the same? Do they all look the same? 
 
COHORT 1:....yeah [exactly the same?] yeah because 
they’re all black and white (zebras) [what about 
lions?] no because the male lions have that thing on 
their face   
COHORT 2: ....they look the same but they’re not 
exactly the same. [why?] because some zebras could 
be like braver and hunters and like can run faster. 
COHORT 3: ....no cause they might have little 
differences like the zebras when you sometimes see 
B23 Recognise all animals show variation among different species 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
3 
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them they’ll have like different patterns on them, 
they’ll still be black and white but they’ll have like 
different orders on them... [ok so what makes them 
have those differences?] like the patterns on 
them...when they’re born like they have them 
13 Why doesn’t it ever look like another kind of animal? 
Why does it always look like the same kind of animal? 
 
 
COHORT 1: because other animals are not just plain 
black and white 
COHORT 2: because fish has like special fins to help 
them live in the sea but like birds they don’t have fins 
because they don’t live in the sea.   
COHORT 3: because it’s that species of animal 
I3 
Ev43 
Give reasons why living things produce offspring of the same 
kind 
Recognise why animals produce offspring of the same kind and 
link this back to inheritance  
(I3) 1; (Ev43) 0 
 
(I3) 3; (Ev43) 1 
 
 
(I3) 3; (Ev43) 3 
14 Can a __ (select specific animal) give birth to another 
____ like _?  
COHORT 1: no because er....I’m not sure 
COHORT 2: no because it’s not its breed. 
I1 Recognise that species run true 
 
0 
3 
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COHORT 3: no because like it couldn’t give birth 
because its not the same species even if they’re like 
the same family like toads and frogs, they couldn’t 
give birth to each other because they’re different 
types. 
4 
 
15 How do animals come to have babies? 
 
COHORT 1: er...I don’t know....I think they lay eggs? 
COHORT 2: erm...I think its like humans do, that they 
have in inside and then they just like get out...like 
humans do. 
COHORT 3: like they start mating then they do 
attempt to show off and then like...and then....I don’t 
know. 
I2 Recognise the process of reproduction as the mechanism behind 
inheritance  
1 
2 
 
 
2 
 
16 Does a baby ___ (select same animal as above) always 
look like the mum and dad ___? Why/why not? 
 
COHORT 1: erm yeah [exactly?] no it’s smaller [ok 
would this frog grow up to look like its parents?] 
B24 Recognise all animals show variation within the same species 
 
 
1 
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yeah... 
COHORT 2: it will look like the mum and dad but not 
as much. Not really as its mum and dad because its 
still young and it needs to grow.. [when it grows up 
will it look like its mum and dad?] yes [will it look 
exactly like its mum and dad?] not exactly [ok, but 
why is that?] because erm you get the same look 
because it’s your relative but you wont look exactly 
like them...its like how humans . Like my sister I won’t 
grow up to be like here because we have to all look 
different. 
COHORT 3: no [why is that?] cause like it might have a 
different pattern on it, like no animals have the same 
pattern [ok, will it look a little bit like its mum and dad 
or not at all?] yeah like the basic features like tails, 
heads.... but as it grows up it will look more like them, 
like birds when they hatch they look nothing like it 
cause they have no hairs or anything 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
17 If this cheetah had a baby, will this baby look exactly I4 Describe how offspring of animals resemble their parents in 
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like its mum and dad? Probe. Will it look more like 
its own mum and dad from its family, a different 
mum and dad from a different family, or will they all 
look the same? 
COHORT 1: it gets bigger, it grows more fur 
COHORT 2: he would know how to hunt for his own 
food and when he grows he’ll get like more hair and 
faster tails... 
COHORT 3: it would have a different pattern but it still 
look the same. 
many features 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
18 How will this baby cheetah change as it grows up? 
 
 
COHORT 1: it will get bigger and it will be cleverer 
COHORT 2: well erm in how like all cheetahs looks it 
will look like that but it won’t look exactly like the 
parents. . 
COHORT 3: it will get bigger and learn skills like 
hunting and also it would be like more aware of its 
I7 
I11 
Recognise the process of growth in animals 
Describe the main stages of the animal life cycle noting inherited 
traits do not change over time  
(I7) 2; (I11) 1 
(I7) 2; (I11) 3 
 
 
(I7) 2; (I11) 2 
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surroundings.    
19 How did the savannah/pond come to be like this?   
 
 
 
COHORT 1: erm I don’t know...   
COHORT 2: Like it was a dry landscape 
COHORT 3: Maybe because it’s near the equator so 
it’s hot 
Ev39 Identify the similarities and differences of local environments 
and how these affect the kinds of animals that live there 
[thereby shaping that environment] 
 
0 
1 
3 
20 Do you think all [zebras] look exactly the same as 
each other? So why do we call them all [zebras]? 
 
COHORT 1: because they’re all zebras! 
COHORT 2: because they’re all the same type of 
animal. 
COHORT 3: since they’re all the same species. 
B15 Grouping living things according to their observable similarities 
and differences 
 
1 
3 
 
4 
21 What makes a human human? 
 
B14 Recognise the similarities between themselves and others 
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COHORT 1: the...hand and legs and stuff [but a 
monkey has those...how are we different?] erm...we 
can like talk and stuff 
COHORT 2: that a human because they’re like people 
and not animals [why are we different?] because 
they’re people...and like we don’t have to hunt for our 
food and that we don’ look all the same and...we 
don’t need to live in a specific area. 
COHORT 3: we’re they’re only animals that have 
different languages and have like been to the moon 
and erm...and that invented really clever things. 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
22 Do people look different to each other or do they 
look the same?? What makes people look 
different/the same? 
 
COHORT 1: People look different because like....it’s 
just like their personality 
COHORT 2: different [what makes humans look 
different then?] the like the countries they come 
B25 
Ev44 
Recognise all humans show variation within a species 
Recognise why humans produce offspring of the same kind and 
link this back to inheritance  
 
(B25) 2; (Ev44) 0 
 
(B25) 3; (Ev44) 3 
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from.... 
COHORT 3: No, even if they’re twins they’ll still be 
some differences.. [what makes humans look 
different then?] like they might think in different ways 
or.....erm...it can like they might think what they’re 
wearing to look a bit different. 
 
(B25) 2; (Ev44) 2 
23 Do people ever look like their mum and dad? Do 
people ever look exactly the same as their mum or 
dad? Why/why not? How?  
 
COHORT 1: just a little bit because ....I’m not sure   
COHORT 2: as they grow up they might but they don’t 
look exactly the same [so why do we look a little bit 
the same as our mum and dad?] because like we have 
their blood   
COHORT 3: Sometimes like you can have the features 
of the mum and dada like you could have your mums 
nose and your dads chin [and do you know why that 
is?] I don’t know.. 
I5 Describe how offspring of humans resemble their parents in 
many features 
 
 
0 
3 
 
 
 
2 
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24 How does a baby change as it grows?  
 
 
COHORT 1: It gets bigger and it can do more stuff 
COHORT 2: It starts to grow older and gets more hairs 
and its body starts to change. 
COHORT 3: it learns to talk and walk and do things 
like erm...do its shoes up by itself and....get toilet 
trained and it will eventually get bigger. 
I10 
 
I8 
Describe the main stages of the human life cycle, noting 
inherited traits do not change over time  
Recognise the process of growth in humans 
(I10) 0; (I8) 1 
(I10) 1; (I8) 1 
 
(I10) 2; (I8) 2 
25 Do animals and people grow in the same way? What 
is the same/different? (commonalities) 
 
COHORT 1: yeah  [what’s the same then?] that they 
both grow [and what’s different?] animals sometimes 
come from eggs but humans don’t 
COHORT 2: Yes. That they like, their fur’s very little 
and they start to do like the little things like swim and 
walk and they like get older and they know to like 
make their own food [is there anything different?] 
I13 Recognise and compare the main external features of the bodies 
of humans and other animals 
 
3 
 
 
2 
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they don’t grow the same, humans have arms and 
they don’t. 
COHORT 3: No like with birds, humans don’t come out 
of eggs. But like the parents, some mammals just 
leave their young. It’s kind of the same cause you like 
look after them.   
 
 
4 
26 Would it make a difference to the zebra if the lion 
wasn’t there anymore? Vice versa. Probe. 
 
COHORT 1: erm yeah because the lions might eat 
them so they don’t have to run away that much, so 
the zebras won’ get dead and they’ll be more zebras 
living. 
COHORT 2: Yeah, because less lions will be hunting 
them down so they’ll be more zebras and their breed 
will get bigger. 
COHORT 3: Yeah because then it will be 
overpopulated with zebras and then people would 
have to kill them but they might kill too many so like it 
B20 Understand the process of a feeding-chain. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
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keeps the amount of zebras under control. 
27   Gazelles eat lots of grass, if there were lots of zebras 
around in the savannah, would it make a difference 
to the gazelles? Probe. 
 
COHORT 1: yeah because there’s no grass for them 
(zebras)  to eat and they’ll get hungry and they have 
to eat something else [like what?] leaves. 
COHORT 2: Yep because they’ll be taking lots of its 
food so they won’t have enough food and they’ll have 
to like go somewhere else to find food. 
COHORT 3: No cause ...but if they ate grass then none 
of the grass left for them but like it might be loads of 
grass here but none here so the zebras will starve to 
death and die out. 
Ec31 Recognise all living things are interdependent interacting with 
each other and their environment (Q.29) 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
28 You see this cheetah? Is it more like the lion, more 
like the zebra or more like the gazelle? Why/why not? 
How is it similar? How is it different? 
 
B28 Identify a number of things that can be grouped as producers, 
consumers, predator, prey, herbivores, carnivores etc. 
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COHORT 1: more like a lion because they’re both cats 
COHORT 2: more like the lion because it doesn’t eat 
plants it eats other animals. 
COHORT 3: like the lion because it hunts and it doesn’t 
eat grass or anything. 
2 
3 
 
3 
 
29 If lions eat zebras, how come there are still lots of 
zebras around in the savannah? 
 
COHORT 1: because like they’ve got…like frogs, they 
can have at least 10 babies 
COHORT 2: from the zebras that still live, they might 
give birth to more zebras. 
COHORT 3: like they (zebras) like they give birth to 
young so then they can grow and look after them to 
grow up? Zebras give birth to it and then they grow 
up and then the old ones would get hunted... 
Ec31 Recognise all living things are interdependent interacting with 
each other and their environment (Q.27) 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
30 Lions eat zebras, but zebras are good at hiding so that 
the lions can’t catch them. The zebras that have lots 
of stripes are good at hiding. Which zebra is the lion 
Ev47 
Ev41 
Ev38 
Recognise natural selection as the process of evolution (Q.34) 
Recognising how animals are suited to the environment in which 
they live 
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likely to eat first? Why? Probe.  
 
COHORT 1: The one with less stripes because they’re 
more easy to see.[right so what will happen to the 
numbers of those types of zebras?] erm they will 
decrease [and what about the numbers of the zebras 
with lots of stripes?] they will increase.   
COHORT 2: the zebras with a little bit of stripes 
because its easier for them to see them and the other 
ones are more camouflaged [right so what’s going to 
happen to the numbers of fish with small fins?] they’ll 
be less of them living 
COHORT 3: I think these ones because they’re closest 
to them, or it could be that one cause it’s far away 
from the pack so it’s an easy target.  
Identify similarities and differences between local environment 
and how these have an effect on the animals that live there  
(Ev47) 1; (Ev38) 0; (Ev38) 0 
 
 
 
 
(Ev47) 3; (Ev38) 0; (Ev38) 0 
 
 
 
 
(Ev47) 2; (Ev38) 0; (Ev38) 0 
 
 
31 Suppose it didn’t rain for a long time, and the lake 
dried up. What would happen to all the animals? 
Probe. 
 
Ec36 Identify the similarities and differences of different environments 
and how these affect the kinds of animals that live there, 
focusing on the interdependence between various habitats and 
organisms 
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COHORT 1: they’ll have to go to another place to find 
water [where would they go?] I’m not sure [ok and 
what would they eat somewhere else?] 
grass...leaves.. 
COHORT 2: they wouldn’t get any water and they’ll 
have to like...some animals they will just like sit there 
for rain to come and some would explore more areas 
to see if there's any more water? If there's no water 
they will like die of thirst. 
COHORT 3: they would like all erm they’ll get really 
thirsty and they’ll just die of thirst. If they was near 
the ocean they could get water but if not they’d just 
die 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
32 What would they eat? Where would they go? Why? 
 
 
 
COHORT 1: Nothing because they don’t really need 
water 
Ec35 Describe how different habitats provide for the basic needs of 
different kinds of animals and plants, and how they depend on 
each other, focusing on the interdependence between habitat 
and organisms 
0 
 
198 
COHORT 2: They won’t have water so they will die. 
COHORT 3: It depends where they are. If they can 
travel to find water then it’s ok but if they’re in the 
middle of nowhere…they die.  
3 
4  
33 Suppose this lake dried up? Would this plant be able 
to live here? What would happen to it? Why? 
 
 
COHORT 1: no . There’s water and stuff 
COHORT 2: erm... They won’t have water so they will 
die. 
COHORT 3: They’d all die out and lose all their leaves 
and like these would starve to death (zebras) and then 
the lions would have no food and they’d die. 
Ec37 
 
 
Ec34 
Identify similarities and differences between local environment 
and how these have an effect on the plants that live there 
focusing on the interdependence between habitat and organisms  
Describe how diff habitats provide basic needs for plants. 
(Ec37) 0; (Ec34) 1 
(Ec37) 1; (Ec34) 1 
 
(Ec37) 3; (Ec34) 3 
34 Suppose this lake dried up? Would it be better for this 
(choose specific animal) to have no babies, 1 baby or 
more babies? Why/why not? Probe. 
 
COHORT 1: No babies because it needs to drink and 
Ev47 Recognise natural selection as the process of evolution (Q.30) 
 
 
 
3 
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then the babies won’t have any water 
COHORT 2: erm...none because it won’t have that 
many stuff to eat and drink. 
COHORT 3: none because....actually a lot because it 
will eventually grow up, it wouldn’t grow up very well. 
[where would they get food then?] I don’t know 
about that...maybe lots because then can help to find 
food? 
 
3 
 
4 
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Figure 7.2. Example of the savannah contextual scene 
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Figure 7.3. Example of the lake contextual scene 
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7.4.9.1 Development of coding scheme 
 
A rating structure formulated by Williams and Smith (2006) was used as a basis for the 
development of a coding scheme, which was centred on the same core knowledge 
structures as the interview schedule. In their study, a content analysis was done after 
transcribing interviews, and key themes were taken as markers of conceptual change which 
were given scores. Scores given were from 1-7 where a higher score meant more conceptual 
knowledge. The present study therefore coded interview answers on the basis of how much 
core knowledge a child had about particular biological concepts; the coding generated an 
ordinal score and such scores were derived for each core knowledge structure. These were 
then totalled and an average score was obtained for each of the four biological constructs 
for both context-specific (asked in both interviews) and generic (asked only in the first 
interview) questions. Note that the core knowledge structures for generic and context-
specific questions were treated separately in subsequent analyses following reliability 
checks for internal consistency of the scores for each biological construct, described in the 
next chapter.    
 
A score of zero referred to no knowledge or irrelevance to the question. A score of one was 
simply a statement without any further elaboration, even after probing. A score of two was 
given to answers that displayed teleological, essentialist, or anthropomorphic beliefs. As 
such these answers could be correct, but the basis of understanding was not scientific in 
nature. A score of three is where answers tended to show the start of scientific 
understanding over social understanding, and scientific terminology begins to be used. A 
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score of four is where this knowledge becomes more generalised in that answers are not 
context-specific and the child displays more consistency and confidence. Scientific 
knowledge is displayed, even if the mechanisms/causes/processes are unknown. A score of 
five is where this knowledge generally becomes more sophisticated and consistent but 
perhaps displaying some lack of knowledge in the mechanisms/causes/processes involved. 
Finally a score of six was for expert-level responses, which is a score that a primary school 
child is highly unlikely to obtain (Table 7.5).   
 
One point to note is that biological constructs are to some extent interconnected and there 
were some core knowledge elements which related to more than one overarching 
construct, for example: “Recognise all living things show variation, are interdependent, 
interacting with each other and their environment” is related to biodiversity and ecology, 
and in such cases, the emphasis of the element was specified (e.g. variation for biodiversity 
versus interdependence for ecology) and the most direct element was scored alongside a 
separate score for other related elements.  
 
Once the coding scheme had been developed, the interview answers from Pilot Study 2 
were retrospectively coded to see if the system worked well enough to pursue. It was found 
that children’s responses from the second Pilot were easily classified into one of the six 
codes and answers from the pilot were used as examples for future coding. Given that the 
sample size for Pilot Study 2 was so small (N=6), reliability checks could not be made until 
data from the main longitudinal experiment had been collected. These reliability checks will 
be described in Chapter 8.  
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Table 7.5. Coding scheme used to code children's responses to questions in the biological interview 
by cohort (C), question (Q), and core knowledge element 
Scor
e 
Criteria  descriptions examples 
0 Do they address 
the question at 
all?  
Don't know; silence; un-codeable; 
responses that indicate no 
knowledge or are irrelevant; no idea 
about entire question, no reasoning; 
no knowledge about mechanisms.  
*Note this does not refer to answers 
where knowledge is displayed but 
reasoning behind it is not.  
…(shrugs) C1, Q2, B18  
 
“Hyenas are a little bit 
cheeky” C1, Q2, Ec30 
 
“I don’t know” C1,C2,C3, 
Q14, I1 
 
“Not sure” C1,C2,C3, Q34, 
Ev47 
1 Do they address 
the question by 
making a simple 
assertion? 
Maybe a 
description only 
Fact; tautological; non-exploratory 
simple assertions (possibly 
inaccurate); no list knowledge (e.g. 
quantifying the things a plant needs 
to grow); reasoning behind their 
answer is limited or not offered or 
based on media/observation or 
simple deduction based on the 
picture. 
“yeah, like in the deserts” 
C2, Q3, B16 
 
 “They will die.” C3, Q32, 
Ec35 
 
“It gets bigger and they 
get small twigs” C1, Q10, 
I12 
 
 “No [why not? because I 
saw it on TV” C2, Q11, 
Ev42 
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2 Do they address 
the question by 
using some kind 
of social 
reasoning  
Inaccurate or little factual 
knowledge but an attempt at an 
explanation. Here they try to offer 
an answer/explanation but without 
coherence, ideas are context-specific 
and not generalised. Creative 
reasoning/explanations used often 
based on material they have in front 
of them (often not logical or 
accurate). Social reasoning such as 
essentialism and anthropomorphism 
may be prevalent (these again may 
have no logic behind them) and 
explanations are not biological in 
nature at all. List knowledge (e.g. 
quantifying what a plant needs to 
grow) may include <2 correct 
answers. Theological 
explanations/reasoning offered. 
None or very few correct ‘life stages’ 
recognised and none are explained. 
 
“people look different 
because it’s just their 
personality” C1, Q22, B25 
 
“Lions will be confused 
because of the stripes” 
C2, Q29, Ec31 
 
“If humans don’t look the 
same that means animals 
won’t either” C2, Q17, I4 
 
“It’s used to it” C1, Q5, 
Ev46 
 
3 Do they address 
the question by 
using slightly 
more biological 
reasoning or an 
attempt at 
explaining a 
biological 
mechanism of 
Better consistency in explanations 
but ideas are still not altogether 
generalised, or always accurate. 
Perhaps still some evidence of 
creative reasoning but the start of 
more coherent logical explanations. 
Knowledge about mechanisms is still 
very little or unknown but an 
attempt at an explanation is made, 
“Yeah, because less lions 
will be hunting them 
down so they’ll be more 
zebras and their breed 
will get bigger.” C2, Q26,, 
B20 
 
“because there’s no grass 
for them to eat and 
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sorts? usually a combination of social and 
biological reasoning, but social 
reasoning is more prevalent (more 
logic to this reasoning than above). 
Scientific vocabulary rarely used 
(<1term) and list knowledge (e.g. 
about the number of things a plant 
needs to grow) <3 correct items. 
Theological explanations 
occasionally offered for complex 
mechanisms. Only some (<3) correct 
‘life stages’ recognised but these are 
not explained. Children answers are 
fixated upon surface traits.  
they’ll get hungry and 
have to eat something 
else” C3, Q27, Ec31  
 
“animals sometimes 
come from eggs but 
humans don’t” C1, Q25, 
I13 
 
“It’s near the equator“ 
C3, Q19, Ev39 
 
 
4 Do they answer 
the question 
using more 
biological 
reasoning and is 
this more 
generalised? 
Reasoning/explanations are much 
more generalised across ideas and 
there is increasing consistency and 
confidence in answers. Some 
scientific terms are starting to be 
used (<2) possibly incorrectly and 
they may be misunderstood.  The 
use of more biological reasoning 
(some inaccuracies or inappropriate) 
over social reasoning. Mechanisms 
where appropriate are inaccurate or 
unknown but seemingly more logical 
in nature (explanations at this point 
may be more descriptive in nature 
given their limited knowledge). List 
knowledge (e.g. number of things a 
“Animals that eat grass 
hibernate I think…” C2, 
Q4, B26 
 
“They’d all die out and 
lose all their leaves and 
like these would starve to 
death (zebras) because 
they need plants and 
then the lions would have 
no food if the zebras die 
and they’d die too. It’s 
like a chain.” C3, Q33, 
Ec34 
 
“Because if I look whole, 
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plan needs to grow) of <4 correct 
answers. No reciprocity in thought, 
knowledge is still piecemeal. 
Majority of (>4) life stages described 
but very few explained.  
like all of it like mum, I’d 
be just like her. If I looked 
all of it like my dad, I’d 
look like him. So if it’s half 
and half, I’m him and 
her.” C3, Q23, I5 
 
“I think these ones 
(zebras) because they’re 
closest to them (lions), or 
it could be that one cause 
its far away from the 
pack so it’s an easy 
target.” C3, Q30, Ev47 
 
5 Do they answer 
demonstrating a 
more 
generalised and 
holistic 
understanding? 
The start of more biological causal 
explanations, which are consistent 
across contexts. Some use of 
scientific/biological words (> 3 
words), but still possibly 
misunderstood. Mechanisms, where 
appropriate, may be more logical 
than above but possibly still 
inaccurate/inappropriate. More 
coherent and/or explicit 
understanding is demonstrated (i.e. 
responses do not seem as though 
they are merely guesses, and causal 
explanations are offered as a basis 
for biological reasoning). There is 
“ It would make a big 
difference because then 
there would be a large 
overpopulation of zebras, 
so then there’d be no 
grass left, so then the 
zebras will all die out! So 
you need a little of 
predetors.” C3, Q6, B20.  
 
“It’s a good place to keep 
her babies safe from any 
predators on land, cause 
if the frog had her babies 
on land there might be 
208 
reciprocity in thought and systems 
are understood in more than just 
one-way relationships. List 
knowledge is good <6 correct. Some 
details in mechanism knowledge 
may be unknown/misunderstood 
but generally the broader ideas are 
grasped. Nearly all ‘life stages’ are 
recognised and explained.  
some predators on land 
who might want to eat it 
and they have some soft 
jelly around it, cause I felt 
one in the lake before 
and umm so they need 
water to keep their 
surface slippery or 
otherwise they’ll dry up 
and die.” C3, Q1, Ec33.  
 
“Their cells join together 
and they can erm make a 
baby so it basically makes 
a mixture of them.” C3, 
Q15, I2 
 
“because it’s adapted to 
the hot weather so like it 
evolved into what it is 
today to survive the 
condition. [So what does 
evolved mean? or 
adapted?] like evolved 
mean like some birds they 
were …some things died 
out cause they didn’t 
evolve like dodo birds” 
C3, Q5, Ev46 
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6 Expert level 
answers. Very 
little incorrect.  
Better grasp of 
interactions/interdependency/ 
reciprocity. Genetic reasoning or 
correct biological explanations are 
offered where appropriate; 
dimensionality of time may still be 
an issue. Very little that is incorrect.  
*No children displayed 
this code in the first pilot 
study so there are no 
examples. 
 
Note that the scale above is ordinal and not interval (which would be required for the 
planned longitudinal data analysis. However, there is substantial precedent for treating data 
from scales such as these as interval. For example science-related studies by Williams and 
Smith (2010), Myant and Williams, (2005), Howe et al., (2005), Howe et al (2012) and 
Phillips and Tolmie (2007) have used ordinal scores, which are later transfored into quasi-
interval scores in order to conduct data analysis.  
 
Interval scores are preferable because they allow the use of more powerful and systematic 
analysis of patterns of data using parametric techniques. Treating ordinal scores as interval 
scores is not a violation of statistical principles despite this often being a concern, however 
as Hair et al (2009) describe, parametric techniques essentially require estimates of central 
tendency to be normally distributed rather than the actual data points, thus as long as there 
are no obvious distortions in the data (e.g. floor or ceiling effects) these techniques tend to 
be largely robust.  
 
Nonetheless, something to note is that in the present study, this does not mean that there is 
not some tension between the detail of children’s responses and the reduction of these to 
interval indices, however the objectives of the research in terms of looking at 
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correspondences between areas of understanding necessitated an emphasis on interval 
scores given the planned data analysis, and more qualitative aspects of the data can be 
explored elsewhere. The ordinal raw scores capture conceptual progression and there is in 
fact some tendency towards normal distribution, with relatively few responses at the 
extremes of the scale, although it is necessary to consider what increases in score imply a 
shift from and to in terms of content, when addressing their interpretation.  
 
The examples shown in the interview schedule (Table 7.4) of the average responses from 
each cohort for each core knowledge element tells us some useful things. For example, the 
key areas missing from children’s knowledge seemed to be ideas around causal process and 
mechanisms behind biological phenomena, and reasons why things were as they were. 
Often young children would wildly guess the answers to questions addressing mechanistic 
understanding. It was only toward Year 5 that some children were able to offer logical and 
at times correct answers. This suggests that children’s early knowledge may not be 
theoretical, but perhaps more perceptual in nature, although a larger sample size would be 
needed to confirm this.  
 
In fact there might be a change in the type of causal reasoning children used with age. Many 
of the explanations behind children’s ideas in Year 1 were attributable to more 
psychological or teleological reasoning, rather than mechanistic or biological causal 
explanations offered by children in Year 5. For example, when children were asked what the 
effect would be if a lion no longer lived in the savannah, a boy aged 6 replied: ”zebras would 
be happier because lions used to scare them.” In contrast, a boy aged 10 replied “if there 
was no lions whatsoever then the zebras could populate a little bit too much and that's when 
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the lion needs to come back”, thus demonstrating key differences in their reasoning.  A key 
turning point for social to biological causal reasoning seemed to be around Year 3 where 
children preferred biological explanations over social ones. This is something the coding 
scheme is also able to detect effectively. However despite this, some social reasoning was 
still offered even among the older children in Year 5. It may be that patterns of non-
biological reasoning are based around observation and discourse within a child’s own 
personal experience (cf. Frusal, 2015). This is further supported by the fact that it was found 
media and prior experience seemed to heavily influence children’s knowledge, particularly 
when they lacked biological understanding. These ideas will need to be investigated in more 
detail in the main experiment, however for now, the findings indicate sensitivity on part of 
the coding scheme and interview schedule.  
 
7.4.10 Overall procedure  
 
Upon entering the testing room, children were informed about the study and given the 
opportunity to ask questions. Children were told that the experimenter was interested in 
how children across primary school were learning science, and that today they were going 
to be playing some games that were related to science learning. They were assured that the 
experiment was in no way compulsory, was not related to their academic achievement and 
that results would remain confidential. They were then asked for their verbal consent and if 
obtained, details about the child’s name (each child was later assigned an anonymous 
identifying code, but the child’s name was needed to be able to follow them up the 
following year and to ensure parental consent), age, and class. The child was then given 
instructions for each subsequent cognitive tests given described earlier in section 7.4.1 and 
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were not told their results on any of the tests, but were given praise throughout such as 
“well done, you’re doing really well.” The child had the opportunity to ask questions 
throughout the testing period and was debriefed at the end of the session.  
 
The order of the measures for general cognitive abilities was organised in such a way so as 
to ensure no boredom or fatigue among children. The order of the tasks was always the 
same: WCST part one, Stroop task set A, digit recall, block recall, backwards digit recall, 
BPVS, NKT, Stroop task set B, and WCST part two (stoop task was set A and set B were 
counterbalanced). Average testing time was approximately 30-40 minutes for each child for 
the first session on the general cognitive ability measures. The second session for the 
biological knowledge task was conducted approximately three weeks later and also took 
around 30 minutes per child.  
 
All testing was conducted in a quiet meeting room within the school, with the researcher 
and the child alone. A table with the materials was set up beforehand and the child sat to 
the left of the experimenter in front of the table.  
 
7.5. Phase Two 
7.5.1 Participants 
 
Participants that were recruited in Phase One of the experiment were followed up in Phase 
Two from the same three state schools in London. As parental consent had already been 
obtained for the entire longitudinal study, only verbal consent of the child was obtained 
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prior to testing. Given that London schools typically have a high turnover, attrition was 
expected. A total of nine children had left the study, leaving the total number of children at 
Phase Two at 129 making up 6.5% of the original sample. Details of attrition levels are 
shown in Table 7.6 below:  
 
Table 7.6. Rates of attrition in each Year group across the three schools recruited in this study 
   School   
    OG GT BP Total 
Year at 
school 
Year 1 1 2 2 5 
Year 3 0 1 1 2 
Year 5 0 2 0 2 
  Total 1 5 3 9 
 
This phase of the study aimed to test children from Year 1 (age 5/6 years), Year 3 (age 7/8), 
and Year 5 (age 9/10). There were 45 participants from school OG, 42 participants from 
school GT and 42 participants from school BP. Of the total sample, 38 children are in Year 1 
(mean age = 57.05 months, SD = 3.53), 41 from Year 3 (mean age = 81.12 months, SD = 7.27) 
and 41 from Year 5 (mean age = 115.30 months, SD = 3.67). Once again the standard 
deviation for Cohort 2 was more widely distributed than for the other two cohorts 
suggesting a wider distribution of ages around the mean. 
 
7.5.2 Materials & administration Phase Two 
 
The materials and procedure for Phase Two session one on the general cognitive measures 
were exactly the same as those described above for Phase One session one. Likewise the 
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materials and the procedure for the biological task were exactly the same as those in Phase 
One, except with the addition of one more task at the end.  
 
The vocabulary subtest from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999) test battery was included in the study as a measure of expressive language. 
It was felt necessary to include this task given that the biological task itself was expressive in 
nature. Unfortunately this test could not have been used during Phase One because it could 
only be administered to children aged 6 years and above. As children were older, this 
measure was subsequently included at the very end of testing after the biological measure. 
The reasons for this were so that the testing time for session one would not be extended, 
but also because it ensured consistency of testing sequence between Phase One and Phase 
Two up to this point. If there were any interaction between testing order and performance, 
this would therefore remain stable.  
 
7.5.2.1 Expressive language 
 
Children were told that they would hear the experimenter say a word and that they were to 
tell the experimenter the meaning of the word as best they could: “I’m going to say a word, 
and all I’d like you to do is to listen carefully and tell me what you think that word means.” If 
children were stuck they were prompted to give an example or to use the word in a 
sentence (as specified by the instructions in the WASI manual). Words used in the task 
increased in difficulty and children’s answers were coded as either zero for incorrect, one 
for partially correct, and two for correct.  Children started the task at various stages, 
following the guidelines of the WASI manual. If they failed to score two for the first two 
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trials, the task was administered backwards until a baseline could be reached (score of two 
for two consecutive trials). For the children aged six, or those that failed the first block of 
verbal trials, the first four trials consisted of showing children a picture of a shell, shovel, 
fish, and map which the child was asked to label correctly. These were scored in the same 
way as the other trials. If children failed to answer correctly five consecutive times, the task 
was stopped, and their scores totalled up. The final overall score was used as a measure of 
expressive language.  
 
7.5.3 Overall procedure for Phase Two 
 
The overall procedure for Phase Two was exactly the same as the procedure described in 
Phase One (see section 7.4.2) with the addition of the expressive language task in session 
two, described above. Testing took place in the same meeting rooms in each school, and the 
materials were set up in the same way as in Phase One, with the child always sitting to the 
left of the experimenter. Testing time was 30-40 minutes for each session.  
 
Children were fully debriefed at the end of the final testing session and were told the aim of 
the study was to try to understand how children in primary school were learning science 
because some children find science a difficult subject to learn. They were also told how 
learning changed from Reception all the way through to Year 6, which is why children across 
a number of year groups took part. Children were made aware that the tasks they 
participated were all linked to science learning in some way and were then given the 
opportunity to ask any specific questions, which the experimenter answered in as much 
detail as possible. Children were once again reminded that their data would remain 
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confidential and anonymous, and they were then thanked for their participation and given a 
selection of stickers as a token of gratitude.  
 
7.6. Teacher data 
 
It was thought that obtaining some background information about the kinds of concepts 
children are exposed to in class across the three schools, and the types of teaching 
strategies used would be valuable information to have. A questionnaire was developed 
which aimed to collect the said information as well as the education level of the teachers, 
their professional training, and confidence levels of teaching science at primary school. 
These questionnaires were administered to teachers across all year groups at all three 
schools in the study. Teachers were told their participation was absolutely voluntary, and 
that information they supplied would remain anonymous, strictly confidential, and if they 
later chose to withdraw their data, they were able to do so with immediate effect. A copy of 
the teacher questionnaire can be found in the appendix (A.4).  
 
Unfortunately the return rate of completed questionnaires was very low, with only 13 
questionnaires having been returned (see Table 7.7). At least one questionnaire was 
returned for each academic year group apart from Reception where no teachers returned 
their questionnaires. For these reasons data were explored qualitatively in the appendix 
(A.5) and interpreted with caution. 
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Table 7.7. Number of teacher questionnaires returned by each school alongside the year group each 
teacher taught 
School Number of Teachers Number of returned questionnaires 
OG 14 0 
GT 19 7: 2 x Year 1; 1 x Year 2; 1 x Year 3; 2 x Year 4; 1 x Year 
6 
BP 32 6: 1 x Year 1; 1 x Year 3; 1 x Year 4; 1 x Year 5; 2 x Year 
6 
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CHAPTER 8: RESULTS TIME 1 
8.1 Overview and analysis strategy 
 
The data created by the triple cohort longitudinal design made it possible to examine 
general patterns of emergence and change in biological constructs, but also to derive 
statistical models of the connections over time between different areas of understanding, 
and the influence of developing general cognitive abilities. Data coding took place 
throughout the period of data collection, with analysis starting after the completion of 
Phase One. Whilst data collection was on-going, analysis was generally cross-sectional, with 
the focus on identifying and comparing performance within each cohort, and examining 
associations between different variables.  
 
This chapter outlines the analyses computed3 after Phase One (henceforth also referred to 
as Time 1) of the data collection. The chapter starts by addressing the reliability of the 
biological interviews and the internal consistency of the biological constructs. Note that the 
psychometric properties of the general cognitive measures were not assessed since these 
were derived from standardised tests.  
 
The exploratory descriptive analyses for general cognitive and biological measures are then 
presented, before assessing the significant differences in performance between cohorts, 
gender, order of presentation of the biological task, contextual scene, and age differences 
across all measures.  
                                                     
3
 All data were analysed using IBM Statistics version 22 and Microsoft Excel version 2013. 
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Associations between all variables were also explored using correlational analyses. These 
were conducted to examine the relationship between the demographic data and the 
biological performance data, which made it possible to identify both overall trajectories and 
sub-groups with specific developmental patterns, along with predictors of these variations. 
Lastly in this chapter, the data obtained from teacher questionnaires are examined.  
 
8.2 Reliability of coding system for biological task 
 
Development of the coding scheme is described in Chapter 7. In order to check the 
reliability of the coding system, two coders independently coded children’s responses to the 
biological interview from a random sample of 12 transcribed interviews, using the scoring 
rubrics described previously. Four children were randomly selected from each cohort (which 
the coders were blind to), with equal males and females. Reliability of scoring was assessed 
by examining the percentage agreement scores between two raters for each core 
knowledge structure for each child. Note that given the nature of the interview schedule, 
there were a number of interview questions, and therefore core knowledge structures, that 
were context-specific and as a result these were only asked once. There were a total of 19 
context-specific elements and 64 non-context-specific or ‘generic’ items; hence an overall 
total of 83 scores per child (see Table 8.1 for a list of generic questions).  
 
Cohen’s kappa was not applicable in this case because the six level scoring multiplied by two 
raters would create too many analyses, which would have required an unfeasibly large 
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sample to populate reliably. Secondly, the large number of analyses would have created 
substantial possibility of chance effects; hence percentage agreement scores were used as 
an alternative in two ways: across elements within each participant (Table 8.2), and across 
participants within each element (Table 8.3). Taken together, these provided a good 
triangulation on how far independent scoring consistently arrived at the same results. Table 
8.3 shows the percentage agreement values between raters across the total number of core 
knowledge structures for each randomly selected participant. The range of percentage 
agreement was very narrow at 13.25%, and the average was high at 72.69% indicating 
acceptable levels of reliability in coding.   
 
Table 8.1. Single-use questions used in the biological interview schedule (total 19) 
Question Core Knowledge Element 
4 What does an animal need 
to live? Probe 
B26 
 
Describe how different habitats provide for the 
basic needs of different kinds of animals and 
how they depend on each other focusing on the 
range of organisms supported by a habitat 
Q4_des List a number of correct items that animals need 
to survive 
7 What does a plant need to 
grow? Probe 
B27 Describe how different habitats provide for the 
basic needs of different kinds of plants [and 
how they depend on each other] 
Q7_des List a number of correct items that plants need 
to survive 
10 How does a plant change as 
it grows? 
I12 Describe the main stages of the plant life cycle- 
noting inherited traits do not change over time 
I9 Recognise the process of growth in plants 
14 Can a __(select specific 
animal) give birth to 
another ____ like _? 
I1 Recognise that species run true 
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15 How do animals come to 
have babies? 
I2 Recognise the process of reproduction as the 
mechanism behind inheritance 
17 If this___ had a baby, will 
this baby look exactly like its 
mum and dad? Probe. Will it 
look more like its own mum 
and dad from its family, a 
different mum and dad from 
a different family, or will 
they all look the same? 
I4 Describe how offspring of animals resemble 
their parents in many features 
18 How will this baby 
___change as it grows up? 
I7 Recognise the process of growth in animals 
I11 Describe the main stages of the animal life cycle 
noting inherited traits do not change over time  
20 So why do we call them all 
zebras/fish? 
B15 Grouping living things according to their 
observable similarities and differences 
21 What makes a human 
human? 
B14 Recognise the similarities between themselves 
and others 
22 Do people look different to 
each other or do they look 
the same?? What makes 
people look different/the 
same? 
B25 Recognise all humans show variation within a 
species 
Ev44 Recognise why humans produce offspring of the 
same kind and link this back to inheritance 
23 Do people ever look like 
their mum and dad? Do 
people ever look exactly the 
same as their mum or dad? 
Why/why not? How? 
I5 Describe how offspring of humans resemble 
their parents in many features 
24 How does a baby change as 
it grows? 
I10 Describe the main stages of the human life 
cycle, noting inherited traits do not change over 
time  
I8 Recognise the process of growth in humans 
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25 Do animals and people grow 
in the same way?  
I13 Recognise and compare the main external 
features of the bodies of humans and other 
animals 
 
Table 8.2. Percentage agreement of coders from two independent raters on a sample of biological 
interviews for each participant  
Participant Total judgements Number of disagreements 
between raters’ scores 
% Agreement 
9 83 19 77.108 
14 83 24 71.084 
24 83 27 67.470 
26 83 16 80.723 
53 83 23 72.289 
65 83 22 73.494 
67 83 25 69.880 
81 83 21 74.699 
108 83 26 68.675 
113 83 24 71.084 
121 83 22 73.494 
123 83 23 72.289 
Total 996 272  72.691 
 
With regards to reliability across elements within each participant, percentage agreement 
was very high at 86.195% on average (see Table 8.3), which suggested substantially robust 
consistency of scoring.  
 
 
 
 
224 
Table 8.3. Percentage agreement of raters for every biological element scored across a random 
sample of 12 participants 
Core Knowledge Element Total judgements Number of 
disagreements 
% Agreement 
Q1_pon_Ec33 24 1 95.833 
Q1_sav_Ec33 24 3 87.500 
Q2_pon_B18 24 5 79.167 
Q2_sav_B18 24 5 79.167 
Q2_pon_Ec30 24 4 83.333 
Q2_sav_Ec30 24 5 79.167 
Q3_pon_B16 24 3 87.500 
Q3_sav_B16 24 6 75.000 
Q4_G_B26 24 4 83.333 
Q4_G_des 24 2 91.667 
Q5_pon_Ev46 24 4 83.333 
Q5_sav_Ev46 24 6 75.000 
Q6_pon_Ec29 24 3 87.500 
Q6_sav_Ec29 24 2 91.667 
Q6_pon_Ec32 24 3 87.500 
Q6_sav_Ec32 24 5 79.167 
Q6_pon_B17 24 4 83.333 
Q6_sav_B17 24 4 83.333 
Q7_G_B27 24 6 75.000 
Q7_G_des 24 3 87.500 
Q8_pon_B19 24 3 87.500 
Q8_sav_B19 24 5 79.167 
Q9_pon_Ev45 24 5 79.167 
Q9_sav_Ev45 24 5 79.167 
Q9_pon_Ev40 24 4 83.333 
Q9_sav_Ev40 24 3 87.500 
Q10_G_I9 24 6 75.000 
Q10_G_I12 24 1 95.833 
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Q11_pon_I6 24 2 91.667 
Q11_sav_I6 24 1 95.833 
Q11_pon_Ev42 24 2 91.667 
Q11_sav_Ev42 24 1 95.833 
Q11_pon_B22 24 5 79.167 
Q11_sav_B22 24 3 87.500 
Q11_pon_B21 24 5 79.167 
Q11_sav_B21 24 5 79.167 
Q12_pon_B23 24 4 83.333 
Q12_sav_B23 24 3 87.500 
Q13_pon_I3 24 5 79.167 
Q13_sav_I3 24 5 79.167 
Q13_pon_Ev43 24 2 91.667 
Q13_sav_Ev43 24 4 83.333 
Q14_G_I1 24 5 79.167 
Q15_G_I2 24 6 75.000 
Q16_pon_B24 24 3 87.500 
Q16_sav_B24 24 5 79.167 
Q17_G_I4 24 6 75.000 
Q18_G_17 24 5 79.167 
Q18_G_I11 24 1 95.833 
Q19_pon_Ev39 24 3 87.500 
Q19_sav_Ev39 24 4 83.333 
Q20_G_B15 24 4 83.333 
Q21_G_B14 24 4 83.333 
Q22_G_B25 24 2 91.667 
Q22_G_EV44 24 2 91.667 
Q23_G_I5 24 6 75.000 
Q24_G_I8 24 5 79.167 
Q24_G_I10 24 2 91.667 
Q25_G_113 24 0 100.000 
Q26_pon_B20 24 5 79.167 
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Q26_sav_B20 24 5 79.167 
Q27_pon_Ec31 24 4 83.333 
Q27_sav_Ec31 24 5 79.167 
Q28_pon_B28 24 3 87.500 
Q28_sav_B28 24 2 91.667 
Q29_pon_Ec31 24 2 91.667 
Q29_sav_Ec31 24 3 87.500 
Q30_pon_Ev47 24 3 87.500 
Q30_sav_Ev47 24 1 95.833 
Q30_pon_Ev41 24 2 91.667 
Q30_sav_Ev41 24 3 87.500 
Q30_pon_Ev38 24 3 87.500 
Q30_sav_Ev38 24 3 87.500 
Q31_pon_Ec36 24 1 95.833 
Q31_sav_Ec36 24 2 91.667 
Q32_pon_Ec35 24 0 100.000 
Q32_sav_Ec35 24 1 95.833 
Q33_pon_Ec37 24 0 100.000 
Q33_sav_Ec37 24 3 87.500 
Q33_pon_Ec34 24 2 91.667 
Q33_sav_Ec34 24 0 100.000 
Q34_pon_Ev47 24 1 95.833 
Q34_sav_Ev47 24 1 95.833 
   Total % average  86.195 
 
 
8.2.2 Internal consistency of the biological constructs 
 
The internal consistency of the scores for each biological construct was assessed using 
Cronbach’s alpha. This was done first by checking the consistency for each construct within 
context, and if this appeared to be reliable, the consistency was also checked across 
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context. The total scores for each biological concept (biodiversity, ecology, inheritance, and 
evolution) were computed by totalling the scores each child obtained for each individual 
core knowledge structure within a given biological construct. As there were two contexts, 
there were some core knowledge structures for which children had no score, as questions 
were not always repeated for each context. This meant that an alpha could not be 
computed for all the core knowledge structures within a biological construct. Also, because 
of the way the interview was developed, questions that were perceptually context-specific 
were asked twice, once for each context, whereas questions that were more generic in 
nature and perceptually not related to either of the contexts presented to the children, 
were only asked once to avoid repetition. For this reason, the context-specific questions and 
the generic questions were treated separately in the reliability analysis. Cronbach’s alpha 
scores were computed for each biological construct on context-specific core knowledge 
structures for the pond context, and then for the savannah context. The results of these 
analyses are in Table 8.4.  
 
Table 8.4. Cronbach's alpha scores for context-specific core knowledge elements in each context 
context-specific elements   context-specific elements 
Time 1   alpha items   Time 2   alpha items 
Biodiversity pond 0.773 11  Biodiversity pond 0.816 11 
savannah 0.736 11  savannah 0.882 11 
Ecology Pond 0.691 10  Ecology Pond 0.677 10 
Savannah 0.682 10  Savannah 0.699 10 
Inheritance Pond   0 2  Inheritance Pond  0.103 2 
Savannah 0 2  Savannah 0.234 2 
Evolution 
  
Pond 0.611 10  Evolution 
  
Pond 0.660 10 
Savannah 0.616 10   Savannah 0.665 10 
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Aside from inheritance concepts, the table highlights that these analyses generally produced 
high alpha scores of >0.6 and values were similar across contexts. Alphas for inheritance 
concepts were quite low; however, the item scoring suggested that children generally 
scored “0” on the context-specific elements for inheritance, of which there were only two 
items, and alphas for small item sets tend to be lower. The fact that children are showing a 
lack of knowledge on inheritance concepts early on is interesting, and will be explored 
further on.  
 
Given the alpha scores for the other biological constructs were relatively high, there was a 
case for computing a total score for each biological construct based on: context-specific 
pond mean scores, context-specific savannah mean scores, and generic mean scores. These 
composite alphas for these more broad-based scores are shown below in Table 8.5: 
 
Table 8.5. Composite alphas for each biological construct 
Composite Scores  Time 1 Time 2 items 
Biodiversity 0.846 0.858 27 
Inheritance 0.856 0.926 15 
Ecology 0.621 0.765 20 
Evolution 0.608 0.781 21 
 
The alphas obtained from the composite scores suggest high reliability in the scale used to 
test children’s biological knowledge, and the items used to investigate each biological 
construct. For these reasons all subsequent analyses were conducted using composite mean 
scores for all biological constructs at Time 1 and Time 2 because the different number of 
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items for each biological construct meant the raw totals were not directly comparable.  
 
8.3 Descriptive analyses 
 
The four variables for biological constructs, and the seven variables for the general cognitive 
ability measures were analysed to observe performance across cohorts at Time 1. Data on 
the biological constructs and the general cognitive measures were tested for normality. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics are shown in Table 8.6: 
 
Table 8.6. Results from tests of normality for biological constructs and general cognitive ability 
measures 
 Tests of Normality Cohort Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
  
    Statistic df Statistic df 
Biodiversity 
  
  
Reception 0.061 47 0.983 47 
Year 2 0.068 44 0.984 44 
Year 5 0.085 45 0.982 45 
Whole sample 0.079* 136 0.974* 136 
Ecology 
  
  
Reception 0.163* 47 0.937* 47 
Year 2 0.143* 44 0.928* 44 
Year 5 0.103 45 0.942* 45 
Whole sample 0.119** 136 0.905** 136 
Inheritance 
  
  
Reception 0.188** 47 0.897** 47 
Year 2 0.117 44 0.933* 44 
Year 5 0.196** 45 0.916* 45 
Whole sample 0.090* 136 0.914** 136 
Evolution 
  
Reception 0.120* 47 0.960 47 
Year 2 0.117 44 0.922* 44 
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*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
  Year 5 0.106 45 0.963 45 
Whole sample 0.087* 136 0.961** 136 
Number knowledge  
  
  
Reception 0.133* 47 0.948* 47 
Year 2 0.114 44 0.959 44 
Year 5 0.169* 45 0.902** 45 
Whole sample 0.066 136 0.990* 136 
BPVS 
  
  
Reception 0.076 47 0.971 47 
Year 2 0.059 44 0.963 44 
Year 5 0.099 45 0.973 45 
Whole sample 0.055 136 0.991 136 
Digit Recall 
  
  
Reception 0.137* 47 0.973 47 
Year 2 0.209** 44 0.921* 44 
Year 5 0.084 45 0.979 45 
Whole sample 0.136** 136 0.970* 136 
B/W Digit Recall 
  
  
Reception 0.195* 47 0.938* 47 
Year 2 0.136* 44 0.896** 44 
Year 5 0.189** 45 0.946* 45 
Whole sample 0.154** 136 0.927** 136 
Block Recall 
  
  
Reception 0.125 47 0.965 47 
Year 2 0.121 44 0.963 44 
Year 5 0.111 45 0.978 45 
Whole sample 0.055 136 0.990 136 
WCST 
  
  
Reception 0.212** 47 0.863** 47 
Year 2 0.162* 44 0.871** 44 
Year 5 0.171* 45 0.936* 45 
Whole sample 0.205** 136 0813** 136 
Stroop 
  
  
Reception 0.243** 47 0.787** 47 
Year 2 0.265** 44 0.751** 44 
Year 5 0.382** 45 0.673** 45 
Whole sample 0.264** 136 0.695** 136 
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The tests of normality in Table 8.6 suggest the majority of the data were not normally 
distributed across cohorts as highlighted by the significant values, aside from biodiversity 
scores, receptive language (BPVS), and block recall scores, where the values are not 
significant. These significant values tend to be concentrated among the younger children, 
suggesting that they are primarily the result of floor effects. Also, the skewness and kurtosis 
values (Tables 8.7 and 8.8) suggest that there are very few extreme departures from the 
mean values for the majority of the test measures, and regardless, the sample size for the 
current study is large enough to proceed with parametric analyses.  
 
Below is a table of means and standard deviations of children’s biological performance at 
Time 1. It can be seen that with increasing age, children’s performance improves, as would 
be expected. It also suggests that biodiversity is the area where children have the most 
knowledge, even at school entry. In comparison, inheritance is the area where children 
seem to have the least knowledge.  
 
Table 8.7. Means and standard deviation statistics for performance on each biological construct by 
cohort 
  Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Biodiversity Reception 1.641 0.507 0.198 -0.396 
Year 2 2.763 0.725 0.337 -0.177 
Year 5 3.804 0.745 -0.018 -0.632 
Whole sample 2.719 1.110 0.267 -0.802 
Ecology Reception 1.038 0.404 0.963 1.212 
Year 2 1.527 0.615 0.908 0.821 
Year 5 2.278 0.898 0.815 0.406 
Whole sample 1.607 0.839 1.224 1.616 
Inheritance Reception 0.609 0.432 0.506 -1.111 
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Year 2 1.161 0.618 0.841 0.389 
Year 5 1.554 0.842 0.853 0.184 
Whole sample 1.1004 0.755 1.097 1.258 
Evolution Reception 0.896 0.500 0.583 0.090 
Year 2 1.643 0.796 1.258 2.831 
Year 5 2.324 0.773 0.705 0.746 
Whole sample 1.610 0.911 0.761 0.605 
 
 
Table 8.8 shows means and standard deviations of children’s performance on the measures 
of general cognitive ability at Time 1. As expected, children improved their performance on 
these tasks with increasing age, also.  
 
Table 8.8. Means and standard deviation statistics for performance on each general cognitive 
measure by cohort 
  Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
BPVS Reception 63.230 17.533 -0.441 0.307 
Year 2 86.560 13.910 -0.710 1.299 
Year 5 121.360 16.472 -0.002 -0.741 
Whole sample 90.140 28.896 0.052 -0.424 
Digit Recall Reception 22.960 3.810 0.364 0.549 
Year 2 27.870 4.556 0.859 0.338 
Year 5 32.620 5.462 0.390 -0.101 
Whole sample 27.760 6.107 0.556 0.068 
B/W digit recall Reception 5.470 1.544 0.007 1.634 
Year 2 9.980 3.625 0.915 0.445 
Year 5 14.780 3.855 0.204 -1.050 
Whole sample 10.010 4.960 0.652 -0.529 
Block recall Reception 16.890 3.908 -0.487 1.672 
Year 2 20.780 3.437 -0.324 -0.297 
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Year 5 25.220 3.971 -0.140 0.707 
Whole sample 20.890 5.097 -0.068 0.223 
NKT Reception 77.997 6.775 -0.543 -0.387 
Year 2 78.211 8.922 -0.772 1.561 
Year 5 91.599 6.230 -0.924 0.112 
Whole sample 82.570 9.740 -0.354 0.077 
WCST Reception 14.810 7.503 1.176 0.606 
Year 2 10.440 4.256 1.730 5.797 
Year 5 9.220 2.875 0.331 1.810 
Whole sample 11.580 5.784 1.891 4.217 
Stroop task Reception 2.430 2.717 1.960 4.666 
Year 2 1.390 1.919 1.443 1.268 
Year 5 0.420 0.543 .768 -0.536 
Whole sample 1.430 2.114 2.480 8.037 
 
8.4 Significance testing  
 
8.4.1 Gender 
 
There were no significant differences in gender for any of the general cognitive ability 
measures, or the biological constructs; hence gender differences are not examined further 
at Time 1.  
 
234 
8.4.2 Order of presentation of context 
 
Tests were carried out to see if there were any significant differences in children’s 
performance of the biological tasks for each construct, depending on the order of 
presentation of the contexts. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no significant order 
effects for all biological constructs except for inheritance concepts: F(126)=4.710, p=0.032, 
two-tailed where children performed better in the second context presented (M=1.242, 
SD=0.757), over the first (M=0.956, SD=0.735). This was examined further by looking at 
cohort differences in presentation order, and these analyses revealed that there were order 
effects only for children in Cohort 1 (Reception): F(41)=10.216, p=0.003, two-tailed, where 
children generally performed better in the second context presented (M=1.161, SD=0.479) 
than the first (M=1.113, SD=0.677); but not for children in Cohorts 2, or 3.   
 
8.4.3 Context 
 
Differences in children’s performance of the biological task for each context were also 
assessed. T-tests revealed no significant differences in children’s performance for either 
context with the exception of inheritance, where children performed significantly better on 
the savannah context (M=0.343, SD=0.387) than in the pond context (M=0.277, SD=0.363): 
t(136)=-2.062, p=0.044 (two-tailed). When this was explored further between cohorts, it 
was only children in the second cohort (Year 2) displayed better performance on the 
savannah context for inheritance (M=0.386, SD=0.355) over the pond context (M=0.284, 
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SD=0.312): t(43)=-2.285, p=0.027, two-tailed. The remaining two cohorts did not display any 
contextual differences for any of the other biological concepts.  
 
8.4.4 Age differences in general cognitive ability measures 
 
A 7x3 factorial ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of year group on performance on 
all the tests of general cognitive ability (Table 8.9). Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed there 
were significant differences across all year groups for BPVS, digit recall, backwards digit 
recall, and block recall (all p<0.001) where children in Year 5 performed better than children 
in Year 2, who performed better than children in Reception. For the NKT, there was only a 
significant difference between Year 5 (M=91.599, SD=6.230) and Reception (M=16.894, 
SD=6.775), and Year 5 and Year 2 (M=78.211, SD=6.230), both at p<0.001. There was no 
significant difference in NKT between Reception and Year 2 (p=1) suggesting these two 
cohorts performed alike. The similar story emerged for WCST, where there were significant 
differences between Reception (M=14.809, SD=7.503) and Year 2 (M=10.444, SD=4.256), 
and Reception and Year 5 (M=9.222, SD=2.875) both at p<0.001, but not between Year 2 
and Year 5 (p=0.825) suggesting children in the older two cohorts made a similar number of 
perseverative errors which were significantly fewer than children in Reception. Lastly, for 
the Stroop task, there was a significant difference between Reception (M=2.426, SD=2.717) 
and Year 2 (M=1.378, SD=1.898) at p=0.034, and between Reception and Year 5 (M=0.422, 
SD=0.543) at p<0.001. There was no significant difference between Year 2 and Year 5 
(p=0.065) suggesting the children in the older cohorts made a similar number of 
incongruent errors which were significantly fewer than children in Reception. The results for 
WCST and Stroop task may indicate ceiling levels for the older two cohorts.  
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Table 8.9. ANOVA for effect of year group on tests of general cognitive ability 
  F p 
partial 
2  
BPVS 151.410 <0.001 0.693 
Digit recall 49.743 <0.001 0.426 
b/w digit recall 100.413 <0.001 0.600 
Block recall 55.800 <0.001 0.454 
NKT 50.381 <0.001 0.429 
WCST 14.255 <0.001 0.175 
Stroop 12.114 <0.001 0.153 
 
8.4.5 Age difference for biological constructs 
 
An ANOVA was computed to examine the age differences in children’s performance 
between each cohort for each biological task. The ANOVA revealed significant differences in 
performance between cohorts for all biological constructs (Table 8.10). Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests revealed that these differences were significant between every cohort for every 
biological construct and were all at p<0.001, except for performance on ecology between 
Year 2 and Year 5, which was at p=0.015.  
 
Table 8.10. ANOVA for cohort differences in each biological construct 
  F p 
partial 
2  
Biodiversity 124.529 <0.001 0.650 
Ecology 41.101 <0.001 0.380 
Inheritance 25.372 <0.001 0.275 
Evolution 49.631 <0.001 0.426 
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8.4.5.1 Differences in performance between biological construct 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was computed to assess whether children performed 
significantly better on any one area of biology than another at Time 1. This found there 
were significant differences in children’s knowledge for biological constructs: 
F(2.607)=222.810, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.621. To explore these differences further, t-tests 
(Table 8.11) were conducted. These revealed that children performed significantly better on 
biodiversity than any other biological concept. There was no significant difference in 
children’s performance on ecology and evolution knowledge, suggesting children perform 
very similarly on these two constructs. Inheritance was the weakest area of understanding; 
with children performing significantly better in all other areas in comparison. 
 
Table 8.11. Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-tests of all biological constructs (df=136) 
Paired samples t-tests 
 Mean 
difference 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
difference 
t 
Biodiversity vs Ecology 1.108 0.728 0.0622 17.805** 
Biodiversity vs Inheritance 1.614 0.929 0.079 20.345** 
Biodiversity vs Evolution 1.109 0.724 0.061 17.932** 
Ecology vs Inheritance 0.506 0.671 0.057 8.820** 
Ecology vs Evolution 0.001 0.669 0.057 0.026 
Inheritance vs Evolution -0.505 0.781 0.067 -7.556** 
*with Bonferroni correction the significance level is p=0.008 (two-tailed) **p<0.001 
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8.5 Partial correlations 
 
Correlations were computed to see the extent to which scores for each of the biological 
constructs were associated with each other. These were done as a prelude to examining the 
relationship between the biological constructs and the general cognitive measures. Age was 
partialled out from these correlations, given the likely developmental trend. Table 8.12 
shows all biological constructs are highly correlated with each other, though the values for 
inheritance were somewhat weaker: 
 
Table 8.12. Partial correlations between all biological constructs, controlling for age. All df = 134 
 Biodiversity Ecology Inheritance Evolution 
Biodiversity 1 0.600** 0.327** 0.558** 
Ecology 0.600** 1 0.512** 0.550** 
Inheritance 0.327** 0.512** 1 0.394** 
Evolution 0.558** 0.550** 0.394** 1 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 (two tailed) 
 
Similar partial correlations (Table 8.13) were conducted with the measures for general 
cognitive ability to observe the extent to which these were related to each other. These 
correlations show that receptive language (BPVS) is significantly associated with all other 
general cognitive measures, apart from the WCST where there was no significant 
correlation. In fact the only significant association WCST had with another variable was 
with digit recall. 
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Table 8.13. Partial correlations for all general cognitive ability measures, controlling for age (df = 
134). 
 BPVS Digit 
recall 
b/w 
digit 
recall 
Block 
recall 
NKT WCST Stroop 
BPVS 1 0.342** 0.252* 0.060* 0.236* -0.144 -0.342** 
Digit 
recall 
 1 0.332** 0.085 0.159 -0.238* -0.11 
B/W 
digit 
recall 
  1 0.137 0.290** -0.115 -0.184* 
Block 
recall 
   1 0.216* -0.042 -0.293** 
NKT     1 -0.071 -0.158 
WCST      1 0.143 
Stroop       1 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 (two tailed) 
 
Partial correlations between general cognitive measures and biological concept controlling 
for age at Time 1 were also conducted. These reveal that BPVS is the variable that is most 
associated with biological concepts. Evolution and biodiversity are the best predicted areas 
of understanding.  
 
BPVS is significantly correlated with all biological concepts when controlling for age. Digit 
recall and backward digit recall are both significantly correlated with biodiversity and 
evolution. Block recall and WCST are not significantly correlated to any biological concept. 
The stroop task is significantly negatively correlated with ecology only, suggesting good 
inhibition skills are associated with greater performance on ecology. These results are 
presented in Table 8.14: 
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Table 8.14. Partial correlations between biological constructs and measures of general cognitive 
ability, controlling for age 
Partial Correlations Time 1 
Control Variables Biodiversity 
score 
Ecology 
score 
Inheritance 
score 
Evolution 
score 
Age at 
time of 
testing 
BPVS 0.329** 0.376** 0.311** 0.338* 
Digit Recall 0.223* 0.083 0.058 0.265** 
Backward digit recall 0.290** 0.105 -0.017 0.212* 
Block recall 0.095 0.116 -0.090 0.098 
Number Knowledge 
score 
0.166* 0.108 0.055 0.022 
WCST: perseverative 
errors 
-0.119 -0.005 -0.105 -0.009 
Stroop: number of 
incongruent errors 
-0.107 -0.151* -0.071 -0.147 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
8.6. Parent demographic data 
 
Some exploratory analyses were carried out to see the extent to which parent demographic 
data was related to children’s scores at Time 1 for both biology and for general cognitive 
ability (Table 8.15).  
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Table 8.15. Cohort specific descriptive figures for parent demographics 
 Reception (N=18) Year 2 (N=36) Year 5 (N=29) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Number of adults  2.440 0.860 2.250 0.500 2.170 0.384 
Occupation level of 
mother 
1.060 1.890 2.060 2.229 2.550 2.501 
Occupation level of father 3.170 1.920 2.860 1.726 3.620 1.935 
Education level of father 
of child 
1.50 1.340 1.500 1.320 1.970 1.210 
Education level of mother 
of child 
1.440 1.100 1.310 0.980 1.550 1.183 
Number of older children 
at home 
0.830 1.100 1.000 1.171 0.720 0.649 
Number of younger 
children at home 
0.670 0.910 0.640 0.639 0.720 1.032 
Attendance of preschool 1.500 0.860 1.530 0.971 1.760 0.872 
Free school meals (SES) 0.110 0.320 0.190 0.401 0.100 0.310 
Native English 0.610 0.500 0.420 0.500 0.340 0.484 
 
 
A multivariate ANOVA was conducted to see if there were any cohort differences in the 
demographic variables, excluding mothers’ occupation level and number of children in the 
home given that these were two variables that were unlikely to vary with age. Findings 
revealed no significant differences between cohorts in any of the demographic variables, as 
can be seen in Table 8.16. 
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Table 8.16. Cohort differences in demographic variables 
df=2 F p 
partial 
2  
No. of adults 1.321 0.273 0.032 
Free school meals 
(SES) 
0.628 0.536 0.015 
Attendance of 
preschool 
1.434 0.244 0.035 
Native English 1.647 0.199 0.040 
Mothers' education 0.423 0.657 0.010 
Fathers' education 1.235 0.296 0.030 
Fathers' occupation 1.367 0.261 0.033 
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Table 8.17. Bivariate correlations between parent demographic variables 
Control 
Variables 
(df = 80) 
Number 
of adults 
in the 
home 
Number 
of 
children 
in the 
home 
Children 
who 
attended 
preschool 
yes/no 
Free 
school 
meals 
English 
native 
language 
Education 
level of 
mother of 
child 
Education 
level of 
father of 
child 
Occupation 
level of 
mother 
Occupation 
level of 
father 
Number of 
adults in 
the home 
1.000 -0.083 -0.071 -0.080 0.169 0.021 0.171 -0.056 0.030 
Number of 
children in 
the home 
 1.000 0.009 0.250* 0.065 -0.272* -0.204 -0.308* -0.243* 
Children 
who 
attended 
preschool 
yes/no 
  1.000 0-.100 -0.137 -0.022 0.073 0.093 0.083 
Free school 
meals 
   1.000 0.118 -0.129 -0.316* -0.069 -0.320* 
English     1.000 -0.229* -0.261* -0.265* -0.207 
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*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
 
native 
language 
Education 
level of 
mother of 
child 
     1.000 0.573** 0.651** 0.530** 
Education 
level of 
father of 
child 
      1.000 0.392** 0.769** 
Occupation 
level of 
mother 
       1.000 0.459** 
Occupation 
level of 
father 
        1.000 
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The parent demographic variables were also used in a correlational analysis, to see the 
extent to which parent variables were related to each other (Table 8.17). Overall mothers’ 
and fathers’ education level are significantly related to each other, as are their levels of 
occupation. Occupation and education levels of mothers and fathers are also associated 
with each other. Speaking English as a native language is associated with mothers’ and 
fathers’ education levels, and also mothers’ occupation level. SES was only significantly 
associated with fathers’ education and occupation levels, suggesting that these two 
variables might be a proxy for SES. Finally the number of children in the home is significantly 
associated with SES, fathers’ education and occupation, and mothers’ education.  
 
These variables were then used in correlational analyses with the biological constructs, 
followed by a correlational analysis with the general cognitive ability measures, whilst 
controlling for age. The results of these analyses are shown below: 
 
Table 8.18. Partial correlations between parent demographic data and each biological construct, 
controlling for age 
Variables (df = 
79) 
Biodiversity Ecology Inheritance Evolution 
Number of 
adults in the 
home 
0.029 0.048 -0.049 -0.036 
Number of 
older children 
in the home 
0.045 -0.087 -0.063 -0.077 
Number of 
younger 
0.136 0.057 0.074 0.145 
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children in the 
home 
Children who 
attended 
preschool 
yes/no 
-0.112 -0.058 -0.146 -0.154 
Free school 
meals 
-0.055 -0.153 -0.013 -0.129 
English native 
language 
-0.246* -0.227* -0.214* -0.368** 
Education level 
of mother of 
child 
0.028 0.188 0.093 0.287** 
Education level 
of father of 
child 
0.030 0.071 0.057 0.190* 
Occupation 
level of mother 
0.076 0.110 0.164 0.195 
Occupation 
level of father 
-0.009 0.049 0.111 0.078 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
The table shows that speaking English as a native language was significantly negatively 
correlated with each biological construct, but note, this is a function of how English 
language was scored and results actually imply that performance on the biological tasks was 
better if the children spoke English as native language. This is unsurprising given how 
language-based the biological task was, and how it would have required a child to have a 
good grasp of language to articulate themselves during the interview. Being a native 
speaker of English is also significantly associated with parent levels of education and 
occupation, suggesting those children who are native English speakers are more likely to 
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have educated parents with higher levels of occupation. 
 
Conversely, not being a native English speaker is significantly associated with free school 
meals (SES) implying that those who are from lower socio-economic backgrounds are less 
likely to be native English speakers.  
 
The correlations also suggest that children’s evolution knowledge is significantly associated 
with the education level of the mother and father, perhaps due to more exposure of 
evolutionary ideas.  
 
Table 8.19. Partial correlations between parent demographic data and measures of general cognitive 
ability, controlling for age 
Variables 
(df = 80) 
BPVS Digit 
recall 
b/w Digit 
recall 
Block 
recall 
NKT WCST Stroop 
Number of 
adults in 
the home 
0.036 -0.093 -0.117 0.134 -0.126 -0.105 0.102 
Number of 
older 
children in 
the home 
-0.238* 0.023 -0.080 -0.203 0.016 -0.077 0.303* 
Number of 
younger 
children in 
the home 
-0.221* -0.087 -0.059 -0.137 -0.029 -0.033 0.127 
Children 
who 
attended 
preschool 
-0.142 -0.023 0.045 0.124 -0.001 0.108 0.050 
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yes/no 
Free school 
meals 
-0.160 -0.047 -0.121 -0.034 -0.041 -0.020 0.059 
English 
native 
language 
-0.481** -0.193* -0.341* 0.178* -0.155 -0.159 -0.025 
Education 
level of 
mother of 
child 
0.272* 0.291* 0.035 0.138 0.105 -0.161 -0.201* 
Education 
level of 
father of 
child 
0.319* 0.114 0.147 0.016 0.158 -0.079 -0.203 
Occupation 
level of 
mother 
0.298* 0.322* 0.066 0.079 0.018 -0.129 -0.177 
Occupation 
level of 
father 
0.395** 0.187 0.194 -0.031 0.145 -0.080 -0.222 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
These correlations (Table 8.19) suggest that receptive language (BPVS) is significantly 
negatively associated with the number of children at home, implying that fewer children in 
the home leads to better receptive language skills, perhaps because of the opportunity for 
more varied speech with adults. Receptive language is also positively and significantly 
associated with the levels of education and occupation of both parents, suggesting high 
levels of parental education generally lead to better receptive vocabulary in the children, 
again this may be because of the opportunity for more sophisticated and varied speech. 
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Note that BPVS is also significantly negatively associated with having English as a native 
language, but given the way these data were scored this would imply that receptive 
language is better for children whose native language is English. This is unsurprising given 
the heavy reliance of the task on English language.  
 
Verbal short-term memory (digit recall) is positively significantly associated with the 
occupation and education level of the mother. This would follow the same story with the 
associations with receptive language described above whereby better increased education 
may lead to better receptive language, and in turn, verbal short-term memory.  Supporting 
this claim is the fact that verbal short-term memory and working memory are significantly 
associated with speaking English as a native language.  
 
Finally, inhibition (Stroop task) is significantly negatively associated with the education level 
of the mother suggesting that better inhibition skills in the child is associated with how 
educated the child’s mother is. Exactly why this may be the case is unclear but will be 
explored further on in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 9: RESULTS TIME 2 
9.1 Overview 
 
This chapter outlines the analyses that were computed4 after Phase Two (henceforth also 
known as Time 2) of the longitudinal study.  The main focus of this chapter was to compare 
the differences between in children’s performance for general cognitive ability test 
measures, and biological knowledge between Time 1 and Time 2, and to comment on any 
changes that occurred in this knowledge over time. Data coding took place during data 
collection at Phase Two.  
 
Analyses were initially cross-sectional, concentrating on the group differences on all 
measures at Time 2. Following this, the longitudinal Time 1 to Time 2 changes in children’s 
performance across all measures and between cohorts were explored. The effect of context, 
order of presentation, and gender are also presented. Parent demographic data and their 
relationship with general cognitive and biological measures at Time 2 are explored before 
considering the outcomes from data reduction techniques.  
 
The main aim of this chapter was to establish the developmental change in general cognitive 
ability and in biological knowledge, and the trends that emerged. The subsequent chapter 
then goes on to explain the changes described here in this chapter.  
                                                     
4
 All data were analysed using IBM Statistics version 22, and Microsoft Excel version 2013 
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9.2 Descriptive analyses 
Tests of normality were conducted on the data for biological knowledge and for general 
cognitive abilities, as in Time 1. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics are 
shown in Table 9.1: 
 
Table 9.1. Tests of normality for measures of general cognitive ability and biological constructs at 
Time 2 
Tests of 
normality 
Cohort Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Statistic df 
BPVS 
  
Year 1 0.146* 43 0.900** 43 
Year 3 0.112 43 0.955 43 
Year 6 0.139* 43 0.969 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.112** 129 0.958** 129 
Digit Recall 
  
Year 1 0.145* 43 0.959 43 
Year 3 0.187** 43 0.905* 43 
Year 6 0.113 43 0.969 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.150** 129 0.966* 129 
B/W Digit Recall 
  
Year 1 0.217** 43 0.913* 43 
Year 3 0.166* 43 0.927* 43 
Year 6 0.176* 43 0.945* 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.127** 129 0.964* 129 
Block Recall Year 1 0.152* 43 0.969 43 
Year 3 0.153* 43 0.922* 43 
Year 6 0.118 43 0.972 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.136** 129 0.976* 129 
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Number 
knowledge  
Year 1 0.131 43 0.961 43 
Year 3 0.132 43 0.963 43 
Year 6 0.169* 43 0.939* 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.101* 129 0.968* 129 
WCST 
  
Year 1 0.171* 43 0.919* 43 
Year 3 0.208** 43 0.935* 43 
Year 6 0.288** 43 0.784** 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.173** 129 0.916** 129 
Stroop Year 1 0.328** 43 0.662** 43 
Year 3 0.310** 43 0.604** 43 
Year 6 0.430** 43 0.532** 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.329** 129 0.572** 129 
Expressive Lang Year 1 0.158* 43 0.955 43 
Year 3 0.095 43 0.984 43 
Year 6 0.133 43 0.948 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.131** 129 0.953** 129 
Biodiversity 
  
Year 1 0.087 43 0.986 43 
Year 3 0.125 43 0.948* 43 
Year 6 0.083 43 0.976 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.098* 129 0.975* 129 
Ecology 
  
Year 1 0.119 43 0.969 43 
Year 3 0.113 43 0.960 43 
Year 6 0.130 43 0.931* 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.088* 129 0.958** 129 
Inheritance 
  
Year 1 0.259** 43 0.747** 43 
Year 3 0.212** 43 0.790** 43 
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Year 6 0.140* 43 0.872** 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.198** 129 0.783** 129 
Evolution Year 1 0.133 43 0.947* 43 
Year 3 0.226** 43 0.794** 43 
Year 6 0.137* 43 0.924* 43 
Whole 
sample 
0.178** 129 0.783** 129 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
The tests of normality suggest that the majority of data are not normally distributed, with 
some variation between cohorts as there was at Time 1, aside from expressive language 
where the data for all cohorts are normally distributed (but not across the whole sample). 
These significant values tend to be concentrated among the younger cohorts, just like Time 
1, suggesting that they are largely a consequence of floor effects. Likewise, the statistics for 
kurtosis and skewness across and between cohorts (Table 9.2) suggest very few extreme 
departures from the mean, and in any case, the sample size for these analyses is sufficient 
to proceed with parametric analyses.  
 
The variables for biological constructs (Table 9.2) and general cognitive ability measures 
(Table 9.3) were analysed to observe children’s performance between cohorts.  
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Table 9.2. Mean and standard deviation values for biological constructs, across cohorts at Time 1 and Time 2 
    Time 1       Time 2      
   Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis  Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis  
Biodiversity R’tion 1.641 0.507 0.198 -0.396 Year 
1 
2.578 0.813 0.156 0.663  
Year 2 2.763 0.725 0.337 -0.177 Year 
3 
3.687 1.054 0.767 0.307  
Year 5 3.804 0.745 -0.018 -0.632 Year 
6 
5.163 1.012 -0.052 -0.695  
Whole 
sample 
2.719 1.110 0.267 -0.802  3.809 1.431 0.321 -0.641  
Ecology R’tion 1.038 0.404 0.963 1.212 Year 
1 
1.349 0.473 0.097 -0.340  
Year 2 1.527 0.615 0.908 0.821 Year 
3 
2.014 0.578 0.479 -0.295  
Year 5 2.278 0.898 0.815 0.406 Year 
6 
2.845 0.816 0.668 -0.497  
Whole 
sample 
1.607 0.839 1.224 1.616  2.069 0.883 0.751 0.465  
Inheritance R’tion 0.609 0.432 0.506 -1.111 Year 0.539 0.478 1.648 1.645  
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1 
Year 2 1.161 0.618 0.841 0.389 Year 
3 
0.936 0.811 1.897 4.328  
Year 5 1.554 0.842 0.853 0.184 Year 
6 
1.710 1.263 1.299 1.399  
Whole 
sample 
1.1004 0.755 1.097 1.258  1.061 1.03 1.932 4.256  
Evolution 
  
R’tion 0.896 0.500 0.583 0.090 Year 
1 
1.567 0.678 0.550 1.768  
Year 2 1.643 0.796 1.258 2.831 Year 
3 
2.328 0.965 2.109 6.034  
Year 5 2.324 0.773 0.705 0.746 Year 
6 
3.634 1.245 0.402 -1.160  
Whole 
sample 
1.610 0.911 0.761 0.605  2.510 1.304 1.012 0.551  
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Table 9.3. Mean and standard deviation values for measures of general cognitive ability across cohorts 
    Time 1       Year 2     
    Mean SD skewness kurtosis   Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
BPVS R’tion 63.230 17.533 -0.441 0.307 Year 1 79.420 12.726 -1.367 3.090 
Year 2 86.560 13.910 -0.710 1.299 Year 3 100.560 18.183 0.421 -0.568 
Year 5 121.360 16.472 -0.002 -0.741 Year 6 131.050 13.459 -0.473 -0.132 
Whole 
sample 
89.430 29.459    103.670 25.955 0.095 -0.853 
Digit recall 
trials 
R’tion 22.830 3.867 0.052 -0.424 Year 1 24.880 3.500 -0.171 -0.173 
Year 2 27.870 4.556 0.364 0.549 Year 3 27.000 4.117 0.680 1.804 
Year 5 32.620 5.462 0.859 0.338 Year 6 29.420 4.289 0.209 -0.664 
Whole 
sample 
27.670 6.135 0.556 0.068  27.10 4.368 0.388 0.331 
B/W digit 
recall trials 
R’tion 5.470 1.544 0.007 1.634 Year 1 6.260 3.787 -0.131 -0.525 
Year 2 9.980 3.625 0.915 0.445 Year 3 11.470 3.838 0.569 -0.603 
Year 5 14.780 3.855 0.204 -1.050 Year 6 14.950 5.318 0.394 -0.861 
Whole 
sample 
10.010 4.960 0.652 -0.529  10.38 5.629 0.407 0.064 
Block recall R’tion 16.890 3.908 -0.487 1.672 Year 1 21.600 3.424 0.242 -0.044 
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trials Year 2 20.780 3.437 -0.324 -0.297 Year 3 23.510 4.183 0.819 -0.028 
Year 5 25.220 3.971 -0.140 0.707 Year 6 26.510 3.615 0.141 0.769 
Whole 
sample 
20.890 5.097 -0.068 0.223  23.880 4.241 0.366 -0.184 
Number 
knowledge 
R’tion 77.997 6.775 -0.543 -0.387 Year 1 77.822 5.370 0.110 1.184 
Year 2 78.211 8.922 -0.772 1.561 Year 3 84.231 7.045 0.273 -0.183 
Year 5 91.599 6.230 -0.924 0.112 Year 6 92.967 4.585 -0.221 -0.964 
Whole 
sample 
82.570 9.740 -0.354 0.077  85.007 8.455 -0.007 -0.844 
WCST R’tion 14.810 7.503 1.176 0.606 Year 1 8.740 6.762 0.816 -0.026 
Year 2 10.440 4.256 1.730 5.797 Year 3 9.510 3.418 -0.266 1.495 
Year 5 9.220 2.875 0.331 1.810 Year 6 9.290 2.030 -1.791 3.544 
Whole 
sample 
11.580 5.784 1.891 4.217  9.180 4.505 0.616 2.004 
Stroop task 
  
R’tion 2.430 2.717 1.960 4.666 Year 1 1.530 2.585 2.208 5.662 
Year 2 1.390 1.919 1.443 1.268 Year 3 1.090 1.962 2.543 6.432 
Year 5 0.420 0.543 0.768 -0.536 Year 6 0.350 0.720 2.570 7.091 
Whole 
sample 
1.430 2.114 2.480 8.037  0.990 1.967 2.916 9.992 
Expressive 
language 
     Year 1 17.120 4.288 -0.486 -0.589 
     Year 3 27.72 7.129 0.162 -0.430 
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     Year 6 42.51 8.028 -0.293 -1.008 
     Whole 
sample 
29.12 12.376 0.401 -0.891 
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9.3 Significance testing at Time 2 
 
9.3.1 Gender 
 
There were no significant differences in gender for either the general cognitive ability 
measures, or the biological constructs; hence gender differences are not examined further 
at Time 2.  
 
9.3.2 Order of presentation of context 
 
There were no significant differences in children’s performance for the order in which the 
two contexts were presented across the overall sample, except for evolution: F(127)=4.176, 
p=0.022, one-tailed, where children generally performed better in the second context 
(M=2.740, SD=1.443) than the first (M=2.277, SD=1.108). This is in contrast to Time 1, where 
order effects were only seen for inheritance contexts. When this was examined further, the 
only cohort displaying significant differences in the order of presentation of contexts was 
Cohort 2 (Year 3) where children performed significantly better on the second context 
presented (M=2.585, SD=1.231) than the first (M=2.104, SD=0.597): F(41)=2.766, p=0.05, 
one-tailed. 
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9.3.3 Context 
 
A mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate if there were any contextual differences in 
children’s performance by cohort. The analysis revealed significant differences and these 
were explored further by post-hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected significant p value =0.006). 
There were significant differences in contextual knowledge across children only for 
biodiversity and ecology contexts. For biodiversity, children held significantly more 
knowledge in the context of a savannah (M=1.548, SD=0.659) than the pond context 
(M=1.482, SD=0.616): t(128)=-2.327, p=0.011, one-tailed. For ecology, children held 
significantly more knowledge in the context of pond (M=1.107, SD=0.465), than savannah 
(M=0.963, SD=0.449): t(128)=6.840, p<0.001, one-tailed. There were no contextual 
differences for inheritance and evolution concepts.  
 
Contextual differences between cohorts were also analysed (Table 9.4; Bonferroni corrected 
significant p value =0.004). For children in Year 1, there was only a significant contextual 
difference in children’s performance for ecological concepts where children performed 
better in the pond context (M=0.737, SD=0.256) than the savannah context (M=0.612, 
SD=0.257): t(42)=4.140, p<0.001, one-tailed).  
 
For children in Year 3, there were significant contextual differences in performance for 
ecology concepts. Children performed better in the pond context (M=1.080, SD=0.334) than 
the savannah context (M=0.935, SD=0.299): t(42)=3.619, p<0.001, one-tailed.  
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For children in Year 6, there were only contextual differences between ecological concepts 
where children performed better in the pond context (M=1.504, SD=0.423), than in the 
savannah context (M=1.342, SD=0.432): t(42)=-0.206, p<0.001, one-tailed.  
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Table 9.4. Contextual differences in children's performance across biological constructs by cohort 
  Pond 
 
Savannah t (df=42) Sig (one-
tailed) 
    Mean SD Mean SD 
Biodiversity Cohort 1 0.973 0.386 1.023 0.385 1.223 0.114 
Cohort 2 1.436 0.485 1.480 0.528 1.062 0.147 
Cohort 3 2.040 0.429 2.142 0.497 1.660 0.052 
Ecology Cohort 1 0.738 0.256 0.612 0.257 4.140 0.001 
Cohort 2 1.080 0.334 0.935 0.299 3.619 0.001 
Cohort 3 1.504 0.423 1.342 0.432 4.149 0.001 
Inheritance Cohort 1 0.930 0.225 0.105 0.279 -0.253 0.400 
Cohort 2 0.244 0.384 0.198 0.396 0.942 0.176 
Cohort 3 0.477 0.556 0.488 0.668 -0.206 0.031 
Evolution Cohort 1 0.686 0.296 0.707 0.287 -0.606 0.274 
Cohort 2 0.974 0.331 0.912 0.353 2.414 0.010 
Cohort 3 1.386 0.365 1.354 0.436 1.022 0.157 
 ** Bonferroni corrected significance level p=0.004 (one-tailed)
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These contextual differences that demonstrate, in general, a preference for the pond 
context were not present at Time 1. At Time 1 only a marginally significant effect of context 
was seen for inheritance where children in Cohort 2 preferred the savannah context. 
Reasons for why the prevalent preference for the pond context is present at Time 2 could 
vary. It may be that children encounter pond contexts more than savannah contexts in 
everyday life, and earlier exposure to these contexts at Time 1 made children more 
sensitised to acquire new knowledge within the same contexts they are repeatedly exposed 
to. Also, teachers and school trips regularly focus on pond environments as opposed to 
savannahs, and this is also likely to contribute to the differences in contexts observed at 
Time 2.   
 
9.3.4 Age differences in general cognitive abilities 
 
A factorial ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether there were any significant age 
differences in children’s performance for any of the measures for general cognitive ability. 
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of year group (see Table 9.6) for all measures except the 
number of perseverative errors in the WCST, where children performed similarly across 
cohorts (see Table 9.5). Bonferroni post-hoc one-tailed t-tests were computed to explore 
the age differences in further detail. The majority of these tests revealed that there were 
significant differences at the p<0.001 level between all age groups on BPVS, digit recall, 
backwards digit recall, block recall, NKT, and expressive language where children in Year 6 
performed significantly better than children in Year 3, who performed significantly better 
than children in Year 1. However, there were no significant differences between age groups 
in the WCST (all at p=1), where children in Year 1 (M=8.744, SD=6.762) made the fewest 
265 
perseverative errors, followed by Year 6 (M=9.287, SD=2.030), then Year 3 (M=9.512, 
SD=3.418). This pattern would imply children in Year 1 perform the best on this task, 
however, the pattern could also reflect the fact that children in the youngest cohort simply 
did not understand the task and while they made fewer perseverative errors, they also 
made the fewest number of rule change detections, suggesting poor performance overall, 
as shown in Table 9.5 below.  
 
Table 9.5. Number of successful rule changes made in the WCST at Time 2 
  Year 1 Year 3 Year 6 
Rule 
changes 
detected 
Mean 6.360 9.260 11.070 
SD 3.370 2.735 1.724 
 
 
For the Stroop task, the only significant difference was between Year 1 (M=1.535, SD=2.585) 
and Year 6 (M=0.349, SD=0.720) at p=0.015 where children in Year 6 made significantly 
fewer incongruent errors than children in Year 1. Whereas children in Year 3 (M=1.093, 
SD=1.962) did not perform significantly differently to either children in Year 1 (p=0.432) or 
Year 6 (p=0.112). 
 
Table 9.6. ANOVA results for age differences in general cognitive measures 
df=2 F p 
partial 
2  
BPVS 128.982** <0.001 0.672 
Digit recall 13.956** <0.001 0.181 
B/W digit recall 43.094** <0.001 0.406 
Block recall 18.67** <0.001 0.229 
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NKT 74.898** <0.001 0.543 
WCST 0.326 0.361 0.005 
Stroop task 4.195* 0.009 0.062 
Expressive 
language 
157.016** <0.001 0.714 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 (one-tailed) 
 
 
9.3.5 Age differences in biological constructs  
 
A factorial ANOVA was computed to examine the age differences in children’s knowledge 
for each biological construct (biodiversity, ecology, inheritance, and evolution). This analysis 
revealed a main effect of year group for each construct (Table 9.7). Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests further illustrated that children in Year 6 performed significantly better than children 
in Year 3, who in turn performed significantly better than children in Year 1 across all 
biological constructs, all at p<0.001 (see Table 9.2 for Mean values). These findings generally 
echo those established in Time 1, where the same results were found. 
 
Table 9.7. ANOVA results for age differences in biological constructs 
(df=2) F 
partial 
2  
Biodiversity 77.603** 0.552 
Ecology 59.394** 0.485 
Inheritance 18.398** 0.226 
Evolution 47.956** 0.432 
**p<0.001 (one-tailed) 
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9.3.6 Differences in performance between biological constructs 
 
In order to investigate whether there were any differences in children’s performance for 
one biological construct over another at Time 2, an ANOVA was computed. This showed 
that there was a main effect of biological concept on children’s performance: 
F(3,375)=619.858, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.832. Post-hoc t-tests were computed to examine 
this effect further (Table 9.8). These analyses revealed children performed significantly 
better on biodiversity (M=3.809, SD=1.431) than ecology (M=2.069, SD=0.883), inheritance 
(M=1.061, SD=1.026), or evolution (M=2.510, SD=1.303), all at p<0.001. Children also 
performed significantly better on ecology than inheritance, but significantly worse in 
comparison to evolution (both at p<0.001). Lastly, children performed significantly better on 
evolution than inheritance, p<0.001). These results are on the whole similar to those at 
Time 1 where children’s strongest area of performance was biodiversity, and weakest area 
was inheritance. However at Time 1, there was no significant difference between ecology 
and evolution, whereas by Time 2, children are performing significantly better in evolution 
concepts, than ecology.  
 
Table 9.8. Post-hoc analyses to examine differences in performance for biological constructs 
Paired samples t-tests (one-tailed) df=128 
 Mean 
difference 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
difference 
t 
Biodiversity vs Ecology 1.739 0.878 0.077 22.492** 
Biodiversity vs Inheritance 2.747 1.197 0.105 26.064** 
Biodiversity vs Evolution 1.299 0.859 0.075 17.151** 
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Ecology vs Inheritance 1.008 0.937 0.082 12.221** 
 
Ecology vs Evolution -0.440 0.075 0.075 -5.843** 
Inheritance vs Evolution -1.448 0.089 0.089 -16.344** 
**Bonferroni corrected significance level = p=0.008) 
 
9.4 Significance testing-Time 1 to Time 2 changes 
 
9.4.1 General cognitive abilities  
 
A series of two-way mixed ANOVAs were conducted for each of the general cognitive 
abilities to see if there was any effect of time point or year group on children’s scores. 
 
9.4.1.1 BPVS 
 
Regarding the BPVS scores, there was a significant main effect of time point 
F(1,126)=173.427, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.579, and a significant main effect of year group, 
F(2,126)=153.302, p<.001, partial 
2 =0.709. This suggests that that children across all 
cohorts are performing significantly better at Time 2 than Time 1, and that at both time 
points children in Cohort 3 perform significantly better than children in Cohort 2, who in 
turn perform significantly better than children in Cohort 1, as shown by post-hoc t-tests in 
Table 9.9. The significant interaction between time point and year group, F(2,126)=4.492, 
p=0.013, partial 
2 =0.067 also indicates that although children’s BPVS scores are 
significantly different at Time 2 from Time 1, these differences in scores are different 
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depending on year group. Generally, the biggest change from Time 1 to Time 2 is with 
Cohort 1, followed by Cohort 2, and the smallest change is with Cohort 3.  
 
9.4.1.2 Digit recall 
 
For digit recall, there was no significant main effect of time point (F(1,126)=3.272, p=0.073, 
partial 
2 =0.025) suggesting that children’s scores for digit recall at Time 2 are not 
significantly different from their scores at Time 1. There was a significant main effect of year 
group: F(1,126)=34.726, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.355. Post-hoc t-tests (Table 9.9) revealed 
there were significant Time 1 to Time 2 changes only for Cohort 1 and Cohort 3, but not for 
Cohort 2 who performed similarly across the two time points.  
 
The two-way ANOVA also revealed an interaction between time point and year group: 
F(1,126)=16.145, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.204. It seems as though Cohort 3, the oldest cohort, 
significantly decline in their digit recall performance. This may imply that children have 
reached span by this age, particularly because Cohort 2 also decline in their performance by 
Time 2, although not significantly from Time 1. Conversely, Cohort 1, the youngest cohort, 
significantly improve in their performance over time points.  
 
9.4.1.3 Backwards digit recall 
 
Backward digit recall revealed a significant main effect of time point (F(1,126)=115.004, 
p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.477) and year group (F(1,126)=40.037, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.389), 
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suggesting children were performing significantly differently at the two time points as well 
as between cohorts. Further post-hoc t-tests (Table 9.9) revealed this significant difference 
was only for Cohort 2 whose performance for backwards digit recall significantly improved 
at Time 2. Children in Cohorts 1 and 3 also improved in their performance, although not 
significantly. A lack of significant improvement for Cohort 3 may be because children have 
reached span, as with the digit recall task. With regards to Cohort 1 however, it may imply 
that the task is still a little difficult for the majority of children, and their performance 
overall is significantly lower than children in Cohort 2 and 3 as shown in section 9.3.4. 
Finally, the two-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between year group and time 
point: F(1,126)=14.437, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.186. 
 
9.4.1.4 Block recall 
 
Results for block recall showed a significant main effect of time point (F(1,126)=115.044, 
p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.477) and year group (F(1,126)=40.037, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.389). 
Post-hoc t–tests (Table 9.9) indicated that children across all cohorts performed significantly 
better at Time 2 than Time 1, and that children in Cohort 3 performed significantly better 
than children in Cohort 2, who in turn performed significantly better than children in Cohort 
1. This is illustrated by the significant interaction between year group and time point too, 
F(1,126)=14.437, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.186, suggesting that although scores were 
significantly different between time points, the way in which they differed varied according 
to the year group of the children. Generally children in Cohort 1 had the biggest 
improvement in their performance, followed by Cohort 2, and then Cohort 1. 
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9.4.1.5 Number Knowledge 
 
Results for number knowledge revealed that there was a significant main effect of time 
point (F(1,126)=13.133, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.094), year group (F(1,126)=79.453, p<0.001, 
partial 
2 =0.558),  and a significant interaction between time point and year group 
(F(1,126)=8.978, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.125. Post-hoc t-tests (Table 9.9) revealed that only 
children in Cohort 2 were performing significantly better at Time 2 than Time 1, whereas 
children in Cohort 3 were performing better but not significantly. Conversely children in 
Cohort 1 were performing worse, although this change was not significant. It may be that 
the older children in Cohort 3 found the task relatively easy and many were performing at 
ceiling, contributing to lack of significant change over time. With regards to the children in 
youngest cohort, it may be that children failed to engage with the task as well as children in 
the other cohorts because their overall maths ability may still be quite low. This would 
mean that they would be unlikely to progress to harder questions in the task, and do poorly 
overall.  
 
9.4.1.6 Perseverative errors–WCST 
 
With regards to the number of perseverative errors children make in the WCST, the two-
way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of time point 
(F(1,126)=13.190, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.095), a significant main effect of year group 
(F(1,126)=6.572, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.094), and a significant interaction between time 
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point and year group (F(1,126)=8.906, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.124). Further post-hoc analysis 
illustrated there was only a significant change in performance from Time 1 to Time 2 for the 
youngest cohort, who made fewer perseverative errors than children in both Cohorts 2 and 
3 (Table 9.9). However as explained earlier in section 9.3.4, this may reflect poor 
performance overall as these children detect the fewest number of rule changes overall 
(Table 9.5). Time 1 and Time 2 scores for the oldest cohort (Year 5 & 6) are very similar and 
not significantly different so this may depict a ceiling effect, or more likely, a failure to 
engage with the task, given its simplicity. Cohort 2 seem to be performing as expected, by 
making fewer preservative errors at Time 2 than at Time 1, however this change is not 
significant.   
 
9.4.1.7 Incongruent errors–Stroop task 
 
Finally, the ANOVA for the number of incongruent errors made during the Stroop task also 
revealed a significant main effect of time point (F(1,126)=7.029, p=0.009, partial 
2 =0.053), 
and year group (F(1,126)=8.977, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.126), but no significant interaction 
between time point and year group (F(2, 125) = 1.822, p=0.166, partial 
2 =0.028). Post-hoc 
analysis highlighted that all cohorts performed better at the task at Time 2, but that the 
change in scores from Time 1 was only significant for Cohort 1, hence the lack of a 
significant interaction between year group and time point.  Generally children in Cohort 3 
performed better (but not significantly better) than children in Cohort 2, who in turn 
performed better (but not significantly better) than children in Cohort 1. Cohort 3 only 
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performed significantly better than children in Cohort 1 (Table 9.9). It seems that children in 
the middle cohort were performing similarly to those in cohorts above and below it.  
 
 
9.4.1.8 Summary 
 
Overall, for Cohort 1 (Year 1/Reception children), the Time 1 to Time 2 changes are all 
significantly different after Bonferroni corrections (p=0.007), except changes in backwards 
digit span, t(42)=-1.619, p=0.50, one-tailed, number knowledge t(42)=.436, p=.0.332, one-
tailed, and Stroop task t(42)=2.121, p=0.020, one-tailed, where a small and non-significant 
improvement is made.  
 
For Cohort 2 (Year 2/3) children, the Time 1 to Time 2 changes are all significantly different 
except for: changes in digit span where children perform similarly across time points, 
t(42)=1.436, p=0.079, one-tailed, changes in WCST where the same pattern is seen, 
t(42)=1.100, p=0.139, one-tailed, and again for the Stroop task, where children are 
performing better at Time 1 than Time 2, t(42)=1.415, p=0.082, one-tailed.  
 
For the oldest cohort (Year 5/6) the Time 1 to Time 2 changes follow a similar pattern, with 
all performance being significantly better at Time 2 except for backwards digit span where 
performance at Time 2 was not significantly better, t(42)=-0.614, p=0.271, one-tailed, block 
recall, t(42)=-2.401, p=0.011, one-tailed, number knowledge, t(42)=-1.850, p=0.035, one-
tailed, WCST, t(42)=-.111, p=0.456, one-tailed, and Stroop task, t(42)=.662, p=0.256, one-
tailed, where there was also a non-significant improvement in scores at Time 2. There are 
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generally fewer significant Time 1 to Time 2 changes in Year 5/6 cohort than any other 
cohort of children, presumably because this cohort is reaching ceiling or span on many of 
the tasks.  
 
Table 9.9. Differences in general cognitive ability performance across Time 1 to Time 2 between 
cohorts 
 (df=42)   year 1       year 2    
    Mean SD   Mean SD t value 
BPVS reception 64.240 17.690  year 1 79.880 12.770 -8.429** 
year 2 86.880 13.460  year 3 100.560 18.180 -7.941** 
year 5 121.980 16.500  year 6 131.050 13.460 -6.280** 
digit recall  reception 22.800 3.560  year 1 25.070 3.410 -3.905** 
year 2 27.950 4.640  year 3 27.000 4.120 1.436 
year 5 32.330 5.390  year 6 29.420 4.290 4.482** 
B/W digit recall  reception 5.390 1.430  year 1 6.390 3.790 1.619 
year 2 9.980 3.670  year 3 11.470 3.840 -3.027* 
year 5 14.560 3.790  year 6 14.950 5.320 -0.614 
block recall reception 17.000 4.090  year 1 21.730 3.430 -10.134** 
year 2 20.700 3.500  year 3 23.510 4.180 -6.246** 
year 5 25.330 3.980  year 6 26.510 3.610 -2.401 
Number 
knowledge 
reception 78.330 6.920  year 1 77.820 5.370 0.436 
year 2 77.940 9.000  year 3 84.230 7.050 -4.433** 
year 5 91.440 6.240  year 6 92.970 4.580 -1.850 
WCST 
perseverative 
errors 
reception 14.440 7.400  year 1 8.540 6.680 3.675** 
year 2 10.470 4.310  year 3 9.510 3.420 1.100 
year 5 9.230 2.930  year 6 9.290 2.030 -0.111 
Stroop incongruent 
errors 
  
reception 2.410 2.870  year 1 1.560 2.640 2.121 
year 2 1.440 1.920  year 3 1.090 1.960 1.415 
year 5 0.440 0.550  year 6 0.350 0.720 0.662 
 *Bonferroni corrected level of significance: p=0.007 **, one-tailed; N=43 for each cohort 
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9.4.2 Biological concepts  
 
A four x two mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine to relationships between biological 
concepts and time point between cohorts (Table 9.10).  The effects all violate the 
assumption of sphericity, therefore Greenhouse-Geisser statistics will be reported. There 
was a significant main effect of biological concept, F(3,375)=619.858, p<0.001, partial 
2
=0.832, hence regardless of time of testing and year group, children’s knowledge varied 
according to concept: children demonstrated more knowledge on biodiversity than 
evolution, F(1,125)=624.340, p<.001, 
2 =0.833, more knowledge of evolution than ecology, 
F(1,125)=22.186, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.151, and finally more knowledge of evolution over 
inheritance, F(1,125)=340.569, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.732.  
 
There is also a significant effect of time point, F(1,125)=123.612, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.497, 
hence irrespectively of biological concepts and year group, the time of testing significantly 
effects children’s knowledge of the concept i.e. it suggests that the more time and 
experience children had around a particular topic, the more knowledge they held about that 
particular topic regardless of what that topic was.  
 
Further post-hoc analyses revealed that in general, all results for biological concepts are 
depicting a developmental trend with children improving in biological knowledge across all 
four areas of biology, but these improvements were not consistent across inheritance 
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concepts. Reception children improve significantly from Time 1 to Time 2 on all areas of 
biology except inheritance, t(42)=-0.660, p=0.257, one-tailed, where there is a slight decline 
in progress. The same is also true for children in the Year 2/3 cohort, t(42)=0.613, p=0.272, 
one-tailed, where children perform slightly worse at Time 2 than Time 1. Finally for the Year 
5/6 cohort, an improvement is seen is all areas of biology, including inheritance, although 
for the latter the improvement is non-significant, t(42)=-0.685, p=0.249, one-tailed. 
 
Table 9.10. Differences in performance of biological knowledge task across Time 1 and Time 2 for all 
cohorts 
    Time 1     Time 
2 
   
   Mean SD  Mean SD t value 
Biodiversity R’tion 1.600 0.500 Year 1 2.580 0.810 -8.502** 
 Year 2 2.800 0.700 Year 3 3.710 1.060 -6.427** 
 Year 5 3.800 0.800 Year 6 5.160 1.010 -10.48** 
Ecology R’tion 1.010 0.400 Year 1 1.350 0.470 -4.711** 
 Year 2 1.520 0.630 Year 3 2.020 0.580 -4.494** 
 Year 5 2.330 0.890 Year 6 2.850 0.820 -3.611** 
Inheritance R’tion 0.600 0.430 Year 1 0.540 0.480 0.660 
 Year 2 1.140 0.580 Year 3 0.950 0.820 1.404 
 Year 5 1.560 0.860 Year 6 1.710 1.260 -0.685 
Evolution R’tion 0.850 0.490 Year 1 1.570 0.680 -6.109** 
 Year 2 1.650 0.800 Year 3 2.340 0.970 -5.105** 
  Year 5 2.330 0.790 Year 6 3.630 1.250 -6.361** 
** Bonferroni corrected level of significance p=0.013, one-tailed; N=43 for each cohort  
 
In terms of between-subjects effects, Levene’s test indicates that variances are not 
homogenous. However, Levene’s test provides a more conservative measure likely to lead 
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towards a type two error, but the fact that a main effect still exists given this conservative 
test, and the large sample size of this study, it can be confidently assumed that the effects 
seen are reliable. Analysis revealed there was a main effect of year group, 
F(2,125)=104.925, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.627, suggesting that children’s scores significantly 
differed across year groups regardless of the type of construct it was, or the time point at 
which they were tested. Generally children in Cohort 3 performed significantly better than 
children in Cohort 2, who in turn performed significantly better than children in Cohort 1, as 
described earlier in section 9.3.5.  
 
The mixed ANOVA also showed a significant two-way interaction between construct and 
year, F(6,375)=21.023, p<0.001, partial 
2 =0.252, indicating that although children’s scores 
for a particular construct were affected by the type of construct it was (biodiversity, ecology 
etc.), the way in which scores were affected by concept differed between the year groups as 
shown by Figure 9.1 below. This plot illustrates the pattern of change in performance across 
time points for each cohort, and seems to suggest that the interaction reflects the growing 
size of gap between the constructs with age: 
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Figure 9.1. Graph illustrating the pattern of Time 1 to Time 2 changes across cohorts for 
performance on each biological construct 
 
The construct and time point interaction was also significant, F(3,375)=51.759, p<0.001, 
partial 
2 =0.293, indicating that although children’s scores differed by the type of 
construct, the way in which these scores differed by construct was different at the different 
time points, generally with biodiversity and evolution concepts making significant progress, 
followed by some progress with ecology concepts, and very little with inheritance concepts, 
where scores get further apart from Time 1 to Time 2.  
 
Figure 9.1 suggests children generally hold the most knowledge about biodiversity initially, 
followed by evolution and ecology where children perform similarly, while knowledge on 
inheritance is generally low. But at Time 2, while biodiversity continues to have high scores, 
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children increase in their evolutionary concepts at a similar rate to that of biodiversity, 
surpassing ecology, followed by inheritance, which remains the concept with the lowest 
scores throughout and actually declines slightly by Time 2.  
 
There is very little carry over from Time 1 to Time 2 for inheritance, especially when looking 
at the earlier plots from the mixed ANOVA that help to visualise the relationships. The mean 
scores for inheritance are consistently low, with ecology and evolution at roughly the same 
level at Time 1 (but evolution generally overtakes ecology), while biodiversity means are 
consistently highest. The fact that inheritance concepts are lowest may suggest that it is 
being measured in a different way; the context-specific alphas for inheritance show very low 
reliability because there are very few context-specific elements, unlike the other constructs. 
While this makes sense, given that many of the questions around inheritance are on 
reproduction and are thus not context-specific, there is an argument that therefore 
inheritance is not being treated in quite the same way as the other three biological 
constructs.  
 
An important note to consider is that Figure 9.1 makes apparent the implication that a lack 
of progress between cohorts for all biological constructs (except inheritance) is unlikely to 
be true. Hence, this would suggest that the measurement task itself to some extent is 
inducing progress over time point. This is a striking finding. For example, scores for 
biodiversity concepts at Time 2 for Cohort 1 are equivalent to scores for the same concepts 
at Time 1 for Cohort 2, and yet there is a difference of a whole school year in between. This 
suggests that the very act of undergoing testing procedures and taking part in the biological 
task appears to be boosting the performance of children at Time 2 within a cohort, to the 
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same level of performance at Time 1 of children in a full academic year later. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that the trajectories for each biological construct are somewhat different, 
the effect of testing appears to be very uniform for the majority of biological concepts, bar 
inheritance, (which seems to have a different trajectory altogether) and therefore cannot be 
a simple artefact of the data. The importance of this finding will be discussed further in 
Chapter 11. Analysis also revealed a significant interaction between time point and year 
group (Figure 9.2) demonstrating at although there are significant changes from Time 1 to 
Time 2, the rate of change is influenced by the year group the child is in, F(2,125)=4.265, 
p=0.016, partial 
2 =0.064, where Cohort 3 consistently demonstrate most knowledge and 
make more progress from Time point 1 to 2, whereas Cohort 2 and Cohort 1 make similar 
levels of progress across the two time points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2. Graph illustrating two-way interaction between time point and cohort 
 
281 
There is no significant three-way interaction between concept, time point, and year, 
F(6,375)=1.275, p=0.268, partial 
2 =0.020.  
 
9.5 Parent demographic data  
 
Some exploratory analyses were carried out to see the extent to which parent demographic 
data were related to children’s scores at Time 2 for both biological constructs, and for 
general cognitive abilities. Using the questionnaire given to parents to complete, the same 
10 variables selected at Time 1 were used for these analyses.  
 
A partial correlational analysis (Table 9.11) was computed to see the extent to which parent 
variables were related to knowledge on the biological constructs at Time 2, whilst 
controlling for age. These illustrate that the only variables significantly related to the four 
biological constructs are: number of adults in the home, English spoken as native language, 
mothers’ education level, and parental occupation levels. Aside from the number of adults 
in the home which is only significantly associated with children’s biodiversity level at Time 2, 
the remaining variables are all significantly associated with biodiversity, ecology, and 
inheritance. Speaking English as a native language is the only variable to be significantly 
associated with evolutionary knowledge at Time 2. 
 
These results are in contrast to those in Time 1 where the only significant variable 
associated with all biological constructs was speaking English as a native language. 
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Particularly, with regards to evolutionary knowledge at Time 1 and high parental levels of 
education.   
 
Table 9.11. Partial correlations between parent demographic data and biological construct at Time 2 
(df=74) Biodiversity Ecology Inheritance Evolution 
Number of adults collapsed to plus 4 -0.252* 0.013 -0.052 0.060 
Number of older children at home -0.147 -0.118 -0.025 -0.043 
Number of younger children at home 0.063 -0.141 -0.149 -0.054 
Children who attended preschool 
yes/no 
0.102 0.172 0.165 0.083 
Free school meals -0.021 -0.090 -0.210 -0.114 
English native  -0.398** -0.334** -0.235* -0.264* 
Education level of mother 0.229* 0.182 0.463** 0.162 
Education level of father 0.169 0.082 0.181 0.069 
Occupation level of mother 0.267* 0.209* 0.341* 0.188 
Occupation level of father 0.278* 0.262* 0.273* 0.197 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
Similar partial correlations were also conducted to see the relationship between parent 
demographic data and general cognitive abilities at Time 2, controlling for age (Table 9.12). 
These correlations reveal that once again, speaking English as a native language is 
associated with better receptive language (BPVS, backward digit recall, number knowledge, 
and expressive language. In fact performance on the expressive language task and the BPVS 
were both associated with parental levels of education and occupation, as might be 
expected. Performance on executive control, however, was only associated with fathers’ 
levels of education and occupation, whereas number knowledge was only related to 
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mothers’ occupation level.  
 
Table 9.12. Partial correlations between parent demographic data and general cognitive ability 
measures at Time 2 controlling for age 
(df=74) BPVS Digit 
recall 
b/w 
digit 
recall 
Block 
recall 
NKT WCST Stroop Expressive 
Language 
Number of 
adults 
-0.035 -0.059 -0.035 0.262* -0.143 0.313* 0.024 -0.081 
Number of 
older 
children at 
home 
-0.338* -0.050 -0.005 -0.174 -0.142 -0.046 0.456** -0.175 
Number of 
younger 
children at 
home 
-0.052 0.034 -0.077 -0.091 -0.115 -0.173 0.117 -0.080 
 Preschool 
attendanc
e 
0.112 0.012 0.039 0.110 0.205 0.124 -0.044 0.117 
SES -0.283* -0.056 -0.130 0.010 -0.042 0.028 0.155 -0.253* 
Native 
English 
-0.498** -0.175 -0.258* 0.207 -0.321* -0.212 0.108 -0.389** 
Education 
level of 
mother 
0.292* 0.050 0.104 0.047 0.102 0.086 -0.076 0.354** 
Education 
level of 
father  
0.351* 0.038 0.261* 0.030 0.089 0.022 -0.162 0.381** 
Occupation 
level of 
mother 
0.344* 0.172 0.136 0.000 0.262* 0.088 -0.118 0.342* 
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Occupation 
level of 
father 
0.419** 0.128 0.290* -0.069 0.151 0.031 -0.196 0.400** 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
 
9.6 Partial correlations 
 
Correlations controlling for age at time of testing were conducted to see how far biological 
constructs correlate with each other at Time 2 (Table 9.13). These analyses show that for 
Time 2, all biological concepts are significantly correlated with other, as they were at Time 
1, also.  
 
Table 9.13. Partial correlations between all biological constructs at Time 2, controlling for age 
(df=126) 
 Biodiversity Ecology Inheritance Evolution 
Biodiversity 1 0.637** 0.395** 0.651** 
Ecology  1 0.340** 0.578** 
Inheritance   1 0.530** 
Evolution    1 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
Partial correlations were also conducted between measures of general cognitive ability to 
observe the extent to which these were all related to each other (Table 9.14). These 
correlations illustrate that BPVS and expressive language are related to all other variables 
except block recall and WCST. Backwards digit recall is also associated with all other 
variables, which is a change from Time 1 where it was not significantly associated with block 
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recall or WCST. Finally, number knowledge is also significantly associated with inhibition and 
expressive language, which again, is a change from Time 1 where it was not. Overall it 
seems as though block recall and WCST do not have much significant association with many 
of the other variables at Time 2, as was also seen as Time 1.  
 
Table 9.14. Partial correlations between all measures of general cognitive ability, controlling for age 
(df=126) 
 BPVS Digit 
recall 
B/W 
digit 
recall 
Block 
recall 
NKT WCST Stroop Expressive 
Language 
BPVS 1 0.380** 0.363** -0.005 0.317** 0.036 -0.273* 0.707** 
Digit 
recall 
 1 0.426** 0.139 0.130 0.064 -0.120 0.367** 
B/w 
digit 
recall 
  1 0.249* 0.301**  0.180* -0.197* 0.332** 
Block 
recall 
   1 0.080 0.050 -0.104 -0.001 
NKT     1 0.165 -0.186*   0.336** 
WCST      1 -0.075       0.064 
Stroop       1 -0.196* 
Ex’sive 
Lang 
       1 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
When partial correlations are conducted between the biological constructs and the general 
cognitive measures, it seems as though BPVS is significantly correlated to all biological 
concepts and cognitive measures except block recall and WCST (Table 9.15). Digit recall, 
backwards digit recall, and number knowledge are significantly correlated with all biological 
concepts. Block recall and WCST generally do not correlate with anything, yet the stroop 
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measure is significantly negatively correlated with all biological constructs except for 
evolution. Finally expressive language is significantly correlated to all measures except block 
recall and WCST. These findings are similar to those in Time 1 where BPVS was significantly 
correlated with all biological constructs. Digit recall and backwards digit recall were only 
significantly correlated to biodiversity and evolution at Time 1, however these are not 
significantly correlated with all biological measures, as is number knowledge, which at Time 
1 was only associated with biodiversity. Block recall is not significantly correlated with any 
biological construct at Time 1 or Time 2 suggesting very little association between these 
variables.  
 
Interestingly, expressive language was not measured at Time 1 but at Time 2 it seems to 
generally have a stronger relationship with the biological constructs in comparison to the 
BPVS. This may be because the biological task is more expressive rather than receptive in 
nature.   
 
Table 9.15. Partial correlations between measures of general cognitive ability and biological 
constructs at Time 2, controlling for age 
Partial Correlations Time 2 
Control Variables Biodiversity 
score 
Ecology 
score 
Inheritance 
score 
Evolution 
score 
Age at 
time of 
testing 
BPVS 0.560** 0.471** 0.306** 0.366** 
Digit Recall 0.289** 0.341** 0.237* 0.293** 
Backward digit recall 0.291** 0.188* 0.194* 0.228* 
Block recall 0.012 0.027 -0.049 0.080 
Number Knowledge 
score 
0.335** 0.285** 0.170* 0.280** 
WCST 0.018 0.086 0.062 0.043 
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Stroop  -0.346** -0.289** -0.127 -0.183* 
Expressive Language 0.611** 0.505** 0.428** 0.528** 
**p<0.001; *p<0.05 
 
9.7 Exploratory Factor Analyses 
 
At the start of Chapter 8 analyses were conducted to check the validity and internal 
consistency of the measure testing biological knowledge in children. The results from these 
analyses revealed moderate alphas but because these were not that high, there is the 
possibility that there might be some more differentiated structure. For this reason, 
exploratory factor analyses were attempted using Kaiser’s criterion, primarily as checks for 
the biological structures. Ideally, all core knowledge elements relating to all four biological 
constructs would have been included in the model to see whether or not a four-factor 
solution was found, one factor for each biological construct, thus confirming validity of the 
measurements. However, as there were 86 core knowledge elements in total, this would 
have required a much larger sample size than the current 129 participants. For this reason 
alternative exploratory factor analyses were conducted for each biological construct so see 
if any sub-structures appeared within each construct, which may give some insight into 
which sub-concepts or questions children performed better or worse on, and provide some 
insight into the moderate alpha scores described in the previous chapter.  
 
Exploratory factor analyses were conducted for each biological construct at Time 1 and Time 
2 using Kaiser’s criterion. All elements related to each of the four constructs were entered in 
separate analyses, except elements with zero variance, which were excluded (Q11-I6sav; 
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Q11-I6pon; q30-Ev38pon). To clarify with an example, a factor analysis was conducted to 
examine biodiversity at Time 1 using all Time 1 biodiversity elements (except those with 
zero-variance).  
 
The data in every instance were plainly factorable and as Bartlett’s approximate chi-square 
was a very sensitive measure and thus less reliable, KMO statistics were used as a reliable 
measure of the factorability of the data. In every instance the KMO values were very high 
suggesting a strong relationship, however the resulting factor loadings, which often 
revealed seven factor solutions for each biological construct, were not sensibly 
interpretable. For these reasons scree plots were consulted as an alternative way to 
determine the optimal number of factors. These plots all suggested either a two or three 
factor solution for all biological constructs at Time 1 and at Time 2. Based on the analyses 
attempted here, confirmatory factor analyses were computed using the two or three 
solutions suggested by the scree plots. The results from the exploratory factor analyses can 
be seen in Table 9.16.
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Table 9.16. Results of exploratory factor analysis for each biological construct at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**p<0.001
  sample 
size 
number 
of 
variables 
KMO Bartlett's chi-sq Factors 
extracted 
Factors 
suggested 
by scree 
plot 
Cumulative 
variance 
variance 
explained 
by first 
factor 
overall 
communalities 
Time 
1 
Bio 137 26 0.795 (325) 1274.950** 7 2 64.84% 25.88% >0.540 
Eco 137 20 0.746 (190) 665.330** 6 2 32.67%   12.77% >0.500 
Inh 137 12 0.658 (45) 186.400** 4 2 61.32% 27.76% >0.450 
Evo 137 20 0.706 (171) 765.920** 7 3 67.71% 22.60% >0.410 
Time 
2 
Bio 129 26 0.824 (325) 2094.790** 7 2 73.79% 36.17% >0.585 
Eco 129 20 0.672 (190) 1091.830** 7 3 71.74% 25.80% >0.500 
Inh 129 12 0.732 (66) 427.010** 5 3 53.25% 30.34% >0.327 
Evo 129 21 0.646  (171) 686.400**   7 3 73.83% 25.12% >0.587 
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9.8 Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 
Based on the exploratory factor analyses conducted above on each of the biological 
constructs at Time 1 and Time 2, it seemed appropriate, given the results of these prior 
analyses, to conduct confirmatory factor solutions using the number of factors specified 
from the scree plot from the previous analyses (Table 9.17). This seemed like a sensible 
strategy to see if anything interpretable could be gained from looking at this data. Also 
based on the earlier reliability analyses, the alpha values implied that there is some high 
inter-correlation between the alphas of different elements meaning that one may not 
actually see a separable structure, particularly given that all elements associated to a 
biological construct were chosen on the very basis of their association with the construct. 
Table 9.17 summaries the results. 
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Table 9.17. Confirmatory factor analyses for each biological construct at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
**p>0.001
 sample 
size 
No. of 
variables 
KMO Bartlett's chi 
sq 
Factor 
extracted 
Cumulative 
variance 
variance 
explained: 
1st factor 
variance 
explained: 
2nd factor 
variance 
explained: 
3rd factor 
overall 
communalities 
Time 
1 
Bio 137 26 0.795 (325) 
1274.95** 
2   22.290% 33.860%   >0.021 
Eco 137 20 0.746 (190) 665.33** 2 32.670% 19.894% 12.776%   >0.109 
Inh 137 12 0.658 (45) 186.40** 2 38.923% 2210.800
% 
16.815%   >0.078 
Evo 137 20 0.706 (171) 765.92** 3 43.355% 17.404% 17.205% 17.205% >0.024 
Time 
2 
Bio 129 26 0.824 (325) 
2094.79** 
2 43.000% 21.970% 21.410%   >0.202 
Eco 129 20 0.672 (190) 
1091.83** 
3 45.360% 16.163% 15.930% 13.260% >0.198 
Inh 129 12 0.732 (66) 427.01** 3 53.250% 20.820% 18.888% 13.550% >0.248 
Evo 128 21 0.758
  
 (171) 686.93 3 48.78% 23.000% 13.60% 12.32% >0.162 
292 
The confirmatory factor analyses were conducted on the basis that there may be an 
identifiable sub-structure within each of the biological constructs, which in turn may have 
had an effect on the way that children scored on the various elements for each construct. 
However, the results of these analyses are not clear cut enough to warrant further 
exploration of the data, as no clear factor structure was seen, and the majority of the 
variance loaded onto the first factor. Communalities for many of the variables were also 
very low implying this method of analysis may not be appropriate. The variance predicted 
by a 2-factor solution was not always high, suggesting that these factors may not reflect a 
subgroup of children’s knowledge or way of thinking, rather it may simply be an artefact of 
the data.  
 
Regardless, the alphas from Chapter 8 suggest a high degree of within scale coherence. 
Given this fact, it was clear that the elements within constructs as well as the constructs 
themselves are highly related suggesting the elements related to a construct fall into one 
factor – that of each biological construct. Hence observing a clear factor structure would 
have been somewhat unlikely.  
 
9.9 Interim summary  & discussion of results: Time 1 & Time 2 
 
Thus far, analyses have only been viewed cross-sectionally in an effort to try and map out 
the route of conceptual change and progression. There have been various useful results as a 
consequence of this, one of the main results being about the relative strength of knowledge 
children hold on biodiversity concepts, regardless of the context in which these concepts 
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are held. Both at Time 1 and at Time 2, children across all cohorts perform significantly 
better on biodiversity than any other biological concept. This may be due to the types of 
core knowledge structures that are implicated in biodiversity concepts. Many of the ideas 
relate to taxonomy which build on the need to categorise, and as described in Chapter 4, 
there is a wealth of research suggesting that children are proficient in categorising from a 
very young age, which would explain their strengths in biodiversity over other biological 
constructs. It may also be that the labelling of organisms that is required prior to any 
classification could explain why language is also significantly correlated to biodiversity, as is 
age, which seems to serve as a proxy for the amount of experience a child has.  
 
Figure 9.1 illustrates how children’s performance across cohorts is very similar for ecological 
and evolutionary constructs. These two constructs are unique in that the core knowledge 
structures focus on global thinking for example, thinking about an ecosystem, or the process 
of natural selection. These types of ideas are also dependent on children’s ability to gauge 
change over time and would require the underlying domain general ability of maintaining 
multiple ideas (Hipkins et al., 2008; Vosniadou, 2014) which would explain why children 
perform similarly in these areas. The relative jump seen at Time 2 where children’s 
knowledge of evolution generally overtakes their knowledge of ecology may also be a result 
of the fact that at Time 2, the new NC (DfE, 2014) was introduced and teachers may have 
been emphasising these new evolutionary concepts to children in science lessons relative to 
ecological ones. These two concepts also focus less on categorisation ability but more on 
processes or causal mechanisms behind biological systems and phenomena. As such, 
children might not be as proficient in these types of concepts relative to biodiversity. 
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In contrast, children’s knowledge of inheritance was significantly less than any other 
biological construct, with no significant change in this knowledge across time points. Given 
past research suggesting children have relatively coherent understanding of inheritance 
(e.g. Springer, 1999; Carey, 1985) it was expected that this would be an area that children 
would perform relatively well in. However, as this study took a broader and more robust 
approach in looking at inheritance concepts, it became clear that children actually have very 
limited knowledge. This may reflect that at primary school level, children are not formally 
taught sexual reproduction and so children can only reflect on ideas of inheritance up to a 
point. This may also explain the lack of any significant change or improvement across time 
points or indeed across cohorts. The very few concepts children do seem to understand 
with regards to inheritance might be those around population, hence the high correlations 
with ecology and evolution. 
 
Results in Figure 9.1 also highlight a key issue with regards to the longitudinal effects of 
testing children. The pattern of results show consistent improvement of children’s 
knowledge of biological constructs (aside from inheritance) from Time 1 to Time 2 where for 
instance, children at Time 2 in Cohort 1 are performing to a similar level to children in 
Cohort 2 at Time 2. This consistent linear increase suggests that testing alone has improved 
children’s knowledge of these biological constructs. The testing procedures were interview 
based, getting children to think about organisms and processed of various biological 
phenomena and to explain their understanding. This would suggest that when children are 
merely given the opportunity to reflect upon reasons for their ideas more deeply, and 
engage in dialogue about these ideas, conceptual development and progression improves 
(discussed in Chapter 11).  
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Correlational analyses revealed outcomes that were also very informative about the types 
of variables from the general cognitive measures that were significantly associated with 
biological constructs. These suggested verbal measures including receptive and expressive 
vocabulary, and short-term verbal working memory were key, implying language may be a 
key factor in the process of conceptual change. Similarly executive control and number 
knowledge were also influential at Time 2. However, across the two time points, block recall 
and cognitive flexibility were not significantly associated, and semantic inhibitory control 
also had no significant association at Time 1 (although more at Time 2). Thus in terms of 
moving forward and trying to explain the changes in biological knowledge described earlier, 
it becomes a useful exercise to try to predict the amount of variance explained by general 
cognitive ability measures for each biological construct at Time 1 and Time 2. The 
correlational outcomes provided a good way to triage the variables that could be used in 
regression analyses reported in Chapter 10.  
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CHAPTER 10: MODELLING ANALYSES 
10.1 Overview 
 
The relationships in the data that became evident after correlational analyses from Chapter 
8 and Chapter 9 were analysed in more detail. It was decided that hierarchical regression 
analyses with a single dependant variable would provide a useful avenue to investigate the 
impact of general cognitive influences as a first step, then the effect on the resulting models 
after including other aspects of biological understanding. This made it possible to check the 
relative impact of general and specific predictors, and in part, how far the impact of general 
cognitive predictors was mediated through more specific influences.  These analyses used 
data from the whole sample, as far as data were available, so that there were no issues of 
infringing conventions on the number of cases per predictor used in the regression models.  
 
Two-stage hierarchical regression models were computed using each of the four biological 
constructs (biodiversity, ecology, inheritance, and evolution) as dependent variables 
separately, and using the general cognitive ability measures alongside chronological age as 
predictors in the first stage of the model. The remaining biological constructs were then 
hierarchically added as predictors in the second stage of the model. This includes a total of 8 
predictors at stage one, and 11 predictors at stage two. The rationale behind these models 
was to try and explain the changes and developmental patterns across the two time points 
observed in the previous chapter. Note that age was included as a predictor in the models 
and was a constant feature in these analyses because it removed the variance attributable 
to participants being in different cohorts. 
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This chapter outlines the first preliminary regression models conducted using all general 
cognitive predictors at step one, and the remaining biological constructs as predictors in 
step two for each biological construct. The results from these analyses highlighted the 
significant predictors in each model, as well as highlighting the extraneous variables which 
seemingly have very little influence on the outcome variable. These, taken together with 
previous results from the earlier correlational analyses, led to later regression analyses 
using only predictor variables that consistently had a significant effect on the outcome 
variables, both at Time 1 and at Time 2.  
 
Regression models predicting the change at Time 2 from Time 1 variables were then 
attempted for each biological construct using the significant predictors that emerged from 
the earlier models. Also, due to the fact that earlier correlational analyses suggested that 
demographic variables were significantly associated with biological knowledge at Time 2, 
preliminary hierarchical regression models using demographic variables in step one and 
remaining biological predictors at step two were computed. These models highlighted the 
significant demographic predictors of biological constructs at Time 1 and Time 2.  
 
As with the cognitive predictors in the earlier regression models, the extraneous 
demographic variables that did not significantly contribute towards the variance in the 
biological outcome variables were removed from the subsequent analyses. This now 
meant that significant cognitive predictors and significant demographic predictors derived 
from preliminary analyses could be included in composite hierarchical regression models 
for each biological construct at Time 1 and Time 2, to see which out these significantly 
associated indictors significantly predicted the variance of each biological construct (in 
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step one) and how this influence changed when remaining biological constructs were 
subsequently included in the model (at step two).  
 
10.2 Preliminary regression analyses 
 
10.2.1 Preliminary regression results from Time 1 
 
The variables that were included in the first stage of the hierarchical regression for each 
biological construct were: age, BPVS, digit recall, backwards digit recall, block recall, NKT, 
WCST, and Stroop task scores. The second stage of the model included the composite mean 
scores from the remaining biological constructs to the one being predicted.   
 
Findings revealed that all biological constructs produced strong and significant regression 
models at Time 1 (AdjR2 >0.6 in all cases for the final model). The preliminary models for 
biodiversity (Table 10.1), ecology (Table 10.2), inheritance (Table 10.3), and evolution (Table 
10.4) at Time 1 can be viewed below:  
 
Generally, when only general cognitive predictors and age in months are included in the 
models, BPVS is the strongest predictor (aside from biodiversity where age is also a 
significant predictor). When other biological concepts are included in the model, BPVS drops 
out as a predictor in all of the models to be replaced by some of the other biological 
concepts. For biodiversity at Time 1, age and backwards digit recall also remain significant 
predictors, whilst for evolution at Time 1 digit recall remains a strong predictor in model 2. 
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Table 10.1. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for biodiversity at Time 1 
Biodiversity Time 1    
Model 1: AdjR2=0.644 (p<0.001)  
  Beta sig 
Age 0.325 0.381 
BPVS 0.288 0.006 
Digit recall 0.044 0.548 
b/w digit recall 0.188 0.035 
Block recall 0.046 0.536 
NKT 0.026 0.706 
WCST -0.031 0.581 
Stroop 0.035 0.575 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.773 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.274 0.002 
BPVS 0.027 0.766 
Digit recall 0.026 0.671 
b/w digit recall 0.156 0.030 
Block recall -0.003 0.958 
NKT 0.024 0.655 
WCST -0.062 0.177 
Stroop 0.038 0.444 
Ecology 0.333 <0.001 
Inheritance -0.015 0.799 
Evolution 0.228 0.001 
 
Table 10.2. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for ecology at Time 1 
Ecology at Time 1    
Model 1: AdjR2=0.397 (p<0.001)  
  Beta sig 
Age 0.077 0.583 
301 
BPVS 0.560 <0.001 
Digit recall -0.054 0.579 
b/w digit recall 0.017 0.886 
Block recall 0.104 0.281 
NKT 0.005 0.957 
WCST 0.041 0.579 
Stroop 0.002 0.983 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.662 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.173 0.116 
BPVS 0.201 0.063 
Digit recall -0.098 0.184 
b/w digit recall -0.067 0.447 
Block recall 0.101 0.166 
NKT -0.016 0.810 
WCST 0.060 0.286 
Stroop -0.015 0.805 
Biodiversity 0.496 <0.001 
Inheritance 0.266 <0.001 
Evolution 0.216 0.011 
 
Table 10.3. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for Inheritance at Time 1 
Inheritance at Time 1   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.293 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
Age 0.231 0.131 
BPVS 0.519 0.001 
Digit recall -0.044 0.670 
b/w digit recall -0.124 0.320 
Block recall -0.120 0.252 
NKT 0.029 0.760 
WCST -0.070 0.382 
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Stroop 0.010 0.907 
   
Model 2: AdjR2 = 0.455 (ps <0.001)   
 Age 0.183 0.191 
BPVS 0.215 0.119 
Digit recall -0.052 0.577 
b/w digit recall -0.147 0.192 
Block recall -0.174 0.060 
NKT 0.028 0.740 
WCST -0.103 0.148 
Stroop 0.014 0.857 
Biodiversity -0.035 0.799 
Ecology 0.430 <0.001 
Evolution 0.205 0.057 
 
Table 10.4. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for evolution at Time 1 
Evolution Time 1   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.454 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
Age 0.127 0.342 
BPVS 0.361 0.006 
Digit recall 0.158 0.087 
b/w digit recall 0.109 0.321 
Block recall 0.055 0.550 
NKT 0.001 0.992 
WCST 0.071 0.315 
Stroop -0.016 0.839 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.626 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.045 0.696 
BPVS 0.047 0.683 
Digit recall 0.160 0.038 
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b/w digit recall 0.052 0.579 
Block recall 0.030 0.701 
NKT -0.014 0.841 
WCST 0.083 0.163 
Stroop -0.031 0.632 
Biodiversity 0.375 0.001 
Ecology 0.239 0.011 
Inheritance 0.141 0.570 
 
 
The results from Tables 10.1–10.4 highlighted some key pieces of information. Firstly, 
receptive language seems to be a very strong predictor and its influence was significant for 
all models at step 1. This is even despite the fact that the BPVS task controls for age. 
Secondly, although receptive language is a significant predictor at step 1 for all models, in 
step 2 when other constructs of biological understanding are included, the BPVS drops out 
as a predictor in all step 2 models. This suggests that language ability per se is not 
important; rather it is its specific manifestation in different forms of biological knowledge. If 
one considers this notion in further detail, it becomes relatively clear that the results are not 
simply attributable to the method of assessment because if this were true then all 
constructs of biological knowledge would carry approximate equal predictive weight. 
However, as this is not apparent, it would suggest that the language effect seen here is 
more specific.  
 
Additionally, receptive language is most strongly predictive of ecology. Upon further 
inspection, ecology is the only biological construct that is predictive of all other biological 
constructs, and is associated with each of them in turn. This would seem to suggest that 
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language acquired around ecological concepts might somehow be central, and perhaps be 
the first step towards driving conceptual progression across biological concepts.  
 
In sum, it seems to be that ecology is the main driver for other areas of understanding, with 
language acquired here then impacting on biodiversity and inheritance. This is also 
supported by the pattern of relationships seen with receptive language. Biodiversity is 
significantly related to age in the step 2 model suggesting an effect of experience not 
evident in the other aspects of knowledge, and to executive control. Interestingly, in 
Chapter 8 it was observed that at Time 1, biodiversity and ecology are the two areas on 
which children perform the best in general. The fact that biodiversity is more strongly 
predictive of ecology than vice versa in these models (see Figure 10.1), may indicate that 
growth in understanding of biodiversity forms a basic stratum on which ecology then builds.  
 
Inheritance produces the weakest model, although this model is still significant at p<0.001. 
This finding reflects the results from the previous chapters where children have seemingly 
little knowledge in this area in comparison to other areas of biology. 
 
Finally, it seems as though general cognitive abilities have ostensibly little association with 
conceptual change in biological understanding; aside from executive control in the 
biodiversity model and short-term verbal memory in evolution. Instead it could be argued 
that both ecology and biodiversity are the main driving factors with language developing at 
ecology passing through to biodiversity, and then biodiversity and ecology might encourage 
the development of evolution and inheritance concepts. Regardless, the main finding to 
arise from these analyses is that language plays a significant part in the conceptual 
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development and progression of biological knowledge. The main points from these analyses 
shown in Table 10.1-10.4 are captured in Figure 10.1 below.  
 
 
Figure 10.1. Preliminary hierarchical regression models for biological constructs at Time 1 
 
10.2.2 Preliminary regression results from Time 2 
 
The same two-stage hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted for scores for each 
biological construct within Time 2 data. The same seven general cognitive variables and age 
were used as variables for the first step, with the inclusion of the remaining biological 
variables at step two. Note that for the Time 2 models expressive language scores were also 
included as a general cognitive predictor at step 1, hence there were 9 predictors in the first 
stage, and 12 predictors in the second stage.  
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Findings revealed that significant regression models were produced for all of the biological 
concepts at Time 2 (AdjR2 >0.6 for most cases for the final model, and AdjR2 >0.4 for the 
final inheritance model). The strongest model was for biodiversity (Table 10.5), and the 
weakest model was for inheritance (Table 10.7):  
 
Table 10.5. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for biodiversity at Time 2 
Biodiversity Time 2   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.724 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
Age 0.067 0.476 
BPVS 0.190 0.101 
Digit recall 0.022 0.716 
b/w digit recall 0.037 0.602 
Block recall -0.024 0.659 
NKT 0.109 0.148 
WCST -0.043 0.370 
Stroop -0.112 0.032 
Expressive language 0.474 <0.001 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.797 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.039 0.628 
BPVS 0.092 0.358 
Digit recall -0.034 0.509 
b/w digit recall 0.069 0.271 
Block recall -0.039 0.411 
NKT 0.049 0.456 
WCST -0.045 0.279 
Stroop -0.086 0.059 
Expressive language 0.249 0.025 
307 
Ecology 0.250 0.001 
Inheritance -0.007 0.894 
Evolution 0.280 <0.001 
 
 
Table 10.6. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for ecology at Time 2 
 
 Ecology Time 2   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.627 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
Age 0.141 0.198 
BPVS 0.180 0.179 
Digit recall 0.146 0.032 
b/w digit recall -0.099 0.238 
Block recall -0.003 0.965 
NKT 0.116 0.187 
WCST 0.023 0.680 
Stroop -0.102 0.092 
Expressive language 0.368 0.009 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.702 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.122 0.213 
BPVS 0.068 0.575 
Digit recall 0.123 0.050 
b/w digit recall -0.107 0.155 
Block recall -0.007 0.901 
NKT 0.050 0.523 
WCST 0.042 0.400 
Stroop -0.060 0.273 
Expressive language 0.091 0.502 
Biodiversity 0.366 0.001 
Inheritance         -0.014 0.833 
Evolution         0.226 0.015 
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Table 10.7. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for inheritance at Time 2 
Inheritance Time 2   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.322 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
Age -0.062 0.675 
BPVS -0.056 0.757 
Digit recall 0.085 0.364 
b/w digit recall 0.057 0.615 
Block recall -0.079 0.357 
NKT 0.035 0.766 
WCST 0.013 0.866 
Stroop -0.017 0.835 
Expressive language 0.613 0.001 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.410 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.041 0.765 
BPVS -0.141 0.410 
Digit recall 0.053 0.552 
b/w digit recall 0.066 0.537 
Block recall -0.107 0.186 
NKT -0.017 0.878 
WCST 0.020 0.782 
Stroop -0.021 0.792 
Expressive language 0.384 0.043 
Biodiversity -0.021 0.894 
Ecology -0.028 0.833 
Evolution 0.507 <0.001 
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Table 10.8. Preliminary hierarchical regression model for evolution at Time 2 
Evolution Time 2   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.571 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
Age -0.030 0.800 
BPVS 0.185 0.197 
Digit recall 0.072 0.332 
b/w digit recall -0.022 0.809 
Block recall 0.054 0.431 
NKT 0.114 0.226 
WCST -0.014 0.814 
Stroop -0.003 0.964 
Expressive language 0.492 0.001 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.712 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.072 0.459 
BPVS 0.084 0.481 
Digit recall 0.010 0.866 
b/w digit recall -0.029 0.698 
Block recall 0.084 0.139 
NKT 0.036 0.641 
WCST -0.005 0.917 
Stroop 0.068 0.210 
Expressive language 0.071 0.596 
Biodiversity 0.398 <0.001 
Ecology 0.219 0.015 
Inheritance 0.248 <0.001 
 
Based on the regression models from Time 2, the idea that specific language is influential in 
conceptual developmental for biological phenomena still remains. With the inclusion of 
expressive language in the Time 2 models, BPVS is never a significant predictor for any of 
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the models like it was at Time 1. This would suggest that it is plainly the encoding of ideas, 
not simply recognition of language that is important in conceptual development. The 
importance of this is further signalled by the fact that unlike BPVS at Time 1, expressive 
language does not always drop out of the step 2 models (although its influence is always 
weaker at step 2), which is consistent with the premise that specific biological language 
might be key predictor of biological knowledge.  
 
The exact relationship between the biological constructs in the step 2 models is different to 
Time 1, possibly in part because of the variance explained by the newly included expressive 
language measure, but perhaps also because the drivers and their effects themselves have 
to some extent shifted. Most markedly, evolution has overtaken ecology as the strongest 
area of performance after biodiversity, and has now displaced ecology as central in the 
sense of predicting all other biological constructs, and also being predicted by them.  
 
The ecology model seems to be the most distinct as when the biological concepts are 
included in the model, expressive language drops out and only digit recall, evolution, and 
biodiversity remain as significant predictors. The pattern for evolution concepts is also 
unique, expressive language drops out of the first model and the only significant predictors 
are the remaining biological concepts. If the Time 1 data are taken to be accurate, the 
implication may be that ecology, having built on biodiversity and fed into evolution, has now 
led to more pronounced growth in evolution.  Inheritance is still relatively speaking an 
outlier, again producing the weakest model, but the influence of evolution and expressive 
language on inheritance would indicate that this should be the next area of growth. Also, 
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the shift from the significant effect of ecology at Time 1, to evolution at Time 2 would 
suggest there might be some type of reciprocal relationship between ecology and evolution.  
 
With regards to the general cognitive measures, none of those that were observed at Time 1 
survive to remain intact to Time 2. Instead, one other (digit recall) has come in. This may 
indicate that the influences of general cognitive abilities are all weak chance effects, but 
perhaps more likely that they have marginal influences that are hard to capture accurately, 
because the data are noisy to some extent. Figure 10.2 below summarises the final models 
for each biological construct. 
 
To summarise, when only general cognitive predictors and age are included in the step 1 
models, expressive language seems to be a core predictor. Receptive language is not 
significantly predicting any variance as it did at Time 1 in any model. When other biological 
concepts are included in the model, expressive language does not drop out of all of the 
models, but remains as a significant predictor of biodiversity and inheritance.  
 
Contrary to Time 1 where it seemed that ecology was the main driver for other areas of 
understanding, with language acquired here then impacting on biodiversity and evolution, 
the results at Time 2 reveal that evolution is the main driver of change. Expressive language 
feeds into biodiversity and inheritance, and then biodiversity seems to be feeding into 
ecology specifically, whilst inheritance feeds into evolution concepts along with biodiversity 
(note that age was a significant factor for the biodiversity model at Time 1).  
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There is definitely a shift in language from ecology at Time 1, to biodiversity at Time 2. The 
fact that expressive language is also a significant predictor of inheritance is unsurprising on 
the account that reproduction is not formally taught in the primary school curriculum and 
so children are likely to try to articulate themselves as best they can without knowing 
anything much about the processes involved; those that were able to do this best are likely 
to have high expressive language.  
 
It seems as though general cognitive abilities have very little association with conceptual 
change in biological understanding; instead it may be biologically specific language that 
drives forward change, in the second time of testing, this may be children’s expressive 
language specifically.  
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Figure 10.2. Summary of the final regression models for all biological constructs at Time 2 
 
10.3 Analyses post-preliminary results 
 
The preliminary regressions revealed that collinearity was a potential issue as many of the 
variables had collinearity values of >0.7. This suggested that there was a high degree of 
correlation between some of the variables included in the model. To account for this, and 
also the fact that many variables included in the analysis did not have a significant 
contribution to the models, and would therefore potentially be adding noise to the final 
results, a possible solution was to exclude any variable from the analysis that consistently 
did not contribute a significant amount of variance to any of the models across Time 1 or 
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Time 2, and could therefore be classed as an extraneous variable. These extraneous 
variables were: block recall, NKT, and WCST measures.  
 
10.3.1. Time 1  
 
The two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was conducted for each biological concept in 
turn using age, BPVS, digit recall, backwards digit recall, and Stroop task measures as 
dependent factors in the first stage and including the remaining biological concepts as 
predictors in the second stage.  
 
As with the preliminary analyses, significant regression models were produced for all of the 
biological concepts (AdjR2 >0.62 for the majority of models, and AdjR2 >0.44 for inheritance). 
For biodiversity, the results were the same as the preliminary model with age, backwards 
digit recall, ecology and evolution being significant predictors at step 2 (AdjR2=0.775, 
p<0.001), after BPVS dropped out at step 1. Thus this model has shown a slight increase in 
the variance predicted by 2%. For ecology, the results were again the same as those at the 
preliminary stage with BPVS dropping out at step 1 to reveal the remaining biological 
constructs as the only significant predictors at step 2 (the variance predicted by this model 
was equal to that in the preliminary model: AdjR2=0.662, p<0.001), and also for inheritance 
where BPVS dropped out at step 1 to reveal ecology as the only significant predictor at step 
2 (a decrease of 12% in the variance predicted by this model: AdjR2=0.442, p<0.001). For the 
evolution model however, there was a change from the preliminary models (Table 10.4). At 
step 1 only BPVS remains as significant predictor, however at step 2 this drops out of the 
model and only biodiversity and ecology are the significant predictors (AdjR2=0.629, 
315 
p<0.001). This is different from the results of the Time 1 preliminary model where digit 
recall remains a significant predictor at step 2 and 62.6% of the variance was explained; in 
this model there was an increase by 2% implying the removal of nuisance variables has 
strengthened the model slightly.  
 
Figure 10.3 below illustrates the final regression models for all four biological constructs at 
Time 1 after the removal of nuisance variables.  
 
 
Figure 10.3. Final regression models for biological constructs at Time 1 after nuisance variables were 
removed 
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10.3.2. Time 2 
 
The same analyses were run for Time 2, with the removal of the extraneous variables: block 
recall, NKT, and WCST measures. 
 
Findings revealed that significant regression models were produced for all of the biological 
concepts (AdjR2>0.69 in the majority of cases and AdjR2>0.42 for inheritance). For 
biodiversity, the removal of the extraneous measures led to BPVS now becoming a 
significant predictor at step 1 alongside Stroop and expressive language. However at step 2, 
BPVS drops out and only expressive language remains with ecology and evolution as 
significant predictors for step 2 just like in the preliminary model (a slight decrease in the 
variance predicted by 10%: AdjR2=0.795, p<0.001). Note that at step 2 the Stroop measure 
is borderline significant (beta=-0.086, p=0.052).  
 
For the ecology model, digit recall is no longer a significant predictor at step 1 or 2 as it was 
in the preliminary model. Instead at step 1, expressive language is the only significant 
predictor, but drops out at step 2 leaving only biodiversity and evolution as predicting the 
majority of the variance: AdjR2=0.699, p<0.001. This is a slight decrease of 5% from the 
amount of variance predicted in the preliminary model for ecology at Time 2.  
 
The results for inheritance are the same as those of the preliminary model at step 1 with 
expressive language as the only significant predictor, however unlike the preliminary model, 
expressive language drops out at step 2 to leave evolution as the only remaining significant 
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predictor of the model: AdjR2=0.420, p<0.001), which is an increase of 10% of the variance 
explained from the preliminary model for inheritance at Time 2.  
 
Lastly, the removal of nuisance variables for the evolution model led to the same findings as 
the preliminary model, whereby expressive language as the only significant predictor at step 
1, drops out at step 2 to reveal the remaining biological constructs as significant predictors. 
The amount of variance for this model remains exactly the same as it did for the preliminary 
model (AdjR2=0.712, p<0.001). Figure 10.4 illustrates the final regression models for all 
biological constructs at Time 2 with the exclusion of nuisance variables.  
 
These final models revealed similar findings to those in the preliminary models except for 
the fact that expressive language is no longer a significant predictor of inheritance at Time 
2, and digit span is no longer a significant predictor of ecology at Time 2. Overall however, 
the regression analyses warrant the same interpretation of those models in the preliminary 
analyses. The expressive language measure no longer being a significant predictor of 
inheritance at Time 2 may reflect that in the preliminary models, this was a marginal effect 
given the relatively large number of predictors in relation to the sample size. Figure 10.4 
summarises these findings. 
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Figure 10.4. Final hierarchical regression models for biological constructs at Time 2 with nuisance 
variables removed 
 
However, one issue with the models at Time 2 was the fact that expressive language was 
included in the model, whereas for Time 1 it was not. In order to make the models at Time 2 
more comparable to those in Time 1, the same hierarchical regression was conducted again 
for Time 2, this time with the exclusion of expressive language, to see how similar the 
models may have looked. This exploratory analysis revealed that the same significant 
predictors remained at Time 2 except expressive language was now replaced by BPVS (see 
Figure 10.5 for the final regression models). 
 
These models suggest that expressive language and receptive language have similar effects 
and therefore highlight the importance of specific language. Also as described earlier, they 
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illustrate that it is the specific manifestation of language ability in different aspects of 
biological knowledge that is important, rather than language ability per se. This is evidenced 
by the fact that unlike BPVS, expressive language does not drop out at the Time 2 models 
suggesting that it is the encoding of ideas, and not simply the recognition of language, that 
is important for conceptual development.  
 
 
Figure 10.5. Hierarchical regression models at Time 2 excluding expressive language measure 
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10.4 Predicting change 
10.4.1 Time 1 to Time 2 change 
 
The earlier models have so far looked at predicting variance of the biological constructs at 
one time point. However in order to comment on a development and progression of these 
concepts, it became necessary to examine how far Time 1 general cognitive abilities 
(excluding those that were rendered extraneous during preliminary analyses) might be 
predictive of Time 2 biological knowledge. These analyses all produced significant models, 
which are shown in Tables 10.9-10.12 below.  
 
Table 10.9. Final regression results for predicting biodiversity at Time 2 
Predicting Biodiversity Time 2     
Model 1: AdjR2=0.652 (p<0.001)     
  Beta sig 
  Age 0.137 0.173 
 BPVS Time 1 0.457 <0.001 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.095 0.192 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.159 0.065 
  Stroop Time 1 -0.090 0.146 
        
Model 2: AdjR2=0.713 (p<0.001)   
  Age -0.015 0.878 
 BPVS Time 1 0.288 0.007 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.060 0.376 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.093 0.253 
 Stroop Time 1 -0.102 0.072 
  Biodiversity Time 1 0.415 <0.001 
 Ecology Time 1 -0.067 0.438 
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  Inheritance Time 1 0.127 0.057 
  Evolution Time 1 0.016 0.845 
 
Table 10.10. Final regression results for predicting ecology at Time 2 
Predicting Ecology Time 2     
Model 1: AdjR2=0.573 (p<0.001)     
  Beta sig 
  Age 0.110 0.321 
 BPVS Time 1 0.482 <0.001 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.144 0.073 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.127 0.183 
  Stroop Time 1 0.027 0.697 
        
Model 2: AdjR2=0.713 (p<0.001)   
  Age 0.010 0.931 
 BPVS Time 1 0.316 0.011 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.132 0.095 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.085 0.367 
 Stroop Time 1 0.023 0.729 
  Biodiversity Time 1 0.231 0.060 
 Ecology Time 1 0.113 0.261 
  Inheritance Time 1 0.074 0.341 
  Evolution Time 1 -0.015 0.871 
 
Table 10.11. Final regression results for predicting Inheritance at Time 2 
Predicting Inheritance Time 2     
Model 1: AdjR2=0.289 (p<0.001)     
  Beta sig 
  Age -0.029 0.839 
 BPVS Time 1 0.329 0.032 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.237 0.023 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.057 0.640 
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  Stroop Time 1 -0.054 0.541 
        
Model 2: AdjR2=0.294 (p<0.001)   
  Age -0.076 0.612 
 BPVS Time 1 0.193 0.242 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.220 0.039 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.040 0.751 
 Stroop Time 1 -0.051 0.558 
  Biodiversity Time 1 0.037 0.819 
 Ecology Time 1 0.096 0.475 
  Inheritance Time 1 0.056 0.592 
  Evolution Time 1 0.109 0.390 
 
 
Table 10.12. Final regression results for predicting evolution at Time 2 
Predicting Evolution Time 2     
Model 1: AdjR2=0.289 (p<0.001)     
  Beta sig 
  Age 0.062 0.598 
 BPVS Time 1 0.429 0.001 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.149 0.083 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.164 0.106 
  Stroop Time 1 -0.017 0.810 
        
Model 2: AdjR2=0.294 (p<0.001)   
  Age -0.036 0.761 
 BPVS Time 1 0.253 0.053 
  Digit recall Time 1 0.145 0.086 
 b/w digit recall Time 1 0.124 0.218 
 Stroop Time 1 -0.020 0.772 
  Biodiversity Time 1 0.220 0.091 
 Ecology Time 1 0.078 0.097 
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  Inheritance Time 1 0.063 0.445 
  Evolution Time 1 -0.053 0.596 
 
The key findings to arise from the Time 1 to Time 2 analyses are that language seems to be 
at the core of development, particularly with its effect on biodiversity. BPVS at Time 1 is 
significantly predictive of biodiversity, ecology, inheritance, and evolution. Table 10.10 
suggests that biodiversity measured at Time 1 might be marginally significant in predicting 
ecology at Time 2. Similarly, in Table 10.12 it seems as though biodiversity at Time 1 and 
ecology at Time 2 might also have a marginal influence in predicting evolution at Time 2. 
These findings are consistent with the earlier account that BPVS feeds into biodiversity at 
Time 1, which in turn feeds into ecology and evolution. However, Tables 10.9-10.12 show 
relatively weak effects. This might be due to the fact that Time 1 data were capturing live 
effects at that time, which may to some extent have played out by Time 2, resulting in 
weaker influences.  
 
Inheritance is by and large an outlier however Table 10.9 shows the marginal influence of 
inheritance at Time 1 on biodiversity at Time 2. It may be that the everyday observations 
children have which have led to their ideas around biodiversity do to some extent overlap 
with their rudimentary ideas about inheritance, for example ideas around variation within a 
species. This marginal effect may be a result of such overlapping ideas that were not 
necessarily borne out or sufficient to gain higher inheritance scores, but still have an 
underlying albeit weak effect on related biological concepts such as those around 
biodiversity.  
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For the inheritance model, the only significant predictor is digit recall, as BPVS drops out at 
step 2. This seems somewhat interesting. Due to the lack of carry-over from Time 1 to Time 
2, the relationships at Time 2 are seemingly more important which means there may be 
very low mean scores for inheritance at Time 1. It could be that the there is a weak 
influence from the other biological constructs but enough of an influence to absorb the 
variance that BPVS would have explained at Time 2 i.e. the combined reduction in shared 
variance could be enough to tip BPVS over to non-significant. This again fits with the idea 
that the other biological constructs all feed into inheritance concepts, but this area still 
remains very low throughout.  
 
Finally for evolution, there are no significant predictors for the step 2 model, although BPVS 
remains marginally significant. This may be because there is quite high collinearity for the 
Stroop measure (0.730) suggesting that this measure should be dropped from the model. 
When the Stroop measure is removed, the step 2 model is significant (AdjR2=0.562, 
p<0.001) and BPVS is the only significant predictor at step 2 (Beta=0.251, p=0.044). This fits 
into the theory because the model echoes the pattern shown by ecology. Also, looking at 
the output more closely, both ecology and biodiversity at Time 1 are around p=0.080 so 
they are having relatively the same predictive power. Likewise, digit recall at Time 1 is at 
p=0.086. When this analysis for evolution is run again without ecology at Time 1, 
biodiversity is significant, and when the reverse analysis is run, ecology is significant, digit 
recall remains close to significance. This suggests that ecology and biodiversity are 
competing in the evolutionary model, yet biodiversity is somehow more fundamental. The 
marginal significance of digit recall suggests that verbal working memory is also required, 
presumably for the effect of language to occur, either as a mechanism for the acquisition of 
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new vocabulary, but also as a potential method for maintaining multiple concepts in the 
mind when trying to coordinate related ideas. Figure 10.6 below illustrates the final 
regression models for predicting change in all four biological constructs at Time 2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.6. Final hierarchical regression models using Time 1 predictors to predict change at Time 2 
 
10.5 Parent Demographics  
 
The influence of parent demographic data on children’s conceptual development for each of 
the biological constructs was examined in more detail. The degree to which parent 
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demographic variables could explain the variance in each of the biological constructs was 
investigated by running the same two-stage hierarchical regression model as described 
earlier, by including the parent demographic variables and age in the first stage of the 
model, and the remaining biological constructs in the second stage. The variables used in 
the first stage of the model were: age of the child at time of testing, number of adults in the 
home, number of younger siblings, number of older siblings, preschool attendance, English 
as a native language, SES, education level of the mother, education level of the father, 
occupation level of the mother, occupation level of the father, dummy variable for English 
spoken at home versus other language spoken at home, and dummy variable for English 
spoken at home versus multiple languages spoken at home (including English). This is a total 
of 13 variables in the first stage, hence 16 predictors in the second stage. The number of 
variables relative in these analyses past the point that one is adequately able to use with a 
sample size of 82, thus these results need to be regarded as preliminary and treated with 
due caution. Note that this is sample size is lower than the final sample of 129, because not 
all parents responded to the demographic questionnaire and full data from only a total of 
82 parents were available. This sample might affect the results for parameters included in 
the models presented earlier, therefore, as the sample sizes are not identical.  
 
10.5.1 Preliminary models for Time 1 
10.5.1.1 Hierarchical Regressions 
 
In order to examine the influence of certain demographic variables on children’s 
performance on the biological constructs, a two stage hierarchical regression was 
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conducted. The variables included in the first stage of the model are described above. In the 
second stage of the model, the composite mean scores for biodiversity, ecology, 
inheritance, and evolution were included. Tables 10.13-10.16 below show the results from 
the preliminary models for all four biological constructs. All models at step 2 were 
significant and strong with AdjR2>0.63 for biodiversity, ecology, and evolution, and 
AdjR2>0.43 for inheritance.  
 
Table 10.13. Preliminary demographic only regression model predicting Biodiversity at Time 1 
 Biodiversity Time 1 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.525, p<0.001   
 Age 0.712 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.072 0.394 
Older children 0.075 0.390 
Younger children 0.136 0.120 
Preschool attendance -0.059 0.463 
Free school meals -0.071 0.406 
English native -0.162 0.077 
Education: mother -0.030 0.795 
Education: father -0.013 0.927 
Occupation: mother 0.103 0.371 
Occupation: father -0.066 0.627 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.036 0.699 
English vs other language at home -0.044 0.642 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.766, p<0.001   
 Age 0.424 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.023 0.698 
Older children 0.070 0.254 
Younger children 0.061 0.329 
Preschool attendance -0.057 0.320 
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Free school meals 0.034 0.585 
English native -0.057 0.395 
Education: mother -0.200 0.022 
Education: father -0.009 0.925 
Occupation: mother 0.108 0.188 
Occupation: father 0.062 0.528 
English only vs bilingual at home 0.015 0.824 
English vs other language at home -0.069 0.307 
Ecology Time 1 0.545 <0.001 
Inheritance Time 1 -0.182 0.020 
Evolution Time 1 0.196 0.045 
 
 
Table 10.14. Preliminary demographic only regression model predicting ecology at Time 1 
 Ecology Time 1 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.197, p<0.001   
 Age 0.449 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.100 0.363 
Older children -0.017 0.877 
Younger children 0.104 0.358 
Preschool attendance 0.004 0.970 
Free school meals -0.151 0.178 
English native -0.156 0.188 
Education: mother 0.222 0.147 
Education: father -0.088 0.629 
Occupation: mother 0.003 0.986 
Occupation: father -0.117 0.508 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.118 0.326 
English vs other language at home -0.017 0.889 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.703, p<0.001   
 Age -0.268 0.007 
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No. of adults 0.038 0.570 
Older children -0.069 0.315 
Younger children -0.050 0.474 
Preschool attendance 0.084 0.190 
Free school meals -0.081 0.241 
English native 0.046 0.539 
Education: mother 0.229 0.019 
Education: father -0.054 0.631 
Occupation: mother -0.134 0.148 
Occupation: father -0.071 0.522 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.056 0.443 
English vs other language at home 0.040 0.596 
Biodiversity Time 1 0.692 <0.001 
Inheritance Time 1 0.370 <0.001 
Evolution Time 1 0.148 0.182 
 
Table 10.15. Preliminary demographic regression model predicting inheritance at Time 1 
 Inheritance Time 1 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.123, p<0.001   
 Age 0.378 0.001 
No. of adults 0.031 0.783 
Older children -0.020 0.863 
Younger children 0.091 0.437 
Preschool attendance -0.072 0.510 
Free school meals -0.006 0.956 
English native -0.147 0.235 
Education: mother -0.045 0.779 
Education: father -0.115 0.544 
Occupation: mother 0.138 0.378 
Occupation: father 0.096 0.604 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.094 0.453 
English vs other language at home -0.104 0.415 
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Model 2: AdjR2=0.434, p<0.001   
 Age 0.231 0.099 
No. of adults -0.007 0.937 
Older children 0.011 0.907 
Younger children 0.033 0.734 
Preschool attendance -0.078 0.380 
Free school meals 0.099 0.298 
English native -0.047 0.647 
Education: mother -0.266 0.050 
Education: father -0.089 0.563 
Occupation: mother 0.158 0.218 
Occupation: father 0.210 0.169 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.023 0.823 
English vs other language at home -0.131 0.208 
Biodiversity Time 1 -0.441 0.020 
Ecology Time 1 0.705 <0.001 
Evolution Time 1 0.255 0.096 
 
 
Table 10.16. Preliminary demographic only regression model predicting evolution at Time 1 
 Evolution Time 1 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.460, p<0.001   
 Age 0.570 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.001 0.993 
Older children 0.054 0.562 
Younger children 0.177 0.058 
Preschool attendance -0.087 0.308 
Free school meals -0.122 0.185 
English native -0.239 0.015 
Education: mother 0.205 0.103 
Education: father 0.119 0.425 
331 
Occupation: mother 0.095 0.440 
Occupation: father -0.240 0.101 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.015 0.876 
English vs other language at home 0.078 0.437 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.632, p<0.001   
 Age 0.205 0.069 
No. of adults -0.045 0.547 
Older children 0.037 0.631 
Younger children 0.101 0.196 
Preschool attendance -0.058 0.420 
Free school meals -0.071 0.357 
English native -0.137 0.099 
Education: mother 0.181 0.101 
Education: father 0.158 0.202 
Occupation: mother 0.040 0.702 
Occupation: father -0.214 0.081 
English only vs bilingual at home 0.033 0.687 
English vs other language at home 0.112 0.184 
Biodiversity Time 1 0.309 0.045 
Ecology Time 1 0.184 0.182 
Inheritance Time 1 0.166 0.096 
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Figure 10.7. Preliminary hierarchical regression models for Time 1 biological constructs 
 
Figure 10.7 suggests that out of all the parent demographic variables, only mothers 
education level is a significant predictor at Time 1, however that this is negative for 
biodiversity and inheritance, and positive for ecology. The change in the direction of the 
significant effect of mother’s education level may be down to the unstable effects of having 
too many predictor variables in the model. This has ultimately led to unstable marginal 
effects possibly as a function of the smaller pool of participants and the results, therefore, 
should be treated with caution. With regards to the remaining significant predictors, age is 
significant for biodiversity and ecology suggesting that experience is significantly 
contributing to children’s knowledge in these two areas. The pattern of findings seem to be 
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different from earlier models (Figures 10.1 and 10.8) but the importance of biodiversity and 
ecology constructs seems to remain.  
 
10.5.2 Preliminary models for Time 2 
10.5.2.1. Hierarchical Regressions 
 
A two-stage hierarchical regression was conducted as above, for Time 2 using the same 
demographic variables in step 1 included at Time 1, described above.  In the second stage of 
the model, the composite mean scores for biodiversity, ecology, inheritance, and evolution 
were included. The results of these preliminary analyses all revealed significant regression 
models at Time 2 (AdjR2>0.69 for biodiversity, ecology, and evolution, and AdjR2>0.49 for 
inheritance).  
 
The results from Tables 10.17-10.20 below suggest that parent demographic variables seem 
to have more of an influence at Time 2 than at Time 1. As well as mother’s level of 
education being significant, father’s education level, the number of adults and young 
children in the home, and father’s occupation are also significant predictors. However as 
with the Time 1 models, the direction of the significant relationship varies, for example the 
number of adults is a significant negative predictor of biodiversity but a significant positive 
predictor for evolution. Similarly, in the ecology model, father’s education is a significant 
negative predictor whereas father’s occupation is a significant positive predictor. This seems 
unlikely given how related father’s education and occupation are and once again, the 
findings may be a result of the smaller sample size in these analyses relative to the number 
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of parameters in the model. Given this issue, these findings must be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
The parent demographics seem to significantly contribute to the ecology model the most, 
with three predictors, whereas the remaining constructs only have one significant parent 
variable. At Time 2, it also seems as though evolution is a main predictor for the other 
biological constructs. Note also that a shift in the ecology model at Time 1 with mother’s 
education level to father’s education and occupation level at Time 2 suggests that these two 
variables may essentially be measuring the same thing and that there may be potential for 
these variables to be collapsed. This will be explored further on. 
 
Interestingly, English as a native language is a significant predictor at step 1 for biodiversity 
and ecology, and marginally significant for evolution, but drops out at step 2. This would 
suggest that English as a native language is to some extent a weaker predictor of biological 
constructs (excluding inheritance) than BPVS, which is superseded by expressive language as 
shown in Figures 10.3 and 10.4.  
 
With regards to SES, preschool attendance, and both dummy variables assessing language 
spoken in the home, these variables did not significantly predict any variance in any model 
(either at step 1 or 2) across Time 1 or Time 2. This consistent non-significant finding would 
suggest that these variables should be excluded from the model so as to reduce noise in the 
data, as was done in earlier models (see Figures 10.1 and 10.2). This left a total of six 
predictors for step 1, and 10 predictors in total for step 2. With a sample of 82, the model is 
still somewhat underpowered, but stronger than the weaker models presented in the 
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preliminary analyses here. The extraneous variables excluded were: the number of older 
children living at home, preschool education, SES, both the dummy variables for language(s) 
spoken in the home, and mother’s occupation. With these variables now identified, the 
regression analyses for Time 1 and for Time 2 were repeated in the same way as described 
above.  
 
Table 10.17. Preliminary demographic only regression model predicting biodiversity at Time 2 
 Biodiversity Time 2 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.594, p<0.001   
 Age 0.658 <0.001 
No. of adults -0.111 0.164 
Older children -0.042 0.612 
Younger children -0.009 0.913 
Preschool attendance 0.031 0.683 
Free school meals 0.043 0.603 
English native -0.198 0.028 
Education: mother 0.040 0.712 
Education: father -0.108 0.403 
Occupation: mother 0.020 0.856 
Occupation: father 0.179 0.160 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.029 0.739 
English vs other language at home -0.102 0.266 
    
Model 2: AdjR2=0.755, p<0.001   
 Age 0.201 0.038 
No. of adults -0.185 0.004 
Older children -0.035 0.589 
Younger children 0.060 0.373 
Preschool attendance -0.009 0.887 
Free school meals 0.059 0.368 
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English native -0.047 0.521 
Education: mother -0.051 0.588 
Education: father 0.130 0.233 
Occupation: mother 0.054 0.539 
Occupation: father -0.035 0.738 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.002 0.978 
English vs other language at home -0.010 0.893 
Ecology Time 2 0.305 0.008 
 Inheritance Time 2 0.076 0.400 
 Evolution Time 2 0.335 0.003 
 
Table 10.18. Preliminary demographic only regression model predicting ecology at Time 2 
 Ecology Time 2 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.584, p<0.001   
 Age 0.692 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.091 0.260 
Older children -0.047 0.574 
Younger children -0.163 0.059 
Preschool attendance 0.082 0.288 
Free school meals 0.032 0.704 
English native -0.256 0.006 
Education: mother 0.084 0.446 
Education: father -0.354 0.009 
Occupation: mother -0.076 0.503 
Occupation: father 0.364 0.006 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.011 0.903 
English vs other language at home -0.100 0.282 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.708, p<0.001   
 Age 0.301 0.004 
No. of adults 0.097 0.184 
Older children -0.032 0.656 
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Younger children -0.151 0.039 
Preschool attendance 0.070 0.284 
Free school meals 0.024 0.743 
English native -0.139 0.080 
Education: mother 0.063 0.536 
Education: father -0.245 0.037 
Occupation: mother -0.082 0.392 
Occupation: father 0.238 0.034 
English only vs bilingual at home 0.020 0.788 
English vs other language at home -0.027 0.731 
Biodiversity Time 2 0.364 0.008 
Inheritance Time 2 -0.037 0.708 
Evolution Time 2 0.266 0.031 
 
Table 10.19. Preliminary demographic only regression model predicting inheritance at Time 2 
 Inheritance Time 2 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.380, p<0.001   
 Age 0.461 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.020 0.835 
Older children 0.064 0.533 
Younger children -0.067 0.516 
Preschool attendance 0.115 0.224 
Free school meals -0.134 0.196 
English native -0.130 0.235 
Education: mother 0.465 0.001 
Education: father -0.349 0.032 
Occupation: mother -0.066 0.636 
Occupation: father 0.221 0.161 
English only vs bilingual at home 0.013 0.905 
English vs other language at home -0.136 0.229 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.496, p<0.001   
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 Age 0.125 0.376 
No. of adults -0.015 0.878 
Older children 0.064 0.491 
Younger children -0.057 0.555 
Preschool attendance 0.107 0.212 
Free school meals -0.118 0.211 
English native -0.033 0.754 
Education: mother 0.425 0.001 
Education: father -0.219 0.159 
Occupation: mother -0.067 0.596 
Occupation: father 0.103 0.495 
English only vs bilingual at home 0.050 0.614 
English vs other language at home -0.060 0.565 
Biodiversity Time 2 0.156 0.400 
Ecology Time 2 -0.064 0.708 
Evolution Time 2 0.439 0.006 
 
Table 10.20. Preliminary demographic only regression models predicting evolution at Time 2 
 Evolution Time 2 Beta Sig 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.443, p<0.001   
 Age 0.631 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.133 0.155 
Older children 0.008 0.937 
Younger children -0.043 0.659 
Preschool attendance 0.018 0.843 
Free school meals -0.047 0.632 
English native -0.188 0.073 
Education: mother 0.089 0.486 
Education: father -0.309 0.045 
Occupation: mother -0.016 0.903 
Occupation: father 0.258 0.085 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.075 0.467 
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English vs other language at home -0.153 0.155 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.690, p<0.001   
 Age 0.031 0.782 
No. of adults 0.149 0.045 
Older children 0.022 0.767 
Younger children 0.025 0.745 
Preschool attendance -0.050 0.462 
Free school meals -0.038 0.610 
English native 0.004 0.964 
Education: mother -0.078 0.460 
Education: father -0.068 0.581 
Occupation: mother 0.015 0.882 
Occupation: father 0.019 0.871 
English only vs bilingual at home -0.063 0.415 
English vs other language at home -0.045 0.583 
Biodiversity Time 2 0.425 0.003 
Ecology Time 2 0.283 0.031 
Inheritance Time 2 0.271 0.006 
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Figure 10.8. Preliminary hierarchical regression models for Time 2 biological constructs 
 
10.5.2.1.1 Final models of significant demographic variables predicting biological 
constructs Time 1 
 
After removing the extraneous demographic parameters from the models presented in 
Figures 10.8 and 10.9, a total of 10 predictors were used in the final models: Age, number of 
younger siblings, English native, mother’s education level, father’s education level, father’s 
occupation level, number of adults in the home, and three of the remaining biological 
constructs to the one being modelled in the analysis. The hierarchical regressions produced 
significant and strong models (AdjR2>0.69 for biodiversity, ecology, and evolution, and 
AdjR2>0.43 for inheritance).  
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Biodiversity: AdjR2=0.539 for step 1; AdjR2=0.763 for step 2 (p<0.001). Ecology: AdjR2=0.225 
for step 1; AdjR2=0.692 for step 2 (p<0.001). Inheritance: AdjR2=0.174 (p<0.050) for step 1; 
AdjR2=0.430 for step 2 (p<0.001). Evolution: AdjR2=0.468 for step 1; AdjR2=0.643 for step 2 
(p<0.001). 
 
Figure 10.9. Final regression models with extraneous variables removed at Time 1 
When the extraneous variables are removed in the Time 1 models, the models largely 
remain the same. The key difference is the fact that mother’s education is no longer a 
significant predictor for biodiversity, ecology, and inheritance, and instead it is a significant 
predictor for the evolution model, where previously in the preliminary models, it was not. 
Removing noise from the data suggests that in actuality, parent demographics have very 
little influence over children’s biological knowledge, aside from mother’s education level 
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which seems to be an important predictor for children’s learning and development. 
However, this does not explain why the locus of influence of the biodiversity and age 
parameters shifts around from having a significant negative influence to a significant 
positive influence or vice versa. It may be that the influences are marginal and shift around 
according to what other parameters are included in the model, which would be consistent 
with the preliminary demographic models, and also the influence of BPVS on the Time 2 
constructs described in section 10.4.1. This is most likely a function of too many variables 
relative to the small sample size and these findings while interpreted with caution, may also 
not be comparable with the cognitive models described in sections 10.2 and 10.3.  
 
10.5.2.1.2 Final models of significant demographic variables predicting biological 
constructs Time 2 
 
The same analyses were conducted for Time 2 demographic only models using the same 
consistently significant demographic variables from the preliminary analyses at Time 1 and 
Time 2. All models were significant at p>0.001 and stronger than they were at Time 1, with 
AdjR2 0.704 for biodiversity, ecology, and evolution. The final inheritance model was 
AdjR2=0.704 for step 2 (p<0.001). A summary of the final regression models is displayed in 
Figure 10.10 below.  
 
Biodiversity: AdjR2=0.590 for step 1; AdjR2=0.774 for step 2 (p<0.001). Ecology: AdjR2=0.561 
for step 1; AdjR2=0.714 for step 2 (p<0.001). Inheritance: AdjR2=0.379 (p<0.050) for step 1; 
AdjR2=0.493 for step 2 (p<0.001). Evolution: AdjR2=0.459 for step 1; AdjR2=0.704 for step 2 
(p<0.001). 
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Figure 10.10. Final regression models with extraneous variables removed at Time 2 
 
At Time 2 it seems that the models vary from Time 1 because the status of evolution 
changes, where is now a significant positive predictor for inheritance, replacing ecology at 
Time 1. This follows a similar pattern to the regression models presented in sections 10.2 
and 10.3 of the cognitive parameters, where it was observed that ecology and evolution 
might have a reciprocal relationship with regards to influencing children’s inheritance 
knowledge. The biodiversity model shows no change in significant predictors, but for 
ecology however, there are far fewer significant parent variables with the only remaining 
variable being father’s occupation level. These final models suggest that again, parent 
demographic variables have little influence over children’s biological knowledge, but the key 
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predictors that do have a significant contribution are: mother’s education level, father’s 
occupation level, and the number of adults in the home.  
 
However the problem of too many variables relative to the sample size remains. One way to 
account for this was to create a composite variable of mother and father levels of education 
because they might be measuring the same thing. As would mother and father levels of 
occupation. This will be explored further on. A puzzling finding was the significant predictive 
influence of the number of adults in the home for biodiversity and evolution models at Time 
2. This also needed to be explored in more detail. 
 
10.5.3 Number of adults 
 
The number of adults in the home was a significant variable in a couple of the models (see 
Figure 10.10), although the influence of this parameter was sometimes negative and 
sometimes positive. In order to examine the effect of the number of adults in the home on 
children’s biological knowledge in more detail, plots were constructed to reveal the pattern 
of this influence at Time 1 and at Time 2. These are shown in Figures 10.11-10.14 below:  
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Figure 10.11. Relationship the number of adults at home with biodiversity at Time 1 and two 
 
 
 
Figure 10.12. Relationship with number of adults at home with ecology at Time 1 and two 
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Figure 10.13. Relationship with number of adults at home and inheritance at Time 1 and two 
 
 
Figure 10.14. Relationship with number of adults in the home and evolution at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
These graphs generally suggest that three adults in the home is the optimal number, 
however this is not the case for inheritance. The third adult was typically reported as a 
grandmother. It may be that the presence of an extra adult may provide the child with more 
resources including time, knowledge, outdoor activities, museum trips etc., which might 
contribute toward the increase in children’s biological knowledge. Interestingly, more than 
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three adults in the home does not provide an extra advantage, rather children’s 
performance seems to be similar to that of having one or two adults in the home.  Reasons 
for why more than four adults in the home might not have an increasingly optimal effect on 
children’s biological knowledge are discussed in Chapter 11.  
 
A thing to consider with these plots is that only two children out of the whole sample 
reported either 6 or 7 adults as being in the home. For these reasons it was thought best to 
include these children in the group with 4 adults, and simply collapse the group to “4+ 
adults in the home” and run any future analysis using this new variable.  
 
10.6 Final composite hierarchical regression models 
 
As discussed above (see Figure 10.10) variables on parent levels of education and 
occupation seemed to have the most influence over children’s biological knowledge. Due to 
the number of multiple variables included in the model however, an attempt was made to 
create a composite variable of mother and father levels of education and occupation. 
 
10.6.1 Parent occupation and education 
 
The relationship between father and mother levels of occupation and education on 
biological knowledge were harder to interpret. There seems to be some shift between 
mother and father level of education as seen in the preliminary parent demographic only 
models, which suggests that these two variables are correlated. Correlations of all parent 
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education and occupation levels are shown below in Table 10.21. As can be seen, all four 
variables are significantly correlated with each other: 
 
Table 10.21. Correlations between parent education and occupation levels 
 Education 
level of 
mother 
of child 
Education 
level of 
father of 
child 
Occupation 
level of 
mother 
Occupation 
level of 
father 
Education level 
of mother of 
child 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 0.595** 0.616** 0.488** 
N 104 90 104 90 
Education level 
of father of 
child 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 1 0.381** 0.788** 
N  93 91 88 
Occupation 
level of mother 
Pearson 
Correlation 
  1 0.415** 
N   109 92 
Occupation 
level of father 
Pearson 
Correlation 
   1 
N    94 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001  
 
To account for this high degree of correlation, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for all of 
these four items. The alpha value came out at 0.786. This is a high degree of reliability 
suggesting these four items are related. However, when viewing the item-total statistics, 
dropping mother’s level of occupation as a variable increases in the alpha value to 0.820 as 
shown in Table 10.22. 
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Table 10.22. Item-total statistics of Cronbach’s alphas for parent education and occupation levels 
 Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Education level of 
mother of child 
6.950 20.379 0.711 0.531 0.726 
Education level of 
father of child 
6.680 18.886 0.677 0.658 0.712 
Occupation level of 
mother 
6.420 14.199 0.522 0.406 0.820 
Occupation level of 
father 
5.140 15.075 0.674 0.643 0.690 
 
 
This suggests that although mothers are often equivalently educated as the fathers, many of 
the mothers do not have an equal level of occupation to the fathers. This may be because in 
the current sample, many mothers have reported their choice to become homemakers after 
having young children or taking short-term career breaks. For these reasons mother’s 
occupation was excluded from a composite measure, which ultimately consisted of an 
average of mother’s level of education, father’s level of education, and father’s level of 
occupation that was created for each child. The new variable “parent edu/occ” was included 
in the same demographic only regression models, before also running the composite 
regression models (general cognitive ability and parent demographic models) as above to 
see what affect this would have and whether interpretation of these models would be 
easier.  
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These new models show no change in the demographic only regression models (excluding 
extraneous variables) with the new ‘parent edu/occ’ variable included at Time 1, but 
contrastingly the model changes for ecology at Time 2 where ‘father’s occupation’ drops out 
as a significant variable. Also for evolution at Time 1, ‘mother education’ is replaced with 
‘parent edu/occ’ composite variable. At Time 2, the models for ecology and inheritance 
change in a similar way.  
 
10.6.1.1 Time 1 regression models with new parent composite variable 
 
Biodiversity: AdjR2=0.542 for step 1; AdjR2=0.717 for step 2 (p<0.001). Ecology: AdjR2=0.244 
for step 1; AdjR2=0.651 for step 2 (p<0.001). Inheritance: AdjR2=0.200 for step 1; 
AdjR2=0.396 for step 2 (p<0.001). Evolution: AdjR2=0.464 for step 1; AdjR2=0.614 for step 2 
(p<0.001). The results of the models can be viewed in the appendices (A.6). The final models 
for each biological construct have been summated in Figure 10.15 below.  
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Figure 10.15. Exploratory regression models using only parent demographic data as predictors for 
biological constructs at (excluding extraneous variables) at Time 1 with new parent 
education/occupation composite variable. 
 
This model suggests that age is significant predictor for all biological constructs aside from 
inheritance, indicating that experience is a crucial factor in the development of biological 
knowledge. Ecological knowledge also seems to be core in terms of driving change in related 
biological areas. Interestingly the only demographic variable that significantly predicts a 
biological construct is being a native English speaker for evolutionary knowledge. This is a 
curious finding and may relate to children being able to sufficiently articulate their 
knowledge during the biological task, which being a native speaker of English, would be 
easier to do.  
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10.6.1.2 Time 2 regression models with new parent composite variable 
 
Biodiversity: AdjR2=0.577 for step 1; AdjR2=0.780 for step 2 (p<0.001). Ecology: AdjR2=0.508 
for step 1; AdjR2=0.713 for step 2 (p<0.001). Inheritance: AdjR2=0.301 for step 1; 
AdjR2=0.441 for step 2 (p <0.001). Evolution: AdjR2=0.409 for step 1; AdjR2=0.701 for step 2 
(p<0.001). The results of the models can be viewed in the appendices (A.7). The significant 
predictors for the final models for each biological construct have been summarised in Figure 
10.16.  
 
Figure 10.16. Exploratory regression models using only parent demographic data as predictors for 
biological constructs (excluding extraneous variables) at Time 2 with new parent 
education/occupation composite variable.  
 
353 
The models at Time 2 suggest that the only two significant parent predictors of children’s 
knowledge at Time 2 are the number of adults in the home and the new parent edu/occ 
composite variable. This new variable only significantly predicts children’s inheritance 
knowledge at Time 2, which may be because parents who are better educated might be 
able to communicate the complexity of reproduction more effectively to children. On the 
whole, this model generally remains the same as the demographic only regression models 
described earlier.  
 
10.6.2 Composite models Time 1 
 
Having removed the extraneous variables from the preliminary parent demographic models 
and creating a composite parent education/occupation variable, the significant variables 
were now included in the final regression models, alongside the significant general cognitive 
ability measures to predict each biological construct at Time 1 and Time 2, reported below. 
Note again that this sample size is 82 as not all parents responded to the demographic 
questionnaire, which might affect the results for the parameters included in the models 
presented earlier as the sample sizes are not identical.  
 
The final composite regression models for Time 1 suggest that ecology is central to 
understanding other related areas to biology. Interestingly, when general cognitive abilities 
are included in the model, the parent variables are no longer significantly contributing to 
any model. This would suggest that cognitive models are in a sense controlling for 
demographic variation as well as age. Furthermore, the only general cognitive ability that 
has a significant influence is backward digit recall, which significantly predicts biodiversity at 
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Time 1. This implies that executive control is required in order to develop concepts around 
biodiversity. If the full results are viewed (Tables 10.23-10.26) for these models, it can be 
seen that at step 1 for each of the models, receptive language as measured by the BPVS is a 
significant predictor, but drops out of the model at stage 2. This, like earlier models, implies 
that biologically specific language is vital toward driving forward conceptual change. It may 
be that language acquired through earlier concepts of biodiversity and ecology need to be 
coordinated, as suggested by the significance of executive control, which would help 
coordinate fragmented ideas and encourage ‘systems thinking’, particularly around 
ecological concepts which lend themselves to this style of scientific thinking. This then may 
contribute towards change and development of inheritance and evolutionary concepts at 
Time 1.  
 
If the previous demographic only models are recalled however, English as a native language 
had much the same type of relationship as BPVS i.e. always a significant predictor at step 1, 
and dropping out at step 2. In these composite models, English as a native language never 
reaches the point of significance at step 1, suggesting speaking English as a native language 
is superseded by children’s receptive language ability. If the earlier cognitive models are 
also recalled for Time 2, expressive language displays a different type of relationship in that, 
unlike BPVS or native English variables, it remains in the step 2 model for biodiversity. All 
this would suggest a hierarchical relationship between these three variables in that English 
as a native language is superseded by children’s receptive language ability, which is 
superseded by children’s expressive language ability.  
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Table 10.23. Composite hierarchical regression model for biodiversity at Time 1 
Biodiversity Time 1 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.631 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.130 0.367 
BPVS  0.442 0.003 
Digit recall 0.099 0.288 
b/w digit recall 0.286 0.007 
Number of adults (comp) 0.069 0.309 
Number of younger children 0.166 0.018 
English native 0.011 0.886 
Parent edu/occ -0.124 0.095 
    
Model 2: AdjR2=0.765 (p<0.001).   
Age 0.125 0.280 
BPVS  0.146 0.251 
Digit recall 0.072 0.347 
b/w digit recall 0.303 0.001 
Number of adults (comp) 0.040 0.464 
Number of younger children 0.090 0.116 
English native 0.054 0.403 
Parent edu/occ -0.096 0.106 
Ecology time 1 0.417 <0.001 
Inheritance time 1 -0.029 0.689 
Evolution time 1 0.101 0.274 
 
Table 10.24. Composite hierarchical regression model for ecology at Time 1 
Ecology Time 1   
 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.319 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.029 0.881 
BPVS  0.672 0.001 
Digit recall 0.026 0.839 
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b/w digit recall -0.067 0.633 
Number of adults (comp) 0.063 0.497 
Number of younger children 0.151 0.109 
English native -0.066 0.542 
Parent edu/occ -0.070 0.485 
    
Model 2: AdjR2=0.669 (p<0.001) 
 Age -0.179 0.194 
BPVS  0.161 0.285 
Digit recall -0.115 0.204 
b/w digit recall -0.194 0.070 
Number of adults (comp) 0.025 0.702 
Number of younger children -0.028 0.677 
English native 0.004 0.958 
Parent edu/occ 0.009 0.895 
Biodiversity Time 1 0.587 <0.001 
Inheritance Time 1 0.237 0.004 
Evolution Time 1 0.336 0.002 
 
Table 10.25. Composite hierarchical regression model for inheritance at Time 1 
Inheritance Time 1   
 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.273 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.058 0.774 
BPVS  0.596 0.005 
Digit recall 0.080 0.541 
b/w digit recall -0.232 0.113 
Number of adults (comp) -0.040 0.672 
Number of younger children 0.112 0.248 
English native -0.075 0.499 
Parent edu/occ -0.036 0.725 
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Model 2: AdjR2=0.404 (p<0.001) 
 Age 0.054 0.773 
BPVS  0.294 0.144 
Digit recall 0.049 0.691 
b/w digit recall -0.188 0.192 
Number of adults (comp) -0.065 0.456 
Number of younger children 0.036 0.696 
English native -0.021 0.841 
Parent edu/occ -0.016 0.863 
Biodiversity Time 1 -0.073 0.689 
Ecology Time 1 0.425 0.004 
Evolution Time 1 0.148 0.318 
 
Table 10.26. Composite hierarchical regression model for evolution at Time 1 
Evolution Time 1   
 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.499 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.178 0.289 
BPVS  0.327 0.057 
Digit recall 0.188 0.086 
b/w digit recall 0.039 0.744 
Number of adults (comp) 0.020 0.802 
Number of younger children 0.165 0.043 
English native -0.175 0.061 
Parent edu/occ 0.006 0.948 
    
Model 2: AdjR2=0.646 (p<0.001) 
 Age 0.163 0.252 
BPVS  -0.034 0.826 
Digit recall 0.157 0.093 
b/w digit recall 0.040 0.720 
Number of adults (comp) -0.010 0.884 
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Number of younger children 0.075 0.286 
English native -0.146 0.065 
Parent edu/occ 0.053 0.472 
Biodiversity Time 1 0.153 0.274 
Ecology Time 1 0.360 0.002 
Inheritance Time 1 0.088 0.318 
 
 
The results from the final models of the composite regression analyses at Time 1 are 
summarised in Figure 10.17 shown below: 
 
 
Figure 10.17. Composite hierarchical regression models at Time 1 using significant demographic and 
cognitive predictors 
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10.6.3 Composite models Time 2 
 
The models at Time 2 suggest that more parent variables are influential at Time 2 than at 
Time 1, namely for biodiversity and evolution where the number of adults seems to be key, 
and the level of parent education/occupation for evolution in particular. The number of 
adults in the home may be important in terms of the resources children have available to 
them in the form of time, trips away, books read to them etc. Likewise the same may be 
true of the number of younger children where the relationship is a negative one perhaps 
due to a lack of resources. Parent education and occupation levels are also likely to be 
influential with regards to the knowledge parents are able to pass on to their children and 
possibly also the number of educational activities, which are all likely to influence children’s 
knowledge. 
 
Additionally, expressive language is the only general cognitive ability measure that 
significantly predicts knowledge of biodiversity at Time 2. This is interesting because it 
would confirm the notion described above that expressive language supersedes receptive 
language, which supersedes English as a native language. This also implies that biologically 
specific language is key for biodiversity at Time 2, but also highlights the overall importance 
of language ability in the developmental of biological knowledge in general.  
 
The addition of evolution and ecology as significant predictors also suggests that ideas 
around biodiversity need to be coordinated and the nature of ecology and evolution aids 
this coordination, which in turn feeds into the other concepts. The only unique model would 
be for inheritance (Table 10.29) where the only significant predictor is evolution. At Time 1, 
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it was ecology. This switch may simply refer to the fact that by Time 2 children in all cohorts 
have better knowledge on evolution than ecology. The results from all the models at Time 2 
are presented in Tables 10.27-10.30, and the significant predictors for each biological 
construct are highlighted in Figure 10.18 below.  
 
Table 10.27. Composite hierarchical regression model for biodiversity at Time 2 
Biodiversity Time 2   
 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.726 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.038 0.758 
BPVS  0.042 0.779 
Digit recall -0.034 0.682 
b/w digit recall 0.055 0.554 
Expressive language 0.752 <0.001 
Number of adults (comp) -0.089 0.140 
Number of younger children 0.075 0.227 
English native -0.034 0.635 
Parent edu/occ -0.026 0.700 
    
Model 2: AdjR2=0.810 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.006 0.957 
BPVS  -0.059 0.640 
Digit recall -0.059 0.397 
b/w digit recall 0.045 0.562 
Expressive language 0.481 0.001 
Number of adults (comp) -0.134 0.010 
Number of younger children 0.093 0.078 
English native -0.001 0.991 
Parent edu/occ 0.004 0.944 
Ecology Time 2 0.347 <0.001 
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Inheritance Time 2 0.005 0.940 
Evolution Time 2 0.190 0.044 
 
Table 10.28. Composite hierarchical regression model for ecology at Time 2 
Ecology Time 2   
 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.572 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.159 0.308 
BPVS  0.256 0.175 
Digit recall 0.010 0.920 
b/w digit recall 0.032 0.783 
Expressive language 0.375 0.053 
Number of adults (comp) 0.061 0.414 
Number of younger children -0.045 0.558 
English native -0.055 0.535 
Parent edu/occ -0.019 0.823 
    
Model 2: AdjR2=0.706 (p<0.001)  
 Age 0.156 0.229 
BPVS  0.215 0.170 
Digit recall 0.008 0.923 
b/w digit recall -0.003 0.974 
Expressive language -0.201 0.285 
Number of adults (comp) 0.076 0.250 
Number of younger children -0.090 0.174 
English native -0.023 0.753 
Parent edu/occ 0.036 0.616 
Biodiversity Time 2 0.536 <0.001 
Inheritance Time 2 -0.055 0.517 
Evolution Time 2 0.274 0.019 
 
 
362 
Table 10.29. Composite hierarchical regression models for inheritance at Time 2 
Inheritance Time 2:    
 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.365 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.024 0.900 
BPVS  -0.007 0.974 
Digit recall 0.186 0.142 
b/w digit recall -0.119 0.403 
Expressive language 0.485 0.041 
Number of adults (comp) 0.004 0.968 
Number of younger children -0.138 0.145 
English native -0.099 0.362 
Parent edu/occ 0.115 0.258 
    
Model 2:  AdjR2=0.429 (p<0.001)   
 Age 0.069 0.703 
BPVS  -0.013 0.954 
Digit recall 0.134 0.270 
b/w digit recall -0.115 0.397 
Expressive language 0.160 0.541 
Number of adults (comp) -0.047 0.609 
Number of younger children -0.138 0.133 
English native -0.070 0.497 
Parent edu/occ 0.174 0.078 
Biodiversity Time 2 0.016 0.940 
Ecology Time 2 -0.108 0.517 
Evolution Time 2 0.484 0.003 
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Table 10.30. Composite hierarchical regression model for evolution at Time 2 
Evolution Time 2   
 Beta Sig. 
Model 1: AdjR2=0.575 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.060 0.700 
BPVS  0.066 0.723 
Digit recall 0.111 0.283 
b/w digit recall -0.003 0.977 
Expressive language 0.729 <0.001 
Number of adults (comp) 0.122 0.106 
Number of younger children -0.011 0.885 
English native -0.070 0.427 
Parent edu/occ -0.126 0.133 
    
Model 2:  AdjR2=0.704 (p<0.001)   
 Age -0.121 0.355 
BPVS  -0.015 0.925 
Digit recall 0.071 0.416 
b/w digit recall 0.001 0.989 
Expressive language 0.282 0.133 
Number of adults (comp) 0.130 0.047 
Number of younger children 0.014 0.836 
English native -0.020 0.784 
Parent edu/occ -0.142 0.046 
Biodiversity Time 2 0.295 0.044 
Ecology Time 2 0.276 0.019 
Inheritance Time 2 0.251 0.003 
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Figure 10.18. Composite hierarchical regression models for biological constructs at Time 2 
 
10.7 Speculative path model: 
 
Given the results of the modelling analyses above, a path model was created to try to 
speculate what the developmental pathway for biological knowledge appears to be. The 
path model was created using AMOS software. The variables chosen in the model were 
selected on the basis of their significance in the final composite regression models 
presented earlier (sections 10.6.2 and 10.6.3). The model in Figure 10.19 illustrates how 
much of a function language is with regards to the impact on biological knowledge.  
 
Although this model is relatively weak (2 (21) = 150.342, p<.0001, RMSEA= 0.212, p<0.001), 
it provides a useful illustration of how the pathways between variables appear to be. Also, 
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the coefficients between variables are moderate to high, suggesting good relationships 
between them. The model suggests age, as a proxy for experience, and language ability both 
receptive and expressive appear to have the biggest influence on biodiversity concepts at 
Time 1. As suggested earlier, it appears that the specific manifestation of language ability in 
different aspects of biological knowledge is most important, rather than language ability per 
se. Also as described earlier, it seems as though expressive language is a stronger predictor 
of biodiversity knowledge than receptive language in this regard. These initial biodiversity 
concepts form a basic foundation on which ecology concepts then build at Time 1, and 
subsequently at Time 2. The context of ecology helps to bind piecemeal concepts together 
initially, and later alongside the context of evolution at Time 2. It may be that ecology and 
evolution allow a child to coordinate ideas and promote more divergent and abstract 
thinking, allowing them to develop more complex ideas about biological phenomena. This in 
turn influences the development of children’s inheritance understanding at Time 2, 
although this is by far the weakest area of children’s understanding.  
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Figure 10.19. Path model of developmental trajectory of biological knowledge across the primary age-range 
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CHAPTER 11: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION  
11.1 Overview 
 
This chapter presents theoretical discussion of the key themes from the results presented in 
Chapter 10. Firstly, the poor inheritance scores at Time 1 and Time 2 are discussed as 
potentially resulting from irregularities, primarily in the way inheritance concepts were 
treated in comparison to other biological areas. One issue that was highlighted in previous 
analyses was that children’s inheritance scores were consistently low across both time 
points for all cohorts. Additionally, the developmental trajectory over the two time points 
seemed to be cohort-specific rather than reveal any type of developmental sequence. Past 
research had indicated children’s relative strengths in aspects of inheritance knowledge (cf. 
Keil, 1989; Springer, 1999; Gelman, 2003, 2015) and given that the results from the present 
work suggested otherwise, precautionary actions were taken to ensure inheritance 
concepts were not being assessed differently to any of the other biological constructs. 
These steps are outlined below. Elements are explored in more detail highlighting the 
conceptual differences between inheritance to biodiversity, ecology, and evolution.  Scoring 
and question development of the biological constructs are additionally explored. 
 
The results from Chapter 10 also illustrated the importance of language for children’s 
development of biological concepts. Theoretical accounts of why this may be are discussed, 
as are the implications of these findings. The apparent impact of testing on learning was 
also demonstrated in Chapter 9. The consequence of this finding is discussed with reference 
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to the scale of that impact relative to school influence, and what these findings suggest 
about the mechanisms that might be underlying conceptual development in biology.  
 
11.2 Conceptual Analysis 
 
One issue with inheritance was that children from all cohorts seemed to perform poorly 
across both time points in comparison to the other three biological constructs, and did not 
seem to progress over time. Also, there were very few Time 1 cognitive or demographic 
predictors that predicted success on inheritance knowledge at Time 2 (Chapter 10). One 
possibility for these results is that there is a central issue with the way questions have been 
devised to explore the inheritance elements taken from the NC (2001; 2014). To investigate 
this in more detail, a conceptual analysis was conducted investigating elements, question 
development, and scoring issues.  
 
11.2.1 Elements  
 
In total, there were 13 elements taken from the NC (DfE, 2014). These are tabulated below: 
 
Table 11.1. Inheritance core knowledge elements.  
Describe the main stages of the plant life cycle, noting inherited traits do not change over time 
Recognise the process of growth in plants, noting inherited traits do not change over time 
Describe how offspring of plants resemble parent plants in features 
Give reasons why living things produce offspring of the same kind 
Recognise that species run true 
Recognise the process of reproduction as the mechanism behind inheritance 
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Describe how offspring of animals resemble their parents in many features 
Recognise the process of growth in animals, noting inherited traits do not change over time 
Describe the main stages of the animal life cycle noting inherited traits do not change over time 
Describe how offspring of animals resemble their parents in many features 
Describe the main stages of the human life cycle, noting inherited traits do not change over time 
Recognise the process of growth in humans 
Recognise and compare the main external features of the bodies of humans and other animals. 
 
 
Upon closer inspection, there are eight out of the thirteen key elements that are specifically 
about the processes and mechanisms (highlighted in bold text) behind inheritance which 
inevitably posed a problem for primary school children given that they were not formally 
taught about the processes of sexual reproduction or genetics. The fact that only five 
elements out of a total of thirteen did not require explicit explanation about the processes 
and mechanisms behind inheritance and focused more on descriptive knowledge of facts, 
meant that overall children had relatively low scores for the inheritance construct on the 
basis of their very limited knowledge about explanatory mechanisms. The mechanisms 
behind inheritance posed a greater problem for children than mechanisms around the other 
conceptual areas because children were perhaps able to grasp and make use of existing 
knowledge available to them to try to logically understand and offer an explanation for the 
other constructs. For example, under the evolution construct children are asked “how did 
the lake get to be like this?” Children who did not know the answer made logical guesses 
such as “well I’m not sure but maybe it rained a lot and there was a ditch in the ground so 
the water filled up like a puddle” (child aged 9). This becomes much harder to do for 
something like inheritance given that it is, conceptually, very different. When children were 
asked a question under the inheritance construct like “how do animals have babies?” Those 
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with no concept of reproduction were not able to offer any intuitive explanation and simply 
stated “I don’t know.”  
 
With inheritance, there is something inherently more difficult to grasp. Many adults 
themselves do not fully understand the processes or genetics involved, and indeed the core 
aspects that enable one to understand the concept fully and coherently would require 
education beyond secondary school level; note this would also be the case for the 
remaining biological constructs. What must be addressed, however, is the fact that these 
elements are included in the NC for primary science. That is not to say it is expected that 
children will be able to demonstrate clear and coherent knowledge in these areas by the 
end of primary school, rather the markers of academic achievement would inevitably be 
recognised differently because children are expected to demonstrate their knowledge ‘age-
appropriately’ as the curriculum specifies (DfE, 2014).  
 
This study used the elements obtained from the NC in an effort to ground interview 
questions and does not therefore score or measure the data in the same way that a primary 
school teacher might, and this is worth keeping in mind. As such, the elements in the other 
biological constructs have been measured in exactly the same way so it is not the case that 
even though these elements have been included in the NC, children will automatically have 
equally good knowledge in all these areas. 
 
Only five elements out of a total of thirteen elements did not require explicit explanation 
about the processes and mechanisms behind inheritance.  The remainder of the thirteen 
elements would perhaps be classed as more descriptive or factual in nature and in this 
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respect, the more description or the more reasons children provide for this descriptive 
understanding, the higher the score a child would obtain. Thus, a lack of knowledge in one 
particular area would lead to low scores. One point to note is that biodiversity also contains 
many descriptive elements (9 descriptive/13 explanatory) and yet children consistently held 
higher scores for biodiversity across all year groups over time. It may be that with the aid of 
the contextual scenes, children were able to answer more descriptive-type questions better, 
in comparison to inheritance questions, where cues were not available to the child in the 
same way e.g. there were no pictorial representations of various stages of growth in plants 
(in fact including such examples would have provided overt answers to the children). In this 
way, it could be argued that inheritance concepts were not as generously aided by the 
pictorial contexts as well as some of the other biological constructs. This also meant that the 
majority of inheritance questions were not context-specific.  
 
The counter-argument to this is that even when children were asked generic inheritance 
questions, they would frequently respond with reference to the context, and therefore 
treated questions context-specifically. For example when children were asked “how does a 
plant change as it grows?” (Q10; element I12) children replied with answers such as “well 
see like this tree here [points to tree in the savannah] this tree is in a hot place so it needs 
loooaaads of water. But it also likes a lot of sun because it doesn’t like getting too cold or it 
won’t grow leaves” (child aged 8). This answer was typical of many children and 
demonstrates how they answered generic questions with reference to the contextual scene 
in front of them. Arguably, plants were available on the page but even in questions 
regarding humans, children responded similarly. When asked: “How do animals come to 
have babies?” (Q15; element I2) a 6-year-old child replied “I think it’s like this bird, the 
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baby’s in the tummy but we don’t lay eggs.” These examples illustrate that despite the 
assumed disadvantage children might have had regarding inheritance concepts by not being 
assisted with the contextual scene, children still frequently used the scenes as support of 
their answers, sometimes in an anthropomorphic manner. Inheritance questions are shown 
in Table 11.2 below. Note questions 4, 5, 7, and 8 all use cues from the context. The 
remainder of the questions are all asked in generic and non-observable terms.  
 
It may be that because a contextual scene was placed in front of children throughout their 
interview and that many of the other interview questions were context-specific, children 
attributed salience to the scene and used it whenever possible when responding to 
inheritance questions. Thus, it can be argued that children treated generic and context-
specific questions in the same way leading to relatively equal treatment of all questions in 
the interview. This is further supported by the fact that there were no contextual 
differences in performance or order effects for inheritance concepts (Chapters 8 and 9). This 
suggests that the questions targeted similar (if not the same) aspects of conceptual 
knowledge. Further evidence for this comes from looking at the figures showing children’s 
responses to inheritance elements across cohorts and across contexts (see elements graphs 
in appendices-A.8). The graphs display a very similar pattern of consistency across both 
pond and savannah contexts.  
 
The element children found the hardest was I6: Describe how offspring of plants resemble 
parents in features, responses for this were very low and seemingly lower for the savannah 
context, although both contexts were consistent. Overall the patterns illustrate that the 
highest scored items, although still scoring low, were those that were more descriptive in 
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nature. These elements showed some growth from Time 1 to Time 2, although this was 
cohort-specific and scores seemed to flat-line across Cohort 2 over time points.  
 
11.2.2 Question development 
 
Another potential issue with the inheritance concepts is that the questions developed for 
the biological interview task, which were aimed to address each element for the construct, 
were flawed and/or not addressing the element in the intended way. As mentioned above, 
the inheritance elements themselves often dealt with ideas that were not as observable to 
children and not aided by the context they saw in front of them, but also by a (likely) lack of 
experiential knowledge. In some sense the questions targeting the inheritance elements 
were less specific than the questions for the other biological constructs simply because they 
had to be. Interestingly, many of these questions were human-focused in a way that the 
questions or elements for the other biological constructs were not. Given research into 
anthropomorphism in naïve biology (e.g. Inagaki & Hatano, 2004; Carey, 1985), it would 
have been predicted that children would actually find these questions easier given that they 
would be able to refer to themselves as exemplars. However, it is evident that this was not 
the case and the general style in which the inheritance questions were asked, more 
explanatory and generic as discussed above, may have posed a problem. 
 
In the majority of the cases for inheritance elements, children were asked questions that 
were directly related and worded in the same manner to target a specific element (Table 
11.2). 
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Table 11.2. Analysing inheritance core knowledge elements by interview questions asked. Yellow 
shading indicates no direct mapping, green shading indicates indirect mapping 
1 How does a plant change as it grows? Describe the main stages of the 
plant life cycle, noting inherited 
traits do not change over time 
2 As above. Recognise the process of growth 
in plants, noting inherited traits 
do not change over time 
3 Do plants look the same? Why/why not? How? Describe how offspring of plants 
resemble parent plants in 
features 
4 (refer to animal on the page) Why doesn’t it ever look 
like another kind of animal? Why does it always look 
like the same kind of animal? 
Give reasons why living things 
produce offspring of the same 
kind 
5 Can a (select animal on the context) give birth to 
another animal like (select a different animal on the 
context)? Why/why not? 
Recognise that species run true 
6 How do animals come to have babies? Recognise the process of 
reproduction as the mechanism 
behind inheritance 
7 If this (select animal off context) had a baby, will this 
baby look exactly like its mum and dad? More like its 
own mum and dad from its family, a different mum 
and dad from a different family, or will they all look 
the same? Why? How? 
Describe how offspring of 
animals resemble their parents in 
many features 
8 How will this baby (select animal off context) change 
as it grows up? 
Recognise the process of growth 
in animals, noting inherited traits 
do not change over time 
9 As above. Describe the main stages of the 
animal life cycle noting inherited 
traits do not change over time 
10 Do people ever look like their mum and dad? Do 
people ever look exactly the same as their mum or 
dad? Why/why not? How? 
Describe how offspring of 
animals resemble their parents in 
many features 
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11 How does a baby change as it grows up? Describe the main stages of the 
human life cycle, noting inherited 
traits do not change over time 
12 As above. Recognise the process of growth 
in humans 
13 Do animals and people grow in the same way? What 
is the same/different?  
Recognise and compare the main 
external features of the bodies of 
humans and other animals. 
 
 
Questions not shaded on Table 11.2 ask children to produce a response that is directly 
related to the element behind that very question. This is evident in all questions except 
those highlighted in green, which access answers related to the element after further 
probing of the initial answers children give, hence these questions obtain the answer 
relating to the target element indirectly. Out of all the questions for inheritance displayed 
on the table, it is only question 1 that does not directly relate to the element, however 
whenever children produced answers that were off target, the researcher would re-direct 
them, rephrase, or probe their answers further with additional questions. It is certainly the 
case that questions with a direct and obvious mapping to elements are likely to specifically 
target children’s understanding about that particular element. Similarly, even those 
questions shaded in green that provide a more indirect mapping would still allow 
examination of the element in question. However, it is possible that those questions where 
there is an indirect element-question mapping, may not trigger the aspects of knowledge in 
children that are being assessed, ultimately leading to lower scores for those particular 
elements.  
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In sum, the objection that inheritance concepts were assessed differently to the other three 
biological constructs by poor element-to-question mapping has been rejected. It simply 
appears as though the overall rate of progress for inheritance concepts across cohorts is 
very little. Where there is progress, it generally seems to be for more descriptive type 
elements and not explanatory ones. Rates of progress across Time 1 and Time 2 are also 
cohort-specific, with a unique pattern for Cohort 2 in that very little progress is seen here 
across the two time points.  
 
In order to make sure that inheritance is not strictly unique in the way that elements are 
organised into more descriptive or explanatory groupings and that the questions targeted 
the elements in the same way for the other biological constructs as they did for inheritance, 
question-element mappings were also explored for the remaining constructs. 
 
11.2.3 Biodiversity 
 
For biodiversity, there are 15 core knowledge elements in total which are tabulated in Table 
11.3: 
 
Table 11.3. Analysing biodiversity core knowledge elements by interview questions asked. Green 
shading indicates indirect question-element mappings 
1 Can all animals live here? Why/why not? Recognise different animals are 
found in different environments, 
focusing on the range of 
organisms supported by a habitat 
2 Could this animals live somewhere else? What kind of 
place could it live in? Probe. Can they live somewhere 
Identify similarities and 
differences between 
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icy/dry…why/why not? environments and the effect this 
has on the animals that live there, 
focusing on the range of 
organisms supported by a habitat 
3 What does an animal need to live? Does it get here? 
Can it go somewhere else to get it? Probe. 
Describe how different habitats 
provide for the basic needs of 
different kinds of animals and 
how they depend on each other 
focusing on the range of 
organisms supported by a habitat 
4 Can all plants live here? Why/why not? Identify similarities and 
differences between 
environments and the effect this 
has on the plants that live there, 
focusing on the range of 
organisms supported by a habitat 
5 What does a plant need to grow? Does it get it here? Describe how different habitats 
provide for the basic needs of 
different kinds of plants [and how 
they depend on each other] 
6 Can they grow somewhere else like (somewhere 
icy/cold/dry)? Why/why not? 
Recognise different plants are 
found in different environments 
focusing on the range of 
organisms supported by a habitat 
7 Do plants look the same? Why/why not? Recognise all plants show 
variation within the same species 
8 As above Recognise all plants show 
variation between different 
species 
9 Do all animals look the same? Why/why not? Recognise all animals show 
variation among different species 
10 Does a baby (select animal from context) always look 
like the mum and dad (same animal as above)? 
Why/why not? 
Recognise all animals show 
variation within the same species 
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11 [If zebras/fish are all a bit different and have different 
stripes (show child the pictorial cues)] then how come 
we call them all zebras/fish? 
Grouping living things according 
to their similarities and 
differences 
12 What makes a human human? How are we different 
to other animals? 
Recognise similarities between 
themselves and others 
13 Do people ever look the same or do they look 
different to each other? What makes people look 
different/same? 
Recognise all humans show 
variation within a species 
14 Would it make a difference to the _if the _wasn’t 
there anymore? Vice versa. Probe. 
Understand the process of a 
feeding chain 
15 You see this heron? Is it more like the trout, the frog, 
or the fish? Why? How is it similar? How is it 
different?  
Identify a number of things that 
can be grouped as producers, 
consumers, predators, prey, 
herbivores, carnivores, etc.  
 
Out of the 15 core knowledge elements, it could be argued that only 4 overtly ask children 
to explain processes or mechanisms (highlighted in bold text) whilst the remaining elements 
are simply about recognition or identifying facts without the need to display explicit 
understanding. However, unlike inheritance concepts, biodiversity concepts about variation, 
taxonomy, and habitats, are all visible in everyday life as well as in the pictorial contexts 
provided to the children. Observing regular patterns in the environment is something 
children have been known to be very good at from a very young age (cf. Mareschal & Quinn, 
2001) thus perhaps children are likely to score relatively higher for biodiversity concepts in 
comparison to inheritance concepts.  
 
In terms of the questions for biodiversity, there are 5 (highlighted in green) that indirectly 
target the element in question through probing initial answers. The remainder of the 
questions target the elements directly. Unlike inheritance, there are no questions which 
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may potentially allude to something other than the target element. This may also explain 
why children have the best biodiversity knowledge across time points. The breakdown of 
scoring per element also shows children generally increase their knowledge across all areas 
aside from elements B25 and B27 where their knowledge actually takes a decrease across 
cohorts and contexts. It is unlikely that scoring for these elements was an issue at Time 2, 
because if this was the case, scoring would have flat-lined. Interestingly, these two elements 
are more descriptive in nature, hence reasons for the lower scores in these two elements 
may be due to issues around boredom. As with inheritance, it seems that elements across 
biodiversity are generally consistent across cohorts and contexts (appendices-A.8).  
 
The fact that nearly all biodiversity elements show children scored similarly across items 
suggests that the explanatory nature did not pose too much of a problem here. In fact the 
lowest elements that children performed on were element B24 (testing within-species 
variation and the processes behind variation) and element B17 (testing interdependence of 
environment and organisms). It could be argued that the former element also has some 
crossover with inheritance knowledge, which might explain the low scores given that 
children struggle with this concept. The latter element overlaps with ecological knowledge 
and is a more explanatory variable too, suggesting children find it hard to think about issues 
in a more global fashion, and that systems thinking (Hipkins et al, 2008) does not really 
initiate until Cohort 3. Nonetheless, what is clear is that there is growth in nearly all the 
elements consistent across cohorts and context, implying reliability in the measures.  
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11.2.4 Ecology 
 
There were a total of 10 core knowledge elements for ecology. This construct had the 
fewest number of elements in total, which are tabulated below in Table 11.4: 
 
Table 11.4. Analysing ecology core knowledge elements by interview questions asked. Green shading 
indicate indirect element-question mapping; yellow shading indicates no direct mapping. 
1 Do you think these animals live here? Why/why 
not? 
Identify that animals live in habitats 
to which they are particularly suited 
2 Can all animals live here? Why/why not? Recognise different animals are 
found in different environments, 
focusing on the interdependence 
between habitat and organisms.  
3 Can all plants live here? Why/why not? Recognise different plants are found 
in different environments, focusing 
on the interdependence between 
habitat and organisms  
4 As above. Identify that plants live in habitats 
to which they are particularly suited 
5 (Select animal) eats lots of grass/little water insect, 
if there were lots of (same animal) around here, 
would it make a difference to the (same animal?) 
Probe. 
Recognise all living things are 
interdependent interacting with 
each other and their environment 
6 If lions eat zebras, how come there are still so 
many zebras around in the savannah? 
Recognise all living things show 
variation and are interdependent 
interacting with each other and 
their environment  
7 Suppose it didn’t rain for a long time, and the 
lake/pond dried up. What would happen to all the 
animals? Probe. 
Identify the similarities and 
differences of different 
environments and how these affect 
the kinds of animals that live there, 
focusing on the interdependence 
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between various habitats and 
organisms 
8 [related to above question] Where would they go? 
What would they eat? Why? 
Describe how different habitats 
provide for the basic needs of 
different kinds of animals and 
plants, and how they depend on 
each other, focusing on the 
interdependence between habitat 
and organisms 
9 Suppose this lake dried up, would this plant be able 
to grow here? What would happen to it? Why? 
Identify similarities and differences 
between local environments and 
how these have an effect on the 
plants that live there focusing on 
the interdependence between 
habitat and organisms  
10 As above.  Describe how different habitats 
provide basic needs for plants 
 
 
The number of elements that could be considered more explanatory in nature is equal to 
the number of elements that may be considered descriptive. There are a couple of 
questions (highlighted in green) above that indirectly address the elements and the child’s 
ability to think in an ecological way, and two questions that may seem as though they do 
not directly target the element (highlighted in yellow). This may be because a number of 
ecology elements require systems thinking in that the environment and its organisms ought 
to be considered as a whole. This would inevitably need to be explained by the child, who 
would have to understand the interrelationships and explain them explicitly to answer some 
of the questions. Further support comes from figures for ecological elements (appendices-
A.8). The elements with the lowest scores are elements Ec34 and Ec35, those which require 
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the children to demonstrate systems thinking. These elements generally show little growth 
or decline in knowledge at Time 2 across cohorts and contexts. Elements Ec36 and Ec37 also 
show similar patterns where there is little growth between time points for Cohorts 1 and 2, 
but a decline in knowledge at Cohort 3 for the pond context and savannah context.  
 
In sum, it is evident that there is growth in the majority of ecological elements which is 
consistent across contexts. Another interesting point to highlight is that the four elements 
children seemingly perform the lowest on are all explanatory-type questions, with the 
exception of element Ec34. This is consistent with the idea that children struggle more with 
explanatory type questions as they require the child to refer to processes, mechanisms and 
more explicit knowledge that the child may not possess. In line with this, the elements that 
children consistently score the highest on are Ec31, Ec32, and Ec33, which incidentally are 
all descriptive-type questions further supporting this idea.  
 
11.2.5 Evolution 
 
Finally for evolution, there are eleven core knowledge elements that are shown in Table 
11.5. 
 
Table 11.5 Analysing evolution core knowledge elements by interview questions asked. Indirect 
element-question mappings are shaded in green. Yellow shading indicates no direct mapping. 
1 
 
Why can’t this lion/otter live in cold weather? But a 
polar bear can? Why? How> 
Consider how some animals are 
adapted to the extreme 
2 Why can’t this tree grow in cold weather but other 
trees, like a Christmas tree can? Why? How? 
Consider how some plants are 
adapted to the extreme 
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3 As above Recognising how plants are suited 
to the environment in which they 
live 
4 Do all plants look the same? Why/why not? Recognise why plants produce 
offspring of the same kind and 
link this back to inheritance 
5 Why doesn’t it ever look like another kind of animals? 
Why doesn’t it always look like the same kind of 
animal? (select specific animal) 
Recognise why animals produce 
offspring of the same kind and 
link this back to inheritance  
6 How did the Savannah/pond come to be like this? Identify the similarities and 
differences of local environments 
and how these affect the kinds of 
animals that live there [thereby 
shaping the environment]  
7 Do people look the same or do they look different to 
each other? What makes people look the 
same/different? 
Recognise why humans produce 
offspring of the same kind and 
link this back to inheritance  
8 Lions/otters eat zebras/fish, but zebras/fish are good 
at hiding/swimming so that lions/otters can’t catch 
them. The zebra/fish that have lots of stripes/bigger 
tails are faster/better at hiding. Which zebra/fish do 
you think the lion/otter is likely to eat first? Why? 
Probe. 
Recognise natural selection as the 
process behind evolution  
9 As above Recognising how animals are 
suited to the environment in 
which they live 
10 As above Identify similarities and 
differences between local 
environment and how these have 
an effect on the animals that live 
there 
11 Suppose this lake dried up, would it better for this 
(choose animal) to have no baby, 1 one baby, or lots 
of babies? Why is that better? Probe.  
Recognise natural selection as the 
process behind evolution  
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For evolution, nine out of the total eleven elements concern the processes and mechanisms 
behind evolution (bold text). The only example where it seems as though the question does 
not target the element is for question 11. It was felt necessary to directly assess for 
children’s knowledge about natural section without actually using those terms. In this vein, 
question 11 was devised, and looking at the figures for element scores (appendices-A.8), 
children displayed quite good knowledge suggesting the element-question link is sound.  
 
The questions that children did seem to struggle with however, were elements Ev38 and 
Ev41. The former concerns a very evolutionary element in that it asks children to think 
about how animals became suited to the environment in which they live over time. This type 
of ‘process’ question inevitably posed some difficulty. The latter recognises the process of 
inheritance and so once again, children may have struggled answering this question for 
reasons explained earlier. Generally for all other elements related to evolution, growth 
across time point is evident for all cohorts and this is consistent across contexts. The lowest 
performing elements are: Ev45, Ev43, Ev44, Ev40, Ev41, and Ev38.  Upon closer inspection, 
all of these elements are all explanatory in nature suggesting children find explicating 
processes or mechanisms harder. This is to be expected however, given children’s lack of 
formal instruction in the area. Overall the analysis and element-specific figures (appendices-
A.8) indicate sound question-element mapping. Children seemed to find explanatory 
questions harder across all constructs and as inheritance has the most of these types of 
questions, children inevitably find these concepts harder to grasp.  
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11.3 Elements used in multiple questions 
 
Another aspect worth exploring with regards to the equal treatment of biological 
constructs, is how far it is the case that the same question is addressing multiple elements, 
and whether there is some bias regarding inheritance in this way. The questions in the 
interview that target multiple and overlapping concepts are tabulated below in Table 11.6. 
 
Table 11.6. Core knowledge elements that were used multiple times for interview questions. Eleven 
in total. 
Question Element  
2 B18  
 
Ec30 
Recognise different animals are found in different environments - focusing on 
the range of organisms supported by a habitat 
Recognise different animals are found in different environments - focusing on 
the interdependence between habitat and organisms 
6 Ec29 
 
Ec32 
B17 
Recognise different plants are found in different environments - focusing on 
the interdependence between habitat and organisms 
Identify that plants live in habitats to which they are particularly suited 
Identify similarities and differences between different environments and the 
effect this has on the plants that live there, focusing on the range of 
organisms supported by a habitat  
9 Ev45 
Ev40 
Consider how some plants and animals are adapted to the extreme 
Recognising how plants are suited to the environment in which they live 
10 I12 
 
I9 
Describe the main stages of the plant life cycle- noting inherited traits do not 
change over time. 
Recognise the process of growth in plants 
11 I6 
Ev42 
 
B22 
B21 
Describe how offspring of plants resemble parent plants in features 
Recognise why plants produce offspring of the same kind and link this back to 
inheritance 
Recognise all plants show variation within the same species 
Recognise all plants show variation among different species 
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13 I3 
Ev43 
Give reasons why living things produce offspring of the same kind 
Recognise why animals produce offspring of the same kind and link this back 
to inheritance  
18 I7 
I11 
Recognise the process of growth in animals 
Describe the main stages of the animal life cycle noting inherited traits do not 
change over time  
22 B25 
Ev44 
Recognise all humans show variation within a species 
Recognise why humans produce offspring of the same kind and link this back 
to inheritance  
24 I10 
 
I8 
Describe the main stages of the human life cycle, noting inherited traits do not 
change over time  
Recognise the process of growth in humans 
30 Ev47 
Ev41 
Ev38 
Recognise natural selection as the process of evolution 
Recognising how animals are suited to the environment in which they live 
Identify similarities and differences between local environment and how 
these have an effect on the animals that live there  
33 Ec37 
 
 
Ec34 
Identify similarities and differences between local environment and how 
these have an effect on the plants that live there focusing on the 
interdependence between habitat and organisms  
Describe how diff habitats provide basic needs for plants… 
 
Out of the entire interview schedule only two elements are used twice. These are Ec31, and 
Ev47. However both of these elements are directly targeted to specific questions and so are 
unlikely to pose a problem. With regards to Table 11.6 above, there are 5 biodiversity 
elements, 5 ecology elements, 7 inheritance elements, and 9 evolution elements. These 
numbers are not far from equal, aside from evolution. When one looks more closely at the 
evolutionary elements involved, they all consider aspects of processes, or mechanistic 
understanding which is why they were used alongside other related elements, such as those 
around ideas of inheritance because these concepts are inherently linked and (assuming 
good knowledge) one is likely to have to refer to one alongside the other e.g. question 18. 
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By this same logic, it is possible that evolutionary concepts will be present alongside other 
elements the most because of the very nature of its structure; further supported by the fact 
that there exist 8/10 explanatory elements in comparison to just 2/10 descriptive elements. 
What Table 11.6 also highlights however, is that there does not seem to be any bias 
towards/away from inheritance elements in the way that elements have been used in 
multiple questions.  
 
11.4 Scoring of inheritance 
 
An additional thing to consider with regards to children’s poor scores in inheritance is the 
scoring system itself, and whether it biases against inheritance elements in any way. As 
discussed earlier, the scoring system was a scale measure; the more knowledgeable a child 
was about a particular phenomenon, the higher the score they received. The scoring system 
was designed to capture the shift in children’s explanation from non-scientific, to scientific 
explanations. It also accounted for the child’s use of logic behind a question even if that 
logic was inaccurate. If the explanation alluded to a scientific explanation of sorts, the child 
was able to obtain a relatively high score, as illustrated by the examples below:  
“They are borned different” 
“because if I look whole, like all of it like mum, I’d be just like her. If I looked all of it 
like my dad, I’d look like him. So if it’s half and half, I’m him and her.” 
Thus with regards to inheritance, even if children obtained lower scores due to a lack of 
knowledge, if they were able to provide an answer that displayed some scientific basis it 
would be the case that they should obtain a relatively high mark. In this sense the scoring 
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system could not have been the sole reason behind children’s low scores in this area. Rather 
it must be something which did not lead children to think creatively or logically about a 
possible answer. It could be that the pictorial representations simply did not provide 
children the cues they needed for the questions However, children referred to contexts 
even when generic questions were asked suggesting generic questions did not impact 
children’s answers differently between contexts as demonstrated earlier. Perhaps it is the 
general style of the questions, being more explanatory rather than descriptive in nature, 
that had more of an impact for children that meant they may not have been able to refer to 
their existing knowledge, which they could have been able to do for the other biological 
constructs (section 11.2.2). As explained above however, there were reasons to believe 
children would have found these types of questions easier. Also, the nature of some of the 
inheritance questions meant that providing cues was simply not possible.  
 
This study made a wider attempt at examining conceptual development in biology than 
other previous studies have taken. The conceptual analysis above does however, dismiss 
any obvious artifactual results in the data. Thus, regardless of whether inheritance is 
conceptually different from the other three biological constructs, the evidence from the 
conceptual analyses provided above suggests that there were no differences in question 
development or scoring of these constructs. The reason for children’s very poor inheritance 
scores are most likely due to their lack of any intuitive knowledge in this area and not 
methodological differences in the treatment of the biological constructs.  
 
Likewise, with regards to evolutionary concepts there may be specific items where children 
display more knowledge about than others, a sub-group of micro-evolutionary concepts so 
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to speak. This is because despite children having a problem with change over time, they are 
still capable of understanding some elements of particular phenomena and so may gain low 
scores even when overall their knowledge is incorrect, whereas for inheritance concepts if a 
child did not know an answer to a question they would get a score of ‘0’. For example, in 
response to the question “…which zebras are likely to be eaten up first: the ones with many 
stripes, or one with fewer stripes? Why?” children would generally pick the zebra with fewer 
stripes, which is of course correct and so they immediately get a score of 1. However when 
the reasoning behind this is probed, some children may give the correct answer referring to 
a lack of camouflage/natural selection, others would come up with an incorrect albeit fairly 
logical answer of something such as “the zebra with fewer stripes is younger so it can’t run 
away as fast.” Although the latter is incorrect, the child was able to answer the initial 
question correctly on the basis of some sound (albeit inaccurate) logic implying a partially 
explicit concept (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). In contrast, the same type of naïve thinking is not 
possible for inheritance or ecology constructs given the nature of the questions and so if 
children did not know the answer they scored ‘0’.  
 
In conclusion, thorough examination of the elements, question development, and scoring 
for each biological construct suggests that inheritance was not treated differently. Although 
it is a conceptually different type of construct with different types of elements of knowledge 
that children need to demonstrate, the methodology was a sound first attempt at capturing 
the sub-groups of concepts within all constructs and developing questions on that basis. 
Children’s poor inheritance scores are therefore not a result of the methodology but 
provide evidence of poor conceptual understanding across primary school. This finding is in 
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contrast to past research where results may have been an artefact of the essentialist 
paradigm, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
11.5 A sequence of acquisition 
 
The results Chapters 8-10 outline a potential sequence of conceptual development in 
biology. These findings support the view that children’s natural tendencies to tacitly acquire 
perceptual information from the environment and categorise this information (cf. Schulz et 
al., 2007; Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015), allows them to subsequently gain an 
understanding about taxonomy, a key area of biodiversity knowledge. As outlined earlier, 
biodiversity is a construct that seems to be assembled by accumulating fragmented facts 
rather than understanding about processes or causal mechanisms (Grotza & Basca, 2003). 
This makes it a relatively straightforward area for children to grasp even from as young as 
age 4, because there is no conceptual development occurring as yet. However, the 
consequence of accumulating large amounts of fragmented knowledge is that these 
concepts require coordination. Past research indicated that general cognitive ability, 
particularly working memory may therefore be predictive of conceptual knowledge in this 
regard (Alloway et al., 2008), although others had not always found evidence of this (Hecht, 
2002; Hecht et al., 2001).  
 
The models presented in Chapter 10 indicated that general cognitive ability had very little 
effect on conceptual progression (discussed later). Rather, the regression models presented 
in Chapter 10 illustrate that constructs of ecology and evolution allow this coordination to 
occur by assisting children to use their previously acquired biodiversity concepts, and merge 
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them with related ecological/evolutionary concepts. These findings also support the view 
that systems thinking (Hipkins et al, 2008) is a necessary function with which to organise 
knowledge and this allows the child to view concepts globally (ecology) and longitudinally 
(evolution), which subsequently aids them to understand biological processes and 
mechanisms. It may be that domain-specific conceptual progression requires having 
context-specific knowledge as this is what ultimately aids understanding about causal 
processes as Grotza and Basca show (2003) and may be why the temporal dimension of 
ecological and evolutionary knowledge because it is easier to understand in situ, as opposed 
to in arbitrary contexts (e.g. Maurice-Neville & Montangero, 1992).  
 
Inheritance on the other hand is conceptually different. Children’s fragmented biodiversity 
knowledge does not directly relate to inheritance concepts, and cannot be coordinated in 
any mental model in the same way, although it would appear that children try to do this 
given the fact that ecology and evolutionary concepts predict inheritance knowledge. This 
finding supports the view that in order to examine conceptual development across 
biological concepts, one needs to study multiple related concepts, rather than inheritance 
concepts alone, as others have also suggested (Williams, 2012). This is not only informative 
about the content of children’s knowledge, but also how children integrate pieces of related 
knowledge to reach a sufficient level of understanding about a particular concept. The fact 
that ecology and evolutionary concepts predict inheritance knowledge across time points, 
suggests that these two constructs (ecology and evolution) are important for coordination 
of fragmented concepts. Indeed work by Hipkins and colleagues (2008) argued something 
similar and the authors stated that concepts such as ecology allow children to engage in 
coordinating related concepts resulting in a more globalised view, i.e. systems thinking. It 
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may be that systems thinking requires a context in which to ground piecemeal ideas in order 
to coordinate them as recent research by Almeida and colleagues (2013) highlighted, but 
also past work that indicates contexts constrain children’s thinking resulting in more 
accurate conceptions (Keil, 1996).  
 
In some sense, it could be that children are using whatever pieces of knowledge they have 
at hand to try to understand a concept, like inheritance, that they are not too familiar with. 
In this regard, Carey’s (1985) account conceptual change supports this idea. When children 
have limited biological knowledge, they seek alternative psychological explanations, which 
is why Carey argued a domain of biology arose from a domain of psychology.  
 
However, if children require the context of ecology or evolution to coordinate fragmented 
ideas as they allow children to think about phenomena across a temporal and global axis, 
then past literature indicates that children are likely to have very context-specific ideas 
(Almeida et al., 2013; Williams & Smith, 2010; Hipkins et al., 2008; Assaraf & Orian, 2001), 
and yet this is not something that was evident in the results from this study. Potential 
reasons for why this might be the case are explored in Chapter 12.  
 
Consequently, it appears as though the amount of experience and exposure a child has to 
biological phenomena, coupled with their burgeoning need to categorise and label 
organisms, processes, or other phenomena, which language ability and executive control 
aid, leads to greater knowledge acquisition in biodiversity initially than any other construct. 
Likewise the lack of any significant context differences at Time 1 would also suggest that the 
information children initially acquire could come from secondary sources (media, teaching, 
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museum trips etc.) rather than actual physical exposure to particular environments. This is 
in line with Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) account of RR that suggests children’s exposure to the 
environment allows them to develop innate context-specific predispostions and attentional 
biases to focus on linguistically relevant input and with time, build up modularised 
representations. This explanation also works hand-in-hand with research indicating that 
children are excellent at categorising (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015) and may even explain 
why: attentional biases. However, what is still unclear is whether or not the level of 
exposure a child has to biological phenomena leads to context-specific understanding.  
 
Aside from related biological constructs being predictive of each other, the results also 
illustrated the impact of language on the developmental sequence. Chapter 3 outlined that 
language might be implicated in conceptual development by being a potential mechanism 
for children to be able to coordinate and explicate fragments of naïve or implicit biological 
concepts (cf. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Tolmie, 2012). Findings from this study support this 
view and provide some further detail in this regard. Results at Time 1 indicate that receptive 
language is a key predictor of all biological constructs (individually) in the first stage of a 
hierarchical regression model, but drops out in the second stage to be replaced by other 
biological constructs. This implies that language ability of the child is not important per se, 
rather it is the specific manifestation of language in different forms of biological knowledge.  
 
At Time 2, a similar and stronger effect is seen for expressive language, which remains a 
significant predictor at stage two for biodiversity and inheritance in the preliminary 
cognitive models, and for biodiversity in the final cognitive models. This would suggest that 
expressive language ability of the child superseded receptive language ability in influencing 
394 
conceptual development of biological concepts. Therefore, the results from the present 
work imply that acquiring specific biological language might be a key mechanism behind 
conceptual development in biology, possibly due to its role in making explicit former implicit 
concepts, and coordinating piecemeal ideas (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Tolmie, 2012). Chapter 
3 highlighted the importance of the role language had in helping children to acquire 
biological knowledge and therefore also accounts for why early studies using language-
sparse models (e.g. Keil, 1996; Springer, 1999; Gelman, 2015) gathered conflicting data that 
children’s early biological knowledge is coherent and theoretical. Instead, by using a 
language-heavy method of interviews, this study has been able to demonstrate that 
language may so important towards children’s conceptual progression that it acts as a 
driver, as speculated by Tolmie (2012).  
 
Various models of conceptual change are also able to account for the importance of 
language in other ways: Piaget’s account of cognitive conflict (Piaget, 1970), Vygotsky’s 
account of the co-construction of knowledge (Vygotsky, 1978), and Tolmie’s two-systems 
hypothesis (Tolmie, 2012).  
 
Studies on collaborative group work have also highlighted the delayed benefits of 
collaboration, seemingly because language used in these settings to communicate points of 
view might have a subsequent priming effect, allowing children to become sensitised to any 
relevant information they come across ad hoc (Howe et al., 2005). In fact the findings from 
this study are in support of Howe and colleagues’ view because children’s understanding of 
biological knowledge (aside from inheritance) at Time 2 showed a consistent improvement 
from Time 1, where children at Time 2 in Cohort 1 were performing to a similar level to 
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children in Cohort 2 Time 1 (Chapter 9). This consistent linear increase implies that the 
process of testing alone improved children’s knowledge of biological constructs, because 
children were given the opportunity to reflect upon reasons for their ideas more deeply and 
engage in dialogue about these ideas during the interview task. Furthermore, the fact that 
this did not seem to be the case for inheritance concepts indicates that results are not a 
result of improving general cognitive abilities as others (Alloway et al., 2008; Zaitchick et al., 
2013; Nayfield et al., 2013) suggested, and highlight the importance of language as a 
potential driver for conceptual change, as conjectured in Chapter 3.  
 
The findings from this study are also in line with those found in Williams and Smith (2010) 
whereby language-heavy tasks, such as explaining the causal mechanisms behind 
phenotypic similarity, revealed children had poor understanding about biological concepts 
in comparison to language-sparse tasks that made use of children’s concrete judgements. It 
seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that children are able to acquire both implicit and 
explicit knowledge about biological facts. This is likely aided by the fact that children are 
excellent at detecting patterns of co-regularity in the environment (Shultz et al., 2007) and 
categorizing this information (Csibra & Shamshudeen, 2015). However, even though 
children are able to acquire fairly accurate and detailed facts about biological knowledge, 
they routinely fail to understand the mechanisms behind biological phenomena as has been 
demonstrated here, but also past research (Williams, 2012; Williams & Smith, 2010; Grotza 
& Basca, 2003). This tendency in children also explains why children have excellent 
biodiversity knowledge while they have very poor inheritance knowledge, as described 
earlier.  
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11.6 Fragmented or theoretical? 
 
Developing a sequence of acquisition of related biological concepts across primary school 
was one of the aims of this study. Not only does it inform one about the level of children’s 
knowledge in different conceptual areas but it allows comment on whether children’s 
conceptual development appeared to be fragmented or theoretical in nature. Currently 
there is no consensus on this matter although, as discussed in Chapter 3, much of the 
evidence seemed to point toward children initially having fragments of knowledge that they 
eventually piece together, which may become more theoretical with increasing age 
(diSessa, 1993; 2004; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Tolmie, 2012), and based on these ideas, it was 
hypothesised as such at the start of this study.  
 
Results from the modelling analyses (Chapter 10) however, indicated a slightly different 
picture. Every hierarchical regression model that was computed to examine the key 
predictors of performance in each biological construct (biodiversity, inheritance, ecology, 
and evolution) showed that in the second stages of the models where the remaining 
biological constructs were used as predictors alongside cognitive or demographic variables, 
the biological constructs consistently predicted performance of each other. This implies that 
in order to gain a good conceptual understanding about a biological construct, children’s 
understanding about other related biological constructs were consistently the most 
important factors. This is a finding past research had not yet found but was speculated by 
some (Grotza & Basca, 2003; Williams, 2012) given how many biological concepts are 
heavily connected.  
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Research conducted on children’s rudimentary understanding about inheritance has 
suggested that children have fairly coherent concepts by age 4 or 5 (Springer, 1996; 1999). 
The notion of coherent concepts in inheritance or indeed other areas of biology, inevitably 
relate to the ideas of conceptual change being a theoretical process. By this account 
children are able to coordinate ideas they acquire within a theoretical network and 
integrate related ideas within and across domains (e.g. Carey, 1985; Vosniadou, 2014).  
 
Consequently, children might be thinking about biological ideas in more theoretical ways 
than hypothesised. Perhaps, as Vosniadou (2014) argues, there may be framework theories 
in place which allow children to organise related pieces of information that are context-
specific. Indeed, Chapter 10 highlighted that ecology and evolution were constructs that 
allowed coordination of seemingly fragmented pieces of information. This element of 
coordination in itself would imply that fragments of knowledge would be loosely organised 
into related domains. In addition, the fact that biological knowledge did not appear to be 
context-dependent, implies that children may be utilising relevant information more 
generally, at least to begin with. Then, as Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) model suggests, with 
increasing exposure to environmental stimuli and language, children start to refine their 
ideas more context-specifically in an iterative cycle.  
 
The successive development from implicit concepts to explicit ones, implies that a range of 
influences including family composition, pet ownership, location of residence (urban or 
rural) are likely to influence children’s early biological concepts (Williams & Smith, 2010). 
Alternatively, it might be that children develop a range of implicit mini-theories for a 
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particular biological phenomena e.g. inheritance, to understand it in different contexts, 
echoing the ideas of Vosniadou’s framework theories (2014). These mini-theories may later 
become integrated into a unified framework to form one broader and perhaps more 
coherent theory that children use to guide them across a range of tasks (e.g. Williams & 
Smith, 2010).  
 
However, while there might be some sort of ‘framework’ in place for a theoretical 
understanding, there is no one biological construct in the results obtained from this study 
that predicts all the other biological constructs, indeed Piaget (1972) also claimed this. The 
relationships we see in the hierarchical regressions could be reflecting the degree of overlap 
between the same elements in the biological constructs. What this would imply is that 
concepts are actually quite fragmented then, and the reason some coherence is seen is 
because children are implicitly noting this inherent relatedness between the concepts, 
perhaps without the use of any framework at all, as has been previously suggested (diSessa, 
1993). Alternatively, it may be that in the cases where children have limited biological 
knowledge, they make use of any other information they have available to them (see Carey, 
1985), which if true, would imply that piecemeal concepts might be organised around a 
degree of relatedness.  
 
The research outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 highlights that generally all theorists agree 
perceptual information from the environment is children’s source of initial information, 
which they are pre-disposed to acquire. Studies have also suggested that perceptual 
information acquired is generally implicit and piecemeal (Kallai & Reiner, 2010; Fugelsang & 
Dunbar, 2005; Howe et al, 2012; Mason & Just, 2015) and unlikely to be communicable as a 
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result (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Taking this as a point of departure alongside the results from 
this study, a contemporary model of conceptualising the process of conceptual change in 
biology is offered.  
 
11.6.1 Potential model of conceptual change in naïve biology 
 
Using what research has already established as the point of departure in Chapter 4, it could 
be argued that on the basis of the results obtained here, there may be a model of learning 
whereby anticipatory systems exist in the brain to detect all perceptual information from 
environmental exposure, as Tolmie (2012) suggests. This effectively creates a tacit 
knowledge system of ideas which at this stage are piecemeal. This programme of work 
highlights the importance of language in driving forward conceptual change in biology, 
hence a process of coordinating atomistic biological ideas and coupling them with linguistic 
units seems to be the next step. This is also in line with the two-systems hypothesis 
described by Tolmie (2012) who suggests that the process of mapping language onto 
concepts may be the same as the processes outlined by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) in the RR 
model, whereby conceptual representations are redescribed at the same time as linguistic 
units, and only when both have reached the E3 level of representation can they be fused 
together. This fusion allows the concept to then be verbally communicable, which means 
the concept no longer is implicit, but has reached conscious access.  
 
Tolmie (2012) provides further detail in this regard. He suggests that repeated support and 
exposure through relevant tasks and contexts aid the process of explication altogether. This 
explains why delayed effects in collaborative group work are seen (e.g. Howe et al., 2005), 
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and also why results from Time 1-2 in this study showed a consistent improvement in 
children’s biological knowledge (aside from inheritance). Tolmie (2012) advocates that 
explicit concepts overlay implicit ones, rather than supplant them altogether. This explains 
why even in adulthood, there has been evidence of the maintenance of naïve concepts 
(Schtulman & Valcacel, 2012).  
 
However, rather than being a completely fragmented process (cf. diSessa, 1993), it may be 
that in the tacit system of Tolmie’s model (Tolmie, 2012), knowledge is piecemeal but the 
subsequent process of explication by mapping conceptual units onto linguistic units requires 
that these fragmented concepts be organised in a manner that groups related ideas 
together, much like Vosniadou (2014) describes in the context of framework theories. 
Unlike Vosniadou, however, I argue that these frameworks are more mobile and dynamic in 
nature, allowing relevant contexts to trigger certain conceptual units to change and re-
organise as required. This is evidenced by the fact that knowledge of different biological 
constructs can help children understand other related constructs. The continual dynamic 
shifts occurring in these loose frameworks also explains why children may have 
sophisticated ideas about some biological areas (e.g. biodiversity), and very naïve ideas 
about other areas (e.g. inheritance). Gradually, however with continuous explication of 
implicit concepts, the system may become more theoretical in nature, where frameworks 
may become more fixed as a result.  
 
In sum, results from this programme of work suggest that knowledge is not quite as 
atomistic as previously thought. However, the two-system hypothesis (Tolmie, 2011) and 
the RR model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) are still able to account for what the process of 
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change might look like, with the extension offered in the dynamic frameworks hypothesis. 
Tacit knowledge is relatively fragmented but with the aid and coordination of language, 
these ideas become explicated and may be organised in dynamic frameworks of related 
ideas that shift around during exposure to relevant contexts, eventually allowing concepts 
to become more theoretical. This is, of course, a hypothesis but it encapsulates both past 
research and the findings obtained from this programme of work.  
 
11.7 General cognitive abilities 
 
The results from Time 1 and Time 2 indicated a marginal influential role of general cognitive 
abilities on the development of biological concepts. This is in contrast to previous research 
which highlighted the predictive influence that cognitive abilities have on numeracy and 
literacy (Cragg & Gilmore, 2014; St Claire-Thomas & Gethercole, 2006; Nunes, Bryant, & 
Barros, 2012). More recent work had also suggested the potential influence of EFs on 
children’s science knowledge at preschool (Nayfield et al., 2013) and to some extent at 
primary school level (Zaitchick et al., 2013).  Reasons for why general cognitive abilities 
seemed to play relatively little role in development of biological concepts in this study are 
not clear. It may be that the measures used to assess general cognitive abilities were not 
sufficiently sensitive to test children across such a vast age range. This will be explored in 
Chapter 12.  
 
Alternatively, the absence of general effects regarding the cognitive abilities may be 
because EFs influence the initial acquisition of concepts, and the processes of integrating 
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and coordinating these concepts. If so, the aspects of children’s biological knowledge that 
were assessed in this study were a consequence of the former integrative processes that 
may have been coordinated by general cognitive abilities and as such, failed to capture the 
role of cognitive abilities in action. For example, if this study were to present children with 
fragments of biological information and ask them to come with explanations about what 
they thought was happening, one would expect to see a more definitive influence of EFs and 
other general cognitive abilities because children would be asked to coordinate and 
integrate ideas. However, this study asked children about the consequence of that, where 
children may have already coordinated and organised their ideas. For these reasons the 
influence of general cognitive abilities appeared to be marginal because it may be in the 
more moment-to-moment processing of conceptual elements that a significant cognitive 
influence is observed.  
 
The relatively weak influence of EFs on conceptual change in biology might also relate to the 
organisation and structure of knowledge. If learning were purely theoretical, it might be 
that EFs would have had a larger influence in being able to coordinate ideas (e.g. Vosniadou, 
2014). In which case learning is more piecemeal than previously thought because as Mayer 
et al (2014) suggest, if it were theoretical, then the role of inhibitory control and cognitive 
flexibility might be especially salient. Given, however, that they were not shown to be 
particularly influential in this study, alludes to the fact that children’s understanding of 
biological phenomena is not yet theoretical because if this were the case then children 
would have displayed accurate and coherent understanding of biological phenomena across 
cohorts, which they did not.  
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As described in Chapter 4, systems thinking (Hipkins et al., 2008) may also be a process that 
is particularly important for children to develop in order to hold multiple ideas about global, 
overarching concepts such as ecosystems or change over time. Indeed, previous work 
suggests that children seem to struggle with these types of concepts at primary school 
(Maurice-Neville & Montangero, 1992; Hipkins et al., 2008), hence perhaps children have 
not yet reached the stage at which they are able to make use of executive control which 
would be required in order to coordinate these types of global ideas.  
 
There has been some recent work examining the effect of brain plasticity on IQ (Ramsden et 
al., 2011) which has shown that the changes in verbal IQ over adolescent years are not an 
artefact of measurement error, but correlate with changes in brain structure in regions 
associated with verbal functions.  Although this work was with adolescents, it may be that a 
similar story is happening with regards to the development of EFs during childhood; changes 
in brain structure might be reflecting the effects and consequent influences we see EFs 
having on areas of conceptual development and academic achievement. These effects have 
been shown to be predictive in preschool (Nayfield et al., 2013) and secondary school (St-
Claire-Thomas & Gathercole, 2006) however there have been few systematic studies 
suggesting the same for primary school children. Results from current work suggest that in 
the case of conceptual progression and change at primary school, effects of general 
cognitive factors are marginal at best possibly due to the same reasons described above.  
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11.8 Demographic variables 
 
The influence of demographic data was not a key focus of this study, nonetheless these 
measures were included so that any potential impact of more environmental or social 
factors were not undetected. For these reasons discussion of these aspects are speculative 
in nature. The final composite hierarchical regression models in Chapter 10 essentially 
control for the majority of demographic variables, resulting in a largely cognitive model. 
That said, findings from the modelling analyses indicate the demographic variables that 
seemed most influential for children’s conceptual development in biology were parent 
levels of education and occupation, the number of adults in the home, and speaking English 
as a native language.  
 
With regards to the first parameter, there is well established research suggesting that low 
levels of parental education are associated with lower levels of academic achievement and 
IQ in childhood (Alexander, Entwisle, & Dauber, 1993; Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, & Klebanov, 
1994). Interestingly, research also highlights SES may be influential in children’s academic 
achievement (see Bradley & Corwyn, 2002 for a review) and yet the SES variable used in the 
modelling analyses (as measured by whether or not children received free school meals), 
did not suggest this to be the case. It is possible that father’s level of occupation may have 
been a proxy for SES. If so, some marginal effects on children’s biological knowledge were 
seen in the preliminary models. Indeed there have been studies investigating which aspects 
of SES most strongly relate to cognitive development with some (Mercy & Steelman, 1982; 
Scarr & Weinberg, 1978) suggesting maternal and paternal education levels are key factors. 
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This might be why SES as measured in this study was never a significant predictor in the 
hierarchical regression analyses; instead, parental levels of occupation and education 
already encompassed this.   
 
In terms of understanding how demographic variables encourage the development of 
biological concepts, there is literature to suggest that mothers who worked in occupations 
with a variety of tasks and problem-solving opportunities provided more warmth and 
support to their children, who in turn manifested greater verbal competency (Parcel & 
Menaghan, 1990). Indeed the link between SES and verbal skills has been well documented 
(Hart & Risley, 1995; Mercy & Steelman, 1982, Hoff-Ginsberg, 1991). Hence, in terms of the 
results from the current study, parent levels of education and occupation, and speaking 
English as a native language all point towards developing children’s verbal competency, 
which in turn help to explain the results from the cognitive regression models where both 
receptive language at Time 1 and expressive language at Time 2 are key influences of 
children’s biological knowledge. This further supports the argument detailed earlier that 
acquiring biologically-specific language may be the driving mechanism behind conceptual 
change in biology, by facilitating the coordination and explication of implicit ideas (cf. 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Tolmie, 2012).  
 
The number of adults in the home was also a significant factor in many of the final 
regression models presented in Chapter 10. It was found that three adults in the home 
seemed to be the optimal number and generally, the third adult was reported as being a 
grandparent. There is some research regarding the important sources of information and 
support grandparents are able to provide to children. Many families in Britain now use 
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grandparents as a form of childcare (Fergusson, Maughan, & Golding, 2007) and mothers 
who work part-time are most likely to receive grandparent help (Dench et al., 1999). Aside 
from benefits of childcare, the presence of an extra adult in the home supports parents of 
children in terms of emotional and material assistance, which in turn benefits the 
development of the child (Cochran & Brassard, 1979). Also, each new person in a child’s 
environment could provide a new interactive style and content of activity. There is 
additional evidence of intergenerational learning where grandparents provide guidance and 
scaffolding, particularly of children of mixed ethic background (Kenner, Ruby, Jessel, 
Gregory, & Arju, 2007), hence additional adults in the home may be important sources of 
teaching by providing extra resources such as one-on-one learning opportunities through 
guided participation in learning with children (Gregory, Long, & Volk, 2004). Exactly why an 
additional adult after the optimal number of three does not appear to have the same 
benefits are unclear. The effect of the number of adults in the home after three were similar 
to having either one or two adults in the home. Perhaps with four or more adults in the 
home there is less opportunity for one-on-one time with the child and so the resources 
become limited compared to the level of having one or two adults in the home (Chapter 10).  
 
11.9 Impact of testing 
 
As briefly noted above, Figure 9.1 in Chapter 9 illustrates that there was a significant impact 
of testing on children’s performance in the biological task; a finding that was relatively 
unexpected. The Time 1 to Time 2 shifts in children’s knowledge about biological constructs 
(aside from inheritance) implies that children are gaining knowledge that is most likely a 
consequence of conceptual progression over the course of a year. The implication then, is 
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that the biological task given to children at Time 1 was enough to shift their knowledge on 
by a whole school year. This is a relatively common finding in research around science 
interventions. For instance, a study into group-work intervention when learning about 
forces and evaporation, led to significant knowledge gains across a number of measures 
(Christie et al., 2004). Primary school children took part in one-hour lessons over 6-8 weeks 
devoted to the intervention, and their performance was assessed longitudinally. Results 
showed that 18 months later, children in the intervention group were still ahead of their 
peers at secondary school level.  
 
Although the study by Christie and colleagues (2004) was over a longer period of time, the 
current body of work also supports the idea that minimal amounts of appropriate input 
makes a significant increase in conceptual development. It could be that participating in the 
study at one point allows children to discuss their ideas in more depth than they might have 
done previously, as well as engage in dialogue which may have helped children to explicate 
their ideas (cf. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). This might consequently prime children to become 
sensitised to subsequent relevant information they encounter (cf. Howe 2005), as described 
earlier. Also the task may have been more interesting for children in comparison to the 
types of work they would normally engage in.   
 
It is unlikely that the reason for significant improvement between time-points could only be 
due to improving underlying general cognitive abilities, specifically increasing language 
ability. While it is almost certainly true that this would contribute to improved performance, 
the uniformity of the findings seen in Figure 9.1 imply something more than just increasing 
language ability, particularly because one would expect an improvement in children’s 
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inheritance ideas at Time 2 and this is simply not observed. The lack of consistent change 
across cohorts between Time 1 and Time 2 for inheritance (unlike any other biological 
construct) would suggest that inheritance might be a different type of construct in 
comparison to the other three.  
 
Inheritance has more generic questions over context-specific questions but upon reflection, 
all this really indicates is that children’s answers are not supported by a physical contextual 
scene in front of them for the generic questions. Despite this however, there is evidence 
that children still answered generic inheritance questions with reference to the specific 
context in front of them, suggesting this construct is not being tested or treated in a 
different way, as discussed earlier. Past research had indicated that children may have 
context-specific ideas about inheritance depending upon the type of task that was used to 
elicit their knowledge (Williams, 2012; Williams & Smith, 2010), yet this study did not 
support this idea as children tended to display fairly consistent, although often inaccurate or 
no knowledge, of inheritance (discussed in Chapter 12).  
 
Also, the lack of order effects seen at Time 1 and Time 2 indicated that only asking 
questions once (as for the generic questions, which inheritance has more of) did not make a 
significant difference to children’s performance. If it were making a difference then one 
would expect to see significant order effects, particularly for the inheritance construct. 
Given that this was not the case, one can be confident that inheritance is being tested and 
assessed in the same way as the other three biological constructs.  
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These findings leave room for speculation about the kinds of teaching practices children are 
exposed to. Figure 9.1 implies that 40 minutes’ worth of engaging dialogue about biological 
phenomena appears to have more of an effect on performance over an academic year, than 
does one year of schooling. Exactly why this may be is somewhat unclear. It could be the 
relative strength of the way the biological task is framed allowing children to go beyond 
piecemeal surface concepts, to thinking about complex ideas in a deeper and systematic 
manner, which children may not get the opportunity to do under formal instruction.   
 
If knowledge gains after minimal exposure are very high as shown by this study, and that 
these gains might persist over time (Christie et al., 2004), why is the impact of intervention 
so high relative to the usual teaching practices? In an attempt to help answer this question, 
teachers within each school recruited in this study were sent questionnaires. Unfortunately 
the poverty of returned questionnaires means that concrete interpretation cannot be 
offered, and the conclusions offered below must be interpreted with caution given the very 
small sample. Nonetheless, the secondary status of this data still provided some useful 
information.  
 
Firstly, as shown by the qualitative analysis of teacher questionnaires (appendix A.5), 
teachers appear to allow the opportunity for children to give explanations about something 
they are studying. This seems like a positive teaching strategy given the results from this 
study indicating the importance of dialogue for explicating implicit ideas. However, this 
strategy might be used as a tool for assessment, and the opportunity for more theoretical 
thinking could be lost. Also, given the large class sizes in urban schools, children do not get 
this opportunity on an individual level, which might encourage them to focus their ideas and 
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actively engage in dialogue. Group-work was also a relatively popular strategy among 
teachers, both in mixed-ability and ability groups. However, when teachers were asked 
about whether children were given the opportunity to argue their viewpoints even if they 
were not their own, the range of responses was from very frequently to never. This suggests 
some inconsistency in the kind of teaching practices employed, but largely points towards 
the issue that children might not be exposed to conflicting ideas to their own, which past 
research has demonstrated is key for cognitive development (cf. Piaget, 1970; Vosniadou, 
2014; Carey, 1985).  
 
Although the number of returned questionnaires from teachers was very few, it appears as 
though the strategies employed in science lessons are vast, and age-specific. The current 
work demonstrates a task that works across primary school, and it could be that 
assumptions teachers might have about what children are able to do at any given age may 
lead to the inconsistencies in teaching techniques. Additionally, the types of professional 
training teachers received also varied, which may have led to teachers focusing their 
attention on different aspects of teaching. Nonetheless what was clear is that training 
appeared to benefit teachers and many changed their practices as a consequence. This 
implies that with further understanding about conceptual development in biology, or 
indeed any other area of science, the avenue for transferring this knowledge to teachers 
(who are receptive of this information) is sound.   
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11.10 Summary 
 
Having completed conceptual analyses on all four biological constructs, it is clear that 
different types of questions elicit different types of responses which some children find 
either easier or more difficult. However, this pattern is consistent throughout cohorts and 
biological constructs, suggesting that although inheritance questions are conceptually quite 
different to those in the other three constructs, there is no bias in the way the questions 
have been constructed or matched to corresponding core knowledge elements. 
 
The sequence of acquisition of concepts in the domain of naïve biology suggested the 
importance of language as a potential mechanism behind conceptual change. Indeed, it was 
speculated that language might have an important role in explicating children’s implicit 
ideas and sensitising children towards relevant information they may encounter (cf. Tolmie, 
2011). The sequence of acquisition also highlighted that the structure and organisation of 
children’s ideas is more theoretical than previously argued in Chapter 2. It appears 
children’s ideas are initially very piecemeal but children’s developing language allows some 
ideas to become partially explicit and as a result, relevant pieces of knowledge are 
organised together in dynamic frameworks which become more fixed as knowledge 
becomes overtly theoretical. Finally speculative remarks were offered around the results in 
relation to cognitive and demographic variables, and the impact of testing on children. 
These areas were never intended as the primary focus of this work, and yet their inclusion 
provided valuable additional information.   
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CHAPTER 12: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
12.1 Overview 
 
There has been a wealth of research that has aimed to try and understand children’s 
conceptions about scientific phenomena. The general consensus has been that children do 
not enter formal instruction as tabula rasa, rather they are already equipped with naïve and 
intuitive ideas about the world around them. Often these naive concepts can pose a 
problem in the classroom when they are in conflict with what is being formally taught (West 
& Pines, 1984, 1986; Chi et al., 1994), leading to difficulties in learning about scientific 
concepts. To resolve such difficulties, children must undergo a process of conceptual change 
in order to develop accurate scientific ideas about the world around them (Nersessian, 
2003).  
 
This chapter will discuss the outcomes of this body of research with reference to aims and 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5, and provide a brief summary of conclusions relative to 
each aim. Firstly, the primary focus for this research, which was to determine the nature of 
conceptual progression in the domain of naïve biology, is explored. This is then followed by 
other aspects that were explored in this thesis such as demographic and cognitive 
influences on conceptual development, which were not primary foci of this study. Thus 
these latter sections are more speculative in nature. Subsequently, the limitations of this 
body of work are also reviewed followed by suggestions of future work. Finally, the 
contributions of the present study will be considered.  
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12.2 Aims  
 
The aim of this research was to investigate conceptual change and progression in the 
context of children’s ideas about biological phenomena. Examining biology is a fruitful area 
in this endeavour because the concepts naturally require a need for integration and can 
become more complex over time, unlike other scientific areas such as physics, where 
concepts may become more atomistic over the course of development.  
 
The literature presented in Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted that despite agreement about the 
occurrence of conceptual change, there is vast disagreement as to the processes involved. 
Arguments for the knowledge-as-pieces, and the knowledge-as-theory perspectives 
generally suggested that children’s initial ideas about scientific phenomena might be 
fragmented. This was one of the first aims of this research: to examine what the state of 
children’s concepts were, and whether conceptual change was a theoretical or fragmented 
process. 
 
Past literature has investigated conceptual change in the context of naïve biology, yet work 
has been limited to specific concepts (e.g. Keil, 1994; Carey, 1985; Gelmen, 2003), specific 
age groups (e.g. Zaitchick et al., 2013; Springer, 1999, Keil, 1987) and specific methodologies 
(e.g. Gelman, 2003, 2015; Carey, 1985; Springer, 1999; Keil & Lockhart, 1999). The aim here 
was to account for all these past limitations by developing a novel methodological paradigm 
to investigate conceptual change and integration among a number of ostensibly related 
biological constructs across the primary school age range.  
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Previous work has focused extensively on children’s naïve notions of inheritance concepts in 
the context of biology, and by using the essentialist paradigm to investigate this, came to 
the conclusion that children have coherent understanding about inheritance concepts (e.g. 
Springer, 1999; Gelman, 2003, 2009, 2015). However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
results obtained by using the essentialist paradigm in these studies, were amenable to more 
simple interpretation and thus another aim of this study was to develop a new 
methodology, which would assess children’s understanding about biological concepts in a 
robust and grounded manner. Specifically by looking beyond biological concepts in isolation 
with regards to conceptual change, and study the potential influence of general cognitive 
abilities on scientific understanding, which past literature has indicated are influential at 
preschool (Nayfield et al, 2013), primary school (Zaitchick et al., 2013), and secondary 
school level (Gathercole et al., 2005; Alloway et al., 2005; St Claire-Thompson & Gathercole, 
2006).  
 
Having been reminded of the aims of this study, this chapter now presents a summary of 
the findings in light of the research questions. 
 
12.3 Summary of findings  
 
12.3.1 Do children have sophisticated ideas about inheritance concepts? 
 
One of the key findings from this body of work was that children appeared to have very little 
knowledge about inheritance concepts in comparison to other biological concepts. This was 
a striking finding given that past literature has suggested children have coherent knowledge 
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about inheritance (e.g. Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1994; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). 
 
However, previous work had often employed the use of the essentialist paradigm when 
studying children’s conceptions about inheritance. The paradigm worked on the notion that 
essentialism is an early precursor to genetic understanding, yet the paradigm itself was 
quite constraining on children’s responses, rather than allowing them the opportunity for 
discussion around their conceptual understanding as the current task did.  Children’s 
responses to classic essentialist tasks (e.g. Gelman 2003; Springer, 1999; Keil, 1999) could be 
interpreted by their natural tendency to make probabilistic judgements and categorise data 
as shown in Chapter 4 (Schulz et al., 2007; Strevens, 2000; Mareschal & Quinn, 2001; 
Younger & Fearing, 1999). In this sense, the reason children appeared to have coherent 
knowledge about inheritance in past studies was because the paradigm was essentially 
testing their ability to detect and organise everyday perceptual data. The findings at Time 1 
support this notion and suggest that in actuality, children have very little understanding 
about inheritance concepts. This is unsurprising given that children are not formally taught 
the process of reproduction in primary school, whereas they are taught biological processes 
behind other biological constructs e.g. how animals are suited to the environment in which 
they live.  
 
Chapter 11 discussed the conceptual differences of inheritance in comparison to other 
biological areas and indicated that children’s poor inheritance knowledge was not a 
consequence of biases in question development or scoring in this study. Rather the more 
robust approach in assessing inheritance away from any essentialist method allowed for 
closer examination of children’s concepts, which found contrasting results to previous work.  
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Consequently, one must consider whether the essentialist paradigm is a useful framework 
to use when trying to investigate children’s early ideas about inheritance. The results 
obtained from this study were able to show key conceptual differences between related 
areas of biology implying that future research ought to consider development in these areas 
separately rather than assuming the same rate of conceptual progression in each, as has 
been done previously (e.g. Zaitchick et al., 2013). It is certainly the case that children have a 
tendency toward essentialism (Gelman, 2015; Altran & Medin, 2001; Soloman, 2002) 
however this tendency seems likely to allude to children’s natural inclination to make 
probabilistic judgements and categorise perceptual data. If so, studying essentialism may be 
a fruitless endeavour (Strevens, 2000; Schtulman & Schultz, 2008; Ghazali & Tolmie, 2014), 
and one must start to question what evidence we have yet to gain by continued use of this 
paradigm. The methodology used in this programme of work, therefore, provides a good 
step towards a suitable alternative approach to measure the level of children’s 
understanding in areas of biology.  
 
12.3.2 What is the sequence of conceptual progression? 
 
Chapter 11 highlighted that the sequence of progression of biological concepts seems to 
begin with acquiring fragmented biodiversity concepts. This is enabled by children’s natural 
inclination to observe regularities in the environment and categorise data. The 
accumulation of fragmented concepts becomes more coordinated to allow children 
understanding of biological concepts more globally through the context of ecology and also 
longitudinally through the context of evolution. Inheritance is the last concept to be 
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acquired because it does not directly relate to other biological concepts. Ecology and 
evolution concepts predict performance in children’s understanding about inheritance, but 
overall performance in this area remains low across primary school, as described above.  
 
A key driver of conceptual progression appears to be language. As suggested in Chapter 11, 
biologically-specific language allows coordination of implicit ideas by explicating them when 
children are exposed to relevant contexts. Language may also help children to develop 
partially explicit ideas (cf. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) which ultimately assists children to 
organise related concepts together in a dynamic framework. 
 
12.2.3 What is the influence of general-cognitive abilities? 
 
The influence of general cognitive abilities on conceptual development of biological 
concepts was marginal. This was a surprising finding given that past research had suggested 
that working memory and EFs in particular, might be predictive of children’s understanding 
at preschool (Nayfield et al., 2013) primary school (Zaitchick et al., 2013), and secondary 
school (Gathercole et al., 2004; St Claire-Thomas & Gathercole, 2006). For these reasons it 
was hypothesised that general cognitive abilities would also have a large influence on 
conceptual progression in this study, however this was not the case. Chapter 10 outlined 
the marginal contribution of EFs on conceptual change, and as discussed in Chapter 11, this 
study did not capture the influence of EFs in action, but the end-results of its influence 
instead. For these reasons only traces of domain-general effects on conceptual 
development in areas of biology were observed.  
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12.3.4 Are children’s concepts theoretical or fragmented? 
 
The sequence of acquisition of biological concepts outlined earlier highlighted that related 
biological constructs are predictive of each other over and above any predictive values of 
domain-general capabilities. This implies that children organise related ideas together in 
frameworks (cf. Vosniadou, 2014) implying that concepts are perhaps more theoretical than 
previously argued in Chapter 2. However, children’s knowledge was not completely 
accurate or coherent implying that fragments of knowledge must be acquired initially where 
some may become partially explicated (cf. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) whilst others remain 
implicit and others become explicit. It could be that concepts that are explicit or partially 
explicit are organised in dynamic frameworks that re-organise and solidify on the basis of 
increasing explicit knowledge. As discussed earlier, language appears to be a key driver for 
this change implying that as children are better able to coordinate their language, concepts 
may become more explicit, and consequently theoretical.  
 
12.4 Limitations  
 
Despite the findings that have been presented, there were some limitations in the present 
work. Perhaps the main limitation of the present work is that the measures of EF abilities 
might not have been sufficiently sensitive. It has been documented that EFs begin emerging 
in infancy and are not fully developed until late adolescence (Best & Miller, 2010; Huizingga 
et al., 2006; Conklin et al., 2007).  
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However, there are no standard measures for EFs that can be used across this entire age-
range or indeed the primary school age-range. Many of the measures for inhibitory control 
and cognitive flexibility are either for pre-school children aged under 4 years, or older 
children aged 6 years or above. It was possible to test EFs using separate measures within 
these age groups, however this option was not chosen because results from different 
measures would not have been comparable given the longitudinal nature of this study. For 
example, children aged 4 at Time 1 would have been tested using pre-school measures of 
EF, such as the dimensional change card sort task (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006), however by Time 2 
this measure would have been too easy for children and they would have likely reached 
ceiling. For these reasons it was decided that measures aimed at older children would be 
most appropriate, given that by Time 2, the majority of children would be within the 
appropriate age brackets of these tasks.  
 
Consequently, this meant that at Time 1, children in Cohort 1 (aged 4-5) were at risk of 
being at floor level in some of the tasks. Results at Time 1 for both the mean scores of WCST 
and the Stroop task indicate the developmental pattern that would have been predicted, in 
that children become better at these tasks with age. Closer inspection revealed that the 
differences in performance between the older two cohorts were not significantly different 
for both tasks however. This might imply that by around age 7/8 (Cohort 2) children are 
reaching their peak. Especially because results for Cohorts 2 and 3 at Time 2 revealed no 
significant differences in performance for the WCST, and only a significant difference 
between Cohorts 1 and 3 on the Stroop task. However, despite the lack of many significant 
findings in this area, the pattern of results did suggest influences of general cognitive 
abilities (albeit marginal) that were simply surpassed by language ability and knowledge of 
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related biological concepts. This in itself provided useful information that other studies have 
not previously found. 
 
The WCST itself was chosen as a measure of cognitive flexibility because it is one that has 
been used frequently in the past (Chelune & Baer, 1986; Romine, Lee, Wolfe, Homack, 
Geroge, & Riccio, 2004). The chimeric animals Stroop task (Wright et al., 2003) was chosen 
as a measure of inhibitory control because it was an effective non-verbal measure that 
could be computerised and was considered enjoyable for the child. A potential drawback of 
using this task was that the software used in the initial version was not obtainable and the 
task had to be altered, as described in Chapter 7. Altering the task may have meant that 
accuracy could have been a problem, particularly because the experimenter was in control 
of showing children the images as fast as possible. However, the effect of semantic 
inhibitory control was a significant predictor in some of the cognitive regression models 
illustrated in Chapter 10, which suggests that the chimeric animals Stroop task was 
sufficiently sensitive.  
 
Furthermore, the chimeric animals Stroop task was chosen as an alternative to the go/no-go 
task (Fillmore & Rush, 2002), which would have required longer administration time and 
given that the testing period for domain-general capability measures was already very 
lengthy, the go/no-go task may have caused boredom or distress and potentially resulted in 
the child being out of class for longer periods of time.  
 
Despite the fact that it appeared as though Cohorts 2 and 3 had reached ceiling on the 
WCST at Time 2, the Stroop task well worked at Time 1 and both EF measures worked well 
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at Time 2. This implies that overall the measures for EFs were sensitive, particularly the 
Stoop task, and particularly at Time 1. With regards to the WCST at Time 2, although 
Cohorts 2 and 3 may have reached ceiling, the results of the study still allowed one to view 
the developmental trajectory across the two time points and still provided the valuable 
information that overall, EFs and indeed other domain-general abilities have little 
involvement in conceptual change in the context of naïve biology. Rather language seems to 
be a key driver.  
 
With regards to language measures, another minor drawback of this study was that the 
expressive language measure was only administered at Time 2. This was because the 
expressive language measure could only be administered to children aged 6 and above; 
even at Time 2, there were a few children in Cohort 1 that were under the required age-
range. An appropriate measure of expressive language was not obtainable for children aged 
4 and above, and a receptive language measure was used instead for both time points. This 
measure demonstrated the important information that biologically-specific language might 
be a key driver of change in biology concepts, and that expressive language as measures at 
Time 2 might be even more so. In Chapter 10, when the expressive language measure was 
removed from the regression models, the receptive language measure replaced it as a 
significant predictor. This suggests that the effects of receptive and expressive language are 
similar, but the effect of the latter is stronger, possibly because the task measuring 
biological knowledge in children is also expressive in nature. Overall, while it would have 
been interesting to view the influence of expressive language at Time 1, the results obtained 
from the study still contributed vastly to the discovery that biologically-specific language is 
of great importance for conceptual change.  
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An additional limitation of this study it that the sample was recruited from across three 
schools. This is an issue because the teaching practices and biology topics covered in each 
school were likely to vary. The nature of recruiting a large sample meant that children could 
not be obtained from one school alone and in this case, three schools were necessary to 
gain a sufficiently large sample in order to conduct the planned quantitative analyses. 
Schools were recruited on the basis that they shared similarities such as a similar profile of 
intake of children from mixed ethnic backgrounds and were all state schools in deprived 
areas of London. However the school sizes did vary, with one school having double the class 
sizes of another, and this may have affected the resources available to children when 
learning, potentially leading to differences in children’s knowledge. An attempt was made at 
trying to assess these types of differences by distributing questionnaires among the 
teachers about their levels of qualifications, training, and teaching practices. Unfortunately 
the rate of returned questionnaires was exceptionally low and none of the intended school 
comparisons could be made, instead a qualitative analysis of teachers across schools and 
year groups in general was conducted. This analysis suggested that overall, teachers 
employed similar teaching strategies and had similar levels of training but due to the small 
sample, these results must be interpreted with caution.  
 
One point to consider about the nature of conceptual development of biological knowledge 
in young children, is the task used to examine this information. An interview based 
assessment meant that there was a potential risk of children giving particular responses 
which might not have truly reflected what they knew. There is no concrete way of 
establishing to what extent verbal assessment protocol impacted on children’s 
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performance, yet the alternative, a non-verbal assessment, would be equally hard to 
establish given the nature of the conceptual content involved. Piaget (1971, 1972) and 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argue that in order for children to demonstrate a sound 
understanding of a particular concept, that concept must be articulable. Other paradigms 
employing reduced verbal assessment via paradigms such as those described in section 
3.1.3, have far more flaws and an absence of what children know in more comprehensive 
terms. Hence a verbal assessment is an appropriate method in this regard.  
 
Additionally, serious attempts were made to ensure that children’s true level of 
understanding was measured firstly by developing a coding scheme that mapped out 
progressive levels of cognitive advance. This allowed examination of children who may have 
had limited explicit knowledge but made a sensible attempt to provide a logical answer 
(even if that answer was incorrect), in comparison to a child who had no real understanding 
of a particular concept at all. Children’s answers were also routinely probed to ensure that 
the exact level of understanding could be ascertained and coded accurately, rather than 
doing this on the basis of a ‘surface response’ because aspects of social desirability and 
demand characteristics may have been present.  
 
Secondly, the nature of the interview questions were themselves grounded in the NC 
despite the fact that the structure of the NC itself is relatively uninformed (Chapter 1). The 
NC provided a standard from which to design the measure and against which to judge the 
outcome, rather than deciding this in a completely bottom-up fashion as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 6. There was no past work that addressed the broad sweep of biological 
understanding from a cognitive-developmental perspective and as such, there is no 
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curriculum independent standard for measurement to calibrate against. One possible 
existing measure that might have arguably had this status are past Key-Stage tests 
(Standards and Testing Agency, 2013) however these themselves are not entirely objective 
because they are based on the NC, and the coverage of biology is only tested in one strand 
whereas this study aimed to address children’s knowledge and understanding in a more 
detailed fashion. Therefore, by developing questions situated in the NC and providing visual 
props, children were not restricted in their answers and could be as abstract or as specific in 
their response and they wanted to or indeed, were able to.  
 
In sum, taking these protocols were all appropriate attempts at mitigating the verbal 
demands of the interview task, to get as close as possible to the level and content of 
children’s biological knowledge by developing an objective and principled scheme of 
conceptual change as possible.  
 
Another point to consider is the validity of the biological interview and coding scheme. The 
core knowledge structures taken from the NC (DfE; 2014) were mapped on to an interview 
question aimed at targeting that specific element. In many cases this resulted in a direct 
one-to-one mapping, however in others, there was often one question used to target 
several core knowledge elements, or vice versa. This could have potentially meant that the 
subtleties of children’s understanding about certain biological concepts may have been lost. 
Also the coding of these elements was fairly subjective. On the other hand, the reliability 
and validity analyses presented in Chapter 8 suggest that the task was valid and the coding 
reliable, with percentage agreement being very high at 86% on average. Further exploration 
of the biological task in Chapter 11 also highlights that this task was a successful initial 
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attempt at a methodology that steered away from the essentialist paradigm, and provided 
some valuable insights on children’s knowledge about biological phenomena that had not 
been reported before. Hence issues around validity of the biological interview and coding 
scheme are unsubstantiated.  
 
Chapter 11 also debunked any potential indication that results from the study that 
suggested children’s poor ideas about inheritance were a result of treating inheritance core 
knowledge structures differently to others. While it does appear to be the case that 
inheritance itself is conceptually different to the other biological structures included in this 
study, the development of the biological task was able to illustrate these differences, and as 
such, provides a valuable tool for further exploration of these ideas.   
 
The use of only two contexts may also have been a potential limitation in the current work. 
Piloting studies had suggested that the two contexts used in this study were ones that 
worked well because children had the most knowledge on them. However, the fact that in 
the pilot studies performance on the other contextual scenes may not have been as high, 
may indicate that children’s ideas about biological phenomena are context-specific (Hipkins 
et al., 2008; diSessa, 1993; Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998). This study found very few 
contextual differences in children’s performance possibly because the use of the two 
contexts effectively balanced this out. At Time 2 there was a tendency for children to 
demonstrate more knowledge for the pond context that was not present at Time 1. This 
may have been because this is a context children are more readily exposed to and perhaps 
the subsequent exposure allowed children to become sensitised to relevant ideas as 
discussed in Chapter 11. This study was required to limit testing to two contextual scenes 
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because of the time restraints in testing children, but also in the programme of study as a 
whole. It may be that in future studies, a selection of contexts ought to be used to assess 
contextual differences in more detail. Alternatively it may be that providing children with 
opportunities to think along more general and abstract terms rather than be constrained by 
contexts per se, may have allowed them to source knowledge in similar ways across 
contexts and make use of commonalities across related knowledge structures. This would 
also lend support to the dynamic frameworks hypothesis (Chapter 11) and indicates that 
children’s early biological knowledge may be more theoretical than initially thought.  
 
Finally, it could be argued that a longitudinal study looking across the entire age range 
would have provided valuable insights across and within individuals. However, there were 
time constraints within this programme of work, and one of the ways in which to obtain 
developmental data across the primary age span was to adopt a triple-cohort longitudinal 
study. This allowed useful cross-cohort comparisons, but also allowed observation of the 
developmental trajectory across two time-points, providing valuable information about 
conceptual development in biology, which would have otherwise been untapped.  
 
12.5 Future directions 
 
While this research was able to fulfil the aims it set to, the results obtained from the present 
work also highlighted some additional questions that future work could explore. Firstly, the 
role of language as a mechanism for conceptual change in biology needs to be investigated 
in more detail. While there is work in support of the RR model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) the 
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two-systems hypothesis (Tolmie, 2011), and the dynamic frameworks hypothesis proposed 
here have yet to be investigated. The neurological basis of differences between tacit and 
explicit understanding have only been observed in adults (e.g. Kallai & Reiner, 2010; Mason 
& Just, 2015) and while it has been suggested that two systems might also be present in 
children (Howe et al., 2005; Tolmie, 2012) more research into whether there are differences 
in implicit and explicit beliefs in children, needs to be conducted. If it is the case that there 
are differences, this would provide some support to the idea that children’s initial tacit 
knowledge might be piecemeal and that theoretical understanding may develop over time. 
This would also highlight the need to assess conceptual change over a period of time, past 
the primary age range, to discover the points at which children’s understanding becomes 
more theoretical in nature, whether there are key markers to this, and how it might be 
achieved faster or enhanced for the purpose of education. The current NC does highlight 
the use of scientific language and teachers reported that they frequently use relevant jargon 
in lessons. This appears to be a positive step towards improving conceptual development of 
scientific concepts.  
 
Additionally, if EFs are thought to be chief in coordinating theoretical thought (cf. Opfer et 
al., 2012; Cragg & Gilmore, 2014; Zaitchick et al., 2013) more examination is needed to 
investigate this further. Perhaps with the development of more age-appropriate methods to 
assess EFs across the primary age-range, one will be able to observe their effects with more 
sensitivity than was possible in this study. Also, there is room for studies employing the use 
of neurological techniques to assess the role of EFs in conceptual change in action. Past 
research has demonstrated brain activation in frontal lobe areas associated with executive 
control (Alvarez & Emory, 2006), although employing this method would rule out 
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examination of younger cohorts. It may be possible to replicate the study by Kallai and 
Reiner (2010) using older children and adolescents. This would allow investigation of 
potentially separable implicit/explicit knowledge systems, and whether there are any 
developmental changes associated with this.  
 
Lastly, if it is the case that boosting executive control might boost theoretical thinking 
particularly in later years, then designing an intervention for children to increase their EF 
and domain-general abilities will be key in promoting conceptual change in biology. It may 
even be beneficial for conceptual change in other scientific areas, although this is something 
else that would also need to be investigated not least to identify whether the findings 
obtained from this study are specific to biology or whether they might also apply across 
domains. Likewise designing an intervention allowing children to explicate various scientific 
phenomena and consequently expose children to relevant contexts and information, would 
also allow examination of whether the findings from this study are specific to biological 
phenomena and whether a potential teaching aid could be developed to promote 
conceptual development in primary science lessons via the use of scientific language.  
 
12.6 Summary & contributions of this work 
 
The current work provided new insights about the nature of conceptual change in the 
domain of naïve biology. The key findings were that biologically-specific language seems to 
be a key driver in promoting conceptual change, and that domain-general capabilities have 
little influence over this change. Language seems chief to conceptual progression, yet the 
430 
current work cannot offer concrete thoughts about the exact mechanisms behind this 
process. Theories by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Tolmie (2012) suggest some possibilities 
about the role of language in explicating naïve ideas, which implies that initial fragments of 
knowledge may become more theory-like over time.  
 
This programme of work was also able to comment on the nature of children’s 
understanding about inheritance. Past research suggests children’s ideas about this concept 
are fairly sophisticated and coherent (Gelman, 2003; Springer, 1999; Keil, 1994) but by 
developing a new methodology to assess children’s understanding, the opposite was found; 
inheritance is the weakest area of understanding in comparison to other biological 
constructs. The development of a more robust methodology allowed for systematic 
assessment of all sub-concepts within inheritance, and indeed other biological areas, 
resulting in more thorough study.  
 
At the end of Chapter 5, three potential routes of conceptual progression were 
hypothesised: that knowledge is theoretical and inheritance concepts would develop first, 
that knowledge is context-specific and ideas might be somewhat isolated to begin with, but 
eventually start to inform each other, and finally that knowledge is piecemeal, with children 
piecing together information in appropriate contexts.  After obtaining results, it would seem 
as though the second hypothesis seems most likely to be the case. Children’s ideas appear 
to be perceptual in nature and an experiential route of progression occurs whereby 
biodiversity concepts arise first, given children’s tendencies to detect regular patterns in the 
environment and categorise data, followed by ecology concepts as others (Hipkins et al., 
2008) have also suggested children have a good grasp of. This is then followed by 
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evolutionary ideas which, with the assistance of ecological concepts, feed into ideas about 
inheritance.  
 
A somewhat surprising insight to result from the current work is that general cognitive 
abilities have seemingly very little influence on conceptual change. This was unexpected 
given the influence and in some cases predictive nature they have on areas on literacy and 
numeracy (Gathercole et al., 2003; Cragg & Gilmore, 2014; Alloway et al., 2008) and in 
preschool science learning (Nayfield et al., 2013). It also highlights the need to examine the 
effect of domain-general abilities over a significant length of time, as well illustrating that 
science is ontologically very different to literacy and numeracy and as such, teaching 
techniques and interventions would be specific to either numeracy, literacy, or science.  
 
12.7. Conclusion 
 
Questions into what the content of children’s concepts is at different ages, how concepts 
develop with age, and how they are organised have puzzled curious minds for decades. 
Research aimed at understanding when children are able to learn to concepts, the 
mechanisms they employ to learn them, and how naïve concepts influence each other to 
develop into sophisticated ideas can ultimately inform teaching methods and curricula to 
enhance education as a practice.  
 
This thesis asked many of the same questions outlined above and sought to examine 
conceptual development of related biological concepts in order to establish a 
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developmental trajectory of change in primary-aged children. The results from the 
longitudinal study revealed children’s concepts are organised into related bundles, 
encouraging coordinated thought with increasing age.  
 
Children’s ideas about biological phenomena seem to be acquired from early experiences 
with the environment. This provides some evidence in support of other work suggesting 
that predispositions to perceptual data forms the basis of tacit knowledge (Strevens, 2000; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Tolmie, 2011; diSessa, 1993; Kallai & Reiner, 2010). Tacit pieces of 
knowledge become explicated by aid of biologically-specific language, possibly through a 
process of representational redescription, which allows one to organise and consequently 
coordinate these ideas in more theoretical ways. The evidence for this comes from the 
results in Chapter 10, which demonstrate that children’s understanding of previously 
acquired biological concepts significantly predicts their knowledge of related areas of 
biology.  
 
The apparent influence of related concepts in conceptual progression was one of the key 
findings obtained from this work and highlights the need to consider multiple and 
associated concepts when studying conceptual change of any kind. Although there is still a 
substantial distance to go in our investigation, this study has made the distance that much 
shorter.  
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APPENDICES 
 
A.1 – Examples of six contextual scenes used in Pilot Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1. Pond scene 
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Figure A.1. Lake Scene 
Figure A.2. Pond scene taken from Hipkins et al., 2008 
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Figure A.3. Field Scene. 
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Figure A.4. Park scene 
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Figure A.5. Rainforest scene 
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Figure A.6. Savannah scene 
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A.2 – Examples of children’s drawings from Pilot Study 1.  
 
 
 
Field context: focus is on 
drawing people 
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Savannah context: 
people were drawn 
alongside animals 
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Lake context:  
inaccurate animals 
included e.g. 
shark/crocodile.  
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Park context: heavily 
human-focused. 
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Lake context: very few 
animals
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A.3 - Letters & questionnaires sent home to parents  
 
Invitation to participate in research on primary school children’s learning in 
biology 
 
Dear parent/guardian, 
  
Your child is invited to participate in a doctoral research project aimed at improving Science 
education in primary schools. The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), a government funded organisation.  
 
The project will take a maximum of two hours, and simply involves giving children a number of 
literacy and numeracy based tasks and then an activity aimed at investigating children’s knowledge 
of various biological phenomena. The children will be informally interviewed about their 
understanding of certain aspects of biology during this activity (e.g. biodiversity, ecology), and 
these will be audio-recorded. Any data your child provides will remain strictly anonymous and 
confidential which means that if the study is published, there will be no way of identifying any data 
as that of your child’s. Please note that this study is not in any way an assessment of your child’s 
academic performance and so no information can be provided about this. This is a longitudinal 
study and your child will be re-invited to participate in autumn term 2014, unless you specify 
otherwise.  
 
Participation will be absolutely voluntary. If your child does not wish to answer questions or if they 
want to stop at any point, they are free to do so. If at any later point you wish your child’s data to 
be withdrawn from the research, please let me know. 
 
If you give permission for your child to participate in this longitudinal research, please complete 
the form below and return it to the school as soon as possible.  
 
For further information you are welcome to contact either the head teacher of your child’s school 
or myself at the Department for Psychology and Human Development, Institute of Education. 
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Yours sincerely, 
 
Zayba Ghazali    
(Doctoral researcher) 
 
Professor Andy Tolmie 
(Supervisor and Dean of the Doctoral School) 
 
Email: zghazali@ioe.ac.uk 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I ______________ (parent/guardian) give my full permission for 
_______________________________ (full name) class ___________, to participate in your 
research. 
 
Signed: __________________________ 
 
Thank you. 
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Below is a short questionnaire to give us a little more information about your child, and 
the activities your child undertakes at home. Any information you supply will remain 
strictly confidential and anonymous. If at any point you wish to withdraw your responses, 
please let me know. If you have any questions or require further information, please 
contact me via email at zghazali@ioe.ac.uk 
 
Thank you. 
Please tell us about your household 
 
1) How many adults are present in the home? _____ 
     
2) Please provide details of occupation and highest level of education of each adult in the 
home. 
 
Adult one: 
Relationship to the child  
Occupation  
Highest level of education  
Adult two: 
Relationship to the child  
Occupation  
Highest level of education  
Adult three: 
Relationship to the child  
Occupation  
Highest level of education  
Adult four: 
Relationship to the child  
Occupation  
Highest level of education  
 
470 
3) How many other children are present in the home? ____ 
Please provide details below 
 
Child one 
Relationship to the child  
Age  
Child two 
Relationship to the child  
Age  
Child three 
Relationship to the child  
Age  
Child four 
Relationship to the child  
Age  
Child five 
Relationship to the child  
Age  
Please tell us about your child 
 
4) Did your child attend pre-school?   Yes / No (delete as 
appropriate) 
 
If yes, please provide details by ticking the appropriate box below: 
 
Private nursery  
State run nursery  
Play group  
Day care  
Other (please specify)  
 
471 
5) Does your child receive free school meals? Yes / No (delete as 
appropriate)  
 
6) Is English your child’s first language?  Yes / No (delete as 
appropriate) 
 
If no, please specify your child’s first language: 
__________________________ 
 
7) What language is regularly spoken in your home? Please tick the appropriate 
box below: 
 
English  
Other (please specify)  
A mixture (please specify)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
472 
A.4 – Teacher Questionnaires  
Year you teach: ______ 
 
Dear teachers, 
Below is a short questionnaire about your experiences teaching science, and the recent 
changes in the primary science curriculum. All responses are completely anonymous and 
confidential. By completing and returning the questionnaire, you are consenting to 
participate in this research. Should you at any point wish to withdraw your responses or 
would like more information, please do not hesitate to contact me at: zghazali@ioe.ac.uk 
 
What is your highest level of qualification in 
Science and Mathematics? 
Science:______ 
Maths:_______ 
On average, approximately how many hours a week 
do you spend teaching science? 
_____hours per week 
On average, approximately how many hours a week 
do you spend teaching biology in particular? 
_____hours per week 
 
 Very 
Frequently 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
In general, how often do you try to 
introduce novel scientific vocabulary 
when relevant to the lesson? 
     
On average, how often do you 
incorporate scientific vocabulary when 
teaching science in general? 
     
In general, how often do children 
experience “working scientifically” in 
science lessons? 
     
In general, how often do children 
experience “working scientifically” 
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during biology lessons specifically? 
By the end of the school year, approximately what percentage of time teaching 
science will you have spent during this school year on each of the following 
content areas? (The total should add to 100%) 
Biology (e.g. structure/function; life processes, 
reproduction/heredity, natural selection; ecosystems, human 
health) 
 
% 
Chemistry (e.g. classification, composition and properties of 
matter; chemical change) 
 
 
% 
Physics (e.g. physical states/ changes in matter; energy; light; 
sound; electricity and magnetism; forces and motion) 
 
% 
Other, please specify % 
 
How often do you incorporate ICT/video materials in science class to do the following: 
 Very 
Frequently 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
Drill and practice      
Demonstrate scientific principles      
Play science learning games      
Do laboratory simulations      
Take a test or quiz      
In general what methods do you employ when teaching scientific topics and how often do 
you use these techniques? 
 
Have children observe natural 
phenomena and describe/record 
information about what they see 
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Let children watch you 
demonstrate an 
experiment/investigation 
     
Have children design or plan 
experiments or investigations 
     
Have children conduct 
experiments or investigations 
     
Work together in small groups (of 
mixed ability) on experiments or 
investigations to come up with a 
joint solution to a problem 
     
Work together in small groups 
(based on ability) on experiments 
or investigations to come up with 
a joint solution to a problem 
     
Read their textbooks or other 
resource material 
     
Have students memorise facts and 
principles 
     
Have children give explanations 
about something they are 
studying 
     
Relate what they are learning in 
science to their daily lives 
     
 
How often do you do each of the following activities during a science lesson? 
 Very 
Frequently 
Frequently Occasionally Rarel
y 
Never 
Conduct pre-assessment to determine 
what students already know 
     
475 
Present new topics to a the class 
lecture-style 
     
Explicitly state learning goals      
Give different work to the students that 
have difficulties learning and/or to 
those who can advance faster 
     
At the beginning of the lesson, present 
a short summary of the previous lesson 
     
Work with individual students      
Get students to hold a debate and 
argue for a particular point of view 
which may not be their own 
     
Assess learning by holding a test or quiz      
Review students’ homework with the 
students 
     
 
How would you rate the impact of any training/CPD in science education that you 
have received in each of the following areas? 
 Not Confirmed what I Caused me to change my 
In the past three years, have you participated in professional development in any of the 
following? 
 Yes No 
Science content   
Science pedagogy and instruction   
Science curriculum   
Integrating ICT into science   
Improving students’ critical thinking or 
inquiry skills 
  
Science assessment   
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applicable was already doing teaching practices 
Deepening my own science content and 
knowledge 
   
Understanding student thinking in science    
Learning how to use 
enquiry/investigation-orientated teaching 
strategies 
   
Learning how to use technology in science 
instruction 
   
Learning how to assess student learning in 
science 
   
Learning how to teach science in a class 
that includes students with special needs 
   
 
How well qualified do you feel to teach each of the following subjects at the Key Stage you 
teach, whether or not they are currently included in your curriculum?  
 Very well 
qualified 
Adequately 
qualified 
Not as well qualified, and 
would like more training 
Biology    
Chemistry    
Physics    
Mathematics    
Literacy/reading    
Social sciences    
Have you noticed any significant differences in the new science curriculum that have 
caused you to alter/modify your past teaching methods? Please describe. 
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In general how easy have you found introducing scientific topics from the new 
curriculum into the classroom? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, do you have any other comments regarding the changes in the science 
curriculum, your experiences, or observations of children’s consequent learning in the 
classroom? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire and for all your patience and generosity 
throughout the testing period. If you would like to find out more about the project and the 
findings published from the longitudinal study, please email me at: zghazali@ioe.ac.uk 
 
Zayba Ghazali  
(doctoral researcher) 
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A.5 – Qualitative analysis of the teacher data 
 
As discussed at the end of Chapter 7, the return rate of completed teacher questionnaires 
was very low, with only 13 out of 65 questionnaires having been returned, a response rate 
of only 20% (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 7). Aside from the Reception year group where no 
teachers returned the questionnaire, at least one questionnaire was returned for each 
academic year group across the three schools. For these reasons, data were explored 
qualitatively and interpreted with caution. The data was also considered by year group and 
not by school because of the poor sample size.  
 
1 Qualifications 
 
There were a total of three questionnaires returned from Year 1 teachers. Of these the 
highest level of qualification for science was at A-Level, whereas for maths, one teacher was 
qualified up to degree level. One questionnaire was returned from a Year 2 teacher, who 
was qualified to GCSE level for both maths and science, as were all three Year 3 teachers. 
Year 4, Year 5, and Year 6 both had at least one teacher qualified at A-Level for either maths 
or science. Generally however, it appears as though GCSE level seems to be the highest level 
of qualification across the majority of primary school teachers in this sample.  
 
2 Teaching hours  
 
Nearly all teachers reported spending approximately 1-2 hours teaching science per week. 
For biology in particular, 30 minutes to 1 hour per week of teaching time was spent, 
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although many teachers reported this was topic dependent. Generally all teachers 
considered there to be equal teaching time for biology, chemistry, and physics topics 
(approximately 33.3%), however some teachers (particularly those in Years 2 and 5) 
considered a larger proportion of teaching time to be placed on biology topics specifically, 
approximately 50-70% of science teaching. This may be as a result of specific topics that are 
introduced in those particular year groups that might require extra attention.  
 
3 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and science 
 
In the questionnaires, teachers were asked how often they employed the use of ICT in their 
science lessons. They were asked to report the frequency of techniques including: drill and 
practice, virtual demonstrations, science games, laboratory simulations, and tests/quizzes. 
The majority of teachers across all years appeared to report similarly with regards to their 
ICT use in science lessons. For drill and practice, very few teachers reported using this 
technique. By far the majority of teachers seemed to use ICT for providing virtual 
demonstrations and allowing children to play science related games. ICT was rarely used for 
laboratory simulations or testing across all year groups.  
 
4 Teaching strategies 
 
Reporting on the teaching strategies used in science lessons was the main focus of the 
questionnaire. Teachers were asked to rate how frequently they used certain strategies or 
techniques. These will be explored separately for each technique.  
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Introduce relevant novel scientific vocabulary:  
All teachers across all year groups reported introducing new and relevant scientific 
vocabulary in lessons very frequently or frequently. The same was also true in biology 
lessons in particular. This may be a consequence of some of the curricular changes 
introduced in 2014 that emphasise the use of vocabulary and scientific terms.  
 
How often children experience working scientifically: 
In terms of how often children experienced working scientifically, the majority of teachers 
consistently reported frequently or occasionally. With regards to working scientifically in 
biology lessons, most teachers reported this was occasionally, with teachers in Year 4 and 
Year 6 reporting this was rare. 
 
How often children observe natural phenomena & record it: 
Reporting on use of this teaching strategy was slightly more variable with responses ranging 
from very frequently to occasionally both within and across year groups. However, it seems 
as though generally this is a technique most teachers employ.  
 
How often children watch the teacher demonstrate an experiment: 
Again, responses to this technique ranged from frequently to rare. Only the Year 2 teacher 
reported using this strategy rarely and as this was the only Year 2 teacher who responded to 
the questionnaire, it cannot be said for certain that this is typical of all teachers in Year 2. 
The majority of other teachers from all year groups seems to demonstrate experiments or 
investigations frequently and occasionally suggesting this is a popular technique.  
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How often children conduct experiments: 
Similarly to watching teachers demonstrate experiments, the responses for how often 
children participated in experimental investigation themselves was variable from very 
frequently to rare. There was only one teacher in Year 1 who reported this as a rare 
practice, whilst the other Year 1 teachers reported occasional use. It might be that Year 1 
children are younger and so cannot conduct many experimental investigations safely or 
indeed appropriately. The frequency for use of this technique seemed to increase with the 
increasing age of the child, with teachers in Year 6 reporting very frequent use.  
 
How often children work in mixed ability or ability groups on experiments to come up with a 
joint solution: 
The responses for how often teachers made children work in either mixed ability groups or 
ability groups appeared to be the same, hence the results are collapsed under one heading. 
Generally this seemed to be a popular strategy with teachers across all years reporting very 
frequently to occasionally. There were slightly more occasionally responses for splitting 
children into ability groups than mixed ability groups suggesting teachers preferred mixed 
ability groupings.  
 
How often children read textbooks/resources and memorise facts/principles: 
The use of textbooks or other resource material was reported as occasionally to never 
across all year groups. It may be that individual learning from resource material is typical of 
children in secondary school, rather than in primary school where it seems as though 
teachers actively guide the learning of children, at least within science lessons. Likewise, 
482 
teachers reported making children memorise facts and principles very occasionally to never 
perhaps for the same reasons.  
 
How often children give explanations about something they are studying: 
Getting children to provide explanations about something they are studying seemed to be a 
teaching strategy that was popular among the sample, with teachers reporting use as very 
frequently to occasionally across all year groups. It may that this is a tool used by teachers 
as a form of assessment, hence its frequent use. 
 
How often children relate what they are learning in science to their everyday lives: 
Relating science to children’s everyday lives seemed to be less of a focus among teachers 
with only three from the whole sample reporting this as frequently. One teacher in Year 1 
reported this as rare, whilst the majority reported occasionally. It may be that in many cases 
it is fairly obvious to children how certain things they learn relate to their everyday lives and 
so teachers may place less of a focus on this aspect.  
 
How often topics are presented lecture-style: 
Presenting new topics lecture style was not a popular teaching technique among the sample 
with the majority of reponses being rare to never, with very few teachers responding 
occasionally. It may be that this technique is not very effective with younger children who 
may require more stimulation and various modes of delivery in order to learn and remain 
attentive.  
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Learning goals are explicitly stated & a brief summary of the lesson before is provided: 
Explicitly stating learning goals is something teachers across year groups seemed to do very 
often with all responses ranging from very frequently to occasionally. Indeed this is 
something that is recommended in the National Curriculum (NC; 2014) as good practice in 
order to make children aware of what they about to be/being taught. Likewise, providing a 
brief summary of the material taught in the previous lesson was popular with teachers’ 
responses being either very frequently or frequently. Again, the NC (2014) considers this 
good practice, which would explain its popularity.  
 
How often different work is given to students with learning difficulties/children who advance 
faster: 
Providing different work to children with learning difficulties or extra work to children who 
advance faster is also something teachers do very frequently or frequently in this sample. It 
may be that this is something that is required in order to make sure children are able to 
work and learn effectively within a classroom environment.  
 
Work individually with students: 
Working individually with teachers was also something that teachers did very frequently to 
occasionally across all year groups. It is likely that this is a way of assessing children and 
being able to target those who are in need of more help.  
 
Get children to hold debates and argue a viewpoint that might not be their own: 
Responses to using this technique varied from very frequently to never. There seemed to be 
group differences with regards to this technique in that teachers of Year 1 and Year 2 
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reported very little to no use, whereas teachers from Year 3 and above reported frequent 
use. It may be that younger children are not able to articulate themselves well enough at 
this stage to debate, particularly one that is not their own. With increasing age, however, 
teachers recognise this as a beneficial technique.  
 
Assess learning by holding a quiz: 
Assessing learning through quizzes was reported as less frequent with responses ranging 
from occasionally to never. Teachers in Year 1 and Year 2 generally reported never using this 
strategy at all, where as those is Years 3 and above reported rare to occasional use. It could 
be that in the lower year groups children are not well managed in test conditions, or may 
not have sufficient knowledge to adequately test. With the older children this is still not a 
popular strategy, however, and it could be that teachers do not wish to cause unnecessary 
distress.  
 
Review homework with the student: 
Teachers responses for this were variable because children in the lower years often did not 
receive any homework, hence responses ranged from occasionally to never. It could be that 
teachers often do not have the time to sit with children individually and go through 
homework as a general teaching strategy and instead conduct informal assessments using 
other methods such as working individually with students and providing different work to 
those who had difficulties or advanced faster.  
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5 Professional training in science education 
 
Nearly all teachers had undergone some professional training in science education 
specifically, apart from one teacher in Year 4 who had not yet received any. The areas which 
teachers had professional training seemed to vary both across and within year groups.  This 
could reflect the topics in which the teachers felt they lacked knowledge and therefore 
sought training. The areas of training included: science content, pedagogy and instruction, 
science curriculum, integrating ICT into science lessons, improving children’s critical thinking 
or inquiry skills, and science assessment. Although the aspects of professional training 
varied across teachers, nearly all teachers felt that training helped them to change their 
teaching practices for the better. Only few of the teachers felt that the training confirmed 
what they were already doing and this was only for some, not all areas, they received 
training in.  
 
6 Teacher comments about the changes in the curriculum 
 
Of the thirteen teachers that returned their questionnaires, only five provided any comment 
about their views on the curricular changes regarding primary science. These were two 
teachers from Year 4, two from Year 5, and one from Year 1.  
 
The Year 1 teacher felt that the new curriculum seemed more prescriptive and somewhat 
restrictive in nature, especially in terms of the new vocabulary to be taught. This teacher 
also felt that for Year 1 in particular, all new topics were easy to introduce mainly because 
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the science coordinator at the school had provided abundant resources in preparation for 
the new changes.  
 
The year 4 teachers noted that the changes allowed more group work and pupil exploration, 
which they felt was a benefit. They also noted a focus on inquiry skills and critical thinking, 
yet with regards to how easy introducing new topics were, one teacher felt they lacked 
resources at times.  
 
In contrast, the Year 6 teachers felt that the new curriculum lacked objectives, was more 
knowledge based, and therefore limited the opportunity for children to access science 
inquiry skills. They note however, that the school in general promotes this as a focus and 
have provided training to aid teachers in this endeavour. One teacher went on to write, “the 
new science curriculum has low expectations of primary school children...[there needs to be] 
more chance for experimentation/working scientifically.”  
 
In sum it appears though teachers are generally of mixed opinion about the new changes. 
This, again, may be due to the year-specific topics that teachers have had to introduce, and 
to some extent, the support, training, and resources they have received from their school. 
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A.6 - Results from Time 1 regression models with new parent composite variable (10.6.1.1) 
 
Table A.1. Hierarchical regression model for biodiversity at Time 1 with new parent composite variable 
Biodiversity Time 1    
Model 1: AdjR2=0.542 (p<0.001)  
  Beta sig 
   Age 
0.715 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.049 0.518 
No. of younger children 0.078 0.286 
English native  -0.168 0.030 
Parent edu/occ -0.012 0.875 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.717 (p<0.001)   
 
   Age  
0.446 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.018 0.759 
No. of younger children 0.036 0.539 
English native  -0.041 0.521 
Parent edu/occ -0.050 0.402 
Ecology 0.421 <0.001 
Inheritance -0.058 0.453 
Evolution 0.180 0.069 
 
Table A.2. Hierarchical regression model for ecology at Time 1 with new parent composite variable 
Ecology at Time 1    
Model 1: AdjR2=0.244 (p<0.001)  
  Beta sig 
Age 
0.454 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.065 0.501 
No. of younger children 0.062 0.508 
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English native  -0.206 0.038 
Parent edu/occ 0.06 0.539 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.651 (p<0.001)   
 
Age 
-0.216 0.028 
No. of adults 0.048 0.470 
No. of younger children -0.024 0.715 
English native  0.017 0.807 
Parent edu/occ 0.010 0.885 
Biodiversity 0.518 <0.001 
Inheritance 0.295 <0.001 
Evolution 0.319 0.003 
 
Table A.3. Hierarchical regression model for inheritance at Time 1 with new parent composite variable 
Inheritance at Time 1   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.200 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
   Age 
0.407 <0.001 
No. of adults -0.033 0.739 
No. of younger children 0.042 0.667 
English native  -0.163 0.108 
Parent edu/occ 0.081 0.416 
   
Model 2: AdjR2 = 0.396 (p<0.001)   
 
   Age 
0.178 0.175 
No. of adults -0.061 0.481 
No. of younger children 0.004 0.965 
English native  -0.037 0.691 
Parent edu/occ 0.034 0.698 
Biodiversity -0.123 0.453 
489 
Ecology 0.51 <0.001 
Evolution 0.151 0.298 
 
Table A.4. Hierarchical regression model for evolution at Time 1 with new parent composite variable 
Evolution Time 1   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.464 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
   Age 
0.565 <0.001 
No. of adults 0.006 0.942 
No. of younger children 0.104 0.192 
English native  -0.276 0.001 
Parent edu/occ 0.101 0.219 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.626 (p<0.001)   
 
   Age 
0.219 0.028 
No. of adults -0.023 0.727 
No. of younger children 0.062 0.341 
English native  -0.156 0.027 
Parent edu/occ 0.077 0.254 
Biodiversity 0.226 0.069 
Ecology 0.326 0.003 
Inheritance 0.089 0.298 
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A.7 - Results from Time 2 regression models with new parent composite variable (10.6.1.2) 
 
Table A.5. Hierarchical regression model for biodiversity at Time 2 with new parent composite variable 
Biodiversity Time 1    
Model 1: AdjR2=0.577 (p<0.001)  
  Beta sig 
   Age 
0.649 <0.001 
No. of adults -0.130 0.081 
No. of children 0.008 0.911 
English native -0.186 0.017 
Parent edu/occ 0.149 0.048 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.780 (p<0.001)   
 
   Age  0.194 
0.012 
No. of adults -0.170 0.002 
No. of younger children 0.082 0.138 
English native  -0.037 0.522 
Parent edu/occ 0.076 0.182 
Ecology 0.388 <0.001 
Inheritance 0.021 0.776 
Evolution 0.317 0.001 
 
Table A.6. Hierarchical regression model for ecology at Time 2 with new parent composite variable 
Ecology at Time 1    
Model 1: AdjR2=0.508 (p<0.001)  
  Beta sig 
Age 0.663 
<0.001 
No. of adults 0.041 0.610 
No. of younger children -0.111 0.163 
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English native  -0.188 0.024 
Parent edu/occ 0.120 0.138 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.713 (p<0.001)   
 
Age 0.201 
0.024 
No. of adults 0.084 0.196 
No. of younger children -0.103 0.099 
English native  -0.045 0.498 
Parent edu/occ 0.042 0.525 
Biodiversity 0.505 <0.001 
Inheritance -0.060 0.470 
Evolution 0.266 0.017 
 
Table A.7. Hierarchical regression model for inheritance at Time 3 with new parent composite variable 
Inheritance at Time 1   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.301 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
   Age 0.411 
<0.001 
No. of adults -0.027 0.776 
No. of younger children -0.176 0.065 
English native  -0.173 0.081 
Parent edu/occ 0.247 0.011 
   
Model 2: AdjR2 = 0.441 (ps <0.001)   
 
   Age 0.126 
0.314 
No. of adults -0.058 0.527 
No. of younger children -0.143 0.101 
English native  -0.061 0.510 
Parent edu/occ 0.216 0.016 
Biodiversity 0.052 0.776 
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Ecology -0.117 0.470 
Evolution 0.548 <0.001 
 
Table A.8. Hierarchical regression model for evolution at Time 2 with new parent composite variable 
Evolution Time 1   
Model 1: AdjR2=0.409 (p<0.001)   
  Beta sig 
   Age 0.598 
<0.001 
No. of adults 0.077 0.379 
No. of younger children -0.084 0.333 
English native  -0.227 0.014 
Parent edu/occ 0.067 0.445 
   
Model 2: AdjR2=0.701 (p<0.001)   
 
   Age 0.015 
0.871 
No. of adults 0.129 0.049 
No. of younger children -0.005 0.935 
English native  -0.044 0.515 
Parent edu/occ -0.102 0.123 
Biodiversity 0.43 0.001 
Ecology 0.277 0.017 
Inheritance 0.293 <0.001 
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A.8 – Elements graphs 
Biodiversity pond context 
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Biodiversity savannah context 
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Ecology pond context: 
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Ecology savannah context: 
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Inheritance pond context: 
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Inheritance savannah context: 
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Evolution pond context: 
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Evolution savannah context: 
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